UFCW, LOCAL 700 (KROGER)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 10, 2014

361 N.L.R.B. 420 (N.L.R.B. 2014)

420 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Food & Commercial Workers International
Union, Local 700 (Kroger Limited Partnership)
and Laura Sands. Case 25–CB–008896
September 10, 2014
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA,
HIROZAWA, JOHNSON, AND SCHIFFER
This case concerns the timing of a union’s notification
to employees subject to a union-security clause of the
specific amount of reduced fees and dues they would pay
if they become nonmembers and object to paying for
union activities not germane to its duties as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative. Under established Board
precedent, a union is not required to calculate and pro-
vide such detailed information until an employee elects
nonmember status and then takes the additional step of
objecting to paying for nonrepresentational expenses.
Here, the Union properly relied on that precedent when it
did not advise the Charging Party of the specific amount
of the reduced dues and fees applicable to nonmember
objectors upon her hire by Kroger Limited Partnership
(Employer), but did timely provide her with that infor-
mation once she resigned her membership and requested
objector status. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party concede that the Union complied with Board law,
but nevertheless argue that we should overrule that prec-
edent. They urge us to hold that the duty of fair repre-
sentation requires every union to provide each one of its
represented employees with specific reduced payment
information when the union first informs the employee of
her obligations under a union-security clause, even in the
absence of an employee request for information about or
objection to the union’s regular fees and dues. The
Charging Party argues that decisions of the Supreme
Court and the United States courts of appeals compel us
to make this change. We have carefully considered these
arguments. We have concluded, however, that the
Board’s established rule is not only permissible, but also
that it strikes the most reasonable balance between the
competing interests at stake. Accordingly, we have de-
cided to adhere to our precedent.1
1 On March 7, 2008, Administrative Law Judge C. Richard Miseren-
dino issued the attached decision. The General Counsel and the Charg-
ing Party filed exceptions, the Respondent filed an answering brief, and
the Charging Party filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision and
the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the
recommended Order.
I.
In revisiting this issue, we are mindful that the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has reached a different conclusion. That court has
concluded that a union must provide specific reduced
payment information to all employees when it initially
notifies them of their obligations under a union-security
clause.2 But, in examining the court’s rationale, we be-
lieve the court erroneously read the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), to compel the result it reached.
Below, we explain why we believe Hudson in fact does
not compel a particular result on this issue. Then, apply-
ing the duty of fair representation standard,3 we examine
new employees’ need for detailed reduced payment in-
formation before they have asserted their right to be a
nonmember objector. We then consider the burden on
unions to calculate and provide that information in their
initial notices to employees. Finally, we explain why, in
our view, the balance of interests does not warrant com-
pelling unions to include more specific reduced payment
information in those initial notices.
II.
The facts are undisputed.4 The Union is the exclusive
bargaining representative of multiple bargaining units of
employees of the Employer. The Union and the Em-
ployer were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
that required, as a condition of employment, that all bar-
gaining unit employees join or pay fees to the Union.
The Employer hired Charging Party Laura Sands on De-
cember 10, 2004, to work at its Crawfordsville, Indiana
facility.
On January 11, 2005,5 the Union sent Sands a mem-
bership application packet and notice advising her of her
right to be and remain a nonmember of the Union and to
object to paying any fees or dues not germane to the Un-
ion’s representational duties. The notice stated, in part:
The right by law, to belong to the Union and to partici-
pate in its affairs is a very important right. Currently,
you also have the right to refrain from becoming a
member of the Union. If you choose this option, you
may elect to satisfy requirements of a contractual union
security provision by paying the equivalent of an initia-
tion fee and monthly dues to the Union. In addition,
non-members who object to payment in full of the
2 Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Abrams v. Com-
munications Workers of America, 59 F.3d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
3 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
4 The parties in this case waived a hearing and submitted a joint mo-
tion and stipulation of facts to the judge.
5 All dates hereafter are in 2005, unless otherwise noted.
361 NLRB No. 39

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 421
equivalent of dues and fees may file written objections
to funding expenditures that are not germane to the Un-
ion’s duties as your agent for collective bargaining. If
you choose to be an objector, your financial obligation
will be reduced very slightly. Individuals who choose
to file such objections should advise the Union in writ-
ing at its business address of this choice. The Union
will then advise you of the amounts which you must
pay and how these amounts are calculated, as well as
any procedures we have for challenging our computa-
tions.6
On January 25, the Union sent Sands another applica-
tion packet and a letter setting forth the applicable initia-
tion fees and dues. Sands joined the Union a few days
later. On June 25, however, Sands resigned her member-
ship and objected to paying fees for any purpose other
than collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment. In response, the Union promptly
notified Sands that its auditors had calculated the amount
of expenses attributable to the Union’s representational
duties to be 86.07 percent and that her monthly financial
core fee would, therefore, be $21.84. This amount repre-
sented a reduction of $3.55 from her monthly union dues
of $25.39. The Union also provided Sands with portions
of the auditor’s report and the procedure for objecting to
and challenging the Union’s calculation of the nonmem-
ber fees. Sands did not challenge the calculations.
III.
A.
In Communications Workers of America v. Beck
(Beck),7 the Supreme Court held that Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act does not permit a collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, over the objection of a dues paying nonmem-
ber employee, to expend funds collected from the objec-
tor under a union-security agreement on activities unre-
lated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment. In California Saw & Knife
6 As the Union’s notice indicated, employees in bargaining units
covered by the National Labor Relations Act may select one of three
distinct relationships with a union: they may be members, nonmem-
bers, or nonmember objectors. Unlike members, nonmembers typically
do not have the right to participate in internal union matters, but they
also are not subject to internal union discipline; for example, a union
cannot fine nonmembers for engaging in strikebreaking activities. See
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Local 1029, 409
U.S. 213 (1972). Whether a nonmember takes the additional step of
objecting to paying for the union’s nonrepresentational expenses is a
separate matter. Some employees may file such an objection; others
may be content to exempt themselves from internal union affairs while
still fully supporting the union financially.
7 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
Works,8 the Board announced a comprehensive set of
procedures designed to implement the Beck decision.
The Board created a three stage process: the initial notice
stage (stage 1), the objection stage (stage 2), and the
challenge stage (stage 3).
At stage 1, before the union has collected any money
from an employee under a union-security clause, the un-
ion is required to inform the employee that she has the
right not to join the union and that employees who
choose to remain nonmembers have the right (a) to ob-
ject to paying for union activities not germane to the un-
ion’s duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction
in fees for such activities; (b) to be given sufficient in-
formation to enable the employee to decide intelligently
whether to object; and (c) to be apprised of any internal
union procedures for filing objections.9 That bundle of
information is often referred to as the “initial notice”
under Beck.10 If an employee decides not to join the un-
ion and also exercises her Beck right to object, California
Saw mandates under stage 2 that the union apprise the
“Beck objector” of the percentage of dues reduction she
will receive, the union’s basis for that determination, and
the right of an objector to challenge those figures.11
stage 3 concerns those objectors who, unlike Sands, chal-
lenge the union’s determination of which of its expenses
are chargeable (those related to representation) or the
computations underlying that determination.12
The Seventh Circuit enforced California Saw in full,
explaining that neither the Beck decision nor the National
Labor Relations Act itself defines or resolves the design
of procedures for assuring that workers learn of and are
able to exercise their Beck rights.13 Regarding the
Board’s three-stage framework, the court stated:
All the details necessary to make the rule of Beck oper-
ational were left to the Board, subject to the very light
review authorized by Chevron. It is hard to think of a
task more suitable for an administrative agency that
specializes in labor relations, and less suitable for a
court of general jurisdiction, than crafting the rules for
translating the generalities of the Beck decision (more
precisely, of the statute as authoritatively construed in
8 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525
U.S. 813 (1998).
9 Id. at 233.
10 E.g., Teamsters Local 738 (E.J. Brach Corp.), 324 NLRB 1193,
1193–1194 (1997).
11 California Saw, above, 320 NLRB at 233.
12 Id. at 242–243; see also Teamsters Local 579 (Chambers & Owen
Inc.), 350 NLRB 1166, 1167 fn. 6 (2007) (describing the three stage
California Saw procedure).
13 Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1998).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 422
Beck) into a workable system for determining and col-
lecting agency fees.14
Following its decision in California Saw, the Board has
consistently applied the three-stage framework of notice-
objection-challenge in considering cases dealing with Beck
rights.
B.
Underlying the California Saw decision was the
Board’s determination that a union’s performance of its
obligations under Beck is to be judged under the duty of
fair representation standard. The duty of fair representa-
tion derives from a union’s status under Section 9(a) of
the Act as the exclusive representative of all employees
in a particular bargaining unit.15 As the exclusive repre-
sentative, the union is required to fairly represent all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. This obligation inevitably
requires a bargaining representative to make discretion-
ary choices in order to reconcile divergent interests
among individual employees, classes of employees, and
the union as a whole.16 Accordingly, under the fair rep-
resentation standard, the union is lawfully entitled to
choose among competing interests as long as its actions
are not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 17 Be-
cause the Beck arena likewise requires unions to make
those sometimes difficult judgments in balancing com-
peting interests, and consistent with the Supreme Court’s
explicit directive that the duty of fair representation ap-
plies to all union activity,18 the Board in California Saw
found “inescapable the conclusion that a union’s obliga-
tions under Beck are to be measured” by the duty of fair
representation standard.19 The Board has recently reaf-
firmed California Saw on this point,20 and we take this
opportunity to confirm our agreement that the duty of
fair representation standard is the appropriate one.
IV.
We turn now to the heart of this case: the General
Counsel’s and Sands’ contentions, which our dissenting
colleagues embrace, that we should revise California
Saw’s established three-stage framework to hold that
every union, in its initial Beck notice to each employee it
represents, must inform the employee of the specific de-
tails of the reduced fees and dues to be paid if she elected
14 Id.
15 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, above, 345 U.S. at 337.
16 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964).
17 See California Saw, above, 320 NLRB at 228–230.
18 See Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991).
19 California Saw, above, 320 NLRB at 230.
20 See Machinists Local 2777 (L-3 Communications), 355 NLRB
1062, 1064 (2010).
to remain a nonmember and then chose to become a Beck
objector.
We have carefully considered their supporting argu-
ments. In particular, we have given due attention to
Sands’ argument, endorsed by our colleagues, that we are
compelled to make this change by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), as interpreted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Abrams21 and Penrod.22 For the reasons that follow, we
are not persuaded by their arguments. Instead, balancing
the competing interests at stake, we find that a union
does not breach its duty of fair representation when it
chooses not to calculate and include in its initial Beck
notice detailed information about the specific amount of
reduced fees and dues that would apply to Beck objec-
tors. Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s finding that the
Union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
A.
Contrary to Sands’ and our dissenting colleagues’ ar-
gument, Hudson does not require us to change our prece-
dent.23 They argue that the Board’s California Saw pro-
cess disregards Hudson’s statement that “[b]asic consid-
erations of fairness . . . dictate that the potential objectors
be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of
the union’s fee.”24 Pointing to Abrams and Penrod, they
argue that courts have concluded that this portion of
Hudson requires unions to disclose specific reduced
payment information in their initial Beck notices, and
that we must reach the same conclusion. Careful exami-
nation of Hudson, however, reveals the flaws in this ar-
gument.
At the outset, we observe that Hudson was decided by
the Supreme Court years before both Beck and California
21 59 F.3d 1373.
22 203 F.3d 41.
23 The General Counsel expresses no view on this argument. Sands
also argues that California Saw’s notice requirements disregard em-
ployees’ Sec. 7 right to choose freely between union membership and
nonmembership, on the theory that an employee cannot make an in-
formed choice about membership without knowing the financial conse-
quences of that decision. Nothing in California Saw can fairly be read
to impede an employee’s Sec. 7 right to become or remain a nonmem-
ber of a union. Indeed, California Saw mandates that initial Beck no-
tices inform employees of that right by clearly describing that they have
a choice between membership and nonmembership. Moreover, we find
Sands’ argument puzzling because that choice is financially neutral—
there is no financial difference between being a union member and
being a nonmember. Both pay the same amount to the union, either in
the form of union dues or dues equivalents. It is only when nonmem-
bers take the additional step of becoming Beck objectors that less than
the full dues equivalent may be paid. We accordingly find no merit in
this argument, and we shall not address it further.
24 Hudson, above, 475 U.S. at 306.

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 423
Saw, making it highly unlikely that the Court had in
mind the question presented in this case. Certainly, this
question was not before the Court. Hudson involved a
public sector union whose relationship with unit employ-
ees was governed by state law. In Hudson, unlike here,
there were only two relationships––not three––that an
employee could have with the union: member or non-
member.25 As to nonmembers, applicable state law pro-
vided that all nonmembers would be required to “pay
their proportionate share of the cost of the collective bar-
gaining process and contract administration.”26 Alt-
hough Beck had not yet been decided, the effect of that
statutory provision was to make all nonmembers the
equivalent of nonmember Beck objectors, entitling them
to pay reduced fees and dues and to challenge the union’s
calculations of those payments. That point—that Hudson
involved nonmembers who were already objecting to the
amount of payments they were making to the union—is
essential to understanding the dispute in Hudson and why
the Court’s disposition of it does not control the present
case.
Hudson arose because the union calculated and col-
lected proportionate share payments from nonmembers
without any prior explanation of how those reduced
payments had been calculated. In addition, although the
union had implemented a procedure for considering
nonmembers’ challenges to the proportionate share pay-
ment, that procedure was controlled largely by the union.
It required employees to make prescribed payments to
the union before any challenge would be permitted.
And, even if a nonmember challenger prevailed in chal-
lenging the amount of the payment, the only remedy was
an immediate reduction in the proportionate share pay-
ment for all nonmembers and a rebate for the challenger.
Employees had to pay up front, with the possibility of
later being reimbursed following a successful challenge.
The Court found “three fundamental flaws” in the un-
ion’s procedure.27 First, the Court condemned the rebate
remedy for successful challengers. The Court found that
even the temporary use by the union of dissenters’ funds
for nonrepresentational purposes impermissibly im-
pinged upon the dissenters’ First Amendment rights.28
Second, the Court found unlawful the union’s failure to
explain to nonmembers making reduced payments the
basis for the amount of the reduction in advance of col-
25 As noted, in bargaining units covered by the Act an employee may
choose from among three relationships with a union: member, non-
member, or nonmember objector.
26 Hudson, above, 475 U.S. at 295 fn. 1.
27 Id. at 304–305.
28 Id. at 305.
lecting those payments.29 On this point, the Court rea-
soned that “[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as
concern for the First Amendment rights at stake” re-
quired the nonmembers to “be given sufficient infor-
mation to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.”30 The
Court went on to say that leaving the employees “in the
dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee –
and requiring them to object [assert a “challenge” in Cal-
ifornia Saw terms] in order to receive the information –
did not adequately protect the careful distinctions drawn
in [Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977)].”31 Finally, the Court concluded that the union’s
challenge procedure was improper because it failed to
provide nonmembers with a reasonably prompt decision
by an impartial decision maker.32
As the foregoing explanation demonstrates, and as the
Board has previously observed,33 Hudson did not address
the question presented here: whether, under a different,
multistep dues system, a union must calculate and speci-
fy in its initial notice to employees the specific amount of
reduced fees and dues that would apply if the employee
chose to become a nonmember and then elected to be-
come an objector. Rather, Hudson concerned a union’s
dealings with employees who already had the status of
objectors and from whom the union already was collect-
ing reduced fees. Those circumstances, in particular,
were the predicate for the Court’s statement that “[b]asic
considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First
Amendment rights at stake” required the nonmembers to
“be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of
the union’s fee.” As the Court explained, the employees
bore the initial burden of objecting to paying for the un-
ion’s nonrepresentational expenses, but once they had
done so, the burden was on the union to explain the basis
for its proportionate share payment.34 That reasoning
does not apply to the present case, which concerns only
employees who have not yet chosen to become nonmem-
bers, who are not yet paying any dues, and who have
never voiced any objection to paying full dues.
29 Id. at 306.
30 Id.
31 Id. In Abood, the Court held that, although a public union may
expend funds on political or other ideological causes not germane to its
representational duties, it could not, constitutionally, finance those
efforts with the funds of objecting employees. 431 U.S. at 235–236.
32 Hudson, above, 475 U.S. at 307. The Court also rejected the un-
ion’s belated attempt to save its procedure by escrowing 100 percent of
the fees collected from the dissenters pending resolution of their chal-
lenges. Id. at 309.
33 See Teamsters Local 166 (Dyncorp Support Services), 327 NLRB
950, 952 fn. 10 (1999) (“Dyncorp”), rev. granted Penrod v. NLRB,
above, 203 F.3d 41.
34 Hudson, above, 475 U.S. at 306.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 424
In arguing to the contrary, Sands and the dissent point
to the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in Penrod,
above. There, as stated, the court denied enforcement of
a case in which the Board considered and rejected a re-
quest, identical to the one here, to require unions to pro-
vide reduced payment information in their initial Beck
notices. In adopting that requirement, the Penrod court
relied exclusively on its previous decision in Abrams. In
Abrams, the court took the position that, although Hud-
son arose in the public sector union context, it “applies
equally” to a union’s statutory duty of fair representation
inasmuch as it in “rooted in [b]asic considerations of
fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment
rights at stake.”35 In addition, the Abrams court found
that, although Hudson did not concern initial notices to
employees, the same “basic considerations of fairness”
necessarily extended to a union’s notice to workers of
their right to object to paying for nonrepresentational
expenses.36 The Penrod court thus concluded that Hud-
son, as interpreted in Abrams, required unions to give
potential Beck objectors the same information provided
to actual Beck objectors.37
The Board subsequently adopted the Penrod court’s
decision as the law of the case, but it has not since ap-
plied Penrod to find that a union violates its duty of fair
representation by failing to provide specific reduced
payment information in its initial Beck notices. With due
respect to the District of Columbia Circuit, we decline to
do so here. For the reasons discussed, we remain con-
vinced that Hudson does not resolve the question pre-
sented in this case. Moreover, we respectfully disagree
with the court that the “fairness” rationale of Hudson
warrants requiring all unions to treat every employee at
stage 1 of the Beck process the same as those employees
who have become nonmembers and who, at stage 2 of
that process, actually have objected to paying for the
union’s nonrepresentational expenses. As Hudson makes
clear, the key difference between those classes of em-
ployees is that the nonmember objectors, by the very act
of objecting, have triggered the union’s obligation to
inform them not only of any proportionate share pay-
ments but also of the basis for those payments.38
35 59 F.3d at 1379 fn. 7, citing Hudson, above, at 306.
36 Id. at 1379 fn. 6.
37 Penrod, above, 203 F.3d at 48.
38 Moreover, any broader reading of Hudson would ignore the fact
that cases involving public sector unions are grounded in constitutional
considerations, whereas cases involving private sector unions are root-
ed in the duty of fair representation. See United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 108, 111, 121 fn.16 (1982) (pointing
out that conduct by private sector unions does not involve state action
and cautioning against uncritical application of First Amendment prin-
ciples to their internal rules); Machinists v. NLRB, above, 133 F.3d at
This is not to suggest that the “fairness” rationale of
Hudson is irrelevant to our consideration of a union’s
obligations with respect to its initial Beck notice. To the
contrary, as Sands and our colleagues point out, the
Board actually relied on Hudson’s “fairness” concept in
California Saw. There, the Board agreed that Hudson
was instructive insofar as “fairness” required unions,
under the duty of fair representation, to inform all em-
ployees in the stage 1 notice of their basic rights under
Beck.39 The Board also looked to Hudson in Chambers
& Owen,40 where the Board agreed with the Penrod
court’s additional finding that Hudson requires unions to
provide Beck objectors with information regarding the
per capita taxes paid to affiliates at the second, rather
than the third, stage of the California Saw process.
Without passing on whether Chambers & Owen was
correctly decided, we again observe that, like Hudson,
Chambers & Owen concerned employees who already
had become nonmembers and objected to paying for the
union’s nonrepresentational expenses. In those circum-
stances, it is clear why the Chambers & Owen majority
so readily relied on Hudson. But the circumstances are
different here, where we are concerned only with wheth-
er a union is required to give specific reduced payment
information to employees who are being fully informed
of their right to choose membership, nonmembership, or
Beck objector status, but have not yet made known their
choice.
For all of those reasons, we are not persuaded that
Hudson, either on its own terms or as interpreted by the
District of Columbia Circuit, compels us to revise the
California Saw framework to require unions to include
specific reduced fee and dues information in their initial
Beck notices.
B.
Instead, the task before us is to determine whether, on
balance, the Union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion by not providing that information in its initial Beck
1017 (“Hudson was a constitutional case; it involved the First Amend-
ment rights of public employees, not the statutory rights of workers
covered by the National Labor Relations Act.”). With due respect to
the District of Columbia Circuit, we believe Abrams and Penrod do not
give this distinction sufficient weight.
For similar reasons, the dissent’s reliance on Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.
Ct. 2618 (2014), and Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012),
is misplaced. Both of those cases arose in the public sector and were
decided under First Amendment principles. Moreover, in neither case
did the Court address the requisite content of a union’s initial notice to
employees of their membership options and their obligation to pay
regular dues and fees.
39 California Saw, above, 320 NLRB at 233 & 233 fn. 50.
40 Teamsters Local 579 (Chambers & Owen Inc.), above, 350 NLRB
1166.

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 425
notice to Sands.41 As stated, a union breaches its duty of
fair representation only if its actions are arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or undertaken in bad faith.42 The record in
this case contains no evidence of discrimination or bad
faith by the Union. Accordingly, the sole question pre-
sented is whether the Union’s actions were arbitrary, i.e.,
“if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time
of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far out-
side a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irration-
al.”43 “This ‘wide range of reasonableness’ gives the
union room to make discretionary decisions and choices”
in order to reconcile the competing individual and collec-
tive interests implicated.44 A union’s discretion is not
boundless, however.45 Drawing the necessary lines re-
quires us, as the California Saw Board put it, “to bring
the values of reasonableness and practicality into our
own considerations of the facts of each case,” and we
shall do so here.46
At the outset, we acknowledge, as indicated, that the
Board has previously engaged in this balancing in Dyn-
corp.47 There, as here, the General Counsel sought to
require that the initial Beck notice include the percentage
of union funds that was spent on nonrepresentational
activities. In rejecting the General Counsel’s request, the
Board reasoned that stage 1 notice requirements were
designed in part to avoid unnecessarily burdening unions
with the time consuming and costly task of calculating
the reduced fees and dues that would apply to a non-
member objector. As the Board explained:
The Board in California Saw held that a union is re-
quired to inform only objectors, not nonmembers in
general, of the percentage by which dues and fees are
reduced for objectors. That is because, to calculate the
percentage reduction in dues and fees for objectors, a
union must break down all of its expenditures into
chargeable and nonchargeable categories and have its
expenditure information independently verified.48
41 Because we disagree with our dissenting colleagues’ view that this
case is controlled by Hudson and Chambers & Owen, we disagree with
their contention that it is inappropriate to balance the competing inter-
ests because, in their words, “the relevant balance has already been
struck.”
42 See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998).
43 O'Neill, above, 499 U.S. at 67, quoting Huffman, above, 345 U.S.
at 338.
44 Marquez, above, 525 U.S. at 45.
45 See, e.g., Machinists Local 2777, above, 355 NLRB 1062 (holding
that a union arbitrarily required Beck objectors to annually renew their
objections).
46 California Saw, above, 320 NLRB at 230.
47 327 NLRB 950.
48 Id. at 952 (footnotes omitted).
The Board concluded that this “expensive and time-
consuming undertaking” is not required of a union simp-
ly because “some employees may object in the future.”49
Rather, the full-fledged undertaking of calculating
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses, and its attendant
verification and subsequent challenge procedures, is re-
quired of unions that are in fact attempting to collect fees
and dues from Beck objectors.50 The Board reasoned
that, where there are no objectors in the unit, for exam-
ple, the duty of fair representation does not require a un-
ion to go to the expense of preparing this information in
case some employee might object in the future. Alt-
hough acknowledging that some unions might choose to
provide the information in their initial Beck notices, the
Board made clear that “the decision whether or not to do
so [is] a judgment call” falling within the wide range of
reasonableness accorded union conduct under the arbi-
trary prong of the duty of fair representation.51 Thus, the
Board in Dyncorp declined to change the California Saw
framework to require that all unions calculate and pro-
vide reduced fee and dues figures in their initial Beck
notices to all bargaining unit employees.
As discussed, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected
the Board’s view in Dyncorp.52 But the court expressly
did not consider the Board’s interests-based rationale.
Instead, the court simply applied the holding of Abrams
that Hudson requires unions’ initial Beck notices to spec-
ify the reduced fees and dues applicable to nonmember
objectors. We recognize that a three-member panel of
that court will, if this case comes before it, be con-
strained to apply Abrams and Penrod as they stand.
Nevertheless, because of the importance of this issue, we
have independently considered the balance struck by the
Board in Dyncorp. As we now explain, we find that un-
der the duty of fair representation standard unions per-
missibly may choose not to provide the specific detailed
information involved here at the time of the initial Beck
notice.
1.
We first examine the purpose of a union’s initial Beck
notice and whether a new employee, in order to deter-
mine whether to choose objector status, needs to know
beforehand the specific amount by which her fees and
dues would be reduced. As described, the stage 1 notice
established in California Saw informs employees of their
basic rights to choose membership or nonmembership
and, if the latter, to object to paying full dues, and the
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Penrod, above, 203 F.3d 41.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 426
procedures for filing an objection. It thus makes clear
the employee’s options in light of the fundamental nature
of a Beck objection. The right to file a Beck objection
arises from the Supreme Court’s determination that
“Congress [in enacting Section 8(a)(3)] did not intend ‘to
provide the unions with a means for forcing employees,
over their objection, to support political causes which
they oppose.’”53 Thus, Beck and the objection it estab-
lished are grounded in the notion that an employee decid-
ing whether to object is deciding whether her political
beliefs are compromised by paying full fees and dues to
the union, which absent an objection may expend those
funds on causes with which the employee disagrees. In
other words, as the Court recognized, we can reasonably
expect that a Beck objection will usually turn on ideolog-
ical concerns, the precise reduction in fees and dues often
being less important.54
We do not assume, however, that financial considera-
tions play no role in an employee’s decision whether to
object. To the contrary, we recognize that some employ-
ees considering requesting nonmember objector status
may be motivated by the prospect of paying reduced fees
and dues, and would prefer to know the precise reduc-
tions beforehand.55 But the duty of fair representation
does not require a union to perfectly anticipate every
interest of every employee.56 For example, courts have
held that unions may require Beck objections to be filed
during certain months of the year, so-called “window
periods,” in the interest of timely resolving obligations
and disputes, notwithstanding that employees naturally
might prefer to file objections whenever they wish.57
Board and judicial acceptance of such compromises is
essential to ensuring that unions have the “wide latitude”
they need to effectively perform their representational
duties.58 So here, the duty of fair representation is not
automatically breached merely because some potential
Beck objectors might prefer advanced disclosure of spe-
cific payment reduction information as opposed to the
general information provided in this case.59
53 Beck, above, 487 U.S. at 751, quoting Machinists v. Street, above,
367 U.S. at 764.
54 See Hudson, above, 475 U.S. at 305.
55 See Machinists Local 2777, above, 355 NLRB at 1065, 1075–
1076 (Member Pearce, dissenting in part).
56 See Humphrey v. Moore, above, 375 U.S. at 349 (“The complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.”).
57 See, e.g., Abrams, above, 59 F.3d at 1381–1382.
58 Air Line Pilots Assn. v. O’Neill, above, 499 U.S. at 78.
59 The dissent suggests that we should adopt the across-the-board
rule proposed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party in order
to align our law with other Federal statutory and regulatory schemes
requiring a variety of prechoice notices to consumers and others. But,
as discussed, Board law already requires a prechoice notice to employ-
ees: Before the union has collected any money from an employee
We find it significant, moreover, that the California
Saw framework imposes no economic consequences on
potential Beck objectors. A timely Beck objection is ef-
fective when filed, and the employee is entitled to a re-
duction in his fees and dues from that date forward.60
Thus, deferred disclosure of the reduced figures them-
selves creates no risk that potential Beck objectors will
end up paying for nonrepresentational expenses any
longer than they desire.61 All the employee needs to do
is make her objection known and she will secure the full
benefit of whatever reduction is applicable.62
For those reasons, we find that California Saw’s stage
1 notice, as currently constituted, reasonably fulfills the
interest of potential objectors in being notified of their
rights and in easily registering an objection without any
undue burdens. The present case is illustrative. The Un-
ion’s stage 1 notice fully informed Sands that she had the
right to be a member or a nonmember, that nonmembers
could object to funding the Union’s nonrepresentational
activities, and that by filing an objection she could obtain
a reduction in fees and dues for such activities. This no-
tice provided Sands a clear opportunity to assert her
rights, which she eventually did. We observe, as did the
judge, that Sands never complained that a lack of infor-
mation delayed or otherwise hindered her objection. Nor
is there any evidence that she ever asked the Union to
provide the reduced payment information before she
made her decision.63 Finally, once Sands did object, the
under a union-security clause, the union must inform the employee (a)
that she has the right not to join the union and (b) that employees who
choose to remain nonmembers have the right (1) to object to paying for
union activities not germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent
and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2) to be given
sufficient information to enable the employee to decide intelligently
whether to object; and (3) to be apprised of any internal union proce-
dures for filing objections. The dissent regards that initial notice as
inadequate, but its solution fails to give proper weight to competing
legitimate interests under the duty of fair representation. We believe
that there are compelling reasons to find that existing law strikes the
appropriate balance.
60 See, e.g., Machinists Lodge 160 (American National Can Co.),
329 NLRB 389, 391 (1999) (finding that the respondent union violated
its duty of fair representation by delaying the effective date of employ-
ee’s timely filed Beck objections).
61 Compare Machinists Local 2777, above, 355 NLRB at 1064–1065
(union’s requirement that Beck objectors renew their objections annual-
ly was unlawful in part because the requirement created a risk that
employees who did not remember to renew would lose the opportunity
to object for the following 11 months).
62 Not requiring disclosure of the reduced payment figures in the ini-
tial Beck notice is consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction in
Machinists v. Street, above, 367 U.S. at 774, that dissent “is not to be
presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the
dissenting employee.” See also Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
above, 431 U.S. at 238.
63 By way of highlighting, again, the contrast with Hudson, above,
475 U.S. 292, when the Supreme Court required the union there to

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 427
Union timely reduced her fees and dues and provided her
with all the information she needed to challenge those
reduced payments.
On the other side of the balance, we find that unions
could be subjected to considerable burdens were we to
require that they calculate and provide in their stage 1
notice the specific reduction in fees and dues that would
apply to nonmember objectors. Initially, we observe,
contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, that the Union’s
ability in this case to timely provide to Sands specific
dues information as required under California Saw does
not establish that all unions have or even can develop
such capability. Unions that currently have no Beck ob-
jectors may not have expended the resources to track and
calculate their chargeable and nonchargeable expenses,
yet under the General Counsel’s and Charging Party’s
proposal those unions would be forced to immediately
undertake those efforts without knowing whether they
would ever have a nonmember objector, let alone how
many. If no employee objects, the union will have ex-
pended significant sums to perform unnecessary record-
keeping and an unnecessary audited accounting.64 These
burdens are significant and subject to annual revision.
See, e.g., Abrams, above, 59 F.3d at 1381 (upholding
union Beck system where 1 week of every 13 weeks un-
ion employees recorded their activities according to 1 of
24 categories; an outside firm retained by the union de-
termined from the time sheets how much time was spent
on chargeable and nonchargeable expenses; the outside
firm also randomly telephoned union employees to verify
the information provided; and independent certified pub-
inform existing employees what their proportionate share would be and
the basis for it, it was a calculation that was germane to all nonmembers
receiving the notice because they already were entitled to pay reduced
fees and dues and to challenge the union’s calculations by virtue of
their statutorily imposed status as objectors. Here, the reduced payment
calculation is not essential at stage 1 of the notice process because
employees are only making the initial decision whether to be a member,
nonmember, or nonmember objector.
64 In arguing that these tasks are not so burdensome, Sands and the
dissent point to Chambers & Owen, above, 350 NLRB 1166. That case
is inapposite. As noted, Chambers & Owen concerned whether un-
ions—that had already received Beck objections—should be required to
provide certain affiliate expenditure information to objectors at the
second stage, rather than the third stage, of the California Saw process.
In answering that question affirmatively, the Board observed that un-
ions are well aware of their obligations to account to Beck objectors for
the way their dues are spent, and found that any administrative burdens
faced by unions in providing the affiliate information would not be
particularly onerous because of advancements in computer and internet
technology that have facilitated unions’ Beck-related disclosure re-
quirements. Id. at 1169–1170. Although it may not be particularly
onerous to require a union that is already obligated to compile certain
information to provide it a step earlier in the California Saw process,
here we are potentially dealing with unions that have not yet compiled
any information at all.
lic accountants annually audited the allocations). Many
smaller local or regional independent unions, moreover,
may not even have the resources to develop those record-
keeping and accounting systems, or to implement them
by administering a full-fledged Beck system.65 Nor are
we convinced that recent computerized record-keeping
and technological developments eliminate these burdens.
The cost of such technological capabilities may well be
beyond the means of smaller unions, which are dispro-
portionately burdened, especially given their limited re-
sources to devote to their representational obligations.66
Other unions reasonably may choose not to invest in
such systems until they are actually faced with an objec-
tion or objections, not due to complacency but to other
appropriate priorities. We would be hard pressed, for
example, to label “irrational” a union’s decision to de-
vote its resources to collective bargaining and contract
administration until a sufficient number of objections
arise that investing in a Beck system becomes cost-
effective.
Further, even when a union does receive an objection,
it lawfully may accommodate that objection by means
that are less costly than the kind of preobjection audited
accounting of its expenses that the General Counsel and
Sands urge. For example, a union that is affiliated with
an international union might forgo that audit and adopt
what is called the “local presumption” to calculate its
nonmember objector fees and dues.67 Still other unions
65 For Fiscal year 2013, the Department of Labor, Office of Labor
Management Standards, lists approximately 808 active, unaffiliated
unions of which approximately 574 have 200 members or fewer and
total receipts of $200,000 or less. Of those 574 unions, approximately
452 have 100 members or fewer and total receipts of $100,000 or less.
See http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rrlo/lmrda.htm, last
visited August 21, 2014. The dissent asserts that “regulatory disclosure
requirements” imposed by the Department of Labor, namely LM-2
reporting, “already require unions to report their expenditures on repre-
sentational activities.” (Footnote omitted.) But sharing the concern
motivating our decision today, the Department of Labor has exempted
from LM-2 reporting any labor organization with annual receipts of less
than $250,000. See 68 Fed.Reg. 5837401, 58383 (October 9, 2003);
AFL–CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66 Nor do we agree with the dissent that the burdens on a small un-
ion should be proportionally lighter, because the funds to be analyzed
are smaller. The same multistep process of developing and updating a
system that tracks and calculates chargeable and nonchargeable ex-
penses would still be required.
67 Under settled Board law, a local union—as an alternative to de-
termining its nonmember objector fee by conducting an audit of its own
chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures—may use the “local pre-
sumption” to calculate this fee. The “local presumption” allows a local
union to use the same allocation of chargeable and nonchargeable ex-
penses as that of its parent affiliate. The Board permits this alternative
because the Board has found that parent organizations almost always
have more nonchargeable expenses than their locals, which means the
Beck objector will actually pay a smaller amount when the “local pre-
sumption” is used. See Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651, 661 (D.C. Cir.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 428
reasonably may choose to waive their right to collect any
money from objectors rather than expend time and mon-
ey calculating and administering the reductions.68 These
judgments fit comfortably within the “wide range of rea-
sonableness” afforded unions under the duty of fair rep-
resentation.69 In those circumstances, imposing the
threshold burden on unions to conduct an audit of their
local expenses would serve no meaningful purpose.70
Considering all of the above, we have found, on the
one hand, that the potential benefits to employees of re-
quiring unions to include detailed reduced payment in-
formation in their initial Beck notices appear to be mar-
ginal, at best. The Board’s established initial notice re-
quirements already meet employees’ fundamental need
for information about their right to object, without im-
posing any significant burdens on their decisions whether
to do so. On the other hand, imposing that requirement
risks saddling unions with administrative and financial
burdens that many unions might find impossible or im-
practical to meet. To be sure, not every union will be
adversely affected to the same degree, and some unions
may be better equipped than others to meet those bur-
dens. But those variances only highlight that the rigid
rule sought in this proceeding is at odds with basic fair
representation principles affording unions a “wide range
of reasonableness” in reconciling the interests of individ-
2000). When a local union uses the local presumption, it will receive
less dues money from those paying the nonmember objector fee, but it
will also be able to avoid the Board’s requirement of a local audit.
Auto Workers Local 95 (Various Employers), 328 NLRB 1215, 1217
(1999), petition for review denied in relevant part, Thomas v. NLRB,
213 F.3d 651 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The parent organization, however, still
has to provide “verified supporting expenditure information” justifying
its chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. Television Artists AFTRA
(KGW Radio), 327 NLRB 474, 477 fn. 15 (1999).
68 See Laborers Local 265, 322 NLRB 294, 296 (1996) (union’s
waiver of payment of any dues or fees moots a challenge to the union’s
calculations and makes unnecessary the provision of financial infor-
mation).
69 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728,
742 (1981) (a union balancing individual and collective interests may
validly determine that “an alternative expenditure of resources would
result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a
whole.”).
70 We also observe that the proposed revision of California Saw
could impose significant burdens even on unions, such as the one in
this case, that already have established Beck systems. Here, for exam-
ple, as described by the judge, the Union stated that providing employ-
ees it represents with an initial Beck notice that includes specific re-
duced fee and dues information for objectors is complicated because, in
Kroger bargaining units alone, the Union maintains 36 separate dues
rates covering thousands of employees in 5 different bargaining units.
In order to provide a meaningful and accurate amount of dues deduc-
tion, the revised stage 1 notice sought in this proceeding thus would
require an individualized calculation for each employee receiving an
initial Beck notice, adding a level of complexity and imposing signifi-
cant additional burdens.
ual employees and those of the organization as a whole.
In the end, we simply are not persuaded that the General
Counsel’s and Sands’ proposed revision to the California
Saw framework is necessary or justified. Rather, we
conclude that California Saw continues to strike a rea-
sonable balance between the competing interests in-
volved, and we reaffirm it today.
V.
We therefore affirm the judge’s finding that the Union
did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to
provide the Charging Party with the reduced fees and
dues applicable to nonmember objectors when it first
advised her of her obligations under the union-security
clause.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.

MEMBERS MISCIMARRA AND JOHNSON, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
Employees subject to union-security arrangements
must pay their share of representational expenses—i.e.,
for collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance handling. However, among the rights guaran-
teed employees under Section 7 of the Act is the right to
refrain from union activity. The “refrain from” right
entitles employees to choose not to subsidize a union’s
nonrepresentational expenditures, such as political con-
tributions.1 Unions have the corresponding statutory
duty to offer information sufficient to enable employees
to make an informed choice.
That much is simple. It is more complex to decide
what information a union must furnish employees, and
when. Unlike our colleagues, we believe the Act re-
quires that a union provide more information earlier in
order for employees to make that informed choice.
A brief review of the relevant legal framework is help-
ful here. Employees subject to a union-security clause
must choose among three types of union participation:
union membership, with full union dues; nonmember
status, with “agency fees” generally equivalent to full
union dues; or nonmember Beck objector status, with a
requirement to pay only the percentage of agency fees
expended by the union for representational purposes.
The decision to become a Beck objector is no trivial
matter. As stated, it involves the exercise of the statutory
right to refrain from union activities—specifically, to
refrain from subsidizing union activities that further poli-
1 Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). Employ-
ees who choose to so refuse are called “Beck objectors.”

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 429
cies or political views with which an employee may dis-
agree. Only nonmembers may exercise the Beck objector
right, so an employee must also assess whether doing so
is worth forfeiting the benefits of union membership and
the right to participate in internal union affairs.
In California Saw,2 the Board for the first time set
forth its view of the information a union must provide to
potential and actual Beck objectors at each of three stag-
es. At stage 1, a union must inform new employees of
their right to become nonmembers and their Beck right to
object to subsidizing nonrepresentational expenditures.
At stage 2, a union must inform the Beck objector of the
percentage reduction in union fees, the basis for the cal-
culation, and the right to challenge the calculations. At
stage 3, once an objector challenges the union’s calcula-
tions, the union must supply further information support-
ing those calculations.
In this case, the General Counsel and Charging Party
request the Board to hold that unions must disclose the
percentage fee reduction to new employees and non-
members at stage 1—when providing initial notice of
their Beck rights and before employees must decide
whether to object—rather than at the postobjection stage
2. In this regard, the General Counsel and Charging Par-
ty request that we overrule Teamsters Local 166 (Dyn-
corp Support Services),3 where the Board followed Cali-
fornia Saw and held that a union does not have a duty to
provide information about the percentage reduction in
union fees for a Beck objector until after an employee
exercises the objection right.
Prior Board and court decisions provide guidance here.
First, the Supreme Court instructs that “basic considera-
tions of fairness” dictate that employees “be given suffi-
cient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s
fee.” Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
306 (1986). Second, in deciding what information un-
ions must provide to employees, it is not appropriate to
engage in a balancing of interests analysis. Although the
adequacy of union disclosures is evaluated under the
duty of fair representation standard, and although that
standard generally accords unions a wide range of rea-
sonableness, “that range does not extend to conduct that
contravenes Hudson” and denies employees “information
essential to the exercise of their Beck and statutory
rights.” Teamsters Local 579 (Chambers & Owen Inc.),
350 NLRB 1166, 1169 (2007). Third, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
2 California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub
nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied
sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998).
3 327 NLRB 950 (1999), rev. granted Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
decided the precise issue presented here. Applying Hud-
son, the court held that “basic considerations of fairness”
require disclosure of the percentage reduction before
employees are required to make the decision to become
Beck objectors. Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41, 47 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
Our colleagues cling to the rationale of Dyncorp.
They distinguish Hudson and find it does not “compel[]”
a revision of California Saw; they balance the putative
respective interests of unions and employees in defining
what is arbitrary conduct within a wide range of reasona-
bleness under the duty of fair representation; and they
decline to follow the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Penrod.
On the other hand, we believe Hudson, Chambers &
Owen, and Penrod warrant a conclusion that the union
must provide the dues reduction percentage information
to new employees and nonmembers before they must
decide whether to become Beck objectors. We therefore
respectfully dissent from our colleagues’ refusal to modi-
fy the California Saw framework as the General Counsel
and Charging Party request.
The Board in California Saw accepted Hudson’s
“basic considerations of fairness” standard as applicable
in our Beck jurisprudence: “[W]e agree with the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia that the same ‘basic
considerations of fairness’ necessarily extend to a un-
ion’s notice to nonmembers of their right to object to
payment of nonrepresentational expenses.” 320 NLRB
at 233 fn. 50 (citing Abrams v. Communications Work-
ers, 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 fn. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). In
Chambers & Owen, the Board reiterated its view that the
“animating principles of Hudson” are applicable to a
determination of whether a union acts in arbitrary breach
of its duty of fair representation under the Act.4 Alt-
hough the majority claims that the Board’s agreement
with the D.C. Circuit applies only to the notice of rights
at stage 1, the D.C. Circuit subsequently concluded that
“since Abrams applies Hudson to new employees . . . ,
they too must be told the percentage of union dues that
would be chargeable were they to become Beck objec-
tors.” Penrod, supra. Indeed, it stands to reason that the
notice of rights at stage 1 is insufficient by itself without
information directly relevant to the exercise of those
rights.5
4 350 NLRB at 1166–1167.
5 Of course, an employee’s choice whether to exercise the statutory
objector right may be based on practical economics rather than any
philosophical opposition to a union’s nonrepresentational activities.
The Respondent describes the percentage of nonrepresentational ex-
penses in this case—13.93 percent—as “slight,” but employees may
well disagree with that characterization. But even if 13.93 percent is
not enough to affect an employee’s decision, the percentage in some
cases is more than enough to affect it. See, e.g., Knox v. Service Em-

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 430
Despite these Board and court pronouncements, the
majority declines to apply Hudson, finding its application
not “compelled” because Hudson involved employees
who were already paying reduced fees. The Board relied
on this very reasoning in Dyncorp,6 and the D.C. Circuit
in Penrod rejected it as foreclosed by its decision in
Abrams. In Abrams, the D.C. Circuit took the Supreme
Court at its word, saying that the Court in Hudson “held
that ‘[b]asic considerations of fairness . . . dictate that the
potential objectors be given sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.’”7 The Abrams
court acknowledged that Hudson presented the issue in a
different factual setting, but it found that difference did
not permit it to avoid Hudson’s holding “that potential
objectors must be given adequate notice”8—a holding the
D.C. Circuit in Penrod found dispositive of the precise
issue presented here.9 And even setting aside the D.C.
Circuit’s holdings, we believe our colleagues’ ap-
proach—asking whether Hudson “compels” the fee-
reduction disclosure at stage 1—fails to accord sufficient
deference to Hudson’s animating principles. Those prin-
ciples apply to all employees, including new hires decid-
ing whether to exercise their right to object.
In further reliance on Dyncorp’s rationale, our col-
leagues argue that the Union’s failure to provide the
Charging Party with the percentage reduction before she
decided whether to object was not irrational. In their
view, this makes it lawful under the “arbitrary” prong of
the duty of fair representation standard. They engage in
a balancing test, weighing the perceived burden on un-
ions to produce the percentage reduction at stage 1
against the benefit to employees of knowing the percent-
age before deciding whether to subsidize nonrepresenta-
tional expenditures. The problem with this analysis is
that the relevant balance has already been struck in
Chambers & Owen in favor of requiring disclosure. The
specific issue decided there was whether a union must
furnish objectors an adequate explanation of the basis for
the fee charged to objectors at the time they object (stage
2), and that objectors should not be required to challenge
the union’s calculations (stage 3) before receiving the
relevant information. The Board found that the infor-
mation must be provided at stage 2 to allow an objector
to make an informed decision about whether to challenge
the union’s fee. Indeed, the Board held that withholding
ployees International Union, Local 1000,132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012) (43.65
percent).
6 327 NLRB at 952 fn. 10.
7 Abrams v. Communications Workers, 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306) (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 1379 fn. 6 (emphasis in original).
9 203 F.3d at 47–48.
information that “actually impedes a nonmember em-
ployee from exercising his Beck rights and interferes
with the statutory right under Section 7 to refrain from
assisting a union is unreasonable and arbitrary.”10
Importantly for the present case, the Board’s analysis
in Chambers & Owen transcends the specific issue ad-
dressed there. As previously stated, the Board reaffirmed
its finding in California Saw that the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Hudson, supra, was dispositive of unions’
disclosure duties under Beck. Rejecting the dissenting
view that post-election disclosure of information was
adequate, the Board stated that
[t]he reason for requiring adequate disclosure to Beck
objectors is so that they can decide whether to chal-
lenge the union’s fee calculations. As the Supreme
Court observed, and contrary to the dissent, that pur-
pose would be thwarted by keeping objectors in the
dark and requiring them to challenge the union’s fig-
ures. Although, as the dissent notes, unions generally
enjoy a wide range of reasonableness under the duty of
fair representation standard, that range does not extend
to conduct that contravenes Hudson and denies to
nonmember objectors information essential to the exer-
cise of their Beck and statutory rights. Nor can we
agree, in light of the plain language of Hudson, that it is
appropriate to engage in the balancing analysis advo-
cated by the dissent.11
The same analysis applies here: basic considerations of fair-
ness require a union to provide new employees and non-
members with the percentage by which their union fees
would be reduced before they decide whether or not to ob-
ject under Beck. Only then can the employee make a fully
informed decision. Applying the animating principles of
Hudson, as defined and applied in Chambers & Owen, to
the facts of this case compels the conclusion that the per-
centage must be supplied at stage 1.
The foregoing precedent also renders inappropriate our
colleagues’ reliance on a balancing of interests analysis
to hold that the union’s failure to provide preelection
information relevant to the exercise of Beck rights is not
arbitrary. Moreover, even assuming such an analysis is
appropriate, it does not favor permitting a union to wait
until after an employee objects before disclosing the per-
centage of dues reductions for Beck objectors. In Cham-
bers & Owen, the Board found the burden on unions of
furnishing the more detailed information underlying such
a reduction at stage 2 rather than stage 3 would not be
particularly onerous, in large measure because of ad-
10 350 NLRB at 1169.
11 Id.

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 431
vances in computer and internet technology.12 Further
advances in computer technology make this rationale
even more compelling today than it was then. And, as
the Board further noted in Chambers & Owen, regulatory
disclosure requirements already require unions to report
their expenditures on representational activities.13 Based
on those figures, it should be relatively easy to calculate
the remainder of total expenditures devoted to nonrepre-
sentational purposes.14
The majority acknowledges that the burden on most
unions of furnishing the percentage reduction at stage 1
would be slight because most unions already have the
percentage in hand as part of their Beck procedures. As a
case in point, the Union produced the requested percent-
ages within four days of a request. Clearly, the infor-
mation was readily available, and producing it was no
burden at all. The majority expresses concern, however,
for small unions that may not have Beck procedures or
nonrepresentational calculations in place. Presumably
this problem would involve only those small unions that
had never dealt with a Beck objection and would there-
fore have to calculate the percentage reduction for the
first time. However, it seems likely that the burden of
doing so would be proportional to the size of the union:
the smaller the union, the simpler the calculation, and the
lighter the burden. Thus, we are not convinced that the
burden on small unions to produce the percentage at
stage 1 is significant. It is certainly no reason to excuse
all unions from providing employees with the infor-
mation they need to exercise their statutory rights.
The Act refers to the Board’s role, in part, as assuring
employees the “fullest freedom” in exercising their pro-
tected rights.15 In the present context, this means ensur-
ing that employees have sufficient information to make
an informed choice about their Beck rights. The change
sought by the General Counsel and Charging Party is not
earthshaking. Nonetheless, our colleagues decline to
make this modest adjustment to the California Saw
framework because they believe directly controlling legal
precedent does not compel it. We disagree. We believe
that Hudson, Chambers & Owen, and Penrod collective-
12 Id. at 1169–1170.
13 350 NLRB at 1169–1170 fn. 14 (noting that U.S. Department of
Labor Form LM-2 requires unions to disclose the amount of disburse-
ments for all representational activities).
14 The majority, citing again to the Board’s 1999 decision in Dyn-
corp, argues that calculating nonrepresentational expenditures would be
“an expensive and time-consuming undertaking.” The exponential
advancement in technology and computerized record keeping in the
past 15 years effectively blunts any force this argument may have had
in 1999.
15 Sec. 9(b).
ly persuade that there is only one reasonable view of a
union’s duty of fair representation in this case.
Besides this direct persuasive authority, we believe
that analogous legal rules and developments support our
view as well. First, throughout Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on employees’ mandatory dues obligations to a
union serving as their bargaining representative, there is
strong concern for protection of employees against com-
pelled speech in derogation of their First Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
788–789 (1961) (“There is, of course, no constitutional
reason why a union or other private group may not spend
its funds for political or ideological causes if its members
voluntarily join it and can voluntarily get out of it. . . .
But a different situation arises when a federal law steps
in and authorizes such a group to carry on activities at
the expense of persons who do not choose to be members
of the group as well as those who do. Such a law, even
though validly passed by Congress, cannot be used in a
way that abridges the specifically defined freedoms of
the First Amendment. And whether there is such
abridgment depends not only on how the law is written
but also on how it works.”) (citations omitted and em-
phasis supplied). Indeed, in the context of an agency fee
imposed on nonmember employees by state law, the Su-
preme Court has recognized prior notice as an important
contributor to protection of employees’ First Amendment
rights. In that context, “an agency-fee provision imposes
‘a significant impingement on First Amendment rights,’
and this cannot be tolerated unless it passes ‘exacting
First Amendment scrutiny.’” Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct.
2618, 2639 (2014) (quoting Knox v. Service Employees,
132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012)). The Court continued:
In Knox, we considered specific features of an agency-
shop agreement—allowing a union to impose upon
nonmembers a special assessment or dues increase
without providing notice and without obtaining the
nonmembers' affirmative agreement—and we held that
these features could not even satisfy the [commercial
speech protection] standard employed in United States
v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001), where
we struck down a provision that compelled the subsidi-
zation of commercial speech.
Id. (italics for emphasis). The Court’s reasoning in Knox, as
restated by Harris—that in public sector cases, First
Amendment freedoms require prior notice in order to secure
nonmember employees’ affirmative agreement to agency
fees—supports our view that some greater and earlier notice
to private sector employees under our Act is required. Oth-
erwise, even under a duty of fair representation standard,
judicial assessment of how our Act works, i.e., the rules of

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 432
disclosure mandated by a Federal agency, will inevitably be
that it impermissibly abridges those freedoms.
Another instructive analogy arises from the area of at-
torney fee disclosures to potential class members in Rule
23 class action litigation monetary settlements. There,
attorneys who serve as class counsel hold duties to class
members similar to a union’s duty of fair representation
to employees.16 Thus, such attorneys, in their capacity
representing the class, and in order to receive judicial
approval for any class settlement, must disclose the
amount of the claimed attorneys’ fees in the proposed
class action settlement—and how that amount was calcu-
lated—to class members. This disclosure must happen
before such members make the decision whether to stay
in the class or “opt out” of the class (and thus “opt out”
of representation by class counsel), so that potential class
members can make an informed choice to (1) accept the
claimed fee amount, (2) reject it entirely by “opting out,”
or (3) contest the fee claim with an objection. See gener-
ally Newberg on Class Actions § 8:22–8:225 (5th ed.);
Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, §§ 21.722–
21.724 (Federal Judicial Center, 2004). Similarly,
providing notice of the exact amount of nonrepresenta-
tional expenditures that the union will charge before em-
ployees must decide whether to forego membership and
object to that amount allows those employees to make an
informed choice as to whether to object to both union
membership and payment. See Newberg on Class Ac-
tions § 8.25 (“Allowing class members an opportunity
thoroughly to examine counsel's fee motion, inquire into
the bases for various charges and ensure that they are
adequately documented and supported is essential for the
protection of the rights of class members.”) (quoting In
re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation, 618
F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Finally, the trend in federal law is to require more pre-
choice disclosure, not less. This is especially true where
a consumer or employee is involved. Consider, for ex-
ample, the expansion of mortgage loan and credit card
disclosure requirements in the Truth in Lending Act of
1968, Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008,
Credit Card Disclosure Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. §1601 et
seq., and their implementation in rules promulgated by
the Federal Reserve Board, 74 FR 23289 (2009), and 75
FR 7658 (2010), and by the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, 77 FR 69738 (2012); the imposition of food
labeling and nutrition disclosure requirements in the Nu-
trition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990 (the
1990 amendments), which added section 403(q) of the
16 Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class”).
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §
343(q)), and the implementation and proposed expansion
of these requirements by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, 79 FR 11880 (2014). The majority offers no com-
pelling reason why employees, who are essentially the
consumers of union services, should be afforded less
notice concerning fees and less “truth-in-labeling” than
the average American consumer receives. Similarly, it is
a mystery why employees should not be fully informed
by a union so they can exercise their dues objection
rights, even while they must be fully informed of their
rights under federal employment laws by federal contrac-
tor employers, per the Department of Labor. See 75 FR
28368 (2010). Significantly, when the federal govern-
ment participates in the market as a consumer, it de-
mands far more detailed notice from its service provid-
ers, e.g., their past history of legal compliance troubles,
than what the Board here is willing to require for em-
ployees, who are expressly protected by our Act, about
where their own money may be going. See Executive
Order 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” 79 FR
45309 (July 31, 2014). What’s sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander. Employees should not receive less
notice, just because the relevant facts are in possession of
a union.
Requiring that unions provide employees with the per-
centage of nonrepresentational expenses at stage 1, be-
fore the employees must decide their status under a un-
ion-security clause, comports with basic considerations
of fairness, is essential to the exercise of their statutory
rights, and is consistent with the overwhelming national
approach of “more notice, not less.” Thus, we would
require a union to provide represented employees with its
reduced fee calculation for nonchargeable expenses at
stage 1.17

Michael Beck, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jonathan D. Karmel, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, for the Re-
spondent Union.
James Plunkett, Esq., of Springfield, Virginia, for the Individu-
al Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C. RICHARD MISERENDINO, Deputy Chief Administrative
Law Judge. On June 5, 2005, a charge was filed against the
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 700 (Lo-
cal 700 or Union)1 alleging that Local 700 failed to inform the
Individual Charging Party, Laura Sands (Sands), of her right to
become a nonmember and of her right as a nonmember to ob-
17 We would apply this requirement prospectively, and accordingly
we concur in the dismissal of the complaint.
1 All dates are 2005, unless otherwise indicated.

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 433
ject to paying the equivalent of union dues and fees. This por-
tion of the charge alleging that Sands was not provided with
information in compliance with the legal standards established
in Communications Workers v. Beck, 47 U.S. 735 (1988), and
NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963), was dismissed
by the Regional Director for Region 25. On October 15, 2005,
however, a complaint issued alleging that Local 700 violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to provide Sands with
the percentage reduction of dues and fees for nonmember ob-
jectors when the Union first informed her of her obligations
under the union-security clause.
On July 10, 2007, the General Counsel, Respondent Union,
and Individual Charging Party submitted a joint motion and
stipulation of facts pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(9) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations waiving a hearing and submit-
ting this case to an administrative law judge for issuance of
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The parties
agreed that the stipulation of facts, charge, complaint, answer,
exhibits attached to the stipulation, statement of issues present-
ed, and each party’s statement of position would constitute the
entire record in this case and that no oral testimony was neces-
sary or desired.
On August 22, 2007, I issued an Order granting the joint mo-
tion and directing the parties to file briefs by September 24,
2007. The Individual Charging Party and the Respondent Un-
ion filed briefs.
On the entire record, and after considering the parties’ posi-
tion statements and the briefs filed by the Individual Charging
Party and the Respondent Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Kroger Limited Partnership I (Kroger or Employer), a corpo-
ration, with its principal office in Cincinnati, Ohio, and a facili-
ty located, among other places, in Crawfordsville, Indiana, is
engaged in the retail sale of groceries, pharmaceuticals, and
sundry goods. During the 12-month period preceding the filing
of the complaint, Kroger, purchased and received at its Craw-
fordsville, Indiana facility, goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly from points outside the State of Indiana. At all materi-
al times, Kroger has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent, United Food and Commercial Workers Un-
ion, Local 700, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Facts
Local 700 and Kroger have a collective-bargaining agree-
ment which requires as a condition of employment all bargain-
ing unit employees to join or pay fees to the Union. On De-
cember 10, 2004, Sands was hired by Kroger to work at the
Crawfordsville, Indiana facility.
By letter, dated January 11, 2005, the Union advised Sands
that as a new employee she was represented by the Union. It
also asked her to complete and return a membership application
packet, which contained a copy of the collective-bargaining
agreement’s valid union-security clause, a membership applica-
tion with check-off authorization, and the following separate
statement:

Important Information Concerning Your
Opportunity to Become an Active Member of the
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, Local 700 and Your
Rights Under the Law.

The right by law, to belong to the Union and to partic-
ipate in its affairs is a very important right. Currently, you
also have the right to refrain from becoming a member of
the Union. If you choose this option, you may elect to sat-
isfy requirements of a contractual union security provision
by paying the equivalent of an initiation fee and monthly
dues to the Union. In addition, non-members who object
to payment in full of the equivalent of dues and fees may
file written objections to funding expenditures that are not
germane to the Union’s duties as your agent for collective
bargaining. If you choose to be an objector, your financial
obligation will be reduced very slightly. Individuals who
choose to file such objections should advise the Union in
writing at its business address of this choice. The Union
will then advise you of the amounts which you must pay
and how these amounts are calculated, as well as any pro-
cedures we have for challenging our computations.
Please be advised that non-member status constitutes a
full waiver of the rights and benefits of UFCW member-
ship. More specifically, this means that you would not be
allowed to vote on contract modifications or new con-
tracts; would be ineligible to hold union office or partici-
pate in union elections and all other rights, privileges, and
benefits established for and provided to active UFCW
members by the UFCW International Constitution, Local
700 Bylaws, or established by the local Union.
We are confident that after considering your options,
you will conclude that the right to participate in the deci-
sion making process of your Union is of vital importance
to you, your family and your co-workers, and you will
complete your application for membership in the United
Food and Commercial Workers.
Your involvement in your union is vital to the pro-
tection of job security, wages, benefits, and working
conditions.

(Jt. Exh. 2.)
On January 25, 2005, the Union sent Sands a second letter
which explained her financial obligations to the Union. With
regard to the amount of dues and the initiation fees, the letter
stated:

Currently, full regular monthly dues and fees based on
your hire date of December 10, 2004 are set forth below.
Dues for February 2005
at $25.39 per month $25.39
Initiation fees $66.00
Total $91.39

(Jt. Exh. 3.)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 434
Enclosed with the letter was a duplicate membership applica-
tion packet, including the above-reference notice informing
Sands, among other things, of her right to be and remain a non-
member of the Union and to object to paying any dues or fees
not germane to the Union’s duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative. A few days later, Sands joined the
Union.
On June 25, Sands sent a letter to the Union resigning as a
member “effective immediately” and stating:

. . . I object to the collection and expenditure by the
union of a fee for any purpose other than my pro rata share
of the union’s costs of collective bargaining, contract ad-
ministration, and grievance adjustment, as is my right un-
der Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988). Pursuant to Teachers Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292 (1986), and Abrams v. Communications Workers, 59
F.3d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1995), I request that you provide me
with my procedural rights, including: reduction of my fees
to an amount that includes only lawfully chargeable costs,
notice of the calculation of that amount, verified by an in-
dependent certified public accountant; and notice of the
procedure that you have adopted to hold my fees in an in-
terest-bearing escrow account and give me an opportunity
to challenge your calculation and have it reviewed by an
impartial decisionmaker. Accordingly, I also hereby noti-
fy you that I wish to authorize only the deduction of repre-
sentation fees from my wages.

(Jt. Exh. 4.)
Four days later, on June 29, the Union responded in writing
advising Sands of the percentage of her dues reduction and the
reduced dollar amount. She also was provided with a copy of
portions of the auditors’ report and the procedure for objecting
to and challenging the Union’s calculation of the nonmember
fees.2 Sands did not challenge the Union’s calculations.
III. ISSUE SUBMITTED
Did the Respondent violate its duty of fair representation un-
der the National Labor Relations Act by failing to include in its
initial Beck notice to the Charging Party the amount of full
Union dues and the percentage reduction in dues that objecting
members would receive?
IV. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
All of the parties acknowledge, and agree, that under current
Board law new employees must receive an initial notice in-
forming them of their right not to become a union member, of
their right not to pay full union dues and fees, and of their right
to object to payment of full dues and fees. See California Saw
& Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224, 229–230 (1995). If an em-
ployee objects to funding union activities that are unrelated to
collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment, the Union must advise the Beck objector of the
percentage of reduction in fees, the basis for the union’s calcu-
lation, and of the right to challenge these figures.
2 The Union maintains 36 separate dues rates, covering 5 Kroger
bargaining units, including 9 separate dues rates covering the Kroger
clerks and meat bargaining units.
The Individual Charging Party and the General Counsel do
not assert that under current Board law a violation occurred.
Rather, they argue that current Board law should be reconsid-
ered and reversed to require that unions inform employees in
the initial Beck notice of the percentage reduction in dues that
an objecting employee would receive and the total amount of
dues to which the percentage applies. They argue that current
Board law conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chi-
cago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986), a
public sector case, where nonunion employees challenged an
agency shop agreement on the grounds that it violated their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it did not ade-
quately prevent the use of their proportionate share of dues for
impermissible purposes. The Court stated that “[b]asic consid-
erations of fairness . . . dictate that the potential objectors be
given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the un-
ion’s fee.”3
The General Counsel and Individual Charging Party there-
fore assert that Hudson directs and fairness dictates that notice
of the percentage deduction, along with the full dues, should be
given to potential objectors, like Sands, in the initial notice in
order for them to decide intelligently whether or not to object.
They also argue that a change in current Board law is warranted
in light of the appellate court decision in Penrod v. NLRB, 203
F.3d 41, 47 (D.C. Cir 2000), and the Board’s decision in Team-
sters Local 579 (Chambers & Owen, Inc.), 350 NLRB 1166
(2007).
Finally, the General Counsel argues that requiring the Union
to provide this information in the initial notice will not be bur-
densome because many major national and international unions
have developed Beck systems with the percentage information
readily available. In addition, the General Counsel asserts that
local unions can make use of a “local presumption” that the
percentage of a local’s expenditures chargeable to objectors is
at least as great as the chargeable percentage of its parent union
and can rely on their international’s Beck system to comply
with their duty of fair representation.
Local 700 argues that a union breaches it duty of fair repre-
sentation only if its actions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith. Unions are given a “wide range of reasonableness”
in meeting this standard. The current Board law is clear with
regard to the initial notice unions must give to new employees.
There is no argument or evidence that Local 700 violated its
duty under current Board law. Rather, the stipulated facts show
that the Union initially provided Sands with all the information
required by law. Thus, the Union asserts that its conduct was
not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.
Local 700 further asserts that providing Sands and thousands
of other employees with individual calculation of their reduced
dues and fees would be burdensome notwithstanding the fact
3 It should be pointed out that the “potential objectors” in Hudson,
where not potentially objecting to being union members (because they
already were nonunion members). Rather, as nonunion members they
were potential objectors to the use of agency shop fees for purposes
other than collective-bargaining and contract administration, which
makes them more akin to second stage Beck objectors, who may poten-
tially challenge a union’s financial calculations.

FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 700 (KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 435
that national and international unions have Beck systems in
place. It points out that in Kroger bargaining units alone, the
Union maintains 36 separate dues rates covering thousands of
employees in five different Kroger bargaining units. Local 700
therefore argues that providing specific calculations of reduced
dues and fees for all nonmembers would be overly burdensome.
Finally, Local 700 argues that reliance on Hudson, supra, is
misplaced. It asserts that Hudson involved public sector em-
ployees and First Amendment rights and concerned nonunion
employees who had already qualified for a reduced fee.
V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
It is well settled law that a Board administrative law judge
must “apply established Board precedent which the Supreme
Court has not reversed” (citation omitted), leaving for the
Board, not the judge, to determine whether that precedent
should be varied. Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14
(1984). All parties here agree that under current Board law
Local 700 has not acted arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In addition,
a careful reading of the Board’s recent decision in Chambers &
Owens, Inc. does not establish a basis for finding a violation.
In Chambers & Owens, Inc., the issue before the Board was
whether the union was required to provide a nonmember Beck
objector with information concerning its affiliates’ activities
and the extent to which those activities were chargeable or
nonchargeable prior to the nonmember objector’s filing a chal-
lenge to the Union’s reduced dues and fees calculation. 350
NLRB 1166, 1168 (2007). In other words, the question pre-
sented to the Board was how much information is a union re-
quired to furnish a Beck objector at the second stage of the Beck
objections procedure in order for the objector to decide whether
or not to challenge the unions’ reduced fee computations.
In that context, the Board agreed with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Hudson that “basic considerations of fairness”
dictate that adequate information regarding dues and fees re-
ductions be provided to objectors to allow them to challenge
unions’ reduced fees computations. It also found, in accord
with the District of Columbia Circuit in Penrod,4 that as to
affiliate expenditures, Hudson is dispositive of the issue, i.e.,
unless a union demonstrates that none of the amount paid to
affiliates was used to subsidize activities for which nonmem-
bers may not be charged, then an explanation of the share that
was so used is surely required. Penrod, 203 F.2d at 47. Not-
withstanding the Board’s favorable discussion of Hudson and
4 In Penrod, the DC Circuit decided three issues: Did the NLRB en-
gage in reasoned decisionmaking in determining that a list of general
expenditure categories provided by the union, in response to a Beck
objection, was sufficient to allow employees to determine whether to
challenge reduced fee calculations; was the union required to explain
how its affiliated unions used money that the union considered charge-
able to Beck objectors; and was the union required to identify in the
initial Beck notice given to new employees and financial core payors,
i.e., those employees who are not full union members, the percentage
reduction in dues that would result from a Beck objection?
Penrod, the Board in Chambers & Owens, Inc., did not address
the issue of whether a union is required to provide a potential
Beck objector with financial information in the initial Beck
notice. Despite the appellate court’s holding in Penrod on that
very issue, the Board to date has not applied the Penrod hold-
ing on that issue, thereby indicating a reversal of current Board
law. An administrative law judge is bound to apply established
Board precedent which neither the Board nor Supreme Court
has reversed, notwithstanding contrary decisions by courts of
appeals. Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4
(1979), enfd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981). As a matter of
current Board law, therefore, Local 700’s conduct did not vio-
late the Act.
Nor do the factual circumstances here warrant a violation.
The thrust of the General Counsel and Individual Charging
Party’s argument is that more financial information in the initial
notice is essential to helping a potential objector make an in-
formed decision on whether or not to object to union member-
ship. The undisputed facts show, however, that on June 25,
2005, Sands resigned as a union member “effective immediate-
ly” without any financial information other than the amount of
union member dues. She also objected to the collection and
expenditure by the Union of a fee for any purpose other than
collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment, and demanded the percentage of her dues reduction
and the reduced dollar amount, which she promptly received
and did not challenge. Thus, it is quite apparent that Sands had
all the information she needed to make an informed decision to
object. In Chambers & Owens, Inc., the Board found that
where a union’s procedure purporting to implement Beck actu-
ally impedes a nonmember employee from exercising his Beck
rights and interferes with the statutory right under Section 7 to
refrain from assisting a union, its conduct is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and therefore violated of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. 350 NLRB 1166, 1168. The undisputed facts here do not
support such a conclusion.
For these reasons, I find that the Respondent did not violate
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. Ac-
cordingly, I shall recommend that complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Respondent has not violated the Act in any manner al-
leged in the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.