OPINION

By the Court, THOMPSON, C.J.:

This appeal is from an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction incident to an action for declaratory relief. The appeal is permissible. Vegas Franchises, Ltd. v. Culinary Workers, 83 Nev. 236, 427 P.2d 959 (1967).

John and Dorotha Ames, resident taxpayers, sought a judgment invalidating Ordinance No. 322 of the City of North Las Vegas. That ordinance creates a special assessment district for street, sidewalk, and storm sewer projects within the city and will be financed by the sale and issuance of public improvement bonds. Their claim for declaratory relief rests upon the premise that Ordinance No. 322 was invalidly enacted as an emergency measure, since the preamble of that ordinance does not adequately express the reasons for the emergency, and an emergency in fact did not exist. The same contention was presented to the district court when Ames sought a preliminary injunction to halt construction which was under way. The district court apparently thought that the ordinance was validly enacted as an emergency measure and denied the application for a preliminary injunction. Although we do not share this view, we are forced to sustain the validity of the ordinance by reason of subsequent validating legislation [Public Securities Validation Act — 67 Stats. Nev. ch. 27, p. 56] which corrected defects existing in the enactment of Ordinance 322. For this reason we affirm.

1. The Charter of the City of North Las Vegas provides that "No ordinance shall be passed as an emergency measure unless reasons for passing it as such are expressed in its preamble." The preamble to Ordinance 322, in pertinent part reads: "* * * said Council desires now to authorize such improvements and work by this emergency measure, the reasons for passage as an emergency measure being the necessity for immediately undertaking such improvements." That statement is nothing more than a mere declaration that an emergency exists. Cf. Joplin v. Ten Brook, 263 P. 893, 895 (Ore. 1928). The reasons therefor are not expressed. The taxpayers of the city were not advised why emergency action was needed.

Three Nevada cases bear on the issue — Penrose v. Whitacre, 61 Nev. 440, 132 P.2d 609 (1942); Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 P. 802 (1922); Chartz v. Carson City, 39 Nev. 285, 156 P. 925 (1916). Penrose suggests that if the condition sought to be corrected had existed for years and was not sudden or unexpected, it is not an emergency. Id. at 457. Chartz characterizes an emergency as something "greatly out of the ordinary; something which could not be adequately met by the usual machinery of government." Id. at 294. Indeed, Chartz stands for the proposition that a street improvement program is a "matter more of comfort and convenience than of immediate, indispensable emergency." Id. at 296. And Carville indicates that it may be permissible for a court to go behind the council's declaration of emergency (whether faulty or otherwise) and ascertain if an emergency in fact existed when the ordinance was passed. One must note, however, that Carville did not resolve this question since it was not an issue on appeal.

Assuming, without deciding, that it may sometimes be permissible for a court to go behind the legislative declaration of emergency and examine the facts, the testimony received by the court below in this case does not show a condition of emergency within the standards established by Penrose and Chartz. The City Manager testified that the improvement project was undertaken to correct flood and traffic problems. There was nothing presented to suggest to the trial court that those problems suddenly developed, were unexpected, or greatly out of the ordinary. To the contrary, the problems had existed for years. We conclude that Ordinance No. 322 was not validly enacted as an emergency measure since the preamble of that ordinance does not adequately express the reasons for the emergency as required by charter, nor did an emergency in fact exist.

2. In 1967 the legislature enacted the Public Securities Validating Act to cure defects existing in the enactment of laws providing for financing public improvements through the issuance and sale of public securities. Subject to constitutional limitations, such curative statute validates the acts and proceedings of municipal corporations. The subsequent legislative sanction is the equivalent of original authority. Harris v. City of Reno, 81 Nev. 256, 401 P.2d 678 (1965). We find no constitutional barrier in this case. Ordinance 322 was passed on August 29, 1966. A public hearing on the proposed special assessment district preceded enactment by more than a month. John and Dorotha Ames were notified of that public hearing by registered mail. They objected orally and in writing to the creation of such district. The city council was aware of their disapproval and heard their protests. The ordinance was not secretly enacted. Due process was accorded the protestants.

The special assessment district bonds have not yet been sold. The curative statute effectively covers this situation. City of Venice v. Lawrence, 141 P. 406, 408 (Cal.App. 1914). We must, therefore, rule that the 1967 Public Securities Validating Act cured the defective enactment of Ordinance No. 322 as an emergency measure.

Affirmed.

COLLINS, J., ZENOFF, J., BATJER, J., and MOWBRAY, J., concur.