Wyman Gordon Pennsylvania, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 2019

368 N.L.R.B. 150 (N.L.R.B. 2019)

368 NLRB No.150
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Wyman Gordon Pennsylvania, LLC and United Steel,
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers
International Union, AFL–CIO–CLC. Cases
04–CA–182126, 04–CA–186281, 04–CA–188990
December 16, 2019
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND EMANUEL
On July 13, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. Wyman Gordon
Pennsylvania, LLC (the Respondent) filed exceptions
and a brief in support, the General Counsel and United
Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Ener-
gy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers Union, AFL–
CIO–CLC (the Union) each filed answering briefs, and
the Respondent filed a reply brief. Additionally, the
General Counsel filed exceptions and a brief in support,
the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the General
Counsel filed a reply brief. Finally, the Union filed
cross-exceptions and a brief in support, the Respondent
filed an answering brief, and the Union filed a reply
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
No party has excepted to the judge’s findings that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining the confidentiality statement in its
employee handbook and violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to grant
union employees an annually recurring wage increase in August 2016
(the annual August wage increase) and by discontinuing its practice of
providing light-duty work to employees on workers’ compensation
without giving the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain. Addi-
tionally, no party has excepted to the judge’s dismissal of the allega-
tions that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by arriving late
to scheduled bargaining sessions and by failing to provide in a timely
manner the information requested by the Union in paragraph 2 of its
August 12, 2016 information request.
The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s finding that it violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to provide the Union with
relevant information requested in paragraphs 3 and 8 of the Union’s
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.2
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the
judge’s findings that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by insisting on resolving noneconomic
subjects of bargaining before discussing economic sub-
jects and by failing to comprehensively respond to the
Union’s September 17, 2015 complete contract proposal.
We affirm the judge’s findings that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to
provide the Union with relevant information requested in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Union’s August 12, 2016 in-
formation request and in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the
Union’s September 6, 2016 information request; we re-
verse, however, the judge’s finding that the Respondent
unlawfully failed to provide the Union with the infor-
mation requested in paragraph 5 of the Union’s Septem-
ber 6, 2016 information request. Finally, we affirm the
judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from the Un-
ion because the Respondent failed to establish that the
Union had, in fact, lost majority support at the time that
it withdrew recognition.3
I. INSISTENCE ON BARGAINING NONECONOMIC SUBJECTS
BEFORE ECONOMIC SUBJECTS
A. Relevant Facts
On April 14, 2015, the Board certified the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of
production and maintenance employees at the Respond-
ent’s facility in Plains, Pennsylvania, where it manufac-
tures components for aircraft engines. On May 1, 2015,
the Union wrote to the Respondent requesting infor-
mation to prepare for bargaining. On June 26, 2015, the
Respondent provided the requested information and
listed a number of dates in August and early September

August 31, 2016 information request. However, the Respondent does
not state in either its exceptions or brief in support any grounds on
which the judge’s purportedly erroneous finding should be reversed.
Therefore, we shall disregard this bare, unsupported exception pursuant
to Sec. 102.46(a)(1)(ii) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations (formerly
Sec. 102.46(b)(2)). See New Concept Solutions, LLC, 349 NLRB 1136,
1136 fn. 2 (2007) (citing Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc., 344 NLRB 694,
694 fn. 1 (2005), enfd. 456 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2006)).
2 We shall amend the judge’s remedy and modify the judge’s rec-
ommended Order to conform to our findings herein and the Board’s
standard remedial language. We shall also substitute a new notice to
conform to the Order as modified.
3 Because we find that the Respondent failed to establish that the
Union had lost majority support at the time that it withdrew recogni-
tion, we find it unnecessary to pass on whether the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices tainted any loss of majority support. For that reason, we
also find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel’s and the Un-
ion’s motions to strike portions of the Respondent’s answering briefs
that address the taint issue.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
2015 on which it was available for the parties’ first bar-
gaining session. Because Joseph Pozza, the Union’s
Sub-District Director and lead negotiator, was not avail-
able on any of those dates, the parties scheduled their
first bargaining session for September 17, 2015.
At the first bargaining session, the Union presented the
Respondent with a complete contract proposal. The pro-
posal combined elements of a collective-bargaining
agreement between the Union and the Respondent at the
Respondent’s Mountain Top, Pennsylvania facility and
the Respondent’s employee handbook at its Plains facili-
ty. While the parties did not discuss the Union’s pro-
posal in great detail during the first bargaining session,
the Respondent clearly communicated in subsequent bar-
gaining sessions that it did not want to simply duplicate
the Mountain Top contract as it had proven to be difficult
to administer because of its vague and imprecise lan-
guage. The parties primarily discussed ground rules dur-
ing the first session. In ground rule 5, they agreed that
“[l]anguage [(i.e., noneconomic)] proposals will be dis-
cussed prior to the discussion of economic proposals.”
Thus, when the Respondent reviewed the Union’s initial
proposal during the second bargaining session, it said
that it would table all economic provisions.
From September 17, 2015, to August 12, 2016, the
parties held 14 bargaining sessions. During that period,
they reached tentative agreements on non-discrimination,
purpose and intent, bereavement leave, and jury duty.
Additionally, the parties discussed and exchanged pro-
posals on dues checkoff, union security, no strike/no
lockout, management rights, plant regulations, and ab-
senteeism and tardiness.4 However, they were unable to
reach tentative agreements on those provisions; in fact,
during the August 12, 2016 bargaining session, they
agreed that they were at impasse on dues checkoff, union
security, no strike/no lockout, and absenteeism and tardi-
ness. The parties also began to bargain over the annual
August wage increase during the August 12 session.5
At the parties’ next bargaining session, on August 26,
2016, Nathan Kilbert, the Union’s attorney, was present

4 The Respondent also made a counterproposal on shoe allowance,
but the Union requested to table that provision until the parties dis-
cussed economic subjects.
5 In May 2016, the parties bargained over the annual health insur-
ance renewal scheduled for June 1, 2016—more specifically, they
bargained over what percentages of premiums unit employees would
pay for the health insurance plans offered by the Respondent—but they
did not bargain over the health insurance benefits that would be part of
the collective-bargaining agreement. Because the parties did not reach
an agreement before June 1, the Respondent simply maintained the
same percentages of premiums that unit employees had been paying for
each plan. The Respondent offered to continue to bargain over the
annual health insurance renewal, but the Union repeatedly stated that it
had accepted what the Respondent had implemented.
for the first time. Kilbert pointed out that the Respond-
ent had not responded to many of the provisions in the
Union’s initial proposal and asked the Respondent to
respond to all outstanding provisions. Kilbert specifical-
ly inquired whether the Respondent would provide eco-
nomic proposals, but the Respondent, citing ground rule
5, replied that the parties had agreed to resolve all none-
conomic subjects before discussing economics. The Un-
ion followed up with a letter dated August 31, 2016,
which stated:
The Union wishes to reiterate its statement at the table
last Friday that we wish to know the Company’s posi-
tions on all issues contained in our September 2015
proposal to which the Company has not yet provided a
response. These issues include Grievances, Arbitra-
tion, Seniority, Job Posting, Federal & State Laws,
New Classifications/Rates, Rights and Assigns, Termi-
nation, Payday, Timekeeping, Safety and Health, and
the non-economic components of Vacation and Holi-
days. In particular, we would like to prioritize discus-
sions of Seniority and Job Postings. You have had our
proposals for nearly a year, so it is not too much to ask
for you to provide a response on all such open items.6
From August 26 to October 12, 2016, the parties held
six bargaining sessions, and the Respondent made initial
counterproposals regarding recognition, grievance proce-
dure, arbitration, Federal and State laws, job posting and
bids, and seniority. The parties reached tentative agree-
ments on grievance procedure and Federal and State
laws. They discussed and exchanged proposals regard-
ing recognition, arbitration, job posting and bids, and
seniority, but they did not reach tentative agreements on
those subjects during this period. The parties also con-
tinued to bargain over the annual August wage increase.
On October 17, 2016, Pozza sent a letter to the Re-
spondent, which stated:
I write also to request that the Company come to our
sessions on October 26 and 27 prepared to discuss the
Union’s economic proposals. As I wrote to you on
August 12, I believe that the Company has withdrawn
from our ground rules agreement regarding discussion
of economics.[7] In any event, this agreement has out-

6 Kilbert testified that the Union emphasized outstanding noneco-
nomic provisions because the Respondent had indicated at the August
26 bargaining session that it would not respond to economic provisions.
He also testified that he requested responses to all outstanding provi-
sions in the Union’s initial proposal at every subsequent bargaining
session that he attended.
7 Pozza’s August 12 letter consisted primarily of an information re-
quest. However, in that letter, Pozza also claimed, somewhat puzzling-
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 3
lived its usefulness. I entered into the agreement with
the belief that the non-economics could be resolved rel-
atively quickly in view of the successful model we
have in the Mountain[ T]op CBA. The Company has
had other ideas and has dragged out the process for
over a year. We would therefore like to discuss our
economic proposals and to hear your proposals. Fur-
ther, we demand that the Company provide responses
to all of those other items in our September 2015 pro-
posal to which it has not provided responses to date.
In a reply letter dated October 26, 2016, Rick Grimaldi, the
Respondent’s attorney and lead negotiator, wrote:
[I]t is somewhat surprising that now, after almost a year
of bargaining, the Union decides it does not like the
ground rules that it negotiated and voluntarily, without
coercion, agreed to implement. The Company has not
withdrawn from the ground rules. The Company con-
tinues to bargain over the language of the contract as
was agreed upon. The Parties have exchanged many
proposals. If the Union is unhappy with the proposals
that the Company has provided, it may counter. The
Company believes that in a first contract, the language
must be resolved adequately as both parties must live
with and abide by that language going forward. The
light duty issue, that you raised, is yet another example
of why it is so important. The Company has come to
the table at every session armed with proposals and
counter proposals—ready to bargain. Can the Union
say the same?
At the October 26, 2016 bargaining session, the Re-
spondent requested that the Union send a list of the pro-
visions in Union’s initial proposal to which it had not yet
responded. That same day, Kilbert emailed the requested
list to the Respondent and stated that it included econom-
ic provisions “because the Union wishes to understand
the Employer’s vision for a completed contract and to
discuss all issues that are outstanding.” In an email sent
later that day, Grimaldi replied, “I believe some of these,
at least as they relate to language, should be easy agree-
ments. We will start putting together proposals. Many
of them are, of course, tied to overall economics.” Dur-
ing an October 27, 2016 bargaining session, the Re-
spondent reiterated that it did not want to repudiate
ground rule 5.
From October 26 to November 17, 2016, the parties
held five more bargaining sessions. While the Respond-
ent did not discuss or make any counterproposals regard-
ing the outstanding economic provisions in the Union’s
initial proposal, it did make proposals regarding military

ly, that the Respondent’s failure to grant an annual August wage in-
crease represented a “repudiation” of ground rule 5.
leave, employee assistance program, pay day, and flu
shots, and the parties reached tentative agreements for
those provisions. The Respondent also made proposals
on a new lead position and layoffs, and the parties dis-
cussed and exchanged proposals regarding those provi-
sions. Further, the parties continued to discuss and ex-
change proposals regarding arbitration, job posting and
bids, seniority, plant regulations, and the annual August
wage increase. However, the parties did not reach any
other tentative agreements before the Respondent with-
drew recognition on November 29, 2016.
B. Analysis
Citing John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 279 NLRB
1034 (1986), Detroit Newspapers, 326 NLRB 700, 704
& fn. 11 (1998), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Detroit
Typographical Union No. 18 v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 109
(D.C. Cir. 2000), and Adrian Daily Telegram, 214 NLRB
1103, 1110–1112 (1974), the judge found that the “Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in refusing in-
definitely to bargain about economic matters until all
non-economic matters were resolved.” Initially, we
acknowledge that in the above-cited decisions, the Board
found that employers violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
by insisting indefinitely on the resolution of all noneco-
nomic issues before negotiating economic issues. See,
e.g., Detroit Newspapers, supra at 704 (citing cases).
However, the present case is factually distinguishable,
and we find, in the circumstances here, that the Respond-
ent did not violate the Act by insisting indefinitely, after
August 26, 2016, on continuing to negotiate noneconom-
ic subjects before discussing economic subjects.8
In John Wanamaker, supra, the employer refused for
more than 6 months to discuss economic matters unless
the union agreed to no-strike and binding arbitration pro-
visions. Id. at 1035. The Board found that the employ-
er’s refusal to discuss economic subjects violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) because it “unreasonably fragmented the
negotiations and drastically reduced the parties’ bargain-
ing flexibility.” Ibid. In Adrian Daily Telegram, supra,
for at least four months following requests by the union
and a Federal mediator that the employer make a full
economic counterproposal, the employer refused to make
such a counterproposal, or to even discuss economics,
until the parties resolved all noneconomic subjects. Id. at
1111–1112. Additionally, the union dropped “broad
hints” at the bargaining table that it was flexible on every
issue, including a particularly contentious issue regarding

8 Because they find this case distinguishable from John Wanamaker
and the other cases on which the judge relied, Chairman Ring and
Member Emanuel find it unnecessary to consider here whether those
cases were correctly decided, but they would be willing to do so in a
future appropriate case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
a guild shop clause, and that economic proposals from
the employer could help to eliminate some of the issues
preventing the parties from reaching agreement. Ibid.
The Board found that in those circumstances, the em-
ployer “was not dealing with the [u]nion ‘in a serious
attempt to resolve [their] differences and reach a com-
mon ground,’” and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1). Id. at 1112 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents’
International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960)).9
Here, the Union did not take issue with the Respond-
ent’s failure to respond to certain provisions in its Sep-
tember 17, 2015 initial contract proposal until almost a
year later, at the August 26, 2016 bargaining session.
Prior to that session, the parties primarily focused on
noneconomic subjects of bargaining, consistent with
ground rule 5. In fact, when the Respondent made a
counterproposal regarding shoe allowance, the Union
asked that the parties table that provision until they dis-
cussed economic subjects. While we acknowledge that
the parties did not make considerable progress in bar-
gaining prior to August 26, 2016, the General Counsel
does not allege that this lack of progress was a result of
unlawful conduct by the Respondent.10
Although the Union requested, during the August 26,
2016 bargaining session, that the Respondent address the
issues in its initial proposal to which it had not yet re-
sponded, the Union followed up on August 31, 2016,

9 Detroit Newspapers, supra, also cited by the judge, did not involve
an allegation that the employer unlawfully insisted indefinitely on the
resolution of all noneconomic issues before negotiating economic is-
sues. Instead, it involved an allegation that the employer unlawfully
repudiated the parties’ agreement to a two-stage bargaining procedure,
under which the employer would initially bargain individually with six
unions that represented six separate units but would save certain eco-
nomic issues for a second stage of joint bargaining with all six unions.
See id. at 701. Because the parties struggled to make progress during
the first stage of bargaining, the Board found that the employer’s repu-
diation of the two-stage bargaining agreement did not violate the Act,
as it “represented a good-faith attempt to accelerate, not delay, the
bargaining process and to achieve, not frustrate, the completion of
collective-bargaining agreements.” Id. at 704.
10 While the parties reached tentative agreements on a few provi-
sions, they seem to have been hung up on dues checkoff, union securi-
ty, no strike/no lockout, and absenteeism and tardiness. The parties
exchanged numerous proposals concerning those noneconomic subjects
over the course of many months but were unable to reach agreement on
any of them. The parties also devoted several bargaining sessions to
negotiating over the annual health insurance renewal.
Grimaldi, the Respondent’s attorney, believed that Pozza, the Un-
ion’s lead negotiator, was to blame for the lack of progress prior to
August 26, 2016. Grimaldi described Pozza as “disorganized,” “unfo-
cused,” and “unresponsive to questions,” and he testified, consistent
with the Respondent’s bargaining notes, that Pozza abruptly ended
bargaining sessions even when the Respondent offered to continue to
bargain. Pozza did not testify at the hearing. In any case, it is not
necessary to determine which party, if any, was to blame for the lack of
progress before August 26, 2016.
with a letter that listed a number of noneconomic sub-
jects on which it desired proposals from the Respondent.
Over the next few bargaining sessions, the Respondent
provided counterproposals regarding grievance proce-
dure, arbitration, Federal and State laws, job posting and
bids, and seniority, which were all specifically listed in
the Union’s August 31 letter. The parties discussed and
exchanged proposals regarding those issues, and they
quickly reached tentative agreements on grievance pro-
cedure and Federal and State laws. Thus, the Respond-
ent engaged with the Union on issues raised in the Au-
gust 31 letter, and its responsiveness allowed the parties
to make progress toward reaching agreement on noneco-
nomic subjects of bargaining.
The Union first emphasized that it wanted to discuss
economic subjects in its letter dated October 17, 2016.
The Respondent continued to insist that the parties focus
on resolving noneconomic subjects before discussing
economic subjects and made proposals regarding other
outstanding noneconomic issues. The parties reached
tentative agreements on military leave, employee assis-
tance program, pay day, and flu shots. Further, they dis-
cussed and exchanged proposals regarding arbitration,
job posting and bids, seniority, a new lead position,
layoffs, and plant regulations—which they had not dis-
cussed since early 2016—and neither party claimed that
bargaining had reached impasse on any of those subjects.
Thus, the parties continued to make progress on noneco-
nomic subjects and had additional room to move on
those subjects until the Respondent withdrew recognition
on November 29, 2016.
In sum, unlike in John Wanamaker and Adrian Daily
Telegram, the Respondent’s insistence on resolving non-
economic subjects of bargaining before discussing eco-
nomic subjects did not unreasonably fragment bargaining
or frustrate the parties’ ability to reach agreement.11 For
one thing, the Respondent continued to insist on resolv-
ing noneconomic subjects in the face of the Union’s re-
quests to discuss economic subjects for a considerably
shorter period of time than the employers in John
Wanamaker and Adrian Daily Telegram. Further, the
Respondent did not demand that the Union agree to any
of its specific proposals for noneconomic subjects before
it would proceed to discuss economic subjects, nor did
the Respondent refuse to discuss economic subjects in
circumstances where the parties’ negotiations over none-

11 We disagree with the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent was
not privileged to “demand adherence to the ground rules after almost a
year of bargaining.” The Board’s inquiry turns, not on how long the
parties had been negotiating under the ground rules, but on whether
insisting on adhering to the ground rules has unreasonably fragmented
or frustrated bargaining.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 5
conomic subjects had reached a stalemate. Instead, fol-
lowing the August 26 bargaining session, the Respondent
made a number of initial counterproposals regarding out-
standing noneconomic issues specifically listed in the
Union’s August 31 letter, and the parties discussed and
exchanged proposals regarding those issues. At the time
the Union specified that it desired to discuss economic
subjects, the parties had not yet exhausted their prospects
for reaching agreement on the outstanding noneconomic
issues, as evidenced by their continued discussion and
exchange of proposals regarding those subjects after the
Union sent its October 17 letter. Thus, at the time bar-
gaining ceased, the Respondent had not fragmented bar-
gaining or frustrated the parties’ ability to reach agree-
ment by continuing to insist on resolving noneconomic
subjects before discussing economic subjects because the
parties were still making progress toward agreement on
noneconomic subjects of bargaining.
Under these circumstances, and in light of the parties’
explicit agreement in ground rule 5 to discuss noneco-
nomic proposals before economic proposals, we do not
believe that it is the Board’s place to pass judgment on
what subjects the parties should have prioritized during
bargaining.12 Therefore, we reverse the judge’s decision

12 Our dissenting colleague is correct that ground rule 5 did not priv-
ilege the Respondent to insist on resolving all noneconomic subjects
before discussing economics “to the point of frustrating the possibility
of reaching agreement.” However, we disagree with her, for the rea-
sons discussed above, that the Respondent persistently insisted on
resolving noneconomic subjects to the point of frustrating the possibil-
ity of the parties reaching agreement here.
Additionally, we recognize that the Board has found that bad faith
on the part of an employer is not a prerequisite to finding that the em-
ployer unlawfully insisted on resolving noneconomic subjects before
discussing economic subjects. See, e.g., Nansemond Convalescent
Center, Inc., 255 NLRB 563, 567 & fn. 16 (1981); Pillowtex Corp., 241
NLRB 40, 46–47 (1979), enfd. mem. 615 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1980);
Cal-Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co., 228 NLRB 1337, 1341–1342 (1977),
enf. denied on other grounds sub nom. NLRB v. Yama Woodcraft, Inc.,
580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978). However, those cases are distinguishable
from the present case. In Nansemond, supra, the employer attempted to
use its position on wages to force the union to comply with its proce-
dural wishes and continued to insist on resolving all noneconomic
subjects before discussing economic subjects to the point that the par-
ties broke off negotiations. See id. at 565–567. In Pillowtex, supra, the
employer insisted that the union cease demanding a dues-checkoff
provision and agree to its noneconomic proposals before it would dis-
cuss economics. See id. at 46–47 (“[I]f one of the parties insists that
noneconomic issues be completely resolved on terms favorable to it
before it will discuss economic issues, impasse is virtually guaranteed.
Such a ‘procedural strai[t]jacket’ is uncompatible [sic] with the statuto-
ry duty to negotiate in a manner which facilitates agreement” (internal
footnote omitted).). In Cal-Pacific Furniture, supra, the employer
refused to bargain over noneconomics unless the union accepted its
economic proposal. See id. at 1340–1342 (“If in these circumstances
the union, as it did here, asks the employer to turn to noneconomic
issues, but the employer, as it did here, refuses to talk about them until
all of the economic issues have been settled on terms favorable to the
in relevant part and dismiss the allegation that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by insisting on
resolving noneconomic subjects of bargaining before
discussing economic subjects.13
II. AUGUST 12, 2016 INFORMATION REQUEST
A. Relevant Facts
On August 12, 2016, the Union requested that the Re-
spondent provide the following information:
2) For each employee working in the bargaining unit at
the time, please provide the date and amount of any
bonuses, monetary awards, lump sums, or other pay-
ments that are not made every payroll period between
January 1, 2013, and present.
. . .
4) Describe the mechanisms by which the payments in
(2) were calculated and a description of the information
relied upon in determining their amount.
5) Provide any written descriptions of the Company’s
practices with respect to pay rate increases, bonuses,
monetary awards, or other payments.
Quarterly cash bonuses (QCBs), which the Respondent pays
to unit employees pursuant to its Quarterly Bonus Program,
are “bonuses . . . or other payments that are not made every
payroll period.” The Respondent uses a formula to calculate

employer, impasse is virtually guaranteed.”). Here, the Respondent
never insisted that the Union accept its noneconomic proposals before it
would discuss economics, and the parties were making progress toward
agreement on noneconomic subjects throughout the entire period that
the Respondent continued to adhere to ground rule 5. Thus, the Re-
spondent did not create a “procedural straitjacket” that frustrated the
possibility of the parties reaching agreement. We acknowledge, as
demonstrated by the cases discussed above and the additional cases
cited in the dissent, that an employer’s insistence on resolving noneco-
nomic subjects before negotiating economic subjects may violate the
Act (or support a finding of overall bad faith) in certain circumstances.
However, our dissenting colleague, the judge, and the parties have not
cited—and we have not found—any case in which the Board has found
a violation when the employer’s insistence did not fragment or frustrate
bargaining. We simply do not agree with our dissenting colleague that
an employer’s insistence on resolving noneconomic subjects before
negotiating economics “inherently fragments the bargaining process
and limits the possibility of reaching agreement” where, as here, the
record evidence does not support such a conclusion, but instead shows
that the parties were making progress toward an agreement by bargain-
ing over, and reaching tentative agreements on, noneconomic subjects.
13 We also dismiss the related allegation that the Respondent violat-
ed Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to comprehensively respond to the
Union’s initial proposal. The Respondent’s failure to respond to certain
provisions in that proposal was part and parcel of its lawful adherence
to the ground rules for bargaining upon which the parties had agreed.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
the QCBs, but in general they are based on plant operating
profits.
In regard to the QCBs, the Respondent provided the
Union with information responsive to paragraph 2 of the
August 12 information request and a description of its
Quarterly Bonus Program found in its employee hand-
book. When, during the October 27, 2016 bargaining
session, the Union began asking questions about how the
QCBs are calculated, the Respondent’s bargaining team
admitted that they did not understand how the QCBs are
calculated but stated that they would either provide a
more detailed description of how the QCB formula
works or have someone who is more knowledgeable ex-
plain it to the Union. At that same bargaining session,
the Union specified that it was also requesting the actual
information that the Respondent has used to calculate
QCBs in the past. The Respondent refused to provide
that information.14 In an October 27, 2016 email, the
Union reiterated its request for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the QCB formula and the calculation information.
The Respondent’s attorney Grimaldi responded that he
would forward “a more accurate description” of the QCB
formula when he received it, but he did not comment on
the calculation information. The Respondent has not
provided the Union with either a more detailed descrip-
tion of how the QCB formula works or the calculation
information (collectively, the QCB information).
B. Analysis
An employer, as part of its duty to bargain, must pro-
vide requested information to a union if that information
is relevant to the union’s duties as the employees’ collec-
tive-bargaining representative, including information
relevant to contract negotiations. See generally NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–154 (1956). Infor-
mation that relates to unit employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment is presumptively relevant. See Cen-
tura Health St. Mary-Corwin Medical Center, 360
NLRB 689, 689 (2014). An employer must provide a
union with requested presumptively relevant information
unless it rebuts the presumption of relevance or estab-
lishes an affirmative defense. Ibid. “The Board uses a
broad, discovery-type standard in determining relevance
in information requests, . . . and potential or probable
relevance is sufficient to give rise to an employer's obli-
gation to provide information.” Shoppers Food Ware-
house, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994). Thus, to rebut the
presumption of relevance, an employer must show that
the requested information is “irrelevant to any legitimate

14 During that bargaining session, the Respondent claimed that the
information used to calculate the QCBs is confidential. However, the
Respondent has not raised a confidentiality defense on exceptions.
union collective-bargaining need.” Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 311 NLRB 424, 425 (1993).
Because the QCB information relates to the unit em-
ployees’ compensation, it is presumptively relevant. The
Respondent attempts to rebut that presumption by argu-
ing that the QCB information is no longer relevant be-
cause the Regional Director dismissed the Union’s
charge alleging that the Respondent violated the Act by
paying QCBs to unit employees without giving the Un-
ion notice and an opportunity to bargain. However, the
Union did not request the QCB information in connec-
tion with that charge15 or to bargain in the interim over
the amounts of the QCBs. Instead, the Union requested
the QCB information to assist it in bargaining for an ini-
tial collective-bargaining agreement, and the QCB in-
formation was clearly relevant to that purpose. First, the
Union needed the QCB information to understand the
unit employees’ current overall compensation and to
effectively bargain over, and draft proposals concerning,
wages and other forms of compensation. Second, to spe-
cifically bargain over the QCBs and perhaps propose a
new formula, the Union needed the QCB information to
understand how the QCB formula works, to verify that
the Respondent has actually applied it, and to gauge how
changes to the formula would affect the dollar amounts
of the QCBs.16 Therefore, we agree with the judge that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by fail-
ing to provide the Union with relevant information re-
quested in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Union’s August 12,
2016 information request—more specifically, a descrip-
tion of how the QCB formula works and the underlying
information that the Respondent has used to calculate the
QCBs.
III. SEPTEMBER 6, 2016 INFORMATION REQUEST
A. Relevant Facts
In its September 6, 2016 information request, the Un-
ion stated:

15 The Board will not require an employer to provide information to
a union when “the union's information request ‘was akin to a discovery
device pertinent to its pursuit of the unfair labor practice charge rather
than to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.’” Fremont
Medical Center, 357 NLRB 1899, 1906 (2011) (quoting WXON-TV,
289 NLRB 615, 617–618 (1988), enfd. mem. per curiam 876 F.2d 105
(6th Cir. 1989)). But that was not what happened here.
16 The Respondent claims that the Union can only bargain over
whether the unit employees will continue to receive QCBs. To the
contrary, bonuses are a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the Re-
spondent cannot dictate the scope of the Union’s proposals concerning
a mandatory subject. The Union is therefore free to propose adjust-
ments to the QCB formula or a completely new formula, although the
Respondent is not required to agree to any such changes. See generally
Sec. 8(d) of the Act.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 7
You referred to the Company’s need to be competitive
on price at the negotiating table on August 26 in justi-
fying the Company’s position on wage increases. You
specifically referenced customers’ lack of understand-
ing of price increases as a reason for the Company’s
position with respect to wages. In order to better un-
derstand the Company’s positions on compensation
and the relationship between employee compensation,
competitiveness, prices, and customer sensitivity to
price increases, the Union wishes to request the follow-
ing information:
1) The current prices for the five items produced by the
facility that realize the greatest revenue;
2) All changes to the prices of the items listed in (1) be-
tween January 1, 2014, and the present;
. . .
4) The labor cost at the facility as a percentage of the
price of each of the items listed in (1) as of the current
date and as of January 1 of 2016, 2015, and 2014[;]
5) The identities of the Company’s primary competi-
tors for each of the items listed in (1) and the current
prices of their most equivalent products.
Union attorney Kilbert testified that the September 6 infor-
mation request was in response to Grimaldi’s statements at
the August 26, 2016 bargaining session during a discussion
of the Union’s proposals for the annual August wage in-
crease. Specifically, Kilbert testified that Grimaldi said that
the Respondent’s “customers would not understand a 15
percent price increase” and that the Respondent “had to
remain competitive.”
By letter dated September 12, 2016, Grimaldi wrote:
I would like to respond to the newest requests in your
September 6, letter. As an initial matter, you mischar-
acterized the statements made at the bargaining table.
Specifically, the Company never said anything about
“the need to be competitive on price” as a justification
for the Company’s position on wages [sic] increases.
The Company did make a generic reference to custom-
ers not wanting to absorb a business’s cost increases.
The reference was to American business in general and
certainly there was no specific reference to the Compa-
ny’s customers.
At the hearing, Grimaldi admitted stating during the August
26 bargaining session that the Respondent did not want to
pass along increases to customers but denied stating that the
Respondent needed to remain competitive.
In a September 21, 2016 follow-up letter to the Un-
ion’s September 6 information request, Pozza, the Un-
ion’s lead negotiator, wrote to the Respondent:
I further wish to state unequivocally that the account of
the facts in your September 12 letter is incorrect. In
justifying the Company’s economic proposal on Au-
gust 26, you specifically stated that “customers would
not understand a 15 percent price increase.” You did
not state this in reference to American business in gen-
eral but as a reason for the Company’s proposal. Short-
ly after, when Mr. Kilbert summarized the Company’s
position as being opposed to a large wage increase be-
cause the Company was seeing a large increase in
health insurance costs and the Company does not want
to pass along the increase in costs to its customers, you
indicated that this was correct and that the Company
needs to “remain competitive.” The information re-
quested, which is calculated to permit the Union to un-
derstand the Company’s competitive position and the
impact of labor costs on its competitiveness, is relevant.
The Company’s refusal to provide it is therefore unlaw-
ful.
In a September 30, 2016 reply letter, the Respondent admit-
ted that it “stated at the table that no customer would under-
stand a 15% price increase,” but continued to refuse to pro-
vide the requested information. Thus, the Respondent has
not provided the Union with the information requested in
paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the Union’s September 6 infor-
mation request.17
B. Analysis
The Respondent correctly points out that it did not
claim an inability to pay the amounts that the Union pro-
posed for the annual August wage increase. Indeed, the
General Counsel does not allege, and the judge did not
find, that it did so. However, “[a]lthough an employer
need not ‘open its books’ to a union in the absence of a
claimed inability to pay, a union may still seek specific
financial data, and the employer must provide such in-
formation upon a showing of relevancy.” Management
& Training Corp., 366 NLRB No. 134, slip op. at 2
(2018). To comply with its duty to provide requested
information that is relevant to, and necessary for, a un-
ion’s performance of its representational duties, an em-
ployer must provide information needed by the union “to
assess claims made by the employer relevant to contract
negotiations.” Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159,
1159 (2006); see also Audio Visual Services Group, Inc.
d/b/a PSAV Presentation Services, 367 NLRB No. 103,
slip op. at 5 (2019); National Extrusion & Mfg. Co., 357
NLRB 127, 128–129 (2011), enfd. sub nom. KLB Indus-
tries, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “In-

17 The Respondent claimed during bargaining that this information
is confidential, but it has not raised a confidentiality defense on excep-
tions.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
formation is relevant under Caldwell only if the union is
seeking ‘specific information to evaluate the accuracy of
the Respondent’s specific claims and to respond appro-
priately with counterproposals.’” Arlington Metals
Corp., 368 NLRB No. 74, slip op. at 3 (2019) (quoting
Caldwell, supra at 1160).
The judge correctly found that the information re-
quested in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the Union’s Septem-
ber 6 information request is relevant because the Union
needs this information to verify the Respondent’s
claim—implicit in its statement that “it did not want its
customers to be faced with a 15% increase in its pric-
es”18—that agreeing to the Union’s wage proposal would
compel the Respondent to raise its prices 15 percent.
That information will allow the Union to determine
whether its proposals would actually result in a 15-
percent increase in the Respondent’s prices, whether
such an increase would be significantly higher than pre-
vious price increases, and what effect labor costs have on
the prices the Respondent charges. However, we reverse
the judge’s finding that the Union is entitled to the in-
formation requested in paragraph 5 of its September 6
information request. Information concerning the Re-
spondent’s competitors’ prices is not relevant to the Un-
ion’s ability to determine if its annual August wage in-
crease proposals would lead to a 15-percent increase in
the Respondent’s prices.19 Therefore, we affirm the
judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to provide the in-
formation requested by the Union in paragraphs 1, 2, and
4 of its September 6, 2016 information request, but we
reverse the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawful-
ly failed to provide the information requested in para-
graph 5.

18 Contrary to the Respondent’s contention in its brief in support of
exceptions, the record is not “utterly devoid of Respondent making any
such statement at any time.” As discussed above, Kilbert testified,
consistent with the Union’s September 21 letter, that during the August
26 bargaining session, the Respondent stated that its “customers would
not understand a 15 percent price increase,” and the Respondent con-
firmed in its September 30 letter that it “stated at the table that no cus-
tomer would understand a 15% price increase.”
19 Although Kilbert testified that the Respondent stated in bargain-
ing that it “had to remain competitive,” the Respondent denied making
any such statement. The judge did not make a credibility resolution as
to this conflicting testimony. Therefore, even assuming that such a
statement, if made, would give rise to a duty to furnish information
under the rule of Caldwell—an issue we do not decide—we find the
record insufficient to support a finding that the information requested in
paragraph 5 is relevant.
IV. WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION
A. Relevant Facts
The Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union
on November 29, 2016, at which time the bargaining unit
consisted of 43 employees. The judge found that in
withdrawing recognition, the Respondent relied solely on
a petition that it received from the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation on behalf of employee
William Berlew.20 The petition consists of five unnum-
bered pages that were scanned into a single electronic
document. The first and last pages of the petition contain
signature lines, a statement that the “undersigned em-
ployees of [the Respondent] do not want to be represent-
ed by [the Union],” and a request that the Respondent
withdraw recognition from the Union immediately if “the
undersigned employees make up 50% or more of the
bargaining unit.” The middle three pages of the petition
contain signature lines but no statement of the petition’s
purpose or request that the Respondent take any action
based on the petition. Nine employees signed the first
and the last pages of the petition, while 14 employees
signed the middle three pages.
B. Analysis
“A union usually is entitled to a conclusive presump-
tion of majority status for one year following Board cer-
tification.” Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S.
781, 786 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). If the par-
ties fail to agree to a collective-bargaining agreement
during the certification year, the union’s presumption of
majority support becomes rebuttable at the end of the
certification year. See ibid. The Board has held that “an
employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition from an
incumbent union only where the union has actually lost
the support of the majority of the bargaining unit em-
ployees.” Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB
717, 717 (2001). Thus, if the union contests an employ-
er’s withdrawal of recognition, the employer has the bur-
den of proving that the union had, in fact, lost majority
support at the time that it withdrew recognition. Id. at
725. If an employer withdraws recognition based on a
petition, the language of the petition need not be, as the
judge suggests, unambiguous, but the more reasonable

20 The judge’s finding is supported by the Respondent’s November
29, 2016 letter to the Union, which stated that its withdrawal of recog-
nition was based on a petition signed by a majority of unit employees,
and the testimony of Timothy Brink, the Respondent’s Area Manager.
The judge discredited the testimony of the Respondent’s attorney Gri-
maldi that the Respondent relied on other factors in addition to the
petition to support its withdrawal of recognition because his testimony
was inconsistent with the evidence described above and the Respond-
ent’s answer to the complaint. As previously stated, we find no basis
for reversing the judge’s credibility resolutions.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 9
interpretation of the language must be that the signatory
employees desired to remove the union as their repre-
sentative. See Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation Cen-
ter, 351 NLRB 817, 818 (2007).
Here, the Respondent failed to establish through the
petition that the Union had lost the support of the majori-
ty of the unit employees at the time that it withdrew
recognition. The first and last pages of the petition clear-
ly indicate that the employees whose signatures appear
on those pages no longer wanted the Union to represent
them; however, only nine employees signed those pages,
which is well short of 50 percent of the 43-employee
bargaining unit. The middle three pages of the petition,
which 14 employees signed, lack any statement of the
signatory employees’ intent in signing the petition, let
alone their desires concerning union representation. The
Board recently found that an employer failed to establish
that a union had lost majority support where “the docu-
ment the [employer] relied on in withdrawing recogni-
tion contained no statement of the employees' desires
concerning union representation.” Liberty Bakery Kitch-
en, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 19, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2018); see
also Anderson Lumber Co., 360 NLRB 538, 538 fn. 1
(2014) (finding that the employer failed to establish that
a union had lost majority support where the statements
submitted by a determinative number of employees “did
not show that they no longer wanted the [u]nion to repre-
sent them for the purposes of collective bargaining”),
enfd. sub nom. Pacific Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB, 801
F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Because the middle three
pages of the petition do not state the petition’s purpose or
request that the Respondent take any action based on the
petition—or state anything at all, for that matter—the
Respondent could not properly rely on the 14 signatures
on those pages to support its withdrawal of recognition.
Thus, the Respondent failed to establish that the Union
had lost majority support at the time that it withdrew
recognition. We therefore affirm the judge’s finding that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by with-
drawing recognition from the Union.21

21 We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s analysis of whether
the Respondent established that the Union had lost majority support at
the time that it withdrew recognition based on evidence adduced at the
hearing, of which the Respondent was not aware at the time that it
withdrew recognition. See Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347
NLRB 1404, 1407 fn. 17 (2006), enfd. sub nom. Highlands Hospital
Corp. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Additionally, because
the petition does not represent objective evidence that the Union had
lost majority support at the time that the Respondent withdrew recogni-
tion, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s analysis of whether
the Respondent properly authenticated a sufficient number of signatures
on the petition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Wyman Gordon Pennsylvania,
LLC, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rub-
ber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied-Industrial and Ser-
vice Workers Union, AFL–CIO–CLC, is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act that
serves as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the following appropriate unit of employees with-
in the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees employed by the Employer at
its 1141 Highway 315, Plains, PA facility, excluding all
other employees, office clerical employees, audit in-
spectors, guards, and supervisors (including group
leaders) as defined in the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining the confidentiality statement in its em-
ployee handbook.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by engaging in the following conduct:
(a) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with rel-
evant information requested in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
Union’s August 12, 2016 information request.
(b) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with rel-
evant information requested in paragraphs 3 and 8 of the
Union’s August 31, 2016 information request.
(c) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with rel-
evant information requested in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of
the Union’s September 6, 2016 information request.
(d) Unilaterally changing its status quo past practice
of increasing unit employees’ wages in August of each
year by failing to grant unit employees a wage increase
in August 2016 without giving the Union notice and an
opportunity to bargain.
(e) Discontinuing its practice of providing light-duty
work to employees on workers’ compensation without
giving the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
(f) Withdrawing recognition from the Union and sub-
sequently failing and refusing to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the unit employees.
5. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
Specifically, having found that the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining the confidentiality
statement in its employee handbook, we shall order the
Respondent to rescind or revise that unlawful provision
and advise its employees in writing that it has done so in
accordance with Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812
& fn. 8 (2005), enfd. in relevant part 475 F.3d 369 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to provide the Un-
ion with the information requested in paragraphs 4 and 5
of its August 12, 2016 information request, in paragraphs
3 and 8 of its August 31, 2016 information request, and
in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of its September 6, 2016 infor-
mation request, we shall order the Respondent to provide
that information to the Union.
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to grant unit employees an an-
nually recurring wage increase in August 2016 and dis-
continuing its practice of providing light-duty work to
employees on workers’ compensation without giving the
Union notice and an opportunity to bargain, we shall
order the Respondent to rescind those unlawful unilateral
changes and to make affected unit employees whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits attributable to its
unlawful conduct. Backpay shall be computed in ac-
cordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). The Re-
spondent shall be required to compensate the affected
unit employees for the adverse tax consequences, if any,
of receiving lump-sum backpay awards, and to file with
the Regional Director for Region 15, within 21 days of
the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by agree-
ment or Board order, a report allocating the backpay
awards to the appropriate calendar years for each em-
ployee. AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No.
143 (2016).
Finally, having found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from
the Union, we agree with the judge that an affirmative
bargaining order is warranted on the facts of this case.
The Board has previously held that an affirmative bar-
gaining order is “the traditional, appropriate remedy for
an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-
bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of em-
ployees.” Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64, 68
(1996). In several cases, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
required that the Board justify, on the facts of each case,
the imposition of such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Indus-
trial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 738–739
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber & Building Material
Corp., 117 F.3d 1454, 1461–1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Exxel/Atmos, Inc., 28 F.3d 1243, 1248–1249 (D.C. Cir.
1994). In Vincent, supra, the court summarized its re-
quirement that an affirmative bargaining order “must be
justified by a reasoned analysis that includes an explicit
balancing of three considerations: (1) the employees'
[Section] 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act
override the rights of employees to choose their bargain-
ing representatives; and (3) whether alternative remedies
are adequate to remedy the violations of the Act.” Id. at
738. Although we adhere to Caterair, supra, we have
examined the particular facts of this case as the court
requires and find that a balancing of the three factors
warrants an affirmative bargaining order.22
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining through their
designated representative by the Respondent’s withdraw-
al of recognition and resultant refusal to bargain with the
Union for an initial collective-bargaining agreement. At
all relevant times, the Union was actively representing
the unit employees and was bargaining for an initial col-
lective-bargaining agreement to advance the employees’
interests with respect to their employment terms. After
the end of the certification year, the Respondent with-
drew recognition without showing that the Union had
actually lost majority support. Although the Union’s
presumption of majority status was rebuttable following
the end of the certification year, the Respondent was still
obligated to recognize and bargain with its employees’
chosen representative absent objective evidence that the
Union had lost majority support. The Respondent’s un-
lawful conduct demonstrated disregard for the employ-
ees’ Section 7 right to choose union representation and
tended to undermine unit employees’ continuing support
for the Union.
At the same time, an affirmative bargaining order, with
its attendant bar to raising a question concerning the Un-
ion’s continuing majority status for a reasonable period
of time, will not unduly prejudice the Section 7 rights of
employees who may oppose continued union representa-

22 Chairman Ring and Member Emanuel would adopt the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s view that the Board should determine, on the facts of each case,
whether an affirmative bargaining order with its attendant decertifica-
tion bar is appropriate by balancing the three considerations set forth in
Vincent, supra. They agree that the conditional three-factor analysis set
forth here in affirming the need for an affirmative bargaining order is
consistent with extant precedent, but in light of adverse judicial rulings
they believe that this precedent warrants full Board review in a future
case.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 11
tion. The bar does not continue indefinitely, but rather
only for a reasonable period of time to allow the good-
faith bargaining that the Respondent’s unlawful with-
drawal of recognition cut short. Since the Union was
unfairly deprived of an opportunity to reach an initial
collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent, it
is only by restoring the status quo ante and requiring the
Respondent to bargain with the Union for a reasonable
period of time that the employees’ Section 7 right to rep-
resentation will be vindicated and that the employees will
be able to fairly assess the Union’s effectiveness as a
bargaining representative in an atmosphere free of the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct. The employees can
then determine whether continued representation by the
Union is in their best interest.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order serves the purpos-
es and policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collec-
tive bargaining and industrial peace, and by removing the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope
of discouraging support for the Union. Such an order
also ensures that the Union will not be pressured by the
possibility of a decertification petition or by the prospect
of an imminent withdrawal of recognition to achieve
immediate results at the bargaining table following the
Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and
the issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order alone would be inade-
quate to remedy the Respondent’s withdrawal of recogni-
tion because such an order would not provide the Union
with a reasonable period of time to bargain and would
allow another challenge to the Union’s majority status
before the taint of the Respondent’s unlawful conduct
has dissipated and before the unit employees have had a
reasonable time to regroup and bargain through their
chosen representative in an effort to reach an initial col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Such a result would be
particularly unjust here because litigation of the Union’s
charges has taken 3 years, and, as a result, the Union
needs to reestablish its representative status with the unit
employees. Further, the Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition would likely have a continuing effect, there-
by tainting any employee disaffection from the Union
arising during that period or immediately thereafter. In
these circumstances, permitting a decertification petition
to be filed immediately might very well allow the Re-
spondent to profit from its own unlawful conduct. We
find that these circumstances outweigh the temporary
impact that the affirmative bargaining order will have on
the rights of employees who oppose continued union
representation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that an af-
firmative bargaining order with its temporary decertifica-
tion bar is necessary to fully remedy the Respondent’s
unfair labor practices in this case.23
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Wyman Gordon Pennsylvania, LLC, Plains,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unlawfully withdrawing recognition from United
Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Ener-
gy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers Union, AFL–
CIO–CLC (the Union) and failing and refusing to bar-
gain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
failing and refusing to furnish it with requested infor-
mation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees.

23 In arguing that an affirmative bargaining order is not justified, the
Respondent relies on Scomas of Sausalito, LLC v. NLRB, 849 F.3d
1147 (D.C. Cir. 2017), where the D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board’s affirmative bargaining order. Scomas, however, is easily
distinguishable from the present case. In Scomas, the employer re-
ceived a petition signed by a majority of the unit employees, which
requested that the employer withdraw recognition from the union. See
id. at 1152. At the time that the employer received the petition, the
union had failed to request bargaining for a successor collective-
bargaining agreement for more than a year following the expiration of
the previous agreement and had not even communicated with unit
employees for years. See ibid. Prior to the employer withdrawing
recognition based on the petition, the union convinced six unit employ-
ees to sign forms revoking their signatures from the petition—reducing
the number of valid signatures on the petition to less than 50 percent of
the unit—but it did not inform the employer. See id. at 1153. The
court concluded that an affirmative bargaining order was not justified
where the employer “acted in good faith on a facially valid decertifica-
tion petition,” the employees’ disaffection did not result from the em-
ployer’s actions but instead resulted from the union’s neglect, and 42
percent of the unit employees still supported an election even after the
revocations. See id. at 1157–1158. Here, the Respondent did not rely
on a facially valid decertification petition, as the petition established
that only 9 of the 43 employees in the unit (21 percent) no longer de-
sired to be represented by the Union. Indeed, the petition did not even
establish that 30 percent of the unit employees supported a decertifica-
tion election, which is the showing of interest required for such an
election. See NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part Two) Representation
Sec. 11023.1. Finally, at all material times, the Union was actively
representing the unit employees, as it frequently communicated with
them and bargained on their behalf with the Respondent for an initial
collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, Scomas does not dissuade us
from finding that an affirmative bargaining order is justified on the
particular facts of this case.
The General Counsel and the Union additionally request both a no-
tice-reading remedy and a bargaining-schedule remedy. Because we
find that the remedies discussed above, including an affirmative bar-
gaining order, are sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act, we
deny their requests.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
(c) Changing the terms and conditions of employment
of its unit employees without first notifying the Union
and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
(d) Maintaining the confidentiality statement in its
employee handbook.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the following appropriate unit concern-
ing terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees employed by the Employer at
its 1141 Highway 315, Plains, PA facility, excluding all
other employees, office clerical employees, audit in-
spectors, guards, and supervisors (including group
leaders) as defined in the Act.
(b) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the in-
formation requested by the Union in paragraphs 4 and 5
of its August 12, 2016 information request, in paragraphs
3 and 8 of its August 31, 2016 information request, and
in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of its September 6, 2016 infor-
mation request.
(c) On request by the Union, rescind any changes in
its unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment
that were unilaterally implemented since June 1, 2016.
(d) Make unit employees whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits suffered as a result of the failure
to grant them an annually recurring wage increase in
August 2016 and the discontinuance of its practice of
providing light-duty work to employees on workers’
compensation in the manner set forth in the amended
remedy section of this decision.
(e) Compensate affected employees for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay
awards, and file with the Regional Director for Region 4,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar
years for each employee.
(f) Rescind the confidentiality statement in its em-
ployee handbook.
(g) Furnish employees with an insert for the current
employee handbook that (1) advises that the unlawful
provision has been rescinded, or (2) provides a lawfully
worded provision on adhesive backing that will cover the
unlawful provision; or publish and distribute to employ-
ees revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain
the unlawful provision, or (2) provide a lawfully worded
provision.
(h) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Plains, Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”24 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since June 1, 2016.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman

24 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 13
________________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MCFERRAN, dissenting in part.
As the Board and courts have long recognized, good-
faith collective bargaining requires parties to discuss all
mandatory subjects, so that they can engage in the give-
and-take that is needed to reach a collective-bargaining
agreement.1 Here, the Respondent persistently refused to
discuss economic subjects until all noneconomic subjects
were resolved, and failed and refused to comprehensively
respond to the Union’s initial contract proposal and re-
quests to bargain. The judge was right that this conduct
disrupted the collective bargaining process, frustrated the
possibility of reaching agreement, and thus (under well-
established precedent) violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. The majority now excus-
es the Respondent’s conduct based on a rationale that has
no solid foundation in applicable precedent or in the pro-
bargaining policies of the Act.2
I.
After the Union’s certification, the parties began bar-
gaining. At the first bargaining session in September
2015, the Union presented a complete contract proposal.
The parties also agreed on ground rules, including a pro-
vision stating in relevant part that “[l]anguage proposals
[(i.e. noneconomic proposals)] will be discussed prior to
the discussion of economic proposals.” By its clear
terms, of course, this ground rule did not require agree-
ment or impasse on noneconomic proposals before there
could be discussion of economic proposals. It required
only that noneconomic proposals be discussed first.
Some weeks later, the Respondent tabled discussion of
the economic provisions in the Union’s proposal and
refused to state a position on any of those provisions.
Predictably, the parties made very little progress dur-
ing the next 11 months of negotiations. In time, the Un-
ion naturally realized that bargaining was not progress-
ing. Starting in August 2016, the Union repeatedly asked

1 See, e.g., Patent Trader, Inc., 167 NLRB 842, 853 (1967) (“Good-
faith bargaining entails exchange of views on all mandatory bargaining
subjects. . . . Experience shows that even intransigence in one area will
frequently thaw in the face of concessions in another.”), enfd. in rele-
vant part 415 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1969), modified on other grounds, 426
F.2d 791 (1970) (en banc). See also Endo Laboratories, Inc., 239
NLRB 1074, 1075 (1978) (recognizing “the kind of ‘horse trading’ or
‘give-and-take’ that characterizes good-faith bargaining”).
2 Sec. 1 of the Act provides that “[i]t is … the policy of the United
States to . . . encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining.” 29 U.S.C. §151.
the Respondent to state its position on the Union’s com-
plete contract proposal, including economic provisions,
made at the very first bargaining session. But the Re-
spondent persistently refused, citing the parties’ ground
rules—despite having negotiated certain economic sub-
jects (i.e. interim health insurance contributions and an
annual wage increase) when it suited its own purposes.
Although the Respondent provided counterproposals to
some provisions in the Union’s contract proposal, the
Respondent never provided any response regarding nu-
merous provisions including: reporting pay, call-in pay,
insurance benefits and employee contributions during the
term of the contract, hours, vacation, holidays, wage in-
creases during the term of the contract, new classifica-
tions and rates, 401(k) plan, rights and assigns, termina-
tion and reopening of the contract, timekeeping, flexible
spending accounts, and COBRA.
Meanwhile, from August through November 2016, the
Respondent engaged in a course of unlawful conduct (as
the Board finds) that inevitably tended to erode employee
support for the Union. The Respondent: (1) failed to
provide an annual wage increase, without giving the Un-
ion prior notice and an opportunity to bargain; (2) failed
and refused to provide requested information that was
relevant to the Union’s ability to engage in meaningful
bargaining; and (3) unilaterally changed its light-duty
policy. Finally, on November 29, 2016, the Respondent
unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union without
objective evidence demonstrating that the Union had lost
majority support.3
II.
My colleagues and I agree, then, that the Respondent
committed several unfair labor practices while the parties
were bargaining for an initial collective-bargaining
agreement, culminating with the unlawful withdrawal of
recognition from the Union.4 Our most important disa-

3 The Respondent relied on a petition demonstrating that just 9 of 43
bargaining unit employees (i.e., 20 percent) no longer supported the
Union.
4 There are no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the Respond-
ent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by failing to provide unit employees an annual
wage increase without giving the Union prior notice and an opportunity
to bargain and by unilaterally changing its light-duty policy, as well as
violating Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining the confidentiality statement in its
employee handbook.
I join my colleagues in affirming the judge’s well-reasoned findings
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing
recognition from the Union without objective evidence demonstrating
the Union’s loss of majority support and by failing and refusing to
provide the Union with requested information.
However, contrary to the majority, I would affirm the judge’s find-
ing that the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was also unlawful
because any loss of majority support was tainted by the Respondent’s
unfair labor practices. As found by the judge, the Respondent’s unlaw-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
greement here is whether the judge correctly found that
the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing
to discuss economic subjects until all noneconomic sub-
jects were resolved and by refusing to respond to the
Union’s contract proposal and requests to bargain. As
explained below, the judge’s findings are fully supported
by established precedent, which the Board should follow
here.
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collective-
ly with the representative of his employees.” Collective
bargaining is defined in Section 8(d) as “the mutual obli-
gation . . . to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.” As the Supreme Court has
explained, good-faith bargaining “presupposes a desire to
reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bar-
gaining contract,” and though “the parties need not con-
tract on any specific terms . . . they are bound to deal
with each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences
and reach a common ground.”5 To that end, “[g]ood-

ful failure and refusal to discuss economic subjects and to respond to
the Union’s contract proposal prolonged bargaining and prevented the
parties from reaching agreement, which reasonably tended to under-
mine employees’ support for the Union. Further, I would also find
(although the judge did not) that the Respondent’s unlawful failure to
provide a wage increase, its unilateral change to its light-duty policy,
and its failure to provide requested information also tainted any loss of
union support. These violations occurred within a few months of the
withdrawal of recognition, and the Board has previously found that
similar violations tainted unions’ loss of majority support. See, e.g.,
Denton County Electric Cooperative d/b/a CoServ Electric, 366 NLRB
No. 103, slip op. at 3 (2018) (failure to provide wage increase); Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 332 NLRB 575, 577 (2000) (information re-
quest), enfd. in relevant part sub nom. mem. Teamsters Local 481 v.
NLRB, 47 Fed. Appx. 449 (9th Cir. 2002); Vincent Industrial Plastics,
Inc., 328 NLRB 300, 302 (1999) (unilateral change), enfd. in relevant
part 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Additionally, contrary to the majority, I would affirm the judge’s
finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and
refusing to provide the Union with the information requested in para-
graph 5 of its September 6, 2016 request, namely information concern-
ing the Respondent’s competitors’ prices. As the majority acknowl-
edges, during negotiations over wages, the Respondent stated that it did
not want its customers to be faced with a 15-percent increase in its
prices. The requested information was relevant to help the Union de-
termine whether the Respondent’s customers would not accept an in-
crease in its prices and to help the Union draft counterproposals and
bargain over the wage increase. See, e.g., Management & Training
Corp., 366 NLRB No. 134, slip op. at 2 (2018).
Contrary to the majority, I would order a bargaining-schedule reme-
dy because the parties have bargained for over a year with little pro-
gress as a result of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices. See, e.g.,
UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 111, slip op. at 4
(2018). I would also order a notice-reading remedy based on the sever-
ity and number of unfair labor practices. See, e.g., CoServ, 366 NLRB
No. 103, slip op. at 1 fn. 3.
5 NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477,
485–486 (1960). Accord: NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
faith bargaining entails exchange of views on all manda-
tory bargaining subjects.”6 Indeed, all mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining must be on the table because “[t]he
very nature of collective bargaining presumes that while
movement may be slow on some issues, a full discussion
of other issues . . . may result in agreement on the stalled
issues. ‘Bargaining does not take place in isolation and a
proposal on one point serves as leverage for positions in
other areas.’”7
Based on these principles, the Board and courts have
long held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by insisting indefinitely on the resolution of all none-
conomic subjects before negotiating economic subjects.8
As the Board has explained:
[I]t is clear that [the employer’s] insistence on refusing
to discuss and submit counterproposals on economic
matters until all noneconomic items were resolved,
constitutes persuasive evidence of intent not to reach
agreement. . . . By postponing or removing from the
area of bargaining – to the very end of negotiations –
most fundamental terms and conditions of employment
(wages, hours of work, overtime, severance pay, report-
ing pay, holidays, vacations, sick leave, welfare and
pensions, etc.), [the employer] reduced the flexibility of
collective bargaining, narrowed the range of possible
compromises, and cut off the infinite opportunities for
bargaining.9

6 Patent Trader, 167 NLRB at 853.
7 Cal-Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co., 228 NLRB 1337, 1341 (1977)
(quoting Korn Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir.
1967)), enf. denied on other grounds 580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978). See
also Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co., 146 NLRB 1304, 1316 (1964)
(“[T]here is often an interrelation, as a practical matter, between clauses
which, on their face, deal with entirely different subjects and agreement
is often reached because one party gives something in one area and the
other is therefore willing to modify or withdraw its demand with re-
spect to an apparently unrelated subject.”).
8 See, e.g., Detroit Newspapers, 326 NLRB 700, 704 (1998) (col-
lecting cases), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Detroit Typographical
Union No. 18 v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also Team-
sters Local 122, 334 NLRB 1190, 1254 (2001); Crispus Attucks Chil-
dren’s Center, 299 NLRB 815, 837 (1990); United Technologies Corp.,
296 NLRB 571, 571–572 (1989); Trumball Memorial Hospital, 288
NLRB 1429, 1446–1449 (1988); John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 279
NLRB 1034, 1034–1035 (1986); Nansemond Convalescent Center, 255
NLRB 563, 567 (1981); Eastern Maine Medical Center, 253 NLRB
224, 245 (1980), enfd. 658 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981); South Shore Hospi-
tal, 245 NLRB 848, 857–860 (1979), enfd. 630 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Adrian Daily Telegram, 214 NLRB
1103, 1110–1112 (1974); Pillowtex Corp., 241 NLRB 40, 47 (1979),
enfd. 615 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1980); Preterm, Inc., 240 NLRB 654, 654,
672 (1979); Cal-Pacific Furniture, 228 NLRB at 1341; Federal Mogul
Corp., 212 NLRB 950, 950–951 (1974), enfd. 524 F.2d 37 (6th Cir.
1975); Patent Trader, 167 NLRB at 853; Vanderbilt Products, Inc., 129
NLRB 1323, 1329–1330 (1961), enfd. 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
9 Patent Trader, 167 NLRB at 853 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 15
Such conduct is “squarely at odds with the type of bargain-
ing contemplated by the Act.”10
Applied here, those principles compel a finding that
the Respondent’s conduct unlawfully fragmented bar-
gaining and frustrated the parties’ ability to reach agree-
ment. Despite bargaining for 14 months, the parties
made very little progress toward reaching an initial
agreement largely because the Respondent refused to
discuss such fundamental terms and conditions of em-
ployment as wages, hours, and benefits. By refusing to
discuss those subjects and to respond to the Union’s con-
tract proposal, the Respondent limited the possibilities
for “the kind of ‘horse trading’ or ‘give-and-take’ that
characterizes good-faith bargaining.”11 The net effect
was that the Respondent’s conduct “reduced the flexibil-
ity of collective bargaining, narrowed the range of possi-
ble compromises, and cut off the infinite opportunities
for bargaining.”12
Well-established precedent also fully supports the
judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) by failing and refusing to comprehensively re-
spond to the Union’s initial contract proposal and re-
quests to bargain.13
III.
In an effort to distinguish this case from applicable
precedent, the majority points out that the parties agreed,
in their ground-rules agreement, to discuss noneconomic
subjects before economic ones, that the Union did not
challenge the Respondent’s failure to bargain economic
subjects for a year, that the Respondent did not insist that
the Union agree to any provisions, and that the parties

10 John Wanamaker, 279 NLRB at 1035.
11 Endo Laboratories, 239 NLRB at 1075.
12 Patent Trader, 167 NLRB at 853.
13 See, e.g., UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 366 NLRB No. 111, slip
op. at 3 (finding violation where employer failed to submit a counter-
proposal in response to the union’s contract proposal). See also Ober-
thur Technologies of America Corp., 368 NLRB No. 5, slip op. at 3
(2019) (“[T]he Act places on unionized employers a duty to bargain in
good faith regarding any and all mandatory subjects of bargaining when
requested by the union to do so.”); Raytheon Network Centric Systems,
365 NLRB No. 161, slip op. at 4 & fn. 10 (2017) (same); Fallbrook
Hospital, 360 NLRB 644, 652 (2014) (“[T]he Respondent’s conduct of
steadfastly refusing to submit any proposals or counterproposals violat-
ed Sec[.] 8(a)(1) and (5).”), enfd. 785 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Viking
Connectors Co., 297 NLRB 95, 106 (1989) (“[T]he Employer’s delay
in making its wage proposals despite the Union’s ongoing efforts to
obtain such a proposal is an independent violation of Sec[.] 8(a)(5).”);
Whisper Soft Mills, Inc., 267 NLRB 813, 814–815 (1983) (employer
unlawfully refused to respond to the union’s economic proposal for 5
months), vacated on other grounds 754 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Case
Concrete Co., 220 NLRB 1306, 1309 (1975) (“Collective bargaining,
particularly for a first contract, is a difficult procedure in most cases. It
can be especially impeded by the failure or the refusal of the parties to
respond to demands, or take positions on contract proposals.”).
were making progress on noneconomic subjects when
the Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition. The
majority also notes that the Respondent refused to nego-
tiate economic subjects for less time than employers in
other Board cases. None of these reasons support the
majority’s failure to find a violation of Section 8(a)(5)
here.
To begin, as the majority seems to acknowledge, the
parties’ ground rules agreement, in and of itself, cannot
shield the Respondent’s refusal to discuss economic sub-
jects. The Respondent and the Union only agreed to dis-
cuss noneconomic subjects first, not to resolve them.14
And, in any case, the Respondent discussed certain eco-
nomic subjects when doing so suited its own purposes.15
More broadly, ground rules agreements do not relieve
parties of their statutory duty to bargain in good faith
regarding all mandatory subjects of bargaining.16 To the
contrary, such agreements are only intended to help the
parties manage the bargaining process and to facilitate
discussion and agreement on all subjects.17 Ground rules
agreements are thus meant to benefit the parties and can-
not be used as a shield to defend what would otherwise
be bad-faith conduct. The ground rules agreement did
not privilege the Respondent’s persistent refusal to dis-
cuss economic subjects to the point of frustrating the

14 See, e.g., Crispus Attucks, 299 NLRB at 837 (finding violation
where “parties agreed only to ‘discuss’ noneconomic matters first not to
‘resolve’ them”). See also Teamsters Local 122, 334 NLRB at 1254
(finding violation because “[w]hile the parties may have initially agreed
to discuss noneconomic items first, there was certainly no agreement
that they be done to conclusion before economic discussions com-
menced”); John Wanamaker, 279 NLRB at 1035 (finding violation
where parties merely “agreed to attempt to settle noneconomic matters
first”); Nansemond, 255 NLRB at 565 (finding violation because
“while the parties may have agreed that noneconomic issues would be
discussed first, there was no agreement requiring even a preliminary
resolution of such issues as a condition precedent to the discussion of
economic issues”); Pillowtex, 241 NLRB at 47 (finding violation where
evidence “fails to show that the parties reached agreement requiring the
resolution of all noneconomic issues before economic issues could be
discussed” and instead shows they agreed to “negotiate and attempt to
resolve all noneconomic issues before going on to economic items”);
Adrian Daily, 214 NLRB at 1111 (finding violation where “the parties
had agreed during the earlier stages of bargaining that they would dis-
cuss noneconomic issues first”).
Thus, I find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s speculation that the
Respondent’s failure and refusal to negotiate economic subjects would
also have been unlawful if the parties had agreed to resolve all noneco-
nomic subjects first.
15 See Crispus Attucks, 299 NLRB at 837 (finding that the employer
was not privileged to refuse to discuss economic subjects, especially
where it had discussed economic matters earlier in bargaining).
16 See Quality Roofing Supply Co., 357 NLRB 789, 789, 797 fn. 13
(2011); Raytheon, 365 NLRB No. 161, slip op. at 4.
17 See Detroit Newspapers, 326 NLRB at 704 fn. 11.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
possibility of reaching agreement.18 Nor is it a defense
that the Union adhered to the ground rules agreement
until it realized that negotiations were going nowhere.
The Union’s conduct hardly waived its right to bargain.
It is irrelevant, meanwhile, that the Respondent did not
insist that the Union agree to any provisions. An em-
ployer’s insistence that a union agree to certain provi-
sions is just one way that an employer can hinder collec-
tive bargaining. Here, the question is whether the Re-
spondent’s persistent refusal to discuss all mandatory
subjects of bargaining hindered the parties’ progress to-
ward an agreement—and it manifestly did.
That the parties were still negotiating and even mak-
ing progress on noneconomic subjects when the Re-
spondent unlawfully withdrew recognition is not a rele-
vant consideration. Obviously, an overall collective-
bargaining agreement cannot be consummated without
discussion and agreement on economic terms, so the Re-
spondent’s willingness to continue discussing noneco-
nomic terms is beside the point as both a factual and le-
gal matter.19 As explained above, a party’s refusal to
discuss some mandatory terms, but not others, inherently
fragments the bargaining process and limits the possibil-
ity of reaching agreement, “as it preclude[s] trading eco-
nomic proposals for noneconomic proposals which is a
customary avenue of compromise.’”20
Last, there is no merit to the majority’s argument that
this case is distinguishable from certain prior decisions,
which in the majority’s view involved more egregious
employer refusals to discuss economic subjects before

18 See Quality Roofing, 357 NLRB at 797 fn. 13; Cal-Pacific Furni-
ture, 228 NLRB at 1342; Adrian Daily, 214 NLRB at 1111–1112. See
also Fred Hustad, Use and Abuse of Ground Rules in Labor Negotia-
tions, 15 A.F.L. Rev. 102, 105–106 (1973):
True free collective bargaining is put under insurmountable obstacles
when it is so restricted. Unshackled collective bargaining solves prob-
lems instead of creating them, but this type of bargaining requires a
flexibility and freedom of response from both parties. It is imperative
that the parties have the freedom to discuss related issues together and
have the flexibility to resolve some potential impasse problems by the
ability to “trade off.” Many problems which at first seemed insur-
mountable at the bargaining table disappear with the reflection of time
and the lack of a need for either party to be boxed into a rigid position.
When it initially appears that the parties are headed for a deadlock on
a particular item, that item should be deferred to a time when the bar-
gaining atmosphere is more conducive to its solution.
19 See Cal-Pacific Furniture, 228 NLRB at 1341 (“[A] party’s re-
fusal to discuss some mandatory subject of bargaining may constitute a
violation of Sec[.] 8(a)(5) regardless of his good-faith bargaining on
other matters.”). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743 (Sec. 8(a)(5)
“may be violated without a general failure of subjective good faith”).
20 Teamsters Local 122, 334 NLRB at 1254 (quoting Preterm, 240
NLRB at 672).
resolving noneconomic ones.21 Those cases did not es-
tablish a floor for finding a violation in this context, and
in any event, the majority’s effort to distinguish those
cases rests on distinctions that, as just discussed, make
no substantive difference.
IV.
For over 50 years, the Board and courts have held that
an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by insist-
ing indefinitely on the resolution of all noneconomic
subjects before negotiating economic subjects and by
failing and refusing to respond to a union’s contract pro-
posal or request to bargain. We should affirm the
judge’s application of this well-established precedent.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2019
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully withdraw recognition from
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufactur-
ing, Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers Un-
ion, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union) and fail and refuse to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our unit employees.

21 Detroit Newspapers, 326 NLRB at 704; John Wanamaker, 279
NLRB at 1035; Nansemond, 255 NLRB at 567; Pillowtex, 241 NLRB
at 46; Adrian Daily, 214 NLRB at 1111.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 17
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested
information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT change your terms and conditions of
employment without first notifying the Union and giving
it an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT maintain the confidentiality statement in
our employee handbook.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if
an understanding is reached, embody the understanding
in a signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees employed by the Employer at
its 1141 Highway 315, Plains, PA facility, excluding all
other employees, office clerical employees, audit in-
spectors, guards, and supervisors (including group
leaders) as defined in the Act.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information requested by the Union in paragraphs 4 and
5 of its August 12, 2016 information request, in para-
graphs 3 and 8 of its August 31, 2016 information re-
quest, and in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of its September 6,
2016 information request.
WE WILL, on request by the Union, rescind the changes
in the terms and conditions of employment for our unit
employees that were unilaterally implemented since June
1, 2016.
WE WILL make you whole, with interest, for any loss
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of our
unlawful failure to grant you an annually recurring wage
increase in August 2016 and our unlawful discontinuance
of the practice of providing light-duty work to employees
on workers’ compensation.
WE WILL compensate affected employees for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum
backpay awards, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 4, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating the backpay awards to
the appropriate calendar years for each employee.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful confidentiality state-
ment in our employee handbook.
WE WILL furnish you with an insert for the current
employee handbook that (1) advises that the unlawful
provision has been rescinded, or (2) provides a lawfully
worded provision on adhesive backing that will cover the
unlawful provision; or WE WILL publish and distribute
revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain the
unlawful provision, or (2) provide a lawfully worded
provision.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-182126 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Rebecca A. Leaf and Mark Kaltenbach, Esqs., for the General
Counsel.
Lori Armstrong Halber, Samantha Sherwood Bononno, and
Rick Grimaldi, Esqs. (Fisher & Phillips, LLP), of Radnor,
Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
Nathan Kilbert and Antonia Domingo, Esqs. (United Steel-
workers), of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Par-
ty.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on March 19 and 20
and April 23-25, 2018. The United Steelworkers filed the initial
charge in case 04-CA-182126 on August 15, 2016; the initial
charge in 04-CA-186281 on October 17, 2016 and the initial
charge in 04-CA-188990 on December 1, 2016. The most re-
cent version of the complaint was issued on March 8, 2018.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent, the Charging Party Union
and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,2 I
make the following

1 Tr. 682, line 3 should read, “there’s really not a lot of competi-
tors.”
2 I granted the Foundation limited intervention to file a post-trial
brief on behalf of William Berlew. I also gave its lawyers permission
to object if their clients were asked questions that could violate the
attorney-client privilege. There were no such objections.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, manufactures components for
aircraft engines at its facility in Plains, Pennsylvania, where it
annually sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside of Pennsylvania. Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union, the United Steelworkers of America, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent, which a subsidiary of Precision Castparts Cor-
poration (PCC), operates a facility in Plains, Pennsylvania near
Wilkes-Barre. This facility, commonly referred to as the Tru-
Form plant, manufactures components for aircraft engines.
After a representation election in 20143 and a hearing on Re-
spondent’s objections, the Board certified the Steelworkers as
the collective bargaining representative of the production,
maintenance and shipping employees at the Tru-Form plant on
April 14, 2015. In the election, 24 employees voted in favor of
representation; 22 voted against representation.
The parties had 25 collective bargaining sessions between
September 17, 2015 and November 17, 2016. 12 of these ses-
sions were conducted during the last 3 and 1/2 months (August-
November) prior to Respondent withdrawing recognition of the
Union on November 29, 2016. 13 were held between Septem-
ber 2015 and July 2016. Prior to September 2015, the parties
met in May 2015 to discuss Respondent’s health insurance
policies. The lead negotiator for Respondent throughout con-
tract negotiations was attorney Rick Grimaldi from the Fisher
& Phillips law firm. The lead negotiator for the Union was
business agent Joseph Pozza until August 26, 2016. Pozza
continued to attend and serve as the Union’s chief negotiator at
some negotiating sessions after August 26, but the Union’s
principal negotiator at the August 26, September 1, September
12, October 26, October 27 and November 17 sessions was
Steelworkers’ attorney Nathan Kilbert.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Withdrawal of recognition/The decertification petition (com-
plaint paragraph 14)4
Sometime prior to October 11, 2016, Tru-Form employee
William Berlew asked Respondent’s Area Manager Tim Brink
about initiating a decertification petition. Brink referred Ber-
lew to the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
(NRTWF). Berlew, a day shift employee, and Michael

3 Tr. 775-776, 784. There was an earlier election, possibly in April
2013, Tr. 775-76.
4 Whether or not the petition demonstrated that the Union lost ma-
jority support was clearly fairly and fully litigated. Respondent did not
object that the validity of the petition was outside the scope of the com-
plaint, elicited testimony regarding the validity from its own witnesses
and addressed the issue at pages 17-21 of its post hearing brief, Yellow
Ambulance Service, 342 NLRB 804, 824 (2004). Moreover, the validi-
ty of the petition on which withdrawal was based is an affirmative
defense which must be raised, and it in fact was raised by the Respond-
ent. The General Counsel is not required to plead the invalidity of the
petition.
Shovlin, a third shift employee, began gathering names on a
document between October 12 and 20. A 22nd name was added
on November 8 and a 23rd on November 14. There is no ex-
planation in this record for the timing of this activity. The Un-
ion’s certification year expired in April 2016 at which point the
dissatisfied employees were free to seek decertification. Things
that had changed between April and October 2016 were the
alleged commission of unfair labor practices. Among these
were that employees had not granted a wage increase on Au-
gust 1, as in past years without bargaining with the Union about
the increase. Another thing that had changed was that negotia-
tions between the Union and Respondent had dragged on for
another 6 months. A third change was an increased frequency
in negotiating sessions and tentative agreements between the
Union and Respondent.
Tim Brink testified that a lot of the employees who signed
the decertification petition had been vocal in their opposition to
the Union ever since the representation election. Brink further
testified that, “so normal course of the day, several employees
would stop and ask me where we were, how we were doing, is
this behind us, how long till it’s over things of that nature,” Tr.
526.
It is unclear over what period Brink fielded these inquiries or
what he said to the employees in response. However, Brink
never told any of these employees that Respondent had an obli-
gation to bargain in good faith with the Union and execute a
collective bargaining agreement with it if an overall agreement
was reached.
On November 23, 2016, Aaron Solem, an attorney with the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation sent a letter
to Rick Grimaldi, Respondent’s chief negotiator. Solem ad-
vised Grimaldi that he represented William Berlew, an employ-
ee at the Tru-Form plant. The letter also advised Grimaldi that
Berlew had proof in the form of a petition signed by 23 of the
43 bargaining unit members that a majority of unit members no
longer wished to be represented by the Charging Party Union.
Solem stated that Respondent could not continue negotiations
with the Union and requested the Respondent withdraw recog-
nition from the Charging Party, Er. Exh. 67.
Attached to Solem’s letter was a 5 page document without
page numbers, Er. Exh. – 2. As they appear in the record, the
first and 5th pages of the document state that the undersigned
employees do not want to be represented by the United Steel-
workers. The first page contains 8 signatures. The fifth page
contains one signature. The second, third and fourth pages of
the document are blank pages with 11 signature lines. There
are 9 signatures on page 2, 4 signatures on page 3, 1 on page 4.
There is no evidence that anyone from Respondent, including
Grimaldi or Tim Brink, Respondent’s area manager, made any
inquiry as to why pages 2, 3 and 4 had nothing but signatures
lines and signatures, or why there were 2 empty signature lines
on page 2; 7 on page 3 and 10 on page 4. Without such an
inquiry, Respondent could reasonably conclude only that 9 of
the 43 unit employees wished to terminate union representation.
Grimaldi sent the decertification petition to Tim Brink.
Brink, without being specific about any one signature, testified
that he recognized the signatures from seeing them on weekly
tool-box sign-in sheets between 2012 and the summer of 2014.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 19
I discredit Brink’s self-serving testimony insofar has he con-
tends that he was able to verify the signature of every employee
on the petition as a result of seeing them on toolbox sign-in
sheets two years before the petition was submitted to him.
There is, for example, no evidence that every employee whose
name appears on the petition was employed at Tru-Form at the
time Brink reviewed these sheets. Respondent hired approxi-
mately 8 employees in unit positions since the summer of 2014.
Thus, Brink would have had no way of knowing whether or not
the signatures of these employees were authentic.5 I do not
credit his testimony that he recognized the signatures of new
hires from documents he may have seen when these employees
were hired or afterwards, Tr. 523-526, 533-34.
On November 29, 2016, Respondent withdrew recognition
on the basis of number of names on the 5 sheets of paper it
received by the NRTWF petition, Respondent’s Answer, G.C.
Exh. 1 (l) and 1 (i).6
Respondent failed to meet its burden of establishing that the
Union lost majority support
The Board in Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB
717, 725 (2001) held that an employer withdraws recognition
from an incumbent union at its peril. If the Union contests the
withdrawal, the employer must prove that at the time it with-
drew recognition the union had, in fact, lost majority support,
Veritas Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Chino Valley Medical Cen-
ter v. NLRB, No. 16-1058, slip opinion at 12 (D.C. Cir July 10,
2018). It must also show that it had objective evidence of that
fact when it withdrew recognition, Highlands Regional Medi-
cal Center, 347 NLRB 1404, 1407 fn. 17, 1413 (2006) and
Pacific Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB, 801 F. 3d 321, 331-34
(D.C. Cir. 2015). Respondent failed to establish that the Union
had lost majority status as of November 29, 2016 and it failed
to prove that it had objective evidence of a loss of majority
status on November 29, 2016. Even under the pre-Levitz stand-
ard, Respondent did not have a reasonable basis for concluding
that the Union had lost majority status at the time it withdrew
recognition.
The document on which an employer relies in withdrawing
recognition must unambiguously state that the signers, consti-

5 Employee Donald Crispell, who signed the petition and testified at
the instant hearing, was hired in July 2015. Employee witness Michael
Shovlin also appears to have been hired after 2014. There is no evi-
dence as to when most of the employees whose names appear on the
petition were hired.
6 I discredit other reasons given by Rick Grimaldi, such as that the
Union prevailed by only 2 votes in 2014, the support of some employ-
ees in Respondent’s objections to the election and turnover in the unit,
Tr. 698-99. Respondent’s withdrawal letter to the Union relied only on
the NRTWF document; the Answer gives that as the only reason for
withdrawal, G.C. Exh. 1(a), and plant manager Tim Brink testified that
he relied solely on this document in deciding to withdraw recognition,
see RTP Co., 334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001) enfd. 315 F. 3d 951 (8th Cir.
2003). Moreover, none of the additional reasons cited by Grimaldi
would be sufficient to justify withdrawal of recognition as a legal mat-
ter, e.g., Liberty Bakery Kitchen, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 19 slip opinion
page 11, n. 25 (2018) regarding closeness of the representation election;
Barclay Caterers, 308 NLRB 1025 fn. 2 (1992) regarding employee
turnover.
tuting a majority of the bargaining unit, do not wish to be repre-
sented by the Union, Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347
NLRB 1404, 1406 (2006); Liberty Bakery Kitchen, Inc., 366
NLRB No. 19 slip opinion page 1, n. 1 (2018), Anderson Lum-
ber Co., 360 NLRB 538 (2014); DaNite Sign Co., 356 NLRB
975, (2011).7
First of all, in the absence of additional evidence, a 5-page
document in which 3 of the pages are blank containing 14 of
the 23 signatures does not satisfy Respondent’s burden to estab-
lish the Union had lost majority support, or even that it had a
good faith belief that such was the case. Thus, when it with-
drew recognition, Respondent had objective evidence only that
9 of the 43 unit employees no longer wanted union representa-
tion
Furthermore, the evidence adduced by Respondent in this
hearing (assuming for the sake of argument that Respondent
can rely on such evidence) does not establish that 8 of these 14
employees knowingly signed a petition eschewing union repre-
sentation. On the basis of the testimony of Russell Finch and
Donald Crispell, I conclude that Respondent has established
after the fact that the 7 employees who signed the petition on
October 14 on page 2, at Mike Shovlin’s truck saw page 1 of
the petition and knew what they were signing.8 Thus, Re-
spondent over a year after it withdrew recognition, Respondent
has established only that 15 employees, the 8 on page 1 and 7
of the signatories on page 2 expressed a desire that the Union
no longer represented them.
Anti-Union employee William Berlew testified to the cir-
cumstances under which the following employees signed the
document submitted to Respondent via the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation. He testified that he obtained
the signatures of Steve Bukowski, Stan Cegelka, Ronald Garry,
Adam Mewhort, Brian Mikolosko, Steven Brotzman and Rob-
ert Wallace. Berlew testified that the all five pages of the doc-
ument were kept in a manila envelope and were presented to
each of these employees as he watched them sign. Berlew
signed the petition first.
Steven Brotzman testified that when he signed the petition
on October 19, Berlew only presented him with one blank sheet
with signatures and signature lines on it. He testified that he
did not see any document with the verbiage on pages 1 and 5
indicating that the signatories did not want to be represented by
the Union. Further, he stated that he understood that the signa-
tories were asking for another election.
Respondent attacked Brotzman’s credibility on the grounds
that he was not entirely forthcoming as to the reasons it fired
him in January 2018. However, I credit his testimony and dis-
credit that of Berlew. First of all, Brotzman admitted on direct

7 When an employer has objective evidence tending to show the un-
ion’s loss of majority status, it assumes the risk that the evidence on
which it relies will be determined later not to show an actual loss of
majority status, Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347 NLRB 1404,
1406-1407, n. 15 (2006).
8 I will ignore the fact that the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses
Crispell and Shovlin are not consistent regarding the circumstances in
which employees signed the petition on October 14. Crispell testified
employees got in the truck; Shovlin testified he wouldn’t let anyone
inside his truck, Tr. 800-802, 808.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
examination that he was terminated. Brotzman testified the
reason was poor quality, while Tim Brink credibly testified that
Brotzman was terminated for falsifying inspection reports.
Since neither reason reflects well on Brotzman, I see no reason
to discredit his testimony about what he signed. I also credit
Brotzman on account of the mysterious and unexplained pecu-
liarities with regard to signatures on pages 3, 4 and 5 of the
document which are explained below.
The circumstances surrounding pages 3, 4 and 5 give cre-
dence to Brotzman’s testimony and led me to discredit that of
Berlew. Berlew was directed to the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation by plant manager Tim Brink. He
testified that he downloaded the documents which constituted
the petition from the foundation’s website. At some point he
gave the petition to Aaron Solem at the NRTWF, who transmit-
ted the documents to Respondent. One would expect someone
at NRTWF to review the document to determine whether it
would satisfy the Board’s long-standing requirements for decer-
tification petitions. An obviously cleaner petition would have
expressly stated on each page that the employees no longer
wanted to be represented by the Union. It should have been
relatively easy for the NRTWF to send Berlew back to have the
14 employees sign such a petition if they did not want union
representation—particularly since there seems to have been no
rush.9
Mike Shovlin also testified to the circumstances under which
he and a number of other employees signed the petition. He
testified that on a break on the third shift on October 14, Brian
Kubasik, Ken Harrison, Don Crispell, Kerry Lauer, Russell
Finch, Andrew Stout and Brian Turner lined out outside his
truck in Respondent’s parking lot and signed the document on
the cab of his truck; Shovlin testified that all five pages of the
document were in a manila envelope and available to those who
signed. Since this testimony is corroborated by Crispell and
Finch, I find that these employees knew they were signing a
petition to end their representation by the Union.
Shovlin also testified to the circumstances under which Jo-
seph Petorak on October 19 and Bryan Filipkoski and Gary
Cox on October 20, signed the document on page 3. After
getting the signatures on October 14, 19 and 20, he testified that
he returned the document in the manila envelope to Berlew, Tr.
806. If this is so, it leaves unexplained how Berlew had all 5
pages to present to Brotzman on October 19. If Shovlin had
returned the 5-page document to Berlew after obtaining the
signatures on October 14, there is no evidence to support a
finding that he presented Petorak, Filipkoski and Cook anything
other than a blank sheet of paper. The fact that Berlew testified
that he obtained Brian Mikolosko’s signature on October 14,
Brotzman’s on October 19 and Bob Wallace’s on October 20,
strongly suggests that Shovlin was not in possession of the
entire petition on October 19 and 20.

9 Berlew testified that he instructed Kevin Foster (p. 5 of Er. 2) to
go online and download the petition and “just make sure that it had that
header on the top,” Tr. 174. Thus, he understood how important it was
to have this verbiage on each page of the document. It would have
been easy for Berlew to instruct Shovlin to do the same thing when he
approached Petorak, Filipkoski and Cook. Either one or the other had
page 1 of the document on October 19 and 20, but not both.
Shovlin testified that Petorak told him that he was interested
in signing the petition. Shovlin testified that he got “the paper
in the envelope” and had Petorak, Filipkoski and Cook sign He
testified that Petorak signed at a Dunkin Donuts; Filipkoski and
Cook signed in a locker room while on break. Shovlin did not
testify as to when Berlew returned the petition to him. Accord-
ing to Berlew, he had the petition on October 19 when he had
Steve Brotzman sign it.
Berlew testified to getting the petition back in the manila en-
velope from Shovlin after the employees signed on October 14,
Tr. 177. He did not testify that he ever gave the packet back to
Shovlin. Thus, I discredit Shovlin’s testimony that he present-
ed the entire packet to Petorak, Filipkoski and Cook, none of
whom testified in this proceeding. For this petition to be valid
there would have to be evidence that Berlew presented the en-
tire packet to Brotzman on October 19 and then gave it back to
Shovlin to obtain the signatures of Petorak, Filipkoski and
Cook and got it back on October 20 to obtain the signature of
Bob Wallace, who signed page 3 on the same day as Filipkoski
and Cook.
Sholvin offered no convincing explanation as to why Peto-
rak, Filipkoski and Cook signed on page 3, when there were 2
empty signature lines on page 2; Tr. 817-20. On this basis I
find that Respondent has not established that Petorak, Filipko-
ski and Cook signed anything other than a blank piece of paper.
Since I credit Brotzman, as opposed to Berlew, I conclude that
Respondent has not established that Bob Wallace signed any-
thing other than a blank sheet of paper. Berlew offered no ex-
planation as to why Wallace did not in the blank signature lines
on page 2.
There is also absolutely no credible evidence confirming that
the signatures of Timothy Ancherani or Kevin Foster are au-
thentic, who obtained these signatures, or the circumstances
under which their signatures appear on pages 4 and 5 of the
document respectively.10
Even assuming that Ancherani’s signature is authentic, I can
only conclude that he signed a blank document. William Ber-
lew testified that Shovlin obtained Foster’s signature, Tr. 174.
However, Shovlin did not mention Foster when he discussed
the signatures he obtained. The NRTWF brief filed on behalf
of Berlew states that Josh Antosh obtained Kevin Foster’s sig-
nature, Br. at 7 and n. 4. I find this has not been established.
First it is inconsistent with Berlew’s claim that Shovlin ob-
tained Foster’s signature. Moreover, I give no credence to the
argument made that although Antosh did not mention Foster’s
name, the record establishes that Antosh obtained Foster’s sig-
nature, Tr. 774. Antosh was able to name other employees he
solicited to sign the petition, but not Foster. The unnamed in-
dividual to whom Antosh spoke could be any employee who
signed after him. Moreover, there is nothing in Antosh’s testi-

10 Similarly, there is no evidence authenticating the signature of Jon-
athan Buselli or the circumstances under which he signed the petition.
Mike Shovlin and Josh Antosh testified that they received the petition
from Buselli, Tr. 773, 805, but neither testified that they saw Buselli
sign the petition, nor did anyone else. On the other hand, Berlew testi-
fied that he gave the petition to directly to Antosh, Tr. 176. Buselli did
not testify in this proceeding. Thus, at a minimum, Respondent’s evi-
dence for the proposition that Buselli signed the petition is inconsistent.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 21
mony explaining why Foster’s signature appears on a sheet
separate from all others or why if he had Foster sign the peti-
tion it does not appear on page 2 or 3 or 4 in the blank signature
lines.
There is no evidence as to when Ancherani or Foster began
working at the Tru-Form plant; thus there is no basis for con-
cluding that Tim Brink could have determined that their signa-
tures were authentic. Without establishing the validity of these
2 signatures, Respondent has not established that a majority of
the bargaining unit wanted Respondent to withdraw recogni-
tion. Without these 2 names, the number of valid names is
reduced to 21 of 43 unit employees. Without establishing that
Brotzman, Ancherani, Foster, Petorak, Filipkoski and Cook
knowingly signed a petition asking for withdrawal of recogni-
tion, Respondent has only established that 17 of the 43 names
can be counted as desiring withdrawal.11
It is noteworthy that the names of Ancherani and Foster ap-
pear on the last two pages of the document. With regard to
Ancherani, Respondent has offered no explanation as to why
his name does not appear in the blank spaces on pages 2 and 3.
This confirms my conclusion that Respondent has not shown
that Ancherani, even if he signed the document, knew what he
was signing.
Josh Antosh testified about Ancherani as follows:
Q. Did you ever talk to Tim Ancherani about the peti-
tion?
A. I talked to—the only time I talked to Tim about it
was after I asked if Billy [Berlew] got ahold of him,
and he said Billy finally got ahold of him.
MR. KALTENBACH: I object on hearsay grounds.
JUDGE AMCHAN: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: But it was after Billy had already—I
asked him if Billy got—if Billy asked him to sign the
paper, and he said, yes, he finally got ahold of him,
that he was—actually get aggravated that nobody
asked him to sign the paper earlier.
Q. BY MS. HALBER: I'm sorry, who was aggravated?
A. Timothy, Timothy Ancherani.
Tr. 774–775.
Berlew, however, testified as to the signatures he obtained
and did not mention Ancherani. Thus, I do not credit Antosh’s
testimony above. Stan Cegelka’s hearsay testimony at Tr. 826-
27, cited by the NRTWF brief at page 10 also fails to establish
that Ancherani (and Bob Wallace) knowingly signed a docu-
ment indicating that they no longer wished to be represented by
the Union. Indeed, Cegelka’s testimony that both Ancherani
and Wallace were “up in the air” about the petition when he
spoke to them about it, makes it more important that when they
signed, they understood exactly what the document meant (as-

11 Actually, only 16 if you subtract Buselli. Respondent called a
number of witnesses to testify as to the circumstances under which they
signed on pages 1 and 2 of the petition: Berlew, Cegelka, Antosh,
Shovlin, Crispell, and Finch. The General Counsel called Adam
Mewhort and Steven Brotzman. None of the employees whose names
appear on pages 3, 4 and 5 of Er. Exh. 2 testified.
suming that Ancherani’s signature is genuine).
I find that Respondent failed to establish that the Union had
lost majority support and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5)and
(1) of the Act in withdrawing recognition from the Union and
refusing to bargain with it after November 29, 2016. Ambassa-
dor Services, 358 NLRB 1172 fn.1, 1182 (2012); 361 NLRB
939 (2014), enfd. 622 F. Appx. 891 (llth Cir. 2015); Latino
Express, Inc., 360 NLRB 911, 925 (2014), Flying Foods
Group, 345 NLRB 101, 103-04 (2005) enfd. 471 F. 3d 178
(D.C. Cir. 2006). Also see, Pacific Coast Supply, 360 NLRB
538 (2014) enfd. 801 F. 3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015).12Respondent
failed to establish that it had objective evidence that the Union
lost majority support at the time it withdrew recognition and
even a year and a half later has failed to establish that the Union
had lost majority support as of November 29, 2016.
I reach this conclusion because Respondent failed to estab-
lish that 7 of the 23 document signers signed anything other
than a blank sheet of paper and that Respondent did not estab-
lish the authenticity of the signatures of Timothy Ancherani and
Kevin Foster. Even assuming that the some of the employees
on page 2 knew what they were signing, Respondent failed to
establish that Brian Mikolosko, Steve Brotzman, Timothy An-
cherani (assuming his signature is authentic), Joseph Petorak,
Bryan Filipkoski, Greg Cook and Bob Wallace signed anything
other than a blank document or that they knew that they were
signing a petition to decertify (or get rid of) the Union.
The NRTWF notes at page 11-12 of its brief that every em-
ployee who testified said he signed the petition with the first
page present and that every employee who testified reaffirmed
that they did not want USW representation. However, it is also
true that none of the signatories whose intentions are most
questionable testified.
Alleged tainting of the decertification petition by Respondent’s
alleged unremedied unfair labor practices.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party Union contend
that Respondent illegally withdrew recognition. First, they
contend that the decertification petition does not establish that
the Union lost majority support as of November 29, 2016.
Secondly, they contend that the petition was tainted by a num-
ber of unremedied unfair labor practices: an illegal confidenti-
ality policy; showing up late to a number of bargaining ses-
sions; failing to give the Union an opportunity to negotiate over
the amount of an annual wage increase; sending several em-
ployees, who were on light-duty, home for several days; refusal
to bargain over economic issues; refusal to provide a response

12 Since Levitz, an employer may not withdraw recognition from an
incumbent union on the basis of an incorrect, but good faith belief that
the Union has lost majority status. Even under the pre-Levitz standard,
Respondent would have violated the Act in this case. All the evidence
about how careful Berlew and Shovlin were in presenting employees
with all 5 pages of the petition was not known to Respondent when it
withdrew recognition. Respondent withdrew recognition on the basis
of a 5 page document, 3 of which were blank and contained 14 of the
23 names collected. Thus, Respondent could not have known, for
example, if these employees no longer wanted to be represented or
simply no longer wanted to be union members, or wanted another elec-
tion, or had no idea what they were signing, Pacific Coast Supply,
360 NLRB 538 (2014) enfd. 801 F. 3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
to a number of Union contract proposals; failure to provide or
delay in providing to the Union information it requested con-
cerning wage rate increases, bonuses, monetary awards or other
payments; failure to provide the Union information it requested
regarding Respondent’s health insurance plans; and refusal to
provide the Union with information regarding its prices, labor
costs and primary competitors.
Complaint paragraph 6: Maintenance of Wyman-Gordon Con-
fidentiality Statement
Respondent has maintained the following confidentiality
statement in its employee handbook since at least 2012:
The impression that customers have of our corporation will be
based, in part, on the way we handle their records and infor-
mation. As professionals, we must respect the customer in-
formation with which we are entrusted and ensure that it is
handled with care and remains in the control of Wyman-
Gordon at all times. If we are careless with their information,
the customer may conclude that we have the same attitude
towards our technical work.
As an employee of Wyman-Gordon, you understand that all
customer, supplier and staff information is confidential and
may not be disclosed to anyone, except where required for a
business purpose. Also, copying, removing, allowing unau-
thorized access to any Company, customer or supplier docu-
ments, paper files, computer files or mailing lists, Company
or customer proprietary information and processes or any
form of distribution of customer, supplier or company infor-
mation is not allowed. Personal employee information, such
as address, phone numbers, social security numbers, etc., is
not to be discussed, copied, released or provided to any other
employee within the Company.
All employees are required to acknowledge the Intellectual
Property Agreement of Wyman-Gordon. Any employee who
breaches the confidentiality requirement will be subject to
discipline, up to and including discharge.
Each new employee had to sign for and acknowledge receipt
of the handbook.
Applying the Board’s recent decision in The Boeing Compa-
ny, 365 NLRB No. 154 (2017), I find this rule unlawful insofar
as it prohibits employees from exchanging or providing to other
employees, the addresses, phone numbers, email addresses or
other methods of communication. Under Boeing, I consider
this a “Category 3” rule in that it obviously inhibits employees
from communicating with each other about wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. Although, as Re-
spondent points out, it is a defense contractor with various se-
curity clearances, its legitimate interests do not need such a
broad prohibition. First of all, one can assume that if some
maintenance and production employees are required to have
security clearances, they all are. Thus, sharing of means of
communication with others with the same security clearance
cannot compromise Respondent’s legitimate interests.
Secondly, the fact that Respondent has apparently never en-
forced the rule to prohibit such inter-employee communication,
indicates that has no legitimate interest in maintaining the rule
in this regard, as does the fact that Respondent provided to the
Union employees’ names, addresses and telephone numbers in
response to the Union’s information requests, Er. Exh. 5. It
thus is quite evident that Respondent’s legitimate interests can
be protected by a narrower rule that does not prohibit employ-
ees from exchanging contact information.
Other the other hand, there is no basis for concluding the
maintenance of this rule had any tendency to cause employees
to become disaffected from the Union.
Complaint paragraph 7: Refusal to meet at reasonable times,
i.e., repeatedly showing up late
The General Counsel introduced evidence that Respondent
was repeatedly late to bargaining sessions starting with the
session on July 12, 2016. Respondent also introduced evidence
on this issue. I find that the record establishes the following:13
At the first bargaining session on September 17, 2015, the
parties negotiated ground rules for the negotiations, G.C. Exh.–
8, which specified that bargaining sessions would last up to
four hours, unless otherwise mutually agreed upon and that
each party had the right to caucus at any time for a reasonable
period. The party requesting a caucus was required to inform
the other party of the anticipated length of the caucus.
July 12: Scheduled start 10:00; Respondent arrives 10:18.
Respondent caucused for 3 hours and the parties left the session
at 1:35. p.m. at the Union’s initiative. Prior to the withdrawal
of recognition, the Union did not complain about Respondent’s
caucuses.
August 12; At the Union’s request, negotiations were re-
scheduled from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. Negotiations started at
11:02.
August 26: Scheduled 10:04; Respondent arrives 11:04.
Rick Grimaldi testified that he initially picked up the wrong
binder to bring to negotiations and had to return to his office to
obtain the correct one. The Union Chief Negotiator was Nathan
Kilbert. This was the first session he attended. The parties
negotiated for 3 ½ hours. Respondent initiated the end of the
session.
September 1: Start 10:00; Respondent arrives 10:26. The
Union Chief Negotiator was Nathan Kilbert. The session ended
at about 3 p.m. at the suggestion of the Union. The Union
caucused for about an hour and then the parties took about an
hour lunch break.
September 12: Start 10:00; Respondent arrives 10:51. The
Union caucused at 11:15; negotiations resumed after lunch at
1:17. Negotiations ended at 4:34. Rick Grimaldi was late due
to being caught in an accident-related traffic jam. The Union
Chief Negotiator was Nathan Kilbert.
September 22: Negotiations started at 10:07. The Union ne-
gotiators left without notifying Respondent between 2:00 and
2:11. The Union Chief Negotiator was Joseph Pozza.
October 11: Start 10:00; Negotiations begin at 10:57. The
Union Chief Negotiator was Joseph Pozza. Negotiations ended

13 The complaint mentions 9 of the 13 negotiating sessions between
July 12 and November 17. It omits the August 12, September 22, Oc-
tober 12 and November 10 sessions.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 23
at 3:38, although Respondent offered to stay later.
October 12: Negotiations start at 9:04. The Union Chief Ne-
gotiator was Joseph Pozza.
October 26: Start 10:00; Respondent arrives 10:54. The par-
ties continued bargaining until 11:22 p.m. The Union claims
that only 3 hours and 11 minutes were spent bargaining; Re-
spondent denies this. Both parties caucused during the session.
The Union Chief Negotiator was Nathan Kilbert.
October 27: Start 09:00; Negotiations start at 09:16. Re-
spondent arrives at 9:02. Management representatives told the
Union that lead negotiator Rick Grimaldi was printing a coun-
ter-offer. The session ended at about 4:00 p.m. During negoti-
ations, Respondent presented the Union with a counter-offer on
seniority. The Union Chief Negotiator was Nathan Kilbert.
Saturday November 5: Start 08:30; Respondent arrives
08:49. The Union Chief Negotiator was Joseph Pozza, who
suggested ending the session at 11:42 a.m.
November 10: Start 09:00; Respondent arrives 09:42. The
Union Chief Negotiator was Joseph Pozza.
November 17 (the last bargaining session): Respondent at
9:43. The Union Chief Negotiator was Joseph Pozza. Re-
spondent ended the session at about 4:00 p.m.
I am unable to conclude that Respondent’s failure to start
negotiations on time on various occasions materially impeded
negotiations. Therefore, I dismiss complaint paragraph 7(b).
Complaint paragraph 8: failure to negotiate over the amount of
an annual wage increase
Respondent had a practice of giving unit employees a wage
increase on or about August 1 of every year. Typically, this
increase ranged from about 40 cents to 70 cents per hour. In
2012 the increase was 65 cents per hour; in 2013, 70 cents plus
a 5 cent increase in the shift differential; in 2014, 57 cents; in
2015, 50 cents. In 2016, unit employees did not get a wage
increase on or about August 1. The first they learned of this
was in early August when they did not see such an increase in
the paychecks.
On August 12, Respondent informed the Union that it would
give a wage increase retroactive to August 1, but had not de-
termined the amount. The parties discussed the wage increase
again on August 26.
In January 2017, employees received a 15 cent per hour in-
crease retroactive to August 1, 2016. In November 2017, they
received a 70 cent increase.
Respondent was generally required to maintain the status
quo while bargaining with the Union for an initial contract.
When a term or condition of employment, such as an annual
wage increase, is scheduled to occur during bargaining, an em-
ployer may (assuming the amount of the increase is discretion-
ary) decline to implement the increase so long as it provides the
union notice that it will not be raising wages and provides an
opportunity to bargain over the change, Stone Container Corp.,
313 NLRB 336 (1993).
In the instant case Respondent failed to make the wage ad-
justment or notify the Union before the scheduled date of the
recurring increase occurred. I find that it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) as a result. However, I do not conclude that this
violation would have tainted a valid decertification petition.
Respondent and the Union began bargaining about the increase
on August 12 and employees were informed that any increase
agreed upon would be retroactive to August 1, 2016. Had Re-
spondent complied with its obligation of advance notice, the
effect on employee morale would have been no different. Em-
ployees would have been waiting for months to find out the
amount of their annual increase.
Complaint paragraph 9: sending light duty employees home
without notifying and bargaining with the Union
In October 2016, 5 of Respondent’s employees were on light
duty. On October 14, without notifying the Union and offering
to bargain, Elizabeth Griffiths, Respondent’s environmental,
health and safety manager, sent these 5 employees home. She
did this in a telephone call with plant manager Tim Brink and
Human Resources Administrator Leah Leikheim on the line,
Tr. 233-35. The 5 employees were recalled to work after miss-
ing 3 days of work. At least 3 of these employees were paid for
the days off. 1 or 2 may not have been paid for 1 of the days
off. Union Local President Brian Collura had been on light
duty since January 2016 and was never sent home prior to Oc-
tober 14.
Respondent had an established past practice of providing
light duty work to employees on workers compensation. Thus,
it was not privileged to discontinue this practice regardless of
what its written policies stated. It is not a defense to an illegal
unilateral change that it was the result of miscommunication
between different agents of Respondent. Moreover, G.C. Exh.
3 establishes that, contrary to Respondent’s assertion, this uni-
lateral change was not merely an error on the part of Elizabeth
Griffiths, Respondent’s environmental, health and safety man-
ager. This change was ratified by Brad Georgetti, Respond-
ent’s human resources director. It was only corrected after the
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge about the change on
October 17 (04-CA-1862821).
While Respondent almost immediately remedied this viola-
tion, it did not adequately repudiate it, per Passavant Memorial
Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978). If the decertification
were valid, this violation did not taint it. As Respondent points
out, in communications with approximately 30 unit members,
the Union took credit for making Respondent return the em-
ployees to light duty almost immediately, Tr. 77, G.C. Exh. 6,
Union bargaining update of October 26, 2016.
Complaint paragraph 10: (a) and (b) refusal to bargain over
economic issues; Complaint paragraph 10 (c)-(f) failure and
refusal to provide a response to the Union’s September 15,
2015 bargaining proposal.
Respondent insisted throughout negotiations that pursuant to
the ground rules that the parties negotiated for bargaining on
September 17, 2015, it was not required to and would not bar-
gain about economic matters until all non-economic matters
were resolved, G.C. Exhs. 9 and 29, Er. Exh. 3, bargaining
notes of August 26, 2016. The ground rules, G.C. Exh-8, pro-
vide in this regard:
#5 All proposals and counter-proposals will be
made in writing. Sufficient copies should be
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD24
made available for the other party. Language
proposals will be discussed prior to the discus-
sion of economic proposals. Handwritten pro-
posals will be acceptable.
The parties, however, did make exceptions, such as bargain-
ing over employee health insurance contributions while negoti-
ations were ongoing. Respondent’s health insurance contract
came up for renewal on June 1 of each year.
On October 17, 2016, the Union sent Respondent a letter in
which it asked Respondent to be prepared to discuss the Un-
ion’s economic proposals at the session scheduled for October
26 and 27. The letter, signed by Business Representative Jo-
seph Pozza, stated that the Union believed that the Company
had withdrawn from the ground rules agreement regarding
discussion of economics. Further, it stated, “this agreement has
outlived its usefulness.” The Union also asked for more bar-
gaining dates as soon as possible and multiple day sessions
I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
in refusing indefinitely to bargain about economic matters until
non-economic matters were resolved. John Wanamaker Phila-
delphia, 279 NLRB 1034 (1986); Detroit Newspapers, 326
NLRB 700, 704 and fn. 11 (1998); Adrian Daily Telegram, 214
NLRB 1103, 1110–1112 (1974). First of all, the ground rules,
by their terms do not require resolution of all non-economic
items prior to bargaining about economics. Secondly, even if
they did, Respondent was not privileged to demand adherence
to the ground rules after almost a year of bargaining with little
progress.
At the parties first bargaining session, September 17, 2105,
the Union presented Respondent with a complete contract pro-
posal. This proposal was modeled after the Union’s contract
with another Wyman-Gordon facility in Pennsylvania, known
as “Mountain Top.”
On August 26, 2016, at the bargaining table, the Union de-
manded a comprehensive response. It reiterated this demand in
a letter to Rick Grimaldi dated August 31, 2016, G.C. Exh. 27.
Respondent never gave the Union a comprehensive response.
Prior to August 26, 2016, Respondent had provided a re-
sponse or counter proposal to 7 of the 29 articles in the Union’s
2015 proposal; Dues check off, union shop, management rights,
strikes and lockouts, death in the family (bereavement), jury
duty and shoe allowances. Between August 26 and the last
bargaining session on November 17, Respondent provided
proposals or counter-offers to the Union’s proposal on recogni-
tion, grievances, arbitration, seniority and reduction in force,
job postings federal and state laws and the payday.
It is uncontroverted that Respondent never provided a writ-
ten response to the 2015 union proposals on reporting pay, call-
in pay,14 insurance benefits and employee contributions during
the term of the contract,15 hours, vacation, holidays, wage in-
creases during the term of the contract, new classifications and
rates, 401(k) plan, rights and assigns, termination and reopen-

14 This is not addressed in the employer’s proposal, Er. Exh. 52.
However, Respondent contends that its absenteeism and tardiness pro-
posal is responsive.
15 Tr. 360-63,589-90, Er. Exh. 53.
ing of the contract, timekeeping, flexible spending accounts and
COBRA.
I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
in its failure to make responsive proposals—particularly after
August 26, Fallbrook Hospital, 360 NLRB 644, 652 (2014).16
The continued lack of progress in negotiations due this failure
was likely to cause dissatisfaction with the Union as evidenced
from the timing of the decertification petition. Thus, even if
there otherwise would have been a valid petition, I conclude
that it would have tainted by Respondent’s refusal to negotiate
economic matters until all non-economic matters were resolved
and its failure and refusal, over the course of 14 months, to
make a comprehensive response to the Union’s September
2015 proposal, United Technologies, 296 NLRB 571 (1989).
The Board’s decision in Master Slack, 271 NLRB 78 (1984)
describes 4 factors in determining whether or not an employer’s
unfair labor practices (ULPs) taint an otherwise valid decertifi-
cation petition: (1) the length of time between the ULP and the
withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the illegal acts,
including the possibility of their detrimental or lasting effect on
employees; (3) any possible tendency to cause employee disaf-
fection from the union and (4) the effect of the unlawful con-
duct on employee morale, organizational activities and mem-
bership in the Union.17
In the instant case, Respondent’s refusal to negotiate on eco-
nomic matters and its failure to make a comprehensive response
to the Union’s comprehensive proposal was ongoing at the time
Respondent withdrew recognition. The continued dragging out
of negotiations 14 months after they started and 2 ½ years after
employees voted for union representation was likely to cause
unit employees, other than those previously opposed to union
representation, to support a decertification petition circulated
by anti-union employees out of a sense that continued represen-
tation was a futile exercise. I thus find that assuming the decer-
tification was valid, it was tainted by these violations and thus
Respondent could not legally rely on such a petition to with-
draw recognition.
Complaint paragraph 11: alleged delay or failure to respond to
the Union’s August 12, 2016 information request
On August 12, 2016, the Union requested the following in-
formation from Respondent for which the General Counsel
alleges an unfair labor practice Er. Exh. 7 requests 2, 4 and 5:
(1) The date and amount of any bonuses, monetary awards,
lump sum or other payments, not made every payroll period
between January 1, 2013 to the present.
(2) The mechanisms by which the payments not made every
payroll period were calculated and a description of the infor-
mation relied upon in determining the amount.
(3) Any written description of Respondent’s practices with re-

16 The fact that the Regional Director dismissed a charge alleging
bad faith bargaining in general does not preclude a finding that Re-
spondent violated the Act in failing to make a comprehensive counter
proposal or refusing to negotiate about economic matters, Whisper Soft
Mills, Inc. 267 NLRB 813, 814–815 (1983).
17 Consideration of these factors is unnecessary when an employer
simply refuses to bargain with an incumbent union.
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 25
spect to pay rate increases, bonuses, monetary awards, or oth-
er payments.
The complaint alleges that with respect to #1 above, Re-
spondent violated the Act by providing the information late,
i.e., not until November 1, 2018. With regard to items 2 and 3,
the complaint alleges that Respondent violated the Act in not
providing this information at all. In its brief, General Counsel
appears to have abandoned its position with a failure to provide
the information requested in items 2 and 3. He only presses his
position on the delay in providing these items. The Union con-
tinues to contend that Respondent violated the Act in it failing
to provide the formula by which Respondent calculated bonus-
es.
I find that the record is unclear as to when the information in
item # 1 was provided, but that it clearly was provided prior to
October 27. For this reason I find that the General Counsel has
not proved that Respondent unreasonably delayed providing
this information.
On October 26, 2016, Rick Grimaldi informed the Union that
it was not entitled to sales figures, a factor by which Quarterly
Cash Bonuses were determined. He refused to negotiate over a
confidentiality agreement for this information, Er. Exh. 3. By
refusing to negotiate a confidentiality agreement Respondent
waived its claim of confidentiality, Delaware County Memorial
Hospital, 366 NLRB No. 28, slip. op. 8 (2018); Postal Service,
364 NLRB No. 27 (2016). It thus violated the Act by not
providing the Union the sales figures.
Complaint paragraph 12: alleged failure to fully comply with
the Union’s August 31, 2016 information request.
The Union requested the following information from Re-
spondent on August 31, 2016:
(1) All health insurance plans for 2013 to 2016 and summary
plan descriptions for January 1, 2013 to May 31, 2013;
(2) Copies of written communications to unit employees an-
nouncing or explaining health insurance plans, benefits or
contributions between January 1, 2013 and December 31,
2014.
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to provide this in-
formation to the Union. Respondent provided the Union the
summary of its health insurance plans, but not the more com-
prehensive plan document, Tr. 597-99. The Union was entitled
to the plan document, regardless of whether the company pro-
vided the summary. Respondent violated the Act in not provid-
ing it
While Respondent provided copies of written communica-
tions to unit employees announcing or explaining health insur-
ance plans, benefits or contributions for 2015 and 2016, it never
provided this information for the period between January 1,
2013 and December 31, 2014, Tr. 389, G.C. Exh. 35. It violated
the Act in this respect.
Complaint paragraph 13: alleged refusal to provide infor-
mation requested by the Union on September 6, 2016.
On September 6, 2016 and several times thereafter the Union
requested the following information from Respondent:
(1) The current prices for the five items produced by the fa-
cility that produce the greatest revenue;
(2) All changes to the prices of these items between January
1, 2014 and the present;
(3) the labor cost as a percentage of the price of each of these
items as of the present and January 1, 2014, 2015 and 2016;
(4) the identity of the Respondent’s primary competitors for
each of the five items and the current prices of their most
equivalent products.
Respondent refused to produce any of this information to the
Union. Respondent contends that because it did not claim an
inability to pay the wage increases proposed by the Union, that
the Union was not entitled to this information. However, the
Union proposed wage increases in line with those the company
had given for the past several years. Respondent told the Union
it would not do so in 2016 because it did not want its customers
to be faced with a 15% increase in its prices. I find the Union
was entitled to the information request in order to determine
whether the wage increases it was seeking would in fact result
in a 15% increase in Respondent’s prices, Caldwell Mfg. Co.,
346 NLRB 1159, 1159–1160 (2006); National Extrusion &
Mfg. Co., 357 NLRB 127 (2011). Thus, I find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in refusing to provide this in-
formation to the Union. However, I see no relationship between
this violation and the alleged loss (albeit unestablished) of the
Union’s majority status.
REMEDY
I recommend that Respondent be ordered to recognize and
on request bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent’s production, mainte-
nance and shipping employees at its Tru-Form plant in Plains,
Pennsylvania for a period of not less than 6 months. If an un-
derstanding is reached, Respondent must sign an agreement
concerning the terms and conditions of employment. I recom-
mend a bargaining order because it is necessary to fully remedy
the violations in this case for the following reasons:
(1) To vindicate the Section 7 rights of a majority of unit em-
ployees who have been denied the benefits of collective bar-
gaining since November 29, 2016. It is only by restoring the
status quo and requiring the Respondent to bargain with the
Union for a reasonable period of time that the employees will
be able to fairly assess the effectiveness of the Union in an
atmosphere free of the Respondent’s unlawful conduct.
(2) An affirmative bargain order also serves the policies of the
Act by fostering meaningful collective bargaining and indus-
trial peace. It removes the Respondent’s incentives to delay
bargaining in the hope of further discouraging support for the
Union. It also ensures that the Union will not be pressured by
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD26
the possibility of a decertification petition or by the prospect
of imminent withdrawal of recognition to achieve immediate
results at the bargaining table following the Board’s resolution
of its unfair labor practice charges and the issuance of a bar-
gaining order.
(3) A cease and desist order without a temporary decertifica-
tion bar would be inadequate to remedy Respondent’s with-
drawal of recognition and refusal to bargain. It would permit
another challenge to the Union’s majority status before the
taint of Respondent’s previous unlawful withdrawal of recog-
nition has dissipated. Allowing another challenge to the Un-
ion’s majority status without a reasonable period for bargain-
ing would be unjust also because the Union needs to re-
establish its relationship with unit employees, who have al-
ready been without the benefits of union representation for
over a year and half. Permitting another decertification peti-
tion may likely allow Respondent to profit from its unlawful
conduct.
These aforesaid circumstances outweigh the temporary im-
pact the affirmative bargaining order will have on the rights of
unit employees who continue to oppose union representation.
ORDER
Respondent, Wyman Gordon Pennsylvania, LLC, Plains,
Pennsylvania, is hereby ordered to
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the United Steel Workers
and failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the collec-
tive bargaining representative of it production, maintenance and
shipping unit employees.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by fail-
ing and refusing to furnish it with requested information that it
relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its func-
tion as the representative of Respondent’s unit employees.
(c) Changing wages, benefits or other terms and conditions
of employment without first notifying the Union and giving it
an opportunity to bargain.
(d) Refusing to negotiate economic terms and conditions of
employment until all non-economic terms and conditions are
agreed upon.
(e) Failing and Refusing to present to the Union a compre-
hensive response to the Union’s September 2015 contract pro-
posal.
(f) Maintaining a confidentiality policy that prohibits em-
ployees from exchanging contact information.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its production,
maintenance and shipping employees at the Tru-Form plant in
Plains, Pennsylvania concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment for a period of not less than 6 months, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) On request by the Union, rescind any changes in its unit
employees' terms and conditions of employment that were uni-
laterally implemented since June 1, 2016.
(c) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the information
previously requested by the Union and unlawfully withheld as
found in this decision.
(d) Rescind its confidentiality policy insofar as it prohibits
employees from exchanging contact information.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Plains Pennsylvania copies of the attached notice marked “Ap-
pendix.”18 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since November 29, 2016.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 13, 2018
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
WYMAN GORDON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC 27
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from, and fail and refuse
to recognize and bargain with the United Steelworkers Union as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of our pro-
duction, maintenance and shipping employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union
by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested information
that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s functions as the
collective bargaining representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union about eco-
nomic issues until all non-economic issues have been resolved.
WE WILL NOT fail to give the Union a comprehensive re-
sponse to its proposals for a collective bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT change your wages, benefits, or other terms
and conditions of employment without first notifying the Union
and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain for a period of
not less than 6 months with the United Steelworkers Union as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of our pro-
duction, maintenance and shipping employees, and if an under-
standing is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
WE WILL, upon the Union’s request, rescind the changes in
the terms and conditions of employment that were unilaterally
implemented since June 2016.
WE WILL upon request provide the Union with comprehen-
sive responses to its proposals for a collective bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the infor-
mation previously requested prior to November 29, 2016, and
unlawfully withheld.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-182126 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.