Westinghouse Electric Supply Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 26, 1951

96 N.L.R.B. 407 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 407
W. Nelson C. Stanford P. Watkins
P. Newsom E. Stephenson R. Washington
L. Norwood E. Stewart A. White
0. Patterson J. Strickland DeWitt Williams
W. Randolph Ill. Strickland H. W. Williams
E. Redmon W. Strickland B. Wilson
A. Reed S. Taylor L. Wilson
V. Reed E. Thomas B. Woods
W. Richmond 1. Vaught B. Wooten
A. Saulsberry R. Venson J. Wooten
C. C. Sharp L. Walker H. Wynn
C. D. Smith 0. Walker
S. Smith W. J. Ward
Appendix C
Employees to be offered reinstatement and to be made whole for any loss of
pay ih the manner set forth in the Intermediate Report :
Al. Anderson
C. Barron
S. Bowling
I Boyd
J. Bryant
L. Byrd
W. Clayton
Eva Clayton
J. E. Couch
0. Dodson
J. Dorn
R Hardwick
1. Harris
A. Hester
A F. Howard
Jerry Jackson
E Jett
A. L. Jones
Ben Jones
E. Joy
A. Kizer
G. W. Lee
L. C. Marr
R. Marr
B. L. Matthews
R E Micken
It Osby
W. Payne
W Porter
T. Powell
S. Pryor
K. Roberson
T. J. Robertson
J Robison
R. Sherrod
G. Smith
11. Smith
J. Sturgiss
C. Walls
C. L. Watson
W. Williamson
Leland Wilson
W. B. Wren
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY and FEDERATION OF
WESTINGHOUSE INDEPENDENT SALARIED UNIONS. Case No. 6-CA-
234. September 26, 1951
Decision and Order
On December 11, 1950, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow
issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, find-
ing that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3),
and (5) of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist there-
found and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the charging Union, and
96 NLRB No. 58.
408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and sup-
porting briefs. The Respondent also requested oral argument before
the Board. This request is denied as the record and the briefs, in our
opinion, adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
this case and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,
and recommendations except as modified herein.-
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. However, unlike the
Trial Examiner, we do not find that the Respondent refused to bargain
with the Union in good faith by its delay of negotiations from August
16 to September 21, 1949, or by its earlier delay between February 14
and April 25, 1949.
Our finding of a violation is predicated upon the fact that the
Respondent refused to disclose to the Union the information con-
tained in its survey chart. Thus, at the September 21 negotiation
meeting, which the Respondent had asked the Union to defer pending
completion of its survey of rates paid by other area employers, the
paramount issue still in dispute was salary rate ranges. The Respond-
ent urged the Union to accept its existing rates, arguing that its
survey confirmed that it was paying equal or better salaries. The
Union asked the Respondent to substantiate this argument. At that
time, the Respondent had completed its survey and had prepared
mimeographed copies of a chart tabulating the results of the survey
without identifying any of the employers involved. Such a chart
could have been shown to the Union without disclosing confidential
data, as the Respondent in effect admits. The Trial Examiner
credited the testimony of the Union's representatives, who denied that
the Respondent showed them the chart. The Trial Examiner refused
to credit contrary testimony of the Respondent's witnesses. Absent
persuasive reasons on the record as a whole for disturbing this credi-
bility resolution, we adopt it .2 As the information disclosed in the
survey was clearly relevant to the salary rate range issue and the
1 The Intermediate Report contains some minor inaccuracies , none of which affects our
ultimate conclusions. For example, it was Harold J. Peterson and not Wilbur C. Maglierl
who testified that Williams stated that in the past "we did not have to bother with wage
scales and wage structure , and wage structure sheets." Similar insubstantial inaccuracies
in the Intermediate Report require no further comment herein.
2 See Wood Manufacturing Company, 95 NLRB 633. We note that the Respondent's
witnesses did not contradict further testimony that the Union, again asked for substantia-
tion of Respondent 's argument at a meeting on September 27.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 409
Respondent plainly knew it,3 the withholding of such information
after the Union's demand deprived the Union of any possibility of
•considering the Respondent's argument and bargaining intelligently
on the matter. Such conduct on the part of the Respondent does not
meet the test of good faith bargaining.' Accordingly, we adopt the
Trial Examiner's conclusion, and find that the Respondent refused
to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of Section 8 (a),
(1) and (5) of the Act when it failed to disclose to the Union the rate
range survey chart.*
The position of our dissenting colleague appears to be that the Trial
Examiner was clearly erroneous in crediting testimony that the Re-
spondent, upon demand, refused to disclose the information in its rate
range survey to the Union. We cannot agree. This credibility find-
ing was made by the Trial Examiner after a full consideration of the
conflicting testimony, and, as indicated in footnote 13 of the Inter-
mediate Report, was based on a "combination of factors," including the
4"comparative demeanor of the witnesses when testifying on particular
points, consistency or inconsistency with other facts in the case which
are undisputed or otherwise clear, and general plausibility." Such
credibility resolutions, in accordance with well-established Board
policy, as our dissenting colleague readily acknowledges, are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed except where the preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
No such exception is warranted here. Our dissenting colleague ap-
parently believes that, despite the rationale in footnote 13 of the Inter-
mediate Report, the Trial Examiner's resolution of this conflicting
testimony was based upon his interpretation of the survey, which our
colleague considers erroneous, as being more consistent with the testi-
mony of the General Counsel's witnesses. We find no support in the
record for this belief. Further, we agree with the Trial Examiner's
interpretation that the survey chart was generally inconsistent with
the Respondent's position on the question of salary rate ranges. That
the chart also contained statistics on weighted average salaries, which
the Respondent believes supported its position, does not detract from
the fact that the parties were negotiating on rate ranges and not aver-
ages. The Respondent's knowledge of this vital distinction is force-
fully indicated by its proposal of September 22-the day after it
claims to have first shown the survey chart to the Union. This pro-
a In N. L. R. B. v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F . 2d 947 (C. A 2), the Court stated :
"Since the Employer has an affirmative duty to supply relevant wage data , the refusal
to do so is not justified by the Union's failure initially to show the relevance of the
requested information . . . The information must be disclosed unless it plainly appears
irrelevant ." (Empasis supplied.)
4 Sherwin-Williams Company, 34 NLRB 651, enforced 130 F . 2d 555 (C. A. 3).
Sherwin-Williams Company, supra; Jacobs Manufacturing Company , 94 NLRB 1214;
southern Saddlery Company, 90 NLRB 1205 ; N. L. it. B. v. Yawman if Erbe Mfg. Co.,
supra,
410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posal refers to rate ranges and-not to average wages. Finally, al-
though it is true that the record fails to disclose any repetition of the
Union's request for the survey information after September 29 or 30-
the date when the Respondent claims again to have disclosed the chart
to the Union-it is significant that at the bargaining conference on
September 27, after the Respondent had allegedly shown the Union
the chart for the first time, the Union's witnesses testified without con-
tradiction that their request for proof substantiating the Respondent's
position again was not met. In these circumstances, we do not believe
it incumbent upon the Union to continue to make futile requests in the
face of two past refusals. As to the argument that the Respondent
would not have had the chart mimeographed if it had not intended
to show it to the Union, it is only necessary to point out that the parties
contemplated making individual rate reviews after agreeing on rate
ranges, and the Respondent may well have intended to give the chart
to the Union at that time to show its average salaries to be higher than
the average salaries of the competitors surveyed. Accordingly, we
find, upon the entire record, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Re-
spondent refused to disclose the survey information to the Union.
In view of our determination above, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent did not refuse
to bargain in good faith with the Union by hiring replacements on
November 7 at higher salaries than the strikers they replaced. We
expressly reserve our decision thereon.6
2. The Trial Examiner concluded that the strike of September 29
was, from its inception, an unfair labor practice strike. We agree.
The Respondent contends that the strike was economic in nature, as
there was no causal connection between the unfair labor practice found
and the strike. In support of its position, the Respondent relies upon
the Board's decision in Anchor Rome Mills, Inc.,' in which the Board
found, in part, that an economic strike had not been converted into an
unfair labor practice strike. We believe that the Anchor Rome case
is not apposite, because it presented a wholly different factual situa-
tion. In the instant case, the salary rate range issue was the para-
mount, if not the sole, issue in dispute when the Union struck because
negotiations had broken down on this issue. To the extent that the
Respondent's illegal conduct in withholding the survey chart made it
difficult, if not impossible, to rely on the bargaining process rather
than industrial strife for settling this issue, such conduct, unlike that
6 The Trial Examiner properly found that the Respondent did not refuse to bargain
in good faith with the Union in violation of the Act by its refusal to sign an incomplete
contract with the Union . The General Counsel and the Union excepted to this finding.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that, as this contract was not a final complete agree-
ment, the Respondent was not required to execute it under the Act The agreement in
the present case is clearly distinguishable from the contracts, involved in Salant & Salant,
Inc, 66 NLRB 24, and Mason & Hughes; 86 NLRB 848.
186 NLRB 1120.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 411
in the Anchor Rome case, was directly related to and became a con-
tributing factor in the inception of the strike. Accordingly, we find
the strike to be an unfair labor practice strike.
3. As the strike of September 29 was an unfair labor practice strike,
and as the Respondent's right to replace the strikers was therefore vul-
nerable,8 the Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act by refusing to reinstate
all 50 complainant strikers, named in Appendix A of the Intermediate
Report, when unconditionally requested to do so by the Union on
November 21, 1949. The Trial Examiner's reinstatement and back-pay
recommendations are substantially in accord with our remedial policy
and we shall adopt them, with the minor modifications hereinafter set
forth.
The Trial Examiner recommended, and we agree, that the Respond-
ent should offer reinstatement to 44 of the 50 complainants, on the
ground that their jobs had not been discontinued. However, the Trial
Examiner excluded, among others, Arthur E. Grieger and Shirley B.
McKee, on the ground that their jobs were discontinued after the
beginning of the strike.9 As such jobs may have been recreated, or as
there may be other positions to which the Respondent should reinstate
them, we are of the opinion, and find, that the Respondent should also
offer Grieger and McKee reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions,10 reducing its force, if necessary, in an nondis-
criminatory manner." If, after such reduction in force, no positions
are available for them, the Respondent should place them on a prefer-
ential employment list 12
The Trial Examiner recommended that the Respondent make whole
the 44 complainants to whom he awarded reinstatement, and 3 others
who had been belatedly offered reinstatement (Marrison, Koehler, and
Boyd), by payment of sums equal to what their normal net wages
would be to the dates of the offers of reinstatement. We shall adopt
this recommendation, and, in addition, shall order back pay for-the
3 remaining complainants as follows : Burkett to November 30, 1949,
when he notified the Respondent that he was no longer interested in
8 Seven Up Bottling Company o f Miami, Inc., 92 NLRB 1622 ; Black Diamond Steam-
ship Corporation v N L. R. B , 94 F 2d 875 ( C A 2) ; certiorari denied 304 U S. 579.
9The remaining four complainants ( Alice II Marrison , Margaret M Koehler, Nerine L.
Boyd, and Joseph S. Burkett ) have either been offered adequate reinstatement or renounced
interest therein.
10 See Chase National Bank of the City of New York , San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827, 829
11 See Carolina Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 1141 , enforced 190 F. 2d 675 ( C. A. 4).
12 See Carolina Mills, Inc , supra. To the extent that the facts with respect to some of
the other complainants ( specifically , Milton L Dierker, Elaine C. Fleming, Louis G.
Schmidt, and Francis It . Stewart ) are similar to those of Grieger and McKee, the same
remedy shall be applicable.
412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
returning to his job; 13 and Grieger and McKee to the date of the
Respondent's compliance with the reinstatement provisions hereof . 14
However, in the computation of Grieger's and McKee's back pay, there
shall be excluded the period between the date of the Intermediate,
Report and the date of this Decision and Order, in accordance with our
customary practice.15
We expressly reserve the right to modify the reinstatement and back-
pay provisions of our Order, if made necessary by a change of condi-
tions since the hearing or in order to define or clarify their application
to a specific set of circumstances not now apparent.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor'Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board
hereby orders that the Respondent, Westinghouse Electric Supply
Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Federation of Westinghouse In-
dependent Salaried Unions, or in any other labor organization of its
employees, by refusing to reinstate any of its employees because of their
participation in a strike, or by discriminating in any other manner in
regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Federation of Westing-
house Independent Salaried Unions as the exclusive representative of
all its salaried, office, and clerical employees at its Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, warehouse and office, excluding salesmen, sales specialists
and demonstrators, confidential secretaries, payroll supervisors, ware-
housemen, servicemen, truck drivers, maintenance employees; watch-
men, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
(c) Interrogating its employees concerning their strike or union
activities, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist Federation of Westing-
house Independent Salaried Unions or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
13 In this respect, the computation of Burkett's back pay is similar to that of Nerine L.
Boyd, who, on June 30, 1950, refused equivalent employment that the Respondent offered
her.
1a See footnote 12.
1a Hamilton-Scheu & Walsh Shoe Co., 80 NLRB 1496.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 413
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Federation of Westing-
house Independent Salaried Unions as the exclusive representative of
all the aforesaid employees and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Offer to all employees named in Appendix A attached to the
Intermediate Report, except Joseph S. Burkett, Alice F. Marrison,
Margaret M. Koehler, and Nerine L. Boyd, reinstatement in the man-
ner provided above in paragraph numbered 3 herein.
(c) Make whole all employees named in Appendix A attached to
the Intermediate Report for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the
Respondent's discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in
paragraph numbered 3 herein.
(d) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, time cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay and the rights of re-
instatement under the terms of this Decision and Order.
(e) Post at its office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, copies of the notice
attached hereto.16 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Sixth Region, shall, after being duly signed
by Respondent or its representative, be posted by Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER REYNOLDS , dissenting :
I disagree with my colleagues ' affirmation of the Trial Examiner's
finding that the Respondent failed to disclose to the Union the rate
range survey which is the factual basis utilized by the majority in
finding violations of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
At the outset, I wish to state that I recognize the Board's well-
settled policy that a Trial Examiner 's credibility resolutions will not
11 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words "A Decision and Order ," the words
"A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be overruled, except where the clear preponderance of all the evidence
convinces the Board that the Trial Examiner's resolution is incorrect 14
The rationale for the establishment of this policy is that the Trial
Examiner and not the Board has had the advantage of observing the
witnesses while they testified. However, I do not believe that the
circumstances in the instant case warrant strict adherence to the
policy. It is apparent to me that the Trial Examiner's resolution
of the conflict as to whether the Respondent disclosed the survey chart
was not based primarily upon 'the general demeanor or credibility of
the witnesses. Thus, the same witnesses which he credited and dis-
credited on this issue were found untrustworthy and trustworthy,
respectively, in testifying as to other matters. Indeed, I am satisfied
that the Trial Examiner's resolution of the conflict was based upon
the belief that the testimony of the General Counsel' s witnesses was
more consistent with the Trial Examiner's interpretation of the survey
itself. In other words, having construed the survey as not supporting
the position taken by the Respondent at the bargaining conference that
it was paying equal or better salaries than those of its competitors, the
Trial Examiner reasonably believed that the Respondent would not
have revealed such information to the union negotiators. In a situa-
tion such as the present one, where the Trial Examiner's resolution of a
credibility issue is premised principally upon his interpretation of
extrinsic evidence, the Board should not accord such a finding con-
trolling weight.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, I do not believe that the survey was
conclusively detrimental to the Respondent's general bargaining posi-
tion as to wages. At the least, it was an equivocal document con-
taining statistics which could be utilized to sustain divergent points
of view. For example, the Trial Examiner makes comparisons with
respect to the minima and maxima rate ranges, but the Respondent
strongly urges among other, things that the- weighted wage averages,
not considered by the Trial Examiner, were favorable to its position.
That the Respondent reasonably believed-as I think it did-that the
survey could be used to support its position,18 is sufficient to destroy
the primary basis of the Trial Examiner's credibility finding. In
any event, the following objective circumstances strongly corroborate
Respondent's witnesses that copies of the survey were in fact.shown
to the Union. After analyzing the wage information, the Respond-
ent prepared mimeographed copies of the survey, deleting the identi-
fying names in the copies so that the survey could be publicly used
without violating the confidence of those who supplied the informa-
tion. Further, the record fails to disclose that a request for the survey
17 Standard Dry Wald Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 544.
18 Among other things, it is significant that the Respondent on its own motion offered
the survey in evidence.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 415
was made by the Union at any time after the date on which the Re-
spondent claims to have shown it. Finally, except for this one dis-
puted matter, the record establishes, as my colleagues apparently con-
cede, that the Respondent bargained in good faith with a sincere
desire to conclude an agreement with the Union.
In view of the foregoing, I am not satisfied that the General Counsel
has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respond-
ent did not reveal to the Union the rate range survey and therefore
I cannot join in the majority's unfair labor practice findings.
CHAIRMAN HERZOG took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their par-
ticipation in strike or union activity or in any other manner inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist FEDERATION OF WESTINGHOUSE INDEPENDENT SALARIED
UNIONS or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with FEDERATION
OF WESTINGHOUSE INDEPENDENT SALARIED UNIONS as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described
herein with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All salaried, office, and clerical employees at our Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, warehouse and office, excluding salesmen, sales
specialists and demonstrators, confidential secretaries, pay-
roll supervisors, warehousemen, servicemen, truck drivers,
maintenance employees, watchmen, guards, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
416 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL offer the following employees immediate and full re-
instatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, in the manner set forth in the Board's De-
cision and Order : "
Mary Alice Allen James G. Lyons
Helen R. Bailey Ronald J. McCafferty
Gladys G. Baker Bessie A. McCallister
Sally L. Black Shirley B. McKee
Pauline R. Bozic M. Joan McQuiston
William G. Bricker William C. Maglieri
Rhea H. Busht . Anne O. Minzenberg
Martha H. Danner Helen Nebel
Lois L. Dearth James P. O'Connor
Milton L. Dierker Harold J. Peterson -
Margaret E. Evans Helen E. Pribila
Elaine C. Fleming John L. Pritchard
Majorie A. Fleming Evelyn K. Reising
Harold E. Fox Thomas A. Rodgers
George E. Gibson John W. Rush, Jr.
Arthur E. Grieger Corinne E. Scheloski
Florence V. Heasley Joanna D. Scheloski
Hilda R. Heil Louis G. Schmidt
Ester B. Hoffman Helen M. Stader
Lydia Z. Johnson Francis R. Stewart
Ruth D. Kapphan - Donald R. Tebbs
Dorothy A. (Kohler) Marjorie L. Waddell
Kucia Samuel A. Weller
June A. Landfried
WE WILL make whole the foregoing 46 employees, and also
Alice H. Marrison, Margaret M. Koehler, Joseph L. Burkett, and
Nerine L. Boyd, for any loss of pay suffered by them as a result of
the discrimination against them, to the extent and in the manner
set forth in the Board's Decision and Order.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-named union or any other labor organization. We will not
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment against any employee because of membership
in, or activity on behalf of, any such labor organization.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated-------------------- By-----------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 417
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
Upon a first amended charge filed July 24, 1950; by Federation of Westing-
house Independent Salaried Unions, herein called the Union, the General Counset
for the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director for the Sixths
Region (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), issued a complaint dated August 4, 1950;
alleging that Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, herein called the Re-
spondent, has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136),
herein referred to as the Act. Copies of the complaint, the amended charge,
and a notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint as amended at the
hearing alleges in substance:
(1) That on and since November 29, 1948, when the Union was certified by
the Board in accordance with the majority vote in an employee election, the
Union has been, and continues to be, the exclusive bargaining representative of
an appropriate bargaining unit consisting of all salaried office and clerical em-
ployees of the Respondent at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, warehouse and office,
exclusive of salesmen, sales specialists and demonstrators, confidential secre-
taries, payroll supervisors, warehousemen, servicemen, truck drivers, main-
tenance employees, watchmen, guards, professional employees, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
(2) That since on or about May 10, 1949, the Respondent, in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act, has refused to bargain collectively in good
faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit, although in meetings with the Union it has
pretended to do so.
(3) That from approximately September 30, 1949, to January 10, 1950, em-
ployees of the Respondent engaged in a strike which was caused, prolonged, and
continued by the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union in good faith-
(4) That, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act and in further
prolongation of the strike of its employees, the Respondent discharged 41 of its
striking employees on November 7, 1949, and has also, since November 21, 1949,
failed and refused to reinstate these 41 striking employees and 9 other striking
employees on their application.'
(5) That on or about December 1, 1949, while the Union's request for a gen-
eral wage increase was pending, the Respondent, in violation of the Act and in
further prolongation of the strike of its employees, unilaterally and without prior
consultation or collective bargaining with the Union, announced and put into
effect a wage increase for approximately 17 of its nonstriking employees in the
appropriate unit.
(6) That in September 1949, the Respondent, through its agent, Gerald Sea-
lone, questioned Shirley McKee, an employee, concerning her Union and con-
certed activities, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
' The original charge was ffied and duly served on November 8, 1949.
a The General Counsel and the staff attorney appearing for him at the hearing are
herein referred to as the General Counsel.; the National Labor Relations. Board. is referred
to as the Board.
' For the names of these employees see Appendix A.
418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent, in its answer to the complaint, admits (1) -the appropriateness
of the unit alleged in the complaint; (2) the selection and, designation of the
Union as collective bargaining representative by a majority of the employees in
this unit, in a Board-conducted election of November 15, 1948; and (3) the
Board's certification on November 29, 1948, of the Union as. the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all the employees in the unit. The Respondent's an-
swer, however, denies that the Union has continued to be the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of these employees, that the Respondent committed any
of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, or that the strike begin-
ning on or about September 30, 1949, was caused or prolonged by any unfair
labor practices of the Respondent. The Respondent's answer further denies
that on November 7, 1949, the Respondent discharged the 41 employees named
in the complaint, but admits that it replaced these employees on or about that
date.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on Sep-
tember 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 27, and 28, 1950, before the undersigned Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the ' Re-
spondent, and the Union appeared by counsel and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
bearing upon the issues. Before the end of the hearing, the General Counsel
submitted his oral argument upon the issues in the case ; counsel for the Re-
spondent and the Union waived oral argument. Since the hearing, the Re-
spondent has forwarded to the undersigned its brief and requests for findings of
fact and conclusions of law.'
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, a- Delaware corporation with its
principal office located in New York, New York, is engaged in the sale and dis-
tribution of electrical apparatus and appliances. Although it maintains offi-
ces and places of business at various points throughout the United States, only its
Pittsburgh, -Pennsylvania, branch is involved in these proceedings. During the
12 months preceding the hearing, the Respondent purchased for sale at its
Pittsburgh branch, products of a value in excess of $4,000,000, of which more than
70 percent was shipped from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
to the Respondent's- branch in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During the same 12-
month period, it sold at its Pittsburgh branch products of a value in excess of
$4,000,000, of which approximately 7 percent was shipped to points outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The Respondent admits, and the undersigned finds, that it is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
4 The undersigned grants the Respondent's request for findings of fact numbered 1 to 7,
inclusive ; 9; 10; 12; 13 ; 15; 16; 18 to 22, inclusive ; 23 26; 28; 30 to 33, inclusive ;
35; 36; 37; 38 ; 40; 41; 42; 45 ; 46; 48; 49; 53 ; 57 to 62, inclusive ; 64; 65; and 67.
Each of the other requests made by the Respondent for specific findings of fact is at least
partially rejected as will appear from a comparison of them with the findings of fact
made in this Report. Several findings of fact requested by the Respondent are stated in
general , conclusional form ; in those cases, the requests are rejected but findings as to the
facts are hereinafter made upon the basis of the evidence. The undersigned grants the
Respondent 's request for conclusion of law numbered 4 and rejects the Respondent ' s other
requests for conclusions of law.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
419
Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and interference, restraint, and coercion
The principal questions presented for decision in the present case are (1)
whether the Respondent on and after May 10, 1949, refused to bargain in good
faith with the Union which had been certified by the Board as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the Respondent's clerical and office employees as the
result of an employee election held with the Respondent's consent on November
15, 1948; and (2) whether, in the course and at the termination of a strike which
began on September 29, 1949, the Respondent discriminatorily discharged some of
the strikers and refused all of them reinstatement to their jobs.
The General Counsel produced a number of witnesses to testify about state-
ments made by the Respondent's representatives to various employees both be-
fore the election and before the strike. Most of these statements were allegedly
made more than 6 months prior to the filing of the original charge in the present
case and are presented by the General Counsel merely as background to the Re-
spondent's later refusal to bargain with the Union in good faith, i. e., to demon-
strate the Respondent's reluctance, if not its unwillingness, to bargain with the
Union from the beginning. However, by an amendment to the complaint made
without opposition at the hearing, the General Counsel asserts that one of
these incidents which occurred within the 6 months preceding the filing and
service of the charge, constituted an interference with the employees' rights
in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. We shall give preliminary con-
sideration to the testimony concerning these incidents before turning to the
principal questions.
Upon the uncontrolled testimony of employee J. P. O'Connor, the under-
inds that a week or so before the election on November 15, 1948, Districtsigned f
Sales Manager R. L. Whitney told O'Connor that if the Union won the election
the employees could no longer come in to ask for a raise, but would have to
do so through the Union.
Upon the uncontradicted testimony of employee William C. Maglieri, the
undersigned finds that 7 or 10 days before the November 1948 election, Branch
Sales Manager Elmer J. Handlon called Maglieri into his office and told him
that the Respondent, with its merit wage increases and vacations, "was a good
outfit to work for" ; that without a union an employee could advance on his
own merit without a union representative's speaking for him ; but that with
a union, advancement would depend on seniority.
In spite of the broad denial by District Storekeeper Gerald M. Scalone` that
he had "any conversations with any employees concerning or pertaining to
relations between Management and the Union," e the undersigned finds, upon
the testimony of employees Helen Nebel, Dorothy Kucia, and Anne Minzenberg,
that during the week preceding the November 1948 election Scalone called them
and the other clerks in the Order Service and Purchasing Departments sepa-
It was stipulated that Scalone was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
° The quotation is taken from the question of the Respondent's counsel, which Scalone
answered in the negative Aside from, this general denial, none of Scalone's testimony
could possibly refer to the statements which employees Nebel, Kucia, and Minzenberg
attributed to him.
420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rately into his office and told them in substance that the Respondent had provided
a fine, new building for them to work in, with a nice office, washroom, and cafe-
teria ; that it could not afford salary raises ; and that, if the Union got in, they
would forfeit their rights as individuals to deal with the Respondent' and that
"everything would have to go through the Union."'
In July 1949, during the period in which District Manager Williams was
engaging in conferences with the Union's representatives looking towards a
contract, Williams presented 10-year service pins to a number of employees at
a meeting attended by all the clerical, sales, and warehouse employees. Em-
ployees John W. Rush, Jr., and Harold J. Peterson, testifying as witnesses for
the General Counsel, said that in the course of his remarks Williams made a
statement to the effect that there had been friendly relations between the em-
ployees and the Respondent "before the Union,'! and that it was too bad that
the employees had to bring in the Union. However, William C. Maglieri, testi-
fying as a witness for the Union, stated that on this occasion Williams merely
said that when one of the older employees was first employed, "we did not have
to bother with wage scales and wage structures, wage structure sheets."
Williams, Supervisor Charles Barrett, salesman Jack Britton, and Branch
Sales Manager Handlon, who attended the meeting, denied that Williams made
the remarks attributed to him by Rush and Peterson or any remarks about the
Union. The undersigned credits their denials.
Employee Louis G. Schmidt testified that in July 1949 he went of his own
accord first to Sales Manager Whitney, then to District Manager Williams,
and finally to District Storekeeper Scalone, and told each of them that he wanted
them to know that he. had not taken part in instigating the union movement,
whereupon each of them said that he was glad Schmidt had told him. This
much of Schmidt's testimony is not contradicted ; indeed, Scalone confirmed
the story up to this point so far as it involved him. Were this all of Schmidt's
stuiy, the undersigned would see no relevancy in it to the issues in the present
case. But Schmidt testified that Scalone not only said he was glad Schmidt
had come to him, but also asked Schmidt who the instigators of the union move-
ment were. Scalone denied having asked this question of Schmidt and the
undersigned credits his denial.
We come now to the testimony concerning the one conversation between a
supervisor and an employee which the General Counsel alleges in his amendment
to the complaint, to have been a'violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
Employee Shirley McKee testified that a week before the strike in September
1949 Supervisor Scalone' called her into his office, told her that he thought
her wages were fair, and then asked her whether she was going on strike.
Scalone, in his testimony, did not specifically deny having this conversation
with Miss McKee, although he did deny having "any conversations with any
f Employee Lois L Dearth also testified that Respondent's auditor, John J. Josack, "told
me if the Union got in I'd never be able to come to him with any problems ; it would always
be through the Union, and that my seniority would nrean nothing to me, I would never
be able to get any merit raises, and I didn't say anything " She testified on direct examf-
nation that Josack made this statement "week or so before we went out on strike, in
September of 1949 " On cross-examination, she testified first that this conversation
occurred before the election, then, that it occurred in 1949, "before we went out on sriike,"
and, finally, that "I don't know whether it was before or after the election, but I know
it was before we went out on strike " Although Josack did not appear to testify, and Miss
Dearth's testimony is therefore uncontradicted, the undersigned bases no finding upon it.
Miss McKee testified that it was "Mr Scalone ," a supervisor, who called her in and
questioned her on this occasion . The General Counsel thereupon asked her , "Is that Air.
Charles Scalone?" And Miss McKee answered , "Yes " However , Scalone ' s first name was
"Gerald" and not "Charles" and the General Counsel apparently misspoke himself, thereby
misleading the witness.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 42E
employees in the bargaining unit concerning the strike ."
9 The undersigned
credits Miss McKee 's testimony and finds that by Scalone 's questioning Miss-
McKee concerning her possible participation in a strike, the Respondent, in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, interfered with, restrained, and co-
erced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
B. The refusal to bargain and discrimination
1 The certification of the Union, its bargaining request, and preparations for
negotiation
On November 29, 1948, pursuant to the results of an employee election conducted
in accordance with a "Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election," 10
the Board certified the Union to be the exclusive bargaining representative of all
the Respondent's employees at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, warehouse and
office in an appropriate bargaining unit consisting of all salaried office and
clerical employees, excluding salesmen, sales specialists and demonstrators,
confidential secretaries, payroll supervisors, warehousemen, servicemen, truck
drivers, maintenance employees , watchmen, guards , professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act.
In a letter dated January 20, 1949, President Leo F. Bollens of the Union asked
D. B. Williams, manager of the Respondent's East Central District, which
includes the Pittsburgh branch, for a meeting "just as soon as is possible," "for
the purpose of negotiating a key sheet . . . [and] position descriptions for each
of the different categories of employees covered within our certification." The
letter added that "Following the completion of these negotiations, we request
'a Rate Review "
During a telephone call made by Bollens to Williams on or about January 27,11
they agreed to meet on February 14, and Bollens promised to furnish Williams
with the Union's forms for rate reviews in advance of the meeting. Accordingly,
in a letter dated February 4, Bollens sent Williams these forms together with
completed specimens of a hypothetical rate review and position descriptions,
confirmed February 14 as the meeting date, and advised Williams that the
members of the Union had elected employees J. P. O'Connor and W. A. Horner
as federal representatives, and certain other employees from various departments
as local group representatives.
As a result of the Union's bargaining request, there were approximately 15
meetings from February 14 to November 21, 1949,12 inclusive, which were attended
by either or both Williams and District Sales Manager R. L. Whitney for the
Respondent , and by either or both Bollens and Secretary Harry C. Jones for
the Union. Each of these meetings was also attended by the Union's two federal
9 As in an instance already noted and commented upon in a preceding footnote, the
quotation is from a question put to Scalone by Respondent' s counsel , which Scalone answered
in the negative.
10 In the election on November 15, 1948 , 80 of the 88 employees in the stipulated appro-
priate unit cast valid ballots. Fifty-six of these votes were for, and 24 were against, the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in .the unit.
11 Bollens testified that not having received a reply to his letter of January 20, he tele-
phoned Wililams on January 27 Union Secretary Jones testified that he was present
when Bollens made the call Williams testified that he telephoned Bollens on or about
January 25. Whitney testified that he was present when Williams made the call. The
undersigned credits Bollens ' testimony on this point
12 Unless otherwise indicated, all events which are hereinafter discussed, took place in.
1949
974176-52-vol. 96-28
422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representatives, with employee T. A. Rodgers replacing W. A. Horner as federal
representative in May. or June 1949. In addition to these meetings with either
or both Bollens and Jones, Williams and Whitney conferred at times with the
federal representatives alone.
These meetings and their related events may roughly be divided into several
periods. In the first period to and including a meeting on August 16, the parties
at first concerned themselves almost exclusively with the development of position
descriptions and then, later, with all the terms of an agreement except salary
rates. In the second period, through September 1949, salary rates were the
subject of consideration and, as a result of a failure to reach an agreement with
respect thereto, a strike started on September 29. In the third period, the Re-
spondent replaced a number of the strikers in November and two meetings were
held with a United States conciliator."
2. Meetings from February 14 to and including August 16,1949
At the first meeting held on February 14, Union President Bollens asked Man-
ager Williams for the Respondent's position descriptions which Bollens declared
should be settled first, since they were essential to a discussion of salary rates.
Although Williams said that he did not have these position descriptions, he
promised to prepare them and stated that as soon as he had done so, he would
meet again with the Union's representatives.
On February 23, Jones telephoned Williams and asked him when the position
descriptions might be expected.14 Williams replied that they would be sent over
to, the Union immediately and accordingly sent Jones by messenger, a draft of
position descriptions covering the Respondent's existing 17 employee-classifica-
tions, and a list of the monthly salary rates of each of the employees working in
the bargaining unit.
Jones testified without contradiction, and the undersigned finds, that in their
telephone conversation on February 23 Williams answered Jones' question as to
when another meeting could be held, by saying that he was busy and that Jones
should call him in a few weeks.
Accordingly, the second meeting was held on March 17, as the result of a
telephoned request made by Jones to Williams a few days before that date. At
"The testimony of the General Counsel's and the Respondent's witnesses particularly
-with respect to the meetings from February 14 to August 16, 1949, inclusive , presents
numerous conflicts on details and is also broad and sketchy on a number of matters More-
over, each of the witnesses , both for the General Counsel and the Respondent , was obvi-
ously uncertain on points of varying importance , and, at times , his testimony was incon-
sistent not only with the testimony of other witnesses produced by the same Counsel, but
also with his own testimony at other points . This is not too surprising in view of the
number of conversations, the lack of any substantial thread of written communications
-between the parties, and the apparent absence of any reliable , refreshing memoranda that
might have assisted the witnesses as they were testifying As a result , however, the
testimony of all the witnesses illustrates at least the fallibility of memory and, for that
reason if for no other, the testimony of no one witness appears to the undersigned to be
.entitled to credence on all points . Resolutions of conflicts and uncertainties in the testi-
mony of the witnesses have therefore been nrade upon a combination of factors ; i. e , the
-comparative demeanor of the witnesses when testifying on particular points , consistency
or inconsistency with other facts in the case which are undisputed or otherwise clear, and
general plausibility.
14 Jones testified that he telephoned Williams on February 18 and again on February 23,
,and asked each time when the position descriptions might be expected and when the next
meeting could be held. Williams denied that he received any call from the Union between
Februaiy 14 and February 23, but admitted receiving the call from Jones on February 23.
-The undersigned believrs it to be immaterial whether Jones telephoned Williams on Febru-
ary 18 as well as on February 23, and therefore does not resolve the conflict in the testi-
mony on this point.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 423
this meeting, Bollens rejected the Respondent's draft of position descriptions
because, he said, they did not include many of the duties which were actually
being performed by employees within each of the classifications." Bollens and
O'Connor testified that Williams replied that "they needed no union, and that the
procedure was too cumbersome." Williams and Whitney denied that Williams
made this statement and Union Secretary Jones, although present at the meeting,
gave no testimony on this point. Whitney, however, testified that Williams, in
disputing Bollens' argument that each position description should be detailed,
specific, and cover only the exact duties actually performed by the particular
employees in the classification, said that if this were attempted, "the organiza-
tion would become quite cumbersome and difficult to operate." Although the
matter is not free from doubt the undersigned credits Williams' and Whitney's
denials that Williams told the Union's representatives on March 17 that no union
was needed. He finds, however, in accordance with Whitney's testimony, that
Williams did tell Bollens that the detailed, exact position descriptions sought
by Bollens would render the Respondent's office operations too cumbersome and
difficult.
In the meeting of March 17, after rejecting the Respondent's draft of position
descriptions, Bollens submitted a typed proposal of a system of "progressive rate
ranges," providing minimum and maximum monthly salaries for each job with an
automatic progression at 6-month intervals through various intermediate rates."
Bollens told Williams that if the Respondent accepted this salary progression
system with the specific minimum, intermediate, and maximum rates, the Union
would accept the Respondent's position descriptions as they stood, but that
otherwise the position descriptions would have to be completely rewritten. Wil-
liams said that the Union's proposal was "not satisfactory" ; that the proposed
rates were too high ; that they were more than the Respondent could afford ; and
that he would attempt to rewrite the position descriptions and then meet again
with the Union's representatives.
It is thus undisputed, and the undersigned accordingly finds, that at the
meetings of February 14 and March 17 the Union insisted that since the Respond-
ent would not accept the Union's proposed rate ranges and automatic rate pro-
gression, the parties should first negotiate position descriptions. Williams and
Whitney testified, but Bollens and Jones denied, that upon Williams' suggestion
at the meeting of March 17 the parties also agreed that after negotiating and
reaching agreement on position descriptions and classifications, they would
negotiate a "working agreement" or general contract and then salary rates.
According to Whitney's testimony, the accepted bargaining schedule contemplated
the ultimate negotiation of a "contract or agreement, to which a wage structure
would be attached." However, the implication in this testimony of Whitney
that the parties agreed that no contract was to be executed until wage rates
were agreed upon does not appear in Williams' testimony. For Williams testified
merely that on March 17 "we agreed that we would first write job descriptions.
Second, job classifications-the two go hand in hand ; and, three, we would
negotiate an agreement, a working agreement ; and, four, we would discuss
wages." The undersigned credits Bollens' and Jones' denials that the Union and
the Respondent agreed upon a negotiating schedule postponing the execution of
any contract until salary rates were determined.
"This was the substance of the testimony of all witnesses except Jones, who testified
that Bollens' objection to the Respondent's position descriptions was that they were
"too broad ; they contained more duties than some of the people were doing, and they
NN ere too all-inclusive and that we couldn't accept them in that present form."
16 The salary ranges proposed by the Union are set forth in Appendix B.
424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
After March 17, either or both Williams and Whitney met with either or both
Bollens and Jones and the Union's two federal representatives on April 12,
June 15, June 23, July 18. July 29, August 4, and August 16.11 In addition to the
meetings on the dates just given, there was one other meeting between April
12 and June 15, which Bollens, Jones, and O'Connor testified was held on April
25, but which Williams and Whitney testified took place on May 12.
Dissatisfied with the lack of progress on the position description issue, Bol-
lens suggested to Williams at the meeting of April 12 that perhaps the Union
should write these descriptions, but Williams said, "he didn't think that was
right." At the same meeting, Bollens also told the Respondent's representatives
that the Union intended to file a notice of dispute with the Federal Mediation
Service, and, on the following day, April 13, Jones advised the Respondent that
the Union had done so. At the meetings on April 12 and June 15. Bollens re-
peated his offer to accept the Respondent's position descriptions if the Re-
spondent would accept the "progressive rate ranges" proposed by the Union
on March 17, but on both occasions, the Respondent refused.
Either at the April 12 meeting (according to Williams' and Whitney's testi-
mony) or at the disputed April 25 meeting (according to Jones' and O'Connor's
testimony),18 it was agreed upon Bollens' suggestion that the Respondent
should submit job-content questionnaires to the employees with the request that
they be answered and returned to the Respondent before May 10. The question-
naire, accompanied by this request, was accordingly circulated among the em-
ployees on April 26 but they were slow in returning the questionnaires and it
was not until sometime late in May that the Respondent received all the answers.
On or about May 26, Union Secretary Jones asked Williams what progress had
been made on the questionnaire and Williams told him that he had not completed
the revised position descriptions. Thereafter, as the employees continued to
submit their answers, Williams and Whitney, sometimes together and sometimes
separately, called meetings with O'Connor and the Union's other federal repre-
sentative, and discussed and made tentative changes in the Respondent's draft
of position descriptions on May 31, June 2, June 3, June 14, July 11, July 12, and
July 14."
At the meeting on June 15, the Respondent submitted to the Union a complete,
revised draft of position descriptions. Thereafter, in the continuing conferences
with the Union's federal representatives and also with the full union com-
mittee, including Bollens and Jones, further changes were made and by August
16 the parties had agreed upon 16 job descriptions and classifications to super-
sede the Respondent's original 17, and also upon the classification of all but
4 of the employees in the unit 20 By September 21 the classifications of these
4 employees were also settled.
17 Williams on direct examination testified as to the substance of an additional meeting
which he said was held on July 25. On cross-examination, however, he admitted, ae
Bollens and Jones also testified, that there was no such additional meeting on July 25.
18 Bollens was obviously in error in testifying, as he did, that the job-questionnaire was
first suggested by him, and agreed to by Williams, at the meeting of June 23
19 The findings as to the specific dates of these conferences with the federal represen-
tatives are based upon the testimony of Williams and Whitney O'Connor testified that
he had four or five such conferences on job descriptions in June and July but that he
could not give their dates nor their exact number
20 This final revision continued only the original position classifications or job titles
for stenographers, classes A and B, and_also -for typists, classes A and B. See Appendix B.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 425
Although the witnesses were in agreement that the Respondent submitted a
complete, revised draft of position descriptions on June 15, which became the
basis of the settlement of that issue, there is a conflict in their testimony as to
whether the Respondent, before June 15, had submitted an earlier, complete
draft. Williams testified that, in addition to the revised draft admittedly given
to the Union on June 15, he submitted successive complete, revised drafts of the
position descriptions at the meeting of April 12, the disputed meeting of May 12,
and the meetings of June 23, July 18, July 29, August 4, and August 16. Whitney
corroborated Williams' testimony as to the submission of these revisions, except
those allegedly presented at the meetings of August 4 and August 16, which
Whitney testified he did not attend. Williams and Whitney further testified,
however, that although they had copies of a number of these revisions in their
files, they were able to identify them with reference to the meetings at which
they were submitted only in the cases of the June 15, June 23, and August 16
revisions. Accordingly, only the proposed revisions of position descriptions
allegedly presented to the Union at the meeting on these three dates were offered
in evidence by the Respondent and received by the undersigned. On the other
hand, Bollens, Jones, and O'Connor testified that when Bollens asked Williams
at the meeting on April 12 and the disputed meeting of April 25 for the revision
of position descriptions which Williams had promised to prepare, Williams
replied that he did not have it ; and that the first complete, proposed revision
of these descriptions submitted or shown to them by the Respondent was the
proposed revision presented to them by Whitney at the meeting of June 15, which
Williams did not attend.
In the important, material conflicts in the testimony which have been set forth
but unresolved up to this point of this Report, the undersigned credits the testi-
mony of Bollens, Jones, and O'Connor, rather than that of Williams and Whitney,
and accordingly finds: (1) That, in addition to the undisputed meetings between
the parties in the period up to and including August 16, there was another meet-
ing on April 25 at which the parties agreed to submit job-content questionnaires
to the employees; (2) that there was no meeting on May 12; (3) that the Re-
spondent, in spite of its promises on March 17, failed to submit a revision of the
position descriptions to the Union, at the meetings on April 12 and April 25;
and (4) that the Respondent's first revision of the position descriptions was in
fact submitted to the Union's representatives at the meeting on June 15.
The general course and results of the meetings up to and including August 16,
so far as they involved the negotiation of general contract terms, are undisputed.
With the prospect of shortly reaching complete agreement on position descrip-
tions becoming apparent at the meeting of June 23, the Union, at Williams' sug-
gestion, submitted a proposed form of contract to the Respondent either at that
meeting or at the meeting of July 18," and Williams then said he would have to
refer the proposal to the Respondent's home office in New York. Williams there-
21 The undersigned believes It to be immaterial whether the Union's contract proposal
was submitted on June 23, as Williams testified, or on July 18, as Jones and O'Connor
testified Whitney %N as not present at the June 23 meeting and gave no testimony as to
when the Union submitted its contract proposal. Bollens testified that the Union and
the Respondent exchanged contract proposals on July 29. But the undersigned finds, in
accordance with the testimony of Williams and O'Connor, that, -,xhatever the exact dates
were, the Union submitted its contract proposal at the meeting preceding the meeting
at which the Respondent submitted its proposed draft.
426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
after submitted a proposed form of contract to the Union's representatives at the
next meeting on either July 18 or July 29.22
Upon Bollens' pointing out to Williams that the Respondent's draft contained
no provision for dues deductions and that the seniority, "cooperation," and griev-
ance clauses were- incomplete, Williams agreed to submit another contract pro-
posal including acceptable provisions on these matters. Accordingly, on August
16, Williams submitted the Respondent's last form of proposed contract!' This
draft, like the Union's original contract proposal and the Respondent's previous
proposal, purported to be the complete contract of the parties, but left a blank
space for the insertion of salary rates. Unlike the Respondent's previous pro-
posal, however, it contained provisions for dues deductions and holidays, and
fuller provisions concerning "cooperation," grievances, and seniority. Bollens
suggested that the parties sign this agreement and continue negotiations on
position descriptions and salary rates. Williams refused to sign the contract,
however, unless the Respondent's existing salary rates were incorporated in the
agreement, and further informed the Union's representative that he would have
to submit the contract to his home office in New York City.24
In the ensuing discussion on August 16, Bollens contended that the Respond-
ent's existing minimum rates were too low and below the minimum about to be
fixed by Congress in pending amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Williams replied that if and when the amendments were passed the Respondent
would comply. Williams also argued that the Respondent's existing rates should
be continued because they were in accordance with the area pattern. The meet-
ing of August 16 ended with Bollens promising to submit salary proposals. in
writing and with Williams also promising to submit a written list of the Re-
spondent's wage rates.
While it thus appears clear that as a result of the meetings up to and including
August 16 the parties had reached agreement on position descriptions and the
general terms of a contract, the General Counsel and the Union contend that the
Respondent's failure to bargain in good faith was demonstrated during that
period not only by its refusal to sign the contract before negotiating wage rates
but also by its prolonging of the negotiations up to that point. In this connec-
tion they argue that the evidence shows that the Respondent, after undertaking
to revise the position descriptions and to advise the Union when each succeeding
meeting could be held to consider them, delayed calling the meeting until the
"Here again the undersigned believes it to be immaterial whether the Respondent's
initial contract proposal was made on July 18, as Williams and Whitney testified, or on
July 29, as Bollens and O'Connor testified. The material fact, on which these witnesses
are in agreement, is that the Respondent submitted a form of contract at the meeting fol-
lowing the Union's submission of its proposed contract.
The testimony of Williams and Whitney concerning the meeting of July 18, however,
furnishes an example of the inconsistency of witnesses produced by the same counsel,
to which reference has been made earlier in this Report. For Williams testified that he
submitted the Respondent's contract proposal at this meeting and that Whitney was not
present. But Whitney testified that he submitted the proposal at this meeting and that
Williams was not present
The undersigned believes Jones to have been clearly in error in testifying, as he did,
that the Respondent's first contract proposal was submitted on August 4.
21 Williams testified that this was the third contract proposal submitted to the Respond-
ent, the second proposal having been made on August 4 Bollens and Whitney testified
that the August 16 proposal was only the second final contract proposal of the Respond-
ent The undersigned believes it unnecessary to decide whether or not a second contract
proposal had been made by the Respondent on August 4.
24 These findings are based upon the testimony of Bollens, Jones, and O'Connor Williams,
without specific reference to the August 16 meeting, testified that "on several occasions"
lie refused to sign the contract because it did not contain wage rates. In addition, he
admitted that on July 29 he told the Union's representatives he would have to submit
the contract to the Respondent 's attorney at its headquarters.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 427
Union finally requested them, and submitted no revision of the position descrip-
tions until June 15.
That the Respondent undertook to revise its position descriptions and to call
meetings for their consideration is clear from the evidence. It is also clear from
the evidence, and the undersigned accordingly finds, that in the successive inter-
vals between each of the first four meetings on February 14, March 17, April 12,
and the disputed meeting on either April 25 or May 12, the Respondent failed to.
notify the Union when the next meeting could be held, and that the dates for the
last three of these meetings were arranged as the result of requests made by either
Jones, Bollens, or O'Connor to Williams only a few days in advance of each of
these meetings 25 It has also been found that , when Respondent apparently made
no attempt to communicate with the Union after the disputed meeting of May 12,
Jones asked Williams on May 26 about the Respondent's progress with the em-
ployee questionnaire. From May 26 to August 16, however, there appears to be
no basis in the evidence for finding that the Respondent was dilatory in setting
the times for meetings with the Union's negotiators. Each of the meetings with.
the Union's federal representatives from May 31 to July 15, inclusive, was
arranged by either Whitney or Williams. The meeting of June 15 with Bollens
and Jones immediately followed the meeting of June 14 with the federal repre-
sentatives. Finally, according to a composite of the consistent, uncontradicted'
testimony of Williams, Whitney, and Bollens, which the undersigned credits, (1)
the meeting of June 23 was called pursuant to an arrangement with the Union's
representatives at the June 15 meeting , for another meeting "sometime in the
next 10 days or 2 weeks" ; (2) by agreement of the parties at the June 23 meeting,
a meeting was scheduled for the week ending July 5 but was, for some reason
undisclosed by the evidence, postponed and later, upon Williams' request to
O'Connor, was rescheduled for July 18; (3) the meeting of August 4 was arranged
by the parties at the meeting of July 29; and (4) the meeting on August 16 was
arranged by Williams during a telephone call to Bollens on August 11, when he
read to Bollens several of the contract changes which he proposed to submit at
the meeting on August 16. There was no evidence by whom or when the meeting
of July 29 was called.
3. Meetings in September 1949, and the beginning of the strike
On August 16, in compliance with his promise at the meeting that day, Presi-
(lent Bollens mailed to the Respondent the Union's new proposal for salary
rate ranges 28 Thereafter, Union Secretary Jones telephoned to Williams and
asked when the parties could meet again. According to Jones he made "numer-
ous" calls beginning a week or so after the August 16 meeting, and was told
by Williams that the Respondent was making a survey of the salary rates
paid by other companies in the area. According to Williams, there were two,
telephone calls from Jones: the first on September 7, when Williams told Jones
that the survey would be completed in 2 or 3 weeks, and the second on September
25 These findings are made upon the testimony of Jones and Williams Jones testified'
without contradiction concerning his telephoned requests to Williams before the March 17
and,April 25 meetings, and also a similar telephoned request to Williams preceding a
meeting on April 8. It is apparent that Jones was in error in his reference to a meeting
on April 8, and actually meant the meeting on April 12, since all the other witnesses
agreed in their testimony that there was a meeting on April 12 but not on April 8. In
any event. Williams testified that the meeting on April 12 was arranged at the telephoned
request of either Jones or Bollens , and that the disputed meeting of May 12 was set as the
result of a request from Jones or O'Connor.
26 For the rate ranges proposed by the Union on August 16 and a comparison with the
existing rate ranges and other rate-range proposals of the parties during the history of
the case, see Appendix B.
428 -DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
19, when a meeting on September 21 was arranged. The undersigned credits
Williams on this point.
Williams and Whitney credibly testified that on or about August 20 they
separately began visiting 10 of their competitors. According to Williams' testi-
mony, at least one of these visits was made as late as the middle of September.
In each case, Williams or Whitney asked the competitor for its salary rate
-ranges and average salaries for those of its employees who performed services
'equivalent to the services described in each of the 16 position descriptions
agreed upon by the Union and the Respondent. According to a stipulation
,entered into by counsel at the hearing, this information was supplied by one of
these competitors for all but 1 of the 16 classifications in a letter dated August
23, 1949; by another competitor for all but 2 of the 16 position classifications
-in a letter dated August 24, 1949; by a third competitor for all 16 position
'classifications in an undated letter ; and by the 7 other competitors in undated
letters for from 1 to 9 comparable position classifications. It was further
stipulated that the Respondent prepared a number of mimeographed copies of
.a chart showing the monthly salary rate ranges and averages salaries of the
competitors and of the Respondent for the 16 position classifications, but that
this chart omitted not only the names of the competitors (whom the Respond-
ent had promised not to disclose and therefore indicated on the chart only by
:alphabetical letters), but also (1) information supplied by Company A that,
nn, addition to regular salaries shown on the chart for employees in 14 compa-
-Table position classifications, it had paid them a 25 percent salary bonus in 1945
and a 30 percent salary bonus in 1946, 1947, and 1948; and (2) the information
supplied by Company B that, in addition to the regular salaries for employees in
,position classifications comparable to all 16 of the Respondent's classifications,
it provided a noncontributory pension of 5 percent. Even aside from this
extra-salary compensation which was not reflected on the Respondent's chart,
the rate-range figures submitted by the competitors and set forth in the chart
4 id not, in the opinion of the undersigned, uniformly or even generally support
the Respondent's argument to the Union's representatives that it was paying
rates equal to, or better than, those of its local competitors ; on the contrary,
revelation to the Union of these figures and their comparisons might well have
served the Union's bargaining purposes on the salary rate issue rather than
the Respondent's purposes." '
27 For example, six of the seven competitors who reported their rate ranges for the posi-
tion of salesclerk. A (i. e, Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F), gave ranges substantially
exceeding both the minimum and the maximum of the Respondent's range of $165-$250.,
The lowest ranges of these seven other companies was $175-$275 and $195-$260, while
their highest was $215-$350. The seventh competitor, Company Y, gave a range of $200-
$250, thus substantially exceeding the Respondent's minimum for the classification.
Of the five competitors who reported ranges for the position of salesclerk B, three of
them (Companies C, G, and Y) all reported ranges substantially exceeding, both the
Respondents minimum and maximum of $150 and $200, the lowest range being $176 to
1207, and the others being $190 to $225 and $250 to $260.
On a company-by-company basis, the information given by Company B (aside from the
noncontributory pension) was most favorable for the Respondent's purposes Of the 16
position rate ranges given by this company, 11 were equal to or less than the Respondent's
ranges for comparable positions ; only 2 were higher in both their minima and maxima,
and the 3 others were higher in their maxima.
Next most favorable for the Respondent were the seven rate ranges given by Company D,
five of which were equal to or less than the Respondent's minima and maxima, while only
one exceeded the Respondent's minimum and maximum and the others exceeded only the
Respondent's maximum.
Companies N and H furnished information of no value for comparisons since Company
N presented only its average salaries and not its ranges, and Company H presented only
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 429
As the result of the. telephone call from Union Secretary Jones to Williams on,
September 19, Williams and Whitney met with Bollens, Jones, and the Union's
two federal representatives on September 2128 Bollens said that since the Union
had just made a wage proposal, he thought that the Respondent should also
submit one. Bollens also argued again that the minimum rate should be no less
than $130 per month, the minimum to be expected under the pending amendments
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Williams replied that if, and when, that
statute were amended, the Respondent would comply. Williams then told
Bollens that the minima and maxima of the wage rates proposed by the Union
in its letter of August 16 were too high, that the Respondent could not meet them
and maintain its competitive standing in the industry, and that.the Respondent's
existing rates should be continued. Turning to the Respondent's salary rate
survey, Williams said that it had taken longer to complete than had been antici-
pated, and that it confirmed the Respondent's position that it was paying salaries
equal to or better than those paid by its local competitors. Williams and Whit-
ney testified that Williams showed, but did not deliver, a copy of the survey
chart to the union representatives without disclosing the names of the companies
whose rate ranges appeared thereon. The undersigned, however, credits
Bollens', Jones', and O'Connor's denials that Williams had ever shown them a
copy of the survey chart, and also their testimony that, on the contrary, Bollens
demanded proof at the meeting on September 21 of the alleged equivalence or
superiority of the Respondent's wage rates in the locality and that Williams
gave none.
The meeting of September 21 closed with a promise by Williams that he would
make a wage proposal to the Union within 48 hours. Accordingly Williams made
an offer to the Union in a letter mailed on September 22. The proposal would
have continued the existing rate ranges for 14 of the 16 position classifications,
but offered an increase of $10 in the minima and maxima for the position of sales
clerk B and sales clerk A, i. e., to increase the existing $150-$200 range for the
first position to $160 to $210, and the existing $165 to $250 range for the second
position to $175 to $26028
Bollens, Jones, and the Union's two federal representatives met again with
Williams and Whitney on September 27. Bollens rejected the Respondent's sal-
ary proposal of September 22 as being too low, arguing that it contained the
its rate for stenographers A, which was $130-$165 and thus identical with the Respond-
ent's rate range for that position.
Generally unfavorable to the Respondent, in the opinion of the undersigned, were the
comparisons between the Respondent's rate ranges and those of the six other companies
which were identified on the chart as Companies A, C, E, F, G, and Y, for
(a) The 14 rate ranges given by Company A exceeded both limits of the Respondent's
comparable ranges in 4 positions ; and the minima only in 5 other positions.
(b) The 15 rate ranges given by Company C exceeded both limits of the Respondent's
comparable ranges in 3 positions ; the minima only in 4 positions ; and the maxima only
in 3 other positions.
(c) The eight rate ranges given by Company E exceeded both limits of the Respond-
ent's comparable ranges in three positions ; the minimum only in one other position ; and,
the maximum only in one other position.
(d) The five rate ranges given by Company F exceeded both limits of the Respondent's
comparable ranges in three positions.
(e) The six rate ranges given by Company G exceeded both limits of the Respondent's
comparable rates in four positions.
(f) The nine rate ranges given by Company Y exceeded both limits of the Respondent's
comparable ranges in five positions ; the minimum only in one other position ; and the
maxima only in two other positions.
28 Except for the conflicts in the testimony actually noted and resolved, the findings
as to the meeting of September 21 are based upon a composite of the consistent testimony
of Bollens, Jones, O'Connor, Williams, and Whitney.
2e See Appendix B.
430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
same rates the Respondent had been paying for years, that the pending amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act should persuade the Respondent to in-
crease their minimum rates, and that the maximum rates should also be raised
since the old employees of the Respondent had already reached these limits and
should be given the incentive of possible raises. Williams again stated that if
the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act should pass, "the Respondent
would conform, that then the whole industry would comply," and supported the
Respondent's existing rate ranges as being "the area rate in our industry." Ac-
,cording to Bollens' and Jones' testimony, which the undersigned credits, Bollens
asked Williams for proof of this last statement, but Williams did not reply.
According to Whitney's testimony there was "a very considerable discussion
. . . as to possible combinations of wage adjustments upward from our own
proposal. . . . a result of a comparison of the [Respondent's and Union's sal-
ary] proposals " 30 Although Whitney gave no details of this discussion, Bollens
testified, and the undersigned credits his testimony, that he (Bollens) suggested
that the Respondent's minima and the Union's maxima be adopted by the parties,
but that Williams rejected this suggestion.
Before the meeting of September 27 ended, Bollens told Williams that he in-
tended to submit the Respondent's salary offer of September 22 to the Union's
members at a meeting at a local hotel that night. He asked Williams to con-
sider raising the offer and to telephone him at the hotel before the meeting.
According to Williams' testimony, which the undersigned credits, he telephoned
Bollens at about 6: 30 p. in. and told him that "we had reviewed [the wage offer]
but I had not been able to talk to my headquarters in New York and we would
have to stand on the wages we had submitted "
At the meeting of the Union's members that night, Bollens read and explained
the contract that Williams had submitted on August 16, and also the salary pro-
posals made by the Union on August 16 and by the Respondent on September 22.
Bollens told the members that Williams had thus refused to make any offer on
salaries except to continue the existing rates. By a majority vote, the members
thereupon decided to strike on September 29, unless Williams made a further
offer before midnight of September 28.
On the morning of September 28, Bollens telephoned Williams that the Union's
members had voted to accept the contract provisions and instructed Bollens to
sign them, but that they had rejected the Respondent's wage proposals and had
decided to strike on September 29 if the Respondent (lid not make a wage offer
by midnight, September 28. No such offer being made by the Respondent, 53 of
the 70 employees in the bargaining unit, including the 50 persons named in Ap-
pendix A, went on strike.
On September 29 or 30," after the strike had started and a picket line had been
.set up, a meeting between Bollens, Jones, the Union's two federal representatives,
Williams, and Whitney was arranged and attended by Herman Kagel, repre-
sentative of Joint Council 40 of the AFL Warehousemen and Teamsters Unions.
Elmer Cole, business agent of the Warehousemen, and two business agents of
the Teamsters, who represented the Respondent's warehousemen and drivers,
came to the meeting with Kagel. At the meeting, Kagel said that his unions
wanted to know the nature of the dispute between the Union and the Respondent
since they normally respected the picket lines of other unions. Bollens replied,
in substance, that the Respondent had refused to raise its existing salary rates
30 Whitney thus differed with Williams' testimony that Bollens told him at this meeting
that the Union's last salary proposal of August 16 was the Union's "final figure."
n The undersigned believes it to be immaterial whether this meeting was held on Sep-
tember 29 , as Bollens , Jones, and O'Connor testified , or on September 30, as Williams and
Whitney testified.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 431
in response to the Union's request for higher rates, that the Respondent's mini-
mum rates were those "that had been paid for sometime," and that an increase
in the Respondent's maximum rates was necessary in order to provide incentive
for the employees 32 Williams said that the Respondent was paying the salary
-rates which prevailed in the locality. Although Whitney testified that Williams
showed the Union's representatives the Respondent's salary survey chart, the
undersigned again credits Bollens','Jones', and O'Connor's denials that they saw ^
-or were shown this chart at any time before the hearing in the present case.
Kagel suggested that the salary issue be arbitrated and Bollens agreed. Wil-
liams said that he did not feel, that such an economic issue was the "proper
.subject of arbitration" but would give the matter consideration 33 According to
Bollens' and Jones' uncontradicted testimony, which the undersigned credits,
Bollens said that the Union was willing to sign the contract to which the parties
had previously agreed and to negotiate immediately on the salary issue, but that
Williams again refused to sign a contract unless the existing salary rates were
incorporated
Later that afternoon, Williams informed Bollens and the AFL representatives
that the Respondent felt that wages were not a matter which it could submit
.to arbitration.
4 The replacements and the November 1949 conciliation meetings
According to Bollens' testimony which the undersigned credits, United States
,Conciliator Charles Ward telephoned Bollens "quite a few times" between Oc-
iober 1 and November 8, and said that he was trying to get representatives of
the Respondent and the Union to hold a meeting for the settlement of the strike.
Williams testified, however, and the undersigned also credits his testimony, that
he could not recall Ward's telephoning him a few days after September 30 for
the purpose of arranging such a meeting, but that Ward did telephone him on or
.about November 1, and that a meeting was then arranged for November 8.
During this period, the strike continued with only 3 strikers returning to work.
'The 50 employees named in the complaint and in Appendix A remained on strike.
On or about November 1, Williams decided to hire replacements, and on No-
vember 7, without notice to the Union, he hired 39 new employees to replace 39
,of the 50 strikers.34 Seven of the employees thus hired on November 7 were
hired at the same salaries as the strikers whose jobs they filled, 20 at salaries
from $5 to $85 per month less than the particular strikers' salaries, and 12 at
salaries from $5 to $25 per month higher than the particular strikers' salaries.
Bessie NcCallister, one of the strikers classified as a "Junior Clerk A" at a
prestrike salary of $130 per month and a possible maximum of $140 per mouth
under the existing salary range for her job, was replaced by a new employee at
the rate of $145 per month. With this minor exception, none of the new em-
ployees was hired at a rate exceeding the existing maximum rate for the classifi-
cation of the striker whom he or she replaced.
On November 8, 1949, the Union filed with the Regional Director for the Sixth
Region at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the original charge in the present case, al-
leging that the Respondent had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with
32 Except when otherwise noted, the findings concerning this meeting are made upon a
'composite of consistent testimony by Bollens, Jones, Williams, and, Whitney.
33 The undersigned credits Whitney's, Williams', and Cole's testimony to this effect.
Bollens, Jones, and O'Connor testified that during the meeting Williams bluntly refused to
arbitrate the salary issue
34 The names of the strikers whose jobs were thus taken by the new employees are indi-
cated on Appendix A.
432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. On the same day,
one of the employees filed a petition with the Regional Director for the decertifi-
cation of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
in the bargaining unit. Before Williams entered the conciliation meeting on
November 8, he received a letter from this employee advising him of the fact that
the decertification petition had been filed.
As scheduled, Conciliator Ward met with Bollens, Jones, the Union's two fed-
eral representatives, Cole of the Warehousemen, Williams, and Whitney on
November 8. Bollens said that he had filed an unfair labor practice charge, that
the Union had tried to "bring about a settlement in regard to the wage dispute,"
that the Respondent had made no salary proposals since September 21, and
"had failed to change their offer at any time since the beginning of the ne-
gotiations." According to Bollens' and Jones' testimony, which the undersigned
credits, Williams said that the Respondent had given the Union its proposal
as to wage rates, that these rates were all the Respondent could afford to pay,
that they were what the Respondent was paying, and that they were what the
Respondent intended to pay. Ward then asked Bollens and Williams if they
would submit further salary proposals to each other. Bollens said he would
do so in writing the following day. According to Bollens', Jones', and O'Connor's
testimony, Williams refused to make a "counter proposal." Williams and Whit-
ney testified, however, and the undersigned credits their testimony, that Williams
said that he would make a further proposal after he had examined the Re-
spondent's outstanding offer.85 So far as the record discloses, there was no
reference at this meeting either to the filing of the decertification petition or
the Respondent's hire of new employees the preceding day to take the place of
many of the strikers.88
On the following day, November 9, Bollens submitted a new salary proposal
to the Respondent in a letter addressed and mailed to Williams. This proposal
was generally in accord with Bollens' statement to Williams at the meeting
on September 27, in that, although it proposed a minimum rate for one position
classification (general clerk "B") which was $5 more than the minimum offered
by the Respondent on September 22, it proposed minima for 2 other positions
which were less than those proposed by the Respondent on September 22, and
minima for the remaining 13 classifications which coincided with the Respondent's
proposal of September 22.34 As maximum rates, the Union proposed figures
which were roughly midway between the Union's offer of August 16 and the
Respondent's offer of September 22, except in the case of the position of telephone
operator, in which the Union proposed a maximum which was less than that
offered by the Respondent on September 22, and in the case of the position of
cashier, in which the Union proposed the same maximum offered by the Re-
spondent on September 22.
Williams testified without contradiction, and the undersigned credits his
testimony, that on or about November 9 Conciliator Ward telephoned him and
suggested another meeting on November 16; that Williams agreed, but, after,
speaking with Ward, remembered that he had another commitment for that
day; that he telephoned Ward and told him so; that Ward said he would set
35 Although Cole testified as to what happened at this meeting , he made no mention of
Ward ' s request for a further exchange in salary proposals by the parties , nor of Bollens'
or Williams ' statements with respect to such a possibility.
86 On direct examination , Cole did testify that at this meeting on November 8 he sug-
gested the reinstatement of the strikers and the displacement of the employees hired during
the strike . On cross-examination , however, he testified , as did the other witnesses , that this
occurred at the meeting on November 21.
31 For the details of the Union's salary proposal of November 9, see Appendix B.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY ° 433
another date ; and that Ward later called him and told him that Bollens was
going to be out of town and that the meeting was set for November 21.
The Respondent submitted its promised new salary proposal in writing at
this last meeting of the parties at Conciliator Ward's office on November 21,
which was attended by Bollens, the Union's federal representatives, Cole of the
Warehousemen, Williams, Whitney, and Job Taylor, the Respondent's attorney.
In its proposal, the Respondent offered to increase all minimum rates over those
proposed in its prior proposal of September 22 and the Union's offer of Novem-
ber 9.38 The minima thus proposed by the Respondent were also equal in 2
positions to those proposed by the Union on August 16, but for the other 14
positions they were from $5 to $60 per month less than the minima proposed by
the Union on August 16. The maxima proposed by the Respondent on November
21, however, were the same as it had proposed on September 22, except in the
case of sales clerk "B" which it proposed to increase from $210 to $250 per month.
When this salary proposal was submitted by the Respondent at the November
21 meeting, the union representatives rejected it. During the meeting, Cole
of the Warehousemen and the Union's representatives left the meeting room
and held a short consultation. When they returned and met again with the
Respondent's representatives, first Cole and then Bollens proposed to the Re-
spondent's representatives that the picket line be removed and that all the
strikers be reinstated by the Respondent pending future settlement of the salary
dispute by negotiation or arbitration as Cole suggested,30 or by negotiation, as
Bollens suggested in his wording of the proposal 40
It is thus clear, and the undersigned accordingly finds, that the Union thereby
proposed the termination of the strike and the strikers' return to work upon
the condition that they all be reinstated: There is conflict in the testimony,
however, as to whether Cole and Bollens, in making this proposal, conditioned
the return of the strikers upon the layoff or discharge of the new employees
who had been hired to replace them. Williams and Whitney testified that this
condition was expressly made a part of the proposal by both Cole and Bollens.
Cole testified that this was so in the proposal as he stated it, and the under-
signed so finds. Bollens, however, denied that he knew of there having been
replacements of the strikers at the time of the November 21 meeting ; that Cole,
in first stating the reinstatement proposal, spoke of the necessary layoffs or dis-
charge of "strikebreakers" to make way for the return of the strikers ; or, more
emphatically, that he himself expressed this as a condition of the strikers' return
to work. But Bollens admitted that one of the strikers had previously told
him there were new employees going to work during the strike ; and he also
testified that, at the beginning of the November 21 meeting, Williams told him
that the Union's acceptance of the Respondent's salary proposal would not
result in the reinstatement of all the strikers, but that Williams refused to tell
38 See Appendix B.
39 This finding that Cole suggested negotiation or arbitration Is based not only upon
Cole's and Bollens' testimony but also upon Williams' statements at several points in
his testimony, although at several other points Williams testified that Cole suggested
only arbitration as the method for solving the salary dispute. Whitney gave still another
version of Cole's reference to "arbitration," which finds no support in the testimony of
any of the other witnesses. According to Whitney, Cole suggested that the parties
"negotiate the wage scale after the Union returned to work," and that, apparently on
the question of who should be reinstated, the parties should "substitute arbitration for
the grievance procedure in the contract."
90 This hnding is based upon the testimony of Bollens and O'Connor, and also-upon
Williams' statements at several points in his testimony, although at another point Williams
testified that Bollens suggested negotiation or arbitration.
434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
him who would not be reinstated or why they would not be reinstated." Upon:
consideration of all the testimony relating to the point, the undersigned credits
Williams' and Whitney's testimony that, in requesting the reinstatement of all
the strikers at the meeting on November 21, Bollens expressly conditioned their
return to work upon the necessary layoff or discharge of replacements hired
during the strike.
It is clear from the testimony, and the undersigned accordingly finds, that at
this meeting the Respondent, speaking through Attorney Taylor, rejected this
request of the Union for the reinstatement of all the strikers which would have
terminated the strike. While the reinstatement request was coupled with the
Union's proposal that negotiations be continued after the reinstatements were
effected and the strike thus terminated, the Respondent's rejection of the pro-
posal in its entirety certainly cannot be regarded as a refusal on its part to,
negotiate with the Union from that point on or during the remainder of the
strike. Indeed, Whitney testified, and the undersigned credits his testimony,
that before the meeting ended, Attorney Taylor told the Union's representatives
that the Respondent "would be glad to continue negotiations on the wages."
But this was the last meeting between the parties in an attempt to bargain-.
There have been no further communications between them concerning the un-
solved bargaining issues or the possibility of further meetings.
5. Further events until'the end of the strike
On November 28, Williams wrote and mailed a letter to the Union, advising it
that 41 specifically named strikers "were permanently replaced " on November 7;
that some of these people had payments due from the Respondent for accrued
and unused vacations ; and that if any of them wished to convert their group
life insurance to individual policies, they should do so within 31 days. . All 41
of the strikers whom this letter named as having been permanently replaced are
also named in the complaint as having been discriminatorily discharged and
refused reinstatement by the Respondent 42 On December 2, however, Wil-
liams mailed notices of separation and insurance conversion rights'to only 36
of these 41 strikers.
The letters thus written by Williams first to the Union and then to the in-
dividual strikers are confusing . As has already been found on the basis of a
stipulation entered into by counsel at the hearing , only 39 of the strikers had in
fact been replaced by new employees . Yet, according to the Respondent 's letter
to the Union on November 28, 41 had been replaced . Then, on December 2, the
Respondent sent separation notices to only 36 strikers . Even aside from the
differences in numbers , a comparison of the stipulation at the hearing, the
Respondent 's letter to the Union , and its letters to the individual strikers , reveals
substantial discrepancies in the names of the strikers which each asserts were re-
placed Thus , the stipulation provides and the undersigned finds, that strikers
Hilda R. Heil and Harold J. Peterson were among the 39 replaced on November 7,
but that strikers Elaine C. Fleming , Shirley B McKee, Louis G. Schmidt, and
F. R. Stewart were not among those replaced In its November 28 letter to the
Union, however , the Respondent omitted the names of Heil and Peterson from the
list of strikers whom it said it had replaced , and included instead, the names
of the 4 strikers , Elaine C. Fleming , McKee, Schmidt , and Stewart . Further-
more, on December 2, it mailed individual notices of separation to each of these
41 O'Connor, on the other hand. testi yed that- Williams did explain his statement" that
all the strikers would not be reinstated , by saying that the stock in the Respondent's
warehouse was low.
42 See Appendix A.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 435
last 4 strikers . Upon these facts, the undersigned finds that the Respondent sent
individual notices of separation to strikers Elaine C. Fleming , Shirley B . McKee,
Louis G Schmidt , and F R. Stewart on December 2, and a previous notice to.
the Union covering them, when in fact none of them had been replaced during
the strike.
On December 1, the Respondent , without prior notice to or consultation with
the Union , gave merit salary increases of from $10 to $25 per month to 14 of the
18 employees in the bargaining unit who had not participated in the strike and
to the 3 employees who had originally struck but who had thereafter returned
to work. So far as the undersigned can determine from the record , it appears,
as both Williams and Whitney testified, that none of these increases raised any
of the employees to a salary exceeding the maximum proposed for his or her
classification by the Respondent in its last salary offer to the Union on November
21 Furthermore , according to Williams ' and Whitney 's testimony , which the
undersigned credits, it was the practice of the Respondent to make these merit
increases periodically . While there may be some suspicion that these particular
salary increases were given to reward the recipients for their abstention from
the strike since all but 4 of the nonstrikers received them, the undersigned never-
theless finds , as Williams and Whitney testified , that they were in fact given
in accordance with the Respondent ' s general practice of granting periodic in-
creases for merit.
On or about Jaunary 5 , 1950, Business Agent Cole of the Warehousemen ar-
ranged a meeting with Bollens and Jones and discussed with them the possibility
of ending the strike and removing the Union 's picket line so that the members of
the Warehousemen and Teamsters could go back to work. Bollens and Jones
asked whether "they could make some sort of a deal with [ the Respondent] in
reinstating some of their people." Cole thereupon telephoned Williams whom
he asked whether the Respondent "was in a position to reinstate any of the
strikers at the time ." Williams replied that he could not reinstate any at the
time, but that , if the strike were called off and operations became normal, he
might gradually take back 10 or 11 strikers , but that he could not say when this
would be . When Cole told this to Bollens , Bollens said that his people were will-
ing to terminate the strike . Cole testified that, although he could not say
whether Bollens asked him to communicate -this to Williams , it was understood
that he would do so. Cole then telephoned Williams that the strike was over,
The picket line was accordingly withdrawn by the Union on January 10, 1950.
6. The situation of the strikers since November 21, 1949
Joseph S. Burkett, 1 of the 50 strikers named in the complaint as having been
discriminatorily discharged or refused reinstatement by the Respondent, in-
formed Whitney by letter dated November 30, 1949, that he had secured a new
job and would not be back to work for the Respondent Alice H. Marrison and
Margaret M. Koehler , who are also among the 50 strikers named in the complaint,
were reinstated to their former positions , which had not been filled since the
beginning of the strike , on December 21, 1949, and February 13, 1950, respectively.
The remaining 47 strikers named in the complaint have not been reemployed
by the Respondent.
In March 1950 , Williams met Bollens in the office of the Board ' s Regional
Director at Pittsburgh , and asked Bollens whether offers of reemployment of
any of the strikers should be addressed to him. Bollens replied that Williams
should write to the strikers directly. Accordingly , on June 30 , 1950, Williams
wrote letters to Nerine L. Boyd, Milton L. Dierker , Arthur E. Grieger , Helen H.
Nebel , and Harold J. Peterson, informing them that there were openings for five.
436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
people in the general class "B" position classification with a salary range from
$140 to $155 per month. The question posed by these letters, of course, is whether
the offers contained therein were offers of reinstatement to the strikers' former
or substantially equivalent positions.
Mrs. Boyd, who had been a general clerk at a salary of $150 per month, wrote
Williams on July 5, 1950, that she had been dissatisfied with her job and her
salary and "would not be interested in returning to the same situation, or per-
haps worse." The undersigned finds that the Respondent on June 30, 1950,
offered Nerine L. Boyd reinstatement to her former or a substantially equivalent
position and that she rejected the offer.
However, Dierker had been a senior clerk "B" at $175 per month ; Grieger,
a sales clerk Junior at $20t1 per month ; and Peterson, a senior clerk "B" at $200
per month. The undersigned finds that, by offering each of them a position on
June 30, 1950, as general clerk "B" at a -salary range of $140 to $155 a month,
the Respondent did not offer them reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions.43
Mrs. Nebel had been classified as a general clerk at $150 per month. Her
work, however, had been specialized and the experience she had acquired was
valuable to her and to the Respondent, since it consisted of expediting orders
made by several of the electrical manufacturing companies, the principal one
of these customers being the Respondent's parent company, The Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, which will be referred to as the Corporation in the brief
appearances it makes in this Report. According to Mrs. Nebel's uncontradicted
testimony, which the undersigned credits, she visited Williams on July 5, 1950,
and rejected the job offered in his letter because Williams told her that one of
the jobs was that of a Kardex clerk in the stock department and the other a
secretarial job, neither of which would have enabled her or the Respondent to
take advantage of her specialized experience. The undersigned finds that by
offering Mrs. Nebel these jobs, the Respondent did not offer her reinstatement
to her former or a substantially equivalent position.
The Respondent contends, however, that the prestrike jobs of Mrs. Nebel and
Arthur E. Grieger, and of their costriker, Shirley McKee, had been discontinued
since the beginning of the strike. Upon the uncontradicted testimony of Whit-
ley, the undersigned finds that this was so in the case of Miss McKee who had
been a messenger, and also in the case of Arthur E. Grieger, whose job of drafting
lighting layouts and lettering signs had been experimentally established. Before
Grieger performed this work, it had been dons partly by the salesmen and partly
on contract outside the plant. This practice was resumed after the strike, ac-
cording to Whitney's uncontradicted testimony.
However, the evidence relied upon by the Respondent to show that Mrs. Nebel's
prestrike job was also eliminated is not persuasive, Mrs. Nebel testified without
.contradiction, and the undersigned credits her testimony, that from 85 to 90
percent of her time was spent in expediting orders of the Corporation and that,
in doing this work, she received and processed telephoned inquiries several
times a day from the Corporation's expediter, Arthur Torek. Torek confirmed
Mrs. Nebel's testimony, and added that, when he could no longer reach Mrs.
Nebel during and after the strike, he was told by the Respondent's sales repre-
sentative, George Kielty, to contact Nancy Dannels, another one of the Re-
spondent's clerks, in the work that he had been handling with Mrs. Nebel ; that
thereafter he made the same contacts with Miss Dannels that he had previously
-with Mrs. Nebel; and that in January 1950 Whitney asked him whether Miss
"Peterson visited Williams and rejected the offer because the salary was too low.
-Dierker never replied to the offer . The record does not disclose whether Grieger replied
.or not.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY' COMPANY 437
Dannels "was doing a job we could 'get by with."* Kielty did not testify and
Whitney did not deny any of the substance of Torek's testimony. Whitney did
testify that'since the strike, Mrs. Nebel's' former work-has been handled "in the
Sales Department by the Sales Clerks," and that, although Miss Dannels is one
of the Respondent's two "Order Service Clerks," she does not make calls to the
Corporation "or contact persons outside the organization." But neither Whitney
nor-any other witness produced by the 'Respondent testified as to what, work
Miss Dannels did, and does, perform. Morever, on cross-examination, Whitney
said that he was not Miss Dannels' immediate supervisor, that he did not know
in fact ' whether she ever called the Corporation, and that she might, without
his knowing about it. Upon this evidence, the undersigned is convinced, and
.therefore finds, that the Respondent still employs a clerk, and whatever his or
her classification title may be, to perform the work done by Mrs. Nebel, and that
her prestrike job has thus remained intact and has not been eliminated by the
Respondent.
There is no other evidence dealing with the possible, continuing reinstatement
rights of the strikers named in the complaint. In summary, therefore, the under-
signed finds upon the foregoing evidence and considerations that of the 50 strikers
named in the complaint :
(1) Joseph S. Burkett voluntarily informed the Respondent on November 30,
1949, that he would not return to his job with the Respondent.
(2) Alice H. Marrison and Margaret M. Koehler were reinstated to their
former positions on December 21, 1949, and February 13, 1950, respectively.
(3) Nerine L Boyd was offered reinstatement to her former position by the
Respondent on June 30, 1950.
(4) Neither Milton L. Dierker, Arthur E. Grieger, Helen H. Nebel, nor Harold
J. Peterson was offered reinstatement to his or her former position or a sub-
stantially equivalent position.
(5) The prestrike jobs of Arthur E. Grieger and Shirley McKee were dis-
continued since the beginning of the strike.
(6) The prestrike job of Helen H. Nebel has not been discontinued by the
Respondent.
(7) None of the 50 strikers named in the complaint, except Alice H. Marrison,
Margaret M. Koehler, and Nerine L. Boyd, has been offered reinstatement either
to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions.
7. Conclusions
a. The status of the Union as exclusive bargaining representative
The Respondent in its answer denied the allegation of the complaint that, at
all times since November 29, 1948 (the date of the Board's certification), the
Union has continued to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respond-
ent's Pittsburgh office and clerical employees. Although the point is not argued in
its brief, the Respondent apparently relied upon the filing of the decertification
petition by one of the employees on November 8, 1949, and the fact that since
November 21, 1949, the Union has made no new attempt to induce the Respondent
to bargain.
There is no merit in this position taken by the Respondent. As the Board
stated in its recent decision in the United States Gypsum Company case (90
NLRB 946) : "It is well established that a Union's representative status estab-
lished by Board certification is conclusively presumed for a reasonable period of
time, customarily one year after certification, and indefinitely thereafter until
•such status is shown to have ceased." And the Board also specifically held in the
97417632-vo1.96-29
438 DECISIONS OF^NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Belden Brick Company case ( 83 NLRB 465 ) that the mere filing of a-decertifica-
tion petition within a year after certification, as was done by the employee in the
present case , does not affect this presumption of continuance nor justify an
employer 's refusal to bargain until the petition has been processed . Finally,
the undersigned hereinafter finds that the Respondent has refused to bargain
with the Union in good faith on and since August 16 , 1949. Thus, the Respond-
ent's refusal to bargain took place well within the year following certification
when the Union was clearly the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Respondent 's employees . Under well-settled precedent," the Union 's status as
exclusive bargaining representative and the Respondent 's obligation to bargain
with it as such have clearly continued, and will continue, at least until the
Respondent, by ultimately bargaining with the Union, has remedied the effects,
of the unfair labor practice.
The undersigned finds in accordance with the Board 's certification of Novem-
ber 29 , 1948, and the evidence in the present proceeding ( 1) that all salaried,
office, and clerical employees of the Respondent at its Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania,
warehouse and office , excluding salesmen , sales specialists and demonstrators,
confidential secretaries , payroll supervisors , warehousemen , servicemen, truck
drivers, maintenance employees , watchmen , guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act; and (2)
that at all times since November 29, 1948, the Union has been, and continues to be,
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.
b. The refusal to bargain
,The obligation of employers and the statutory representatives of their em-
ployees to bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment , is imposed by the Act for the purpose of encouraging
agreement between them on these matters , and a reliance by the employees upon
their representatives ' persuasiveness and the employers ' Good faith at the bar-
gaining table , rather than upon strikes interrupting their work and affecting
commerce.46 The process of collective bargaining thus contemplated by the Act
consists of the presentation , consideration , and discussion by the parties of their
proposals , positions , and arguments in an honest , persistent , and continued at-
tempt to reach a binding agreement and to put it into effect as soon as possible.'
When either party fails to make this attempt, or refuses, upon the request of the
other, to execute a contract embracing any final agreements which may have been
reached, it has refused to bargain collectively in violation of the Act.47
At the hearing , the General Counsel advanced a number of arguments for hold-
ing that the Respondent iii the present case failed to bargain with the Union in
the good faith thus required by the Act. Some of these arguments , however, do
not warrant the conclusion urged by the General Counsel.
44 Franks Bros Co . v. N. L R. B., 321 U S 702 ; N L. R. B. Y. P Lorillard Company,
314 U. S. 512 ; Great Southern Trucking Co. v N. L. R. B, 139 F. 2d 984 ( C. A-4),
certiorari denied 322 U S 729; N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co ., 110 F. 2d 632, 640
(C. A. 4) ; N. L. R B. v. Swift and Company, 162 F . 2d 575 ( C. A. 3) ; Shawnee Milling
Company, 82 NLRB 1266 , 1271; National ' Plastic Products Company, 78 NLRB 699, 707.
95 See Sections 1, 8 (a) (5), and 8 ( d) of the Act . Burgie Vinegar Company, 71 NLRB
829; Aldora Mills, 79 NLRB 1; Elwell -Parker Company , 75 NLRB 1046, 1057.
46 Ibid
4' See Section 8 (d) of the Act. Salant and Salant, 66 NLRB 24, 46-47; Mason and
Hughes , 86 NLRB 848 , 850, 993; and cases cited above
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 439
In the first of these arguments which the undersigned rejects, the General
Counsel contends that, on and after August 16, the Respondent refused to bar-
gain collectively in the manner required by the Act, by refusing to comply with
the Union's requests that, leaving the salary terms to further negotiation, they,
immediately execute a contract embracing all the other terms of the contract
upon which they had reached agreement. In making this argument, the General
Counsel necessarily relies upon the provision of Section 8 (d) of the Act which
defines the obligation to bargain collectively as including, among other things,
"the execution of any agreement reached, if requested by either party." Apply-
ing this to the present case, the General Counsel argues, in substance, that, since
the nonsalary provisions were agreed to by the Respondent without express
qualification, and were apparently unrelated to the unresolved salary issue, the
parties' agreement upon these nonsalary provisions must be regarded as final and
not subject to modification during the following salary negotiations.
This, however, is not in accord with the usual understanding and practice of
parties in the give and take of point-by-point bargaining toward what they in-
tend to be an ultimately complete contract. Ordinarily, until agreement is
reached on all points, an agreement on any one or more points is regarded as
tentative in the sense that it is still subject to change by "trading off" benefits
which would accrue thereunder, in order to reach agreement even on otherwise
unrelated points which are later to be discussed. By thus keeping open the pos-
sibilities of trading and compromise, this normal, though usually unexpressed,
understanding of bargaining parties obviously facilitates the making of the com-
plete agreements between employers and unions which the Act favors, and should
therefore prevail except in the unusual case, wheie there clearly appears to be
an understanding that intermediate, incomplete, or partial agreements on par-
ticular provisions are to be final and binding.98 The instant case presents the
usual situation, for there was no express understanding by the parties at any
time either that no contract was to be executed until all issues had been bar-
gained,99 or that agreements reached on all the nonsalary provisions were final
and were not to be reviewed or modified in the course of the later negotiations
on the salary question. The undersigned therefore refuses to hold in the present
case, as the General Counsel urges, that the agreements on the general provisions
of the contract were final agretuieats, which the Respondent was obligated to
execute before negotiating on the salary range issue.
In the second of the General Counsel's arguments, which the undersigned re-
jects, the General Counsel asserted that the Respondent improperly refused "offer
after offer presented by the Union [concerning wage rates] without at any time
making any counter proposals beyond [existing] wage schedules." The facts, so
far as they may have suggested this argument to the General Counsel, may briefly
be summarized . At the meeting on March 17, the Union submitted its first wage
proposal, requesting substantial increases in the Respondent's salary rate ranges,
but, upon the Respondent's refusal to accept the proposal, the Union suggested,
48 As the Respondent points out in its brief, this was the unusual sort of situation dealt
with by the Board in the two decisions cited by the General Counsel. In Salant and Salant,
Inc. (66 NLRB 24), the parties had agreed upon all nonwage terms and to abide by the
National War Labor Board's decision of the remaining wage issue. And in Mason and
Hughes, Inc. (86 NLRB 848), the parties had finally agreed not only upon all nonwage
terms, but also upon the continuance of the existing wage rates for at least 6 months, the
dispute being only as to whether the parties should immediately execute a complete con-
tract incorporating existing wage rates with a provision for reopening the wage question
in 6 months, or whether no contract should be executed until, after 6 months, the parties
had resumed and completed their negotiations on the wage issue.
4° It will be recalled that the undersigned has found, contrary to Whitney's testimony,
that the Union did not agree on March 17 that no contract was to be executed until the
salary issue was settled
440 DECISIONS :OF -NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and it was thereupon agreed,'that acceptable position descriptions, he, developed
before negotiating a salary scale. After the new position descriptions were
agreed upon, the Union submitted further salary proposals on August 16 and
November 9,.in each instance requesting rates which were lower than, those for
which it had previously asked. At the meetings on March 17, August 16, Sep-
tember 21, September 27, September 29 or 30, November 8, and November 21, the
Respondent repeatedly rejected the Union's current salary proposals as being
too high and urged the continuance of the Respondent's existing rates as being
equal to, or better than, those paid by the Respondent's local competitors. On
September 22 and November 21, the Respondent made salary proposals offering
some increases in its existing rates. In its September 22 offer, it suggested that
the existing rates be continued except for increases of $10 per month in 2 of the
16 positions. In its November 21 proposal, it suggested that the maximum rates
remain the same in all positions except one, in which it proposed a substantial
increase, but that the minimum rates for, all positions be increased to figures
exceeding those proposed by both the Respondent and the Union in their im-
mediately preceding proposals.
Thus it appears that the Respondent did not simply reject each salary proposal
made by the Union, but discussed it, gave the reasons for its rejection, and for
its desire to continue its existing rates instead, and finally made two offers of its
own for increases in the rates of a number of the position classifications. In
addition to ignoring these eventual offers of increase by the Respondent, the
General Counsel, in his argument, incorrectly assumes that, upon the submission
of a proposal by a union representing employees, good faith in collective bar-
gaining requires the employer to make a counterproposal in which he modifies or
changes his previously expressed position in some respect, so that it approaches
the new proposal of the union. That this is not so is clearly indicated by the
provision of Section 8 (d) of the Act that the obligation to bargain "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession."
The third argument of the General Counsel which the undersigned rejects is
that the Respondent's lack of good faith was demonstrated by its failure to pre-
sent, a negotiator "with authority to bind the Company." The'General Counsel
thus refers to Manager Williams' statements to the Union's representatives on
three occasions that it was necessary for him to consult with the Respondent's
New York office. The first two of these statements were made in connection
with the acceptability to the Respondent of the Union's first contract draft and,
then, of the final draft. The third of these statements was made by Williams
on September 27, to explain to Bollens why he was not able, on a few hours' notice,
to comply with the Union's request for a new, higher wage offer than the one
the Respondent had made only 5 days previously. But Williams was the Re-
spondent's District Manager with responsibility for its local operations and per-
sonnel, and, according to his credible testimony, had general authority from the
Respondent in the contract negotiations, including, for example, full authority
to make wage proposals and to decide whether or not to commit the Respondent
to sign a contract without wage scale provisions.60 His statements to the Union's
0 Early in the cross-examination of Williams, the undersigned sustained an objection to
a question by the General Counsel as to whether Williams would have had to have approval
to sign the Respondent 's original contract proposal . The undersigned expressly based this
ruling ( 1) upon the fact, apparent from the General Counsel 's witnesses ' testimony, that
Williams' statements concerning the necessity of his submission of certain points to his
superiors had not impeded bargaining nor were they apparently designed to do so, and also
(2) upon the undisputed fact that the Union, too, had stated to Williams that it required
approval from its members of the draft of position descriptions and the Respondent's Sep-
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY - 441
representatives indicated merely that on a few occasions he thought circum-
stances required him to seek advice and approval from his home office. In and
by themselves, they certainly did not indicate any intent to "stall," to avoid
reaching agreement, or to discourage hope by the Union and its members that
agreement might be reached. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the
Union's representatives, with the same obligation to exercise substantial
authority in the bargaining, also informed Williams that some of his proposals
must be submitted to the Union's members for approval. As a matter of fact,
the third of Williams' statements that he had to consult his home office was made
in response to Bollens' urgent request on September 27 that Williams submit a
new salary offer within a few hours, so that the new offer, rather than the Re-
spondent's recent, previous offer, might be submitted to the Union's members
that night. Upon these considerations, the undersigned, following-the prece-
dents set by the Board in similar cases, rejects the General Counsel's argument
that Williams was not possessed of the substantial authority, with which collec-
tive bargaining representatives must be vested under the Act 01
Other arguments of the General Counsel which the undersigned rejects, are
based upon the Respondent's hire of new employees to replace strikers on No-
vember 7, and the Respondent's grant of wage increases to 17 of the 21 non-
striking, old employees on December 1. The General Counsel points out, as the
undersigned has found, that the Respondent hired some of the new employees "at
higher rates than [those] paid the strikers" whom they replaced. Apparently,
he contends that the questions of whether any of the replacements might be
paid more than the strikers, and whether nonstriking employees should receive
salary increases, were within the scope of the current bargaining on salary rate
ranges, and, therefore, that unilateral action by the Respondent with respect to
these matters was improper as a refusal to bargain per se, and also as evidence
of its bad faith in insisting to the Union that the existing rate ranges be con-
tinued. But the Union and the Respondent were negotiating concerning rate
ranges, and not the salaries of individual, particular employees within these
ranges. For his argument to be valid, therefore, it was necessary for the General
Counsel to show that the higher rates paid to new employees and the increases
to nonstriking, old employees, were unilateral acts affecting the ranges for their
respective classifications. This he had not done. For only 12 of the 39 new
employees were hired at salaries higher than those paid to the strikers whom
they replaced, while 9 were hired at the same salaries, and 20 at lower salaries-
some of them substantially less than those paid to the particular strikers whom
they replaced. Furthermore, none of the 39 new employees (with one minor
exception which has been noted) received salaries in excess of the Respondent's
existing maximum rate for his job. As to the salary increases given on De-
cember 1 to the 17 nonstriking, old employees, they were, as the undersigned
has found, merit increases in accordance with the Respondent's existing prac-
tice, and not changes in the general rate ranges about which the Union and
tember 22 wage offer. (See W. W. Cross and Company, Inc., 77 NLRB 1162, 1166-1167
(footnote 11) ; Shell Oil Company, 77 NLRB 1306, 1307 (footnote 4) ; Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 81 NLRB 1052, 1062 (footnote 26). At later points in the record, however,
Williams without objection gave the testimony concerning his bargaining authority, which
is set forth in the text.
81 See the decisions of the Board cited in the preceding footnote In each of the decisions
of the Board which the General Counsel has cited in urging an opposite conclusion, the
Board found that, in contrast with the facts in the present case, the employer's representa-
tive either had no authority or that the limitations upon his authority were calculated
to impede , and did impede, the course of bargaining. Standard Generator Service Com-
pany of Missouri, Inc., 90 NLRB 790; Republican Publishing Company, 731NLRB 1085,
1090 ; Ozark Dam Constructors, 86 NLRB 520, 521, 531.
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent were bargaining. Nor did the increase on December 1 raise any
employee to a salary in excess of the maximum proposed by the Respondent, for
his position on November 21. It is thus apparent, and the undersigned finds,
that the Respondent did not refuse to bargain, or evidence bad faith in bar-
gaining, with the Union either by hiring some replacements at higher salaries
than the strikers they replaced on November 7,J2 or by, granting the merit in-
creases to the nonstriking employees on December 1 '
One further argument made by the General Counsel which the undersigned
also rejects is that the Respondent showed bad faith in bargaining by failing
to notify the Federal conciliator and the Union's representatives at their meeting
on November 8 that it had permanently replaced "a great majority of all the
striking employees" the day before. Contrary to the General Counsel's assump-
tion, there is no duty upon the part of an employer to notify a striking union
of the permanent replacement of strikers unless, and until, such disclosure be-
comes necessary in answering unconditional requests for reinstatement from
the union or individual strikers."
We turn now to the General Counsel's argument that the Respondent failed
to bargain in good faith because it unduly prolonged the negotiations on both
the position descriptions and the salary range issue.
With respect to the negotiations and meetings on the position descriptions,
the facts previously found may well be briefly recalled. At the first meeting
of the parties on February 14, Williams promised to prepare and submit to
the Union a draft of the Respondent's position descriptions. On February
23, when he did send this draft to the Union and was therefore presumably
prepared to meet again with, the Union's representatives, he nevertheless told
Jones on the telephone that he was busy and that Jones should call him again
in a few weeks to ariange for the next bargaining meeting. The second meet-
ing on March 17 was therefore set only when Jones asked for it a few days
before that date. Upon the Union's rejection of the Respondent's original
draft of position descriptions at the March 17 meeting, Williams undertook
to redraft them, and when ready, to call the next meeting. With only the posi-
tion descriptions scheduled for immediate negotiation, Williams let time slip
by without notifying the Union when another meeting could be held, and the
next meetings on April 12 and 25 were again the result of telephoned requests
by the Union to Williams, in each case a few days before these meetings.
Moreover, Williams did not submit a revision of the position descriptions at
either the April 12 or 25 meetings, and at the latter meeting, it was agreed
that the job-content questionnaires be issued, to furnish a basis for the revision.
The questionnaires were in fact issued to the employees by the Respondent
on April 26, with the agreed request that the employees return them with their
answers on May 10. For the period between April 25 and August 16, there is
no basis for criticizing the Respondent's attention to bargaining. As the under-
62 See Pacific-Gamble Robinson Co., 88 NLRB 482, 25 LRRM 1350
5a The General Counsel has not argued that the salary increases of December 1 were in
fact a reward to the old employees for not striking or for abandoning the strike. However,
the undersigned has found upon the uncontradicted testimony of the Respondent 's witnesses
that these raises were in fact granted in accordance with the Respondent's practice of
giving periodic merit increases. No relevant evidence was offered at the hearing to dis-
pute the existence of this practice or the requisite merit of all but three of the nonstriking
employees to receive these increases.
54 For purposes of considering this particular argument of the General Counsel, it must
be assumed that the strike was then an economic strike, although , as will be seen, the
undersigned hereinafter finds upon facts not basic to the General Counsel's instant argu-
ment, that the strike was caused by the Respondent's unfair labor practices. With this
necessary assumption In mind, see Oklahoma Rendering Co., 75 NLRB 1112, 21 LRRM 1115.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY - 443
signed has found, the employees were slow in returning their questionnaires
and when they were turned in, the Respondent held frequent meetings with
the Union's representatives, during which the position description problem was
settled and agreement was reached on all contract terms except salary rate
ranges.'
However, the undersigned finds that during the earlier period between Febru-
ary 14 and April 25, the Respondent not only unduly prolonged and delayed
the negotiations on position descriptions, but brought them to a standstill after
March 17, (1) by Williams' putting off conferences with the Union's representa-
tives on the Respondent's February 23 draft of position descriptions until March
17, and (2) by' Williams' failure, despite his promises on March 17 and again
on April 12, to revise these descriptions and to submit the revision to the Union
at a meeting to be called by him when the revision was ready.
Since this refusal by the Respondent to bargain with the Union in good faith
upon the position descriptions from February 14 to April 25 occurred more
than 6 months before November 8, the date upon which the original charge
in this case was filed, it cannot itself be made the basis of a remedial order
against the Respondent 68 As background, however, it does demonstrate, and
therefore may properly be considered as demonstrating, the Respondent's atti-
tude of indifference to its obligation under the Act to attempt to reach an agree-
ment with the Union as soon as possible,67 which again came to the surface on
and after August 16, and, in similar manner, resulted in the Respondent's delay
of negotiations on the salary rate issue.
Thus, between August 16 and September 21, Williams again postponed meet-
ing with the Union ostensibly to prepare himself for further negotiations. Al-
though he had known since February that salary rate ranges were to be nego-
tiated and had already expressed the Respondent's argument that the existing
ranges should be continued because they were equal to, or higher than, the Re-
spondent's competitors' ranges, he told the Union's representatives in August
and early September that he still had to make a salary range survey in support
of his argument and therefore could not meet with the Union on the issue until
the end of September-more than a month after the preceding meeting. Not only
was this an unreasonable excuse for postponing bargaining on the rate-range
question at this late date, but it also is apparent from the evidence that the
Respondent failed to make and complete the survey within the time it reasonably
should have taken. For, according to Williams' testimony, although, beginning
on August 20, he and Whitney separately visited the 10 competitors for informa-
tion on their rates, at least one of these visits was made as late as the middle of
September, more than 4 weeks after the Respondent's last meeting with the Union.
The undersigned finds that the Union's experience with the Respondent's earlier'
delays in the negotiations on the position descriptions was repeated in the Re-
es Whether the Respondent's progress with the drafting of acceptable position descrip-
tions after May 31 was slower than it should have been, is a matter upon which the
record sheds no light. The evidence, though clearly to the effect that the Union con-
tinued its general objection to the narrowness of the descriptions proposed by the
Respondent, gives no details as to specific differences between the parties -on such points.
It therefore affords no basis for judging the difficulty of the Respondent' s task or
estimating the time which it might reasonably have been expected to consume.
56 Section 10 (b) of the Act provides :
... That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the
service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made. . . .
57 Amelson Mfg., Co , 88 NLRB 761, 25 LRRM 1388; Florida Telephone Corp., 88 NLRB
1429, 25 LRRM 1499; Sun Oil Co., 89 NLRB, 833, 26 LRRM 1057; Lucerne Hide and
Tallow Co., 89 NLRB 989, 26 LRRM 1076; The Post Printing and Publishing Co., 90
NLRB 1820 , 26 LRRM 1396 ; Pacific Mills, 91 NLRB 60, 26 LRRM 1453.
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent's delay of negotiations on the salary rate-range issue, and that by this
latter delay from August 16 to September 21, the Respondent refused to bargain
with the Union in good faith, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of
the Act G8
The undersigned also finds that at the meetings on September 21 and either
September 29 or 30 the Respondent refused to bargain in good faith on the salary
rate-range issue by refusing to disclose the information gathered by it in its wage
rate survey. By Williams' statements to the Union's representatives, the Re-
spondent had made the equivalence or superiority of its rate ranges over those
of its competitors its primary argument for the continuation of the existing
ranges. Indeed, it had held off any meeting between August 16 and September
21 in order to make the survey to support this argument. Yet, when the meeting
on September 21 was held, and the Respondent was asked by the Union for the
information which it had been given time to secure and which was the essential
basis for its argument, it withheld it, thus depriving the Union of any possibility
of considering the Respondent's argument and bargaining intelligently on the
matter .0
In reaching these conclusions that the Respondent refused to bargain col-
lectively with the Union in good faith, the undersigned has not given any weight
to the preelection statements which were made in November 1948 by the Re-
spondent's representatives and supervisors to various employees and which have
been outlined in Section III A of this Report. Although these statements reflect
a dislike on the part of these representatives of the Respondent to have the Union
represent the employees, they were made 5 months before the negotiations began.
The undersigned therefore has judged the Respondent's conduct solely by what
transpired during the negotiations. On this basis alone, then, the undersigned
has found that the Respondent on and after August 16 refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act
by delaying negotiations on the salary rate-range issue and by refusing to dis-
close to the Union the results of its salary rate-range survey which it contended
supported its position that its existing-salary ranges should be continued.
c. The discrimination
Upon the facts found, it is clear that the Union called the strike which began
on September 29, 1949, because of the breakdown of its attempt to negotiate with
the Respondent on the salary rate-range issue. The undersigned has found that
the Respondent in violation of Section.8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act had refused
to bargain with the Union on this issue in the good faith required by the Act.
'The undersigned therefore concludes that the strike was caused by the Respond-
ent's unfair labor practices.
It has been found that on November 21, 1949, the Union requested the Respond-
ent to reinstate all the strikers but that the Respondent refused to do so. Since
the strike was an unfair labor practice strike, the Union's request that all
strikers be returned to work was justified in spite of the 39 replacements which
the Respondent had hired on November 7. The undersigned therefore finds that
6s See Burgle Vinegar Company, 71 NLRB 829; Aldora Mills, 79 NLRB 1.
69 Aluminum Ore Company, 39 NLRB 1286, 1296-1298, enforced in Aluminum Ore Com-
pany v. N. L. R. B., 131 F. 2d 485 (C. A. 7) ; N. L. R. B. V. J. H. Allison & Company,
165 F. 2d 766 (C. A. 6), certiorari denied 335 U. S. 814, rehearing denied 335 U. S. 905;
The Electric Auto-Lite Company, 89 NLRB 1192; The B. F. Goodrich Company, 89 NLRB
1151; Yawman and Erbe Manufacturing Company, 89 NLRB 881 ; General Controls Co.,
88 NLRB 1341; Southern Saddlery Co., 90 NLRB 1205; Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
00 NLRB 1244.
0
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 445
the Respondent was not justified in refusing to reinstate the strikers on Novem-
ber 21, 1949, and that, by refusing, it discriminated against the 50 strikers named
in Appendix A, with respect to their hire and tenure of employment because of
their participation in the strike, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coerc-
ing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the.Act,
discouraging membership in the Union, and committing unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
The Respondent points out that the original charge which was filed by the
Union on November 8, 1949, alleged only that the Respondent had violated Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act, and that.the charge was amended by the Union
to include an additional allegation of discrimination in violation of Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act only on July 24, 1950, more than 6 months after November 21, 1949,
the day upon which the undersigned has just found that the discrimination was
committed. The Respondent therefore contends that under Section 10 (b) of the
Act," the Board may not find that the Respondent discriminated against its
employees at this early date in violation of Section 8 (a) (3). The Board, how-
ever, has held that, under Section 10 (b), any unfair labor practice occurring
within the 6-month period preceding the filing and service of an original charge,
whether alleged in the charge or not, may be included in the complaint and;
if proved, may become the basis of a finding of unfair labor practice and the
issuance of a remedial order.81 The undersigned accordingly rejects the Respond-
ent's contention that Section 10 (b) bars the finding in the present case that the
Respondent discriminated against the striking employees on November 21, 1949,
in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in .Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, the
undersigned will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The undersigned has found that the Respondent discriminated against the 50
strikers named in Appendix A by refusing to reinstate them on November 21,
1949, to their former or substantially equivalent positions. It has further been
found that on November 30, 1949, Joseph S. Burkett voluntarily informed the
Respondent that he would not return to his job with the Respondent; that Alice
H. Marrison and Margaret M. Koehler were reinstated to their former posi-
lions on December 21, 1949, and February 13, 1950, respectively; that Nerine
L. Boyd was offered reinstatement to her former position by the Respondent
on June 30, 1950; and that the prestrike jobs of Arthur E. Grieger and Shirley
McKee were discontinued after the beginning of the strike. The undersigned
will therefore recommend that the Respondent offer to each of the persons named
° Section 10 ( b) provides:
.. . That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board, and the service
of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, . .'.
41 Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157; Tennessee Knitting Mills , Inc., 88 NLRB 1103.
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in Appendix A, except Joseph S. Burkett, Alice H. Marrison , Margaret M. Koeh-
ler, Nerine L. Boyd, Arthur E. Grieger, and Shirley McKee, immediate and full
reinstatement 'to his or her former or substantially equivalent position. The
undersigned will also recommend that the Respondent make whole each of the
persons named in Appendix A, except Joseph S. Burkett, Arthur E. Grieger, and
Shirley McKee, for any loss of pay which each of them have suffered by reason
of the Respondent's discrimination against him or her by payment to each of
a sum of money equal to that which he or she normally would have earned as
wages from November 21, 1949, to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment, less his or her net earnings during said period." Loss of pay shall be
computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or portion thereof
during the period between November 21, 1949, to the date of a proper offer of
reinstatement. The quarterly periods, herein called quarters, shall begin with
the first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be deter-
mined by deducting from a sum equal to that which each employee would--nor-
mally have earned for each such quarter or portion thereof, his net earnings,
if any, in any other employment during that period. Earnings in one particu-
lar quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quar-
ter.°S It will also be recommended that Respondent, upon reasonable request,
make available to the Board and its agents all payroll and other records perti-
nent to an analysis of the amounts due as back pay.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case , the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Federation of Westinghouse Independent.Salaried Unions is a labor organi-
zation admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
2. All salaried, office, and clerical employees of the Respondent at its Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, warehouse and office, excluding salesmen, sales specialists
and demonstrators, confidential secretaries, payroll supervisors, warehousemen,
servicemen, truck drivers, -maintenance employees, watchmen, guards, profes-
sional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
3. Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions is now, and during
all times material herein has been, the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on August 16, 1949, and at all times thereafter, to bargain col-
lectively with Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions as the
exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the
employees named in Appendix A, thereby discouraging membership in Federation
of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions, the Respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
and (3) of the Act.
6. By the above unfair labor practices and by otherwise interfering with, re-
straining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440.
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY 447
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging In unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
STRIKERS NAMED IN THE COMPLAINT 1
*(x)Mary Alice Allen
*(x)Helen R . Bailey
*(x)Gladys G. Baker
(x) Sally L. Black
Nerine L. Boyd
*(x) Pauline R . Bozic
* (x) William G . Bricker
Joseph S. Burkett.
*(x)Rhea H. Bush
•(x)Martha H. Danner
*(x)Lois L. Dearth
Milton L. Dierker
*(x)Margaret E. Evans
• Elaine C. Fleming
* (x) Marjorie A. Fleming
*(x)Harold E. Fox
•(x)George E. Gibson
Arthur E. Grieger
*(x)Florence V. Heasley
(x)Hilda R. Heil
*(x)Esther B . Hoffman
*(x)Lydia Z. Johnson
•(x)Ruth D. Kapphan
Margaret M. Koehler
*(x)Dorothy A. (Kohler) Kucia
*(x)June A. Landfried
*(x)James G. Lyons
•(x)Ronald J . McCafferty
*(x)Bessie A. McCallister
* Shirley B. McKee
*(x)M. Joan McQuiston
Alice If . Marrison
* (x) William C. Maglieri
*(x)Anne O. Minzenberg
Helen H. Nebel
(x) James P . L'Connor
(x)Harold J . Peterson
• (x) Helen E . Pribila
(x) John L. Pritchard
*(x)Evelyn K. Reising
*(x)Thomas A. Rodgers
•(x)John W . Rush, Jr.
* (x) Corinne E. Scheloski
*(x)Joanna D. Scheloski
• Louis G. Schmidt
*(x)Helen M . Stader
* Francis R. Stewart
*(x)Donald R. Tebbs
*(x)Marjorie L. Waddell
* (x) Samuel A. Weller
1 The 50 persons listed in this Appendix are the strikers named in the complaint as
having been discriminatorily discharged or refused reinstatement by the Respondent.
Spellings and full names are given in accordance with the eviden, . u- l:v marriage, the
former Dorothy A. Kohler has become Dorothy A . Kucia.
The 41 names preceded by asterisks (*) are the names of those of tie strikers whom
the General Counsel in paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges to have been discriminatorily
discharged on November 7, 1949 . According to the Respondent 's answer and its letter
to the Union on November 28, 1949, however, they were replaced by the hire of new
employees on November 7, 1949.
The 39 names preceded by (x)'s are the names of those of he strikers who, according
to the stipulation of counsel at the hearing and the Trial Ecaminer ' s fin.ling in this Report,
were in fact replaced by the hire of new employees on November 7, 1949.
It should be noted , therefore , ( 1) that those persons whose names are preceded only
by an asterisk are strikers who the Respondent notified the Union were repiaced , but who
in fact were not replaced ; and (2 ) that those persons whose names are preceded only by
an (x) are strikers who were in fact replaced . but concerning whose replacement no notice
was given by the Respondent.