Senior Citizens Coordinating Council

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 28, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1100 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1100
Senior Citizens Coordinating Council of Riverbay
Community Inc., a/k/a Senior Citizens
Coordinating Council of Co-op City and
Barbara Mathew. Case 2–CA–28713

March 28, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On September 23, 1996, Administrative Law Judge
Raymond P. Green issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the Respondent filed an opposing brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
The primary issue here is whether the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging three of
its employees because they composed, signed, and sent
out a letter that threatened a work stoppage with the ob-
ject of influencing the Respondent in its selection of
management personnel, i.e., the director of its Multi-
Service Center. A second issue is whether the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) by instructing employees to
sign a memorandum retracting their alleged protected
activities or be terminated. The answer to these ques-
tions depends on whether the employees’ actions consti-
tuted protected concerted activity. The judge found, in
effect, that the employees’ activity was concerted, but
not protected. Accordingly, he found that the Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by discharging these
employees and dismissed the complaint. As discussed
below, we reverse.
The Facts
The facts, as set out by the judge and supplemented by
uncontradicted testimony, are as follows. The Respon-
dent is a non-profit corporation engaged in providing
social services at a large housing project in the Bronx,
New York, known as Co-op City. The Respondent has
two divisions, the Nutrition Program,1 and the division at
issue here, the Multi-Service Center. The Multi-Service
Center receives most of its funding from the New York
City Department for the Aging (DFTA).2 The Multi-
Service Center provides social services for aged residents
of Co-op City. Until March 1995,3 William Austin was
the director of the Multi-Service Center. As such, he was
the top managerial official in charge of this division, as
well as the first-line supervisor of the Multi-Service Cen-
ter employees, social workers Hubert Peck, Barbara
Mathew, and Connie Kirkland, part-time bookkeeper
Michele Mercado, and longtime employee Blanche
Polovetz, who performed office clerical work and minor
casehandling tasks. When Austin resigned his position
in March,4 the Respondent appointed Polovetz, the most
senior employee at the Center, as the acting director until
it hired a new director. Unlike Peck, Mathew, and Kirk-
land, Polovetz was not a social worker but was, in effect,
the office manager of the Multi-Service Center. Polovetz
had previously served as acting director when the posi-
tion of director was vacant.

1 The Nutrition Program, the larger of the two divisions, operates a
kitchen, dining room, and a “meals on wheels” program. Candice
Harris is the director of the Nutrition Program.
2 In this regard, in establishing that the Board had jurisdiction over
the Respondent, at the hearing in this case counsel for the General
Counsel stated that all the parties agreed that the Multi-Service Center
received approximately $202,000 annually in gross income. Later in
the hearing, the parties stipulated that DFTA’s contract with the Multi-
Service Center for fiscal year 1995 was for approximately $202,000.
On May 15, Polovetz met with certain DFTA officials,
including Linda Whitaker, its assistant commissioner,
Bureau of Community Services, and Jorge Romero, its
director of Bronx Programs. In a June 1 letter to Marga-
ret Wilson, the Respondent’s acting president, confirm-
ing the May 15 meeting and responding to the Respon-
dent’s request to promote Polovetz to the position of act-
ing director of the Multi-Service Center, Romero wrote
that Polovetz did not meet the minimum requirements to
be acting director because she did not have a degree in
social work, counseling, psychology, or gerontology and
2 years of human services experience. He also stated that
Polovetz did not have the hands-on case management
experience required to be a case management director.
Romero added that if the Respondent insisted on having
Polovetz as acting director, DFTA would not assume any
responsibility for any of her actions or decisions that
adversely affected the Program or the clients. Romero
concluded by stating that DFTA expected that the posi-
tion of director would be advertised and that when a
qualified candidate was chosen, a copy of the resume had
to be forwarded to DFTA for approval.
Also in June, the Respondent appointed Candice Har-
ris to be its executive director while she retained her po-
sition as the director of the Respondent’s Nutrition pro-
gram.5 One of Harris’ first tasks was to set up a plan to
3 All dates hereafter refer to 1995 unless otherwise stated.
4 The judge stated incorrectly that Austin had retired from his posi-
tion.
5 Prior to this time, each division had its own director who reported
directly to the Respondent’s board of directors. Concerned about lack
of oversight, the Respondent amended its bylaws to create the position
of executive director. The executive director is in charge of both the
Nutrition program and the Multi-Service Center. Thus, while each
division retained its own director, they now reported to Harris, who, in
turn, reported directly to the Respondent’s board of directors.
The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s failure to find that
both Polovetz and Harris are statutory supervisors under the Act. We
find merit in this exception with respect to Harris, since the parties
stipulated that Harris possessed supervisory authority within the mean-
ing of Sec. 2(11) of the Act from the time of her appointment as execu-
tive director in June, and the actions alleged as unfair labor practices
330 NLRB No. 154
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1101
reorganize the Multi-Service Center and to recruit a new
permanent director for that program. Also during the
early summer, Frank Chimkin, who had previously
worked at the Multi-Service Center as a social worker
and was bookkeeper Mercado’s boyfriend, applied for
the director’s job. Social worker Mathew spoke to indi-
viduals at DFTA in favor of his appointment.
After Harris’ appointment as executive director, she
became involved in a dispute over Polovetz’ pay. Al-
though Polovetz had verbally informed Mercado several
times that she (Polovetz) was the acting director and was
authorized to be paid at the director’s salary “line” while
she occupied that position, Mercado refused to issue pay
checks to her in the amount requested, asserting that the
authorization had to be in writing and approved by both
DFTA and the Respondent. Mercado believed that she
(Mercado) was employed by both DFTA and the Re-
spondent because the Respondent received approxi-
mately 95 percent of its funding from DFTA. DFTA
required that increases in pay be authorized in writing.
Seeking DFTA authorization to pay Polovetz at the di-
rector’s salary level, Mercado called Romero on July 20.
Mercado told Romero that she was aware of the May 15
meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to place an ad
in the newspaper and interview candidates for the direc-
tor’s position.6 She then asked Romero whether she
could pay Polovetz at the director’s salary line. Romero
confirmed the May 15 meeting and promised to fax Mer-
cado a copy of his June 1 letter. Romero also told Mer-
cado that she could pay Polovetz at the director’s salary
level. Mercado continued to insist, however, that the
Respondent furnish her written authorization to issue
checks to Polovetz on the director’s salary line. In early
August, Harris and Florence Mack, the Respondent’s
president, met with Mercado to find out why Polovetz
was not being paid at the appropriate level.7 Mercado
insisted that the Respondent give her written authoriza-
tion before she issued a check at the director’s salary

occurred after that. With respect to Polovetz, we note that the parties
stipulated that, as the acting director of the Multi-Service Center, she
possessed supervisory authority within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) until
sometime in June. No evidence was introduced to show that Polovetz’
authority in this regard was diminished after Harris’ appointment as
executive director, but we find it unnecessary to decide whether she
continued to possess such authority. As the acting director of the
Multi-Service Center, she was clearly held out as an agent of the Re-
spondent with respect to operations in that center.
6 Mercado and Mathew testified without contradiction that they first
learned of the May 15 meeting from Polovetz herself soon after it oc-
curred. Polovetz did not testify at the hearing.
7 The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure to find that
Mack was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
We find it unnecessary to pass on this issue. The Respondent’s wit-
ness, Harris, a stipulated supervisor, testified that she was directed by
Mack, acting on behalf of the board of directors, to terminate the em-
ployees and that she and Mack had jointly decided on giving the em-
ployees an option of retracting their letter as a way of avoiding termina-
tion. As the Respondent’s president, Mack, was clearly acting as its
agent.
level. Although Mack then informed Mercado by a letter
of August 8 that Polovetz was the acting director,
Mercado still refused to issue a check to Polovetz at the
director’s salary level because the letter did not authorize
her to do so. Mercado finally issued the proper check to
Polovetz after Mack sent her another letter on August 14
that explicitly authorized her to pay Polovetz “from the
Directors [sic] budget line retroactively.”
Prior to learning of the June 1 letter and thereafter, so-
cial workers Peck, Mathew, and Kirkland, and book-
keeper Mercado met approximately once or twice a week
to discuss their concerns about Polovetz’ appointment as
acting director. Mathew and Peck were concerned about
Polovetz’ lack of credentials because Polovetz could not
sign off on cases, supervise their work, or provide assis-
tance and guidance in the handling of more difficult
cases. Mathew and Peck were also concerned that time
was being taken away from their case work because they
had to provide assistance to each other with their cases
and had to spend more time doing the computer work
which Austin, the former director, had done prior to his
resignation. Mercado expressed her concerns about the
Respondent’s insistence that she issue checks to Polovetz
without written authorization. Finally, in late July and
after Mercado’s July 20 telephone conversation with
Romero, Mathew called Helen Jenkins, DFTA’s program
director, to explain the employees’ (i.e., Mathew’s,
Peck’s, Kirkland’s, and Mercado’s) concerns and to in-
form DFTA that, contrary to Romero’s direction as
stated in his June 1 letter, the Respondent had made no
effort to hire a new director. Jenkins, in essence, told the
employees to put their concerns in writing. The employ-
ees then composed the August 4 letter at issue here.
About August 10, Peck, Mathew, Kirkland, and
Mercado sent the letter, dated August 4 and initially au-
thored by Mercado, to DFTA’s Linda Whitaker, with
copies to the Respondent’s board of directors and to cer-
tain other DFTA officials, including Romero, DFTA’s
director of Bronx Programs, and Jenkins, DFTA’s pro-
gram director. Peck, Mathew, Kirkland, and Mercado
also sent copies of the letter to local politicians, including
Congressman Eliot Engel, State Assemblyman Stephen
Kaufman, State Senator Joseph Galiber, and Bronx Bor-
ough President Fernando Ferrer. The letter, the full text
of which is attached as Appendix A to the judge’s deci-
sion, begins by stating that the Respondent “is in a state
of crisis” and asks for DFTA’s help. The letter goes on
to state, inter alia, that:

On March 10, 1995, Mr. William Austin, MSW,
resigned as Director of the Co-op City Multi-Service
Center. Since that time the office has been without a
director and there are currently no plans to find a re-
placement. We are without appropriate supervision,
and like any other agency, require professional so-
cial work supervision.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1102
. . . .
Our dilemma has made it difficult for us to give
our clients the highest quality care management. In-
stead, we are distracted by issues of office status,
power and monetary gain, forcing us to ask our-
selves questions like these:
Who can we turn to when we have a question re-
garding a case? Again, Mrs. Polovetz is not quali-
fied and Ms. Harris’ agency has never provided case
management.
Who is supervising us on a regular basis and re-
viewing our cases?
Who is updating us on new policies and proce-
dures?

The letter concludes:

The Multi-Service staff has met and composed
this letter. We are writing to you urging you to take
immediate action concerning this matter. We each
feel very strongly and united in this cause and are
ready to take further action if our pleas go unan-
swered. Therefore, if we do not see movement in
the hiring of a new Director (without interference
and with significant DFTA involvement) we, the
staff of the Co-op City Multi-Service Center, are
prepared to take a job action wherein we will begin
not reporting to work until sufficient measures are
taken to hire a new Director.

Peck, Mathew, Kirkland, and Mercado all signed the letter.
Harris first learned of the letter on Saturday, August
19, through a telephone call from Mack. Both Harris and
Mack were upset by the letter, particularly because it was
sent both to Whitaker and other DFTA officials and to
various politicians. On Monday, August 21, Harris and
Mack visited the Multi-Service Center where, over
objections from Peck and Mathew, they first met alone
with Mercado. Polovetz also attended this meeting. At
the meeting, Harris told Mercado that the Respondent
had contracted out the bookkeeping work and gave
Mercado 2 weeks’ notice. Harris denied Mercado’s
claim that she was being terminated because of the letter.
Harris also stated, however, that the letter was “vile” and
poorly thought out and that when you put things in
writing, you have to be on firm ground before making
charges. During their conversation, Polovetz spoke
sarcastically of the “beautiful letter” that Mercado had
sent to DFTA’s Linda Whitaker and interjected several
times that the letter was vicious and vindictive.8

8 Mercado secretly tape recorded the August 21 meeting. At the
hearing in this case counsel for the General Counsel introduced the tape
into evidence and then sought to introduce Mercado’s transcript of the
tape into evidence as General Counsel’s Exhibit 27 (GC 27). The Gen-
eral Counsel excepts to the judge’s rejection of GC 27 and contends, in
effect, that the transcript should be received into evidence on the basis
of Mercado’s testimony to the effect that the transcript was an accurate
reflection of the tape’s contents. We find this exception without merit
After the meeting, Harris and Mack, again accompa-
nied by Polovetz, met with Peck and Mathew. Kirkland
was not at the facility at this time, and Harris rejected
Peck’s and Mathew’s request to delay the meeting until
Kirkland could attend. Harris told Peck and Mathew that
both she and the Respondent’s Board were upset that
they had gone outside the agency. Peck and Mathew told
Harris and Mack of their concerns related to having no
supervision and of the extra time they had to work. Har-
ris told Peck and Mathew that they would have another
meeting on Wednesday, August 23. Harris had not yet
decided to discharge any of the social workers.
On Tuesday, August 22, Mathew called Harris and ei-
ther told her that the social workers would not meet with
her again unless a DFTA official were present or re-
quested that a DFTA official be present at their next
meeting. After the telephone call, Polovetz told Mathew
that what she had just done was the straw that broke the
camel’s back and that Harris and Mack were on their
way over to Multi-Service Center. Mathew then left the
facility on other business and was absent when Harris
and Mack arrived. At Peck’s request, the meeting was
delayed until Mathew could return. After waiting some
time, however, Harris said that she could not wait any
longer and held the meeting with Peck and Kirkland
alone. At the meeting, Harris presented Peck and Kirk-
land with a letter retracting their August 4 letter and told
them that they must sign it in order to retain their jobs.
Peck refused to sign the letter and was fired. Kirkland
signed the letter and was retained. On Wednesday, Au-
gust 23, Harris returned to the Multi-Service Center and
gave Mathew a letter of termination dated August 22.
Harris told Mathew that her services were no longer
needed and that she should clean out her desk and leave.9
Analysis
As explained above, the primary issue here is whether
Peck, Mathew, and Mercado’s conduct in composing and
sending the August 4 letter that threatened a work stop-
page unless Polovetz were replaced constituted protected
activity. For the following reasons, we find, contrary to
the judge, that it did.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act,10 employees have the
right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid

as the judge, after listening to part of the tape, rejected GC 27 on the
grounds that the tape was partially inaudible and that the transcript
apparently contained things that were not on the tape. On this basis, we
agree with the judge that testimonial evidence, not the tape, is the best
evidence regarding what transpired at the August 21 meeting.
9 Although Harris gave Mathew the dismissal letter on August 23,
this does not conflict with the judge’s finding that Mathew was effec-
tively discharged on August 22. In this regard, the dismissal letter,
which is identical to the one that Peck received, was dated August 22.
Further, on August 23, Harris did not give Mathew an opportunity to
sign the retraction letter before she notified Mathew of her dismissal.
10 Sec. 7 of the Act states in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1103
and protection. Concomitantly, an employer may not,
without violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, discharge or
otherwise threaten, restrain, or coerce employees because
they engage in such activities. Not all concerted activity,
however, is protected.11 In cases such as the present one,
where employees seek to protest the selection or termina-
tion of a supervisor or other management official, an
analysis of whether the employees’ activities are pro-
tected under the Act is fact-based and depends on
whether “such facts establish that the identity and capa-
bility of the supervisor involved has a direct impact on
the employees’ own job interests and on their perform-
ance of the work they are hired to do.” Dobbs Houses,
135 NLRB 885, 888 (1962), enf. denied 325 F.2d 531
(5th Cir. 1963).12 See also Hoytuck Corp., 285 NLRB
904, 907 (1987). In sum:

Ordinarily, the applicability of the [“mutual aid
or protection”] clause is not seriously in question be-
cause employers seldom impose discipline upon em-
ployees for complaining about matters not affecting
their palpable “lot as employees,” nor do employees
often bring nonwork-related complaints into the em-
ployment environment. On the periphery of the
clause, however, there appears to be a tacit assump-
tion that employee efforts to affect the ultimate di-
rection and managerial policies of the business are
beyond the scope of the clause. This distinction
seems to be implicit in the line of cases which holds
that protests against the appointment or termination
of “low-level” supervisors may be protected when
directly related to employees’ conditions of em-

tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion[.]
11 As the Supreme Court explained in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 567–568 (1978):
It is true, of course, that some concerted activity bears a less
immediate relationship to employees’ interests as employees than
other such activity. We may assume that at some point the rela-
tionship becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be
deemed to come within the “mutual aid or protection” clause. It
is neither necessary nor appropriate, however, for us to attempt to
delineate precisely the boundaries of the “mutual aid or protec-
tion” clause. That task is for the Board to perform in the first in-
stance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come before it.
12 As the Board stated in Dobbs Houses, 135 NLRB at 888–889:
For, under well-established precedent, concerted action by em-
ployees to protest an employer’s selection or termination of a
supervisory employee is not automatically removed from the
protection of the Act. Each case must turn on its facts. Where,
as here, such facts establish that the identity and capability of
the supervisor involved has a direct impact on the employees’
own job interests and on their performance of the work they are
hired to do, they are legitimately concerned with his identity.
Therefore, strike or other concerted action which evidences the
employees’ concern is no less protected than any other strike
which employees may undertake in pursuit of a mutual interest
in the improvement of their conditions of employment. [Foot-
note omitted.]
ployment, while similar activity with regard to “top
management” of the employer is not safeguarded.13

In the present case, the judge found that the employ-
ees’ activity related to the August 4 letter was not pro-
tected because it was, in effect, solely to effect or influ-
ence changes in the management hierarchy, i.e., the ap-
pointment, in conjunction with DFTA, of a new director
as soon as possible, and did not, on its face, deal with
any specific working conditions that might have been of
concern to the employees. Rather, the judge found that
the primary focus of the letter was not the employees’
own terms and conditions of employment, but “the
status, power and money being paid to Blanche
Polovetz.” While lack of proper supervision was a main
concern of social workers Peck and Mathew raised in the
August 4 letter, the judge discounted the effect of the
absence of supervision on their jobs because he found
that Peck and Mathew “would like to think” that they
were in a “professional job, requiring independent judg-
ment on their part.” The judge further found that the
employees’ other concerns, such as the time they con-
sumed doing computer work and advising each other on
cases after Polovetz’ appointment, were “post hoc ration-
alization[s]” because they were not specifically set out in
the August 4 letter. As to these specific employee con-
cerns, the judge found, in effect, that even if they were in
issue, such concerns did not have an impact on the em-
ployees’ terms and conditions of employment because
they did not affect the employees’ wages and benefits
and did not require the employees to work longer hours.
As to bookkeeper Mercado, the judge found “patently
ridiculous” the General Counsel’s contention that Mer-
cado reasonably feared that she could be discharged or
disciplined if she issued paychecks to Polovetz on the
director’s line without prior authorization from DFTA
and the Respondent. Instead, he found that Mercado’s
refusal to issue the paycheck to Polovetz was insubordi-
nate behavior which would have justified her discharge.
Further, because the Respondent told Mercado on August
21, prior to its decision to terminate Peck and Mathew,
that the bookkeeping had been contracted out, the judge
concluded that the decision to contract out the bookkeep-
ing work was motivated not by her signature on the let-
ter, but by her past refusal to pay Polovetz. Finally, the
judge found that a major objective of the employees in
sending the letter was to promote the hiring of Chimkin,
Mercado’s boyfriend, as the new director. Thus, the
judge found that the facts here were “very similar” to
those in Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota, supra,
and N.Y. Chinatown Senior Citizens Coalition, 239
NLRB 614 (1978), which, the judge stated, “both in-
volved situations where internal politics relating to the
selection of managerial personnel and each agency’s
13 Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota, 250 NLRB 35, 41 (1980)
(citations omitted).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1104
policy goals were the primary concerns of the employ-
ees.”
We find, contrary to the judge, that Peck’s, Mathew’s,
and Mercado’s activities in composing and sending the
August 4 letter were protected under the Act because we
find, for the reasons set out below, that the August 4 let-
ter protested matters that were of legitimate concern to
the employees and which had a direct impact on their
terms and conditions of employment. As a preliminary
matter, we note that although Polovetz was, in effect,
both the first-line supervisor of the Multi-Center em-
ployees and its highest management official, we need not
decide which job status is relevant here because our
analysis does not depend on Polovetz’ management posi-
tion, but on whether her “identity and capability” had a
direct impact on the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment.14 In finding that they did, we will first ex-
plain why we find that social workers Peck’s and
Mathew’s actions were protected. We will then set out
our reasons for finding bookkeeper Mercado’s activities
protected.
As to Peck’s and Mathew’s activities, we find, con-
trary to our dissenting colleague, that the judge erred (1)
by assuming, in effect, that the social workers did not
need direct supervision because they liked to think of
themselves as professional employees who exercised
independent judgment, and (2) by ignoring in his analy-
sis the influence that DFTA, the Respondent’s primary
funding source, had on the employees’ activities at issue
here. As to the former, the judge’s finding, in effect, that
Peck and Mathew did not need direct supervision is
without support in the record. Rather, it is based on the
judge’s conjecture that Peck and Mathew “like[d] to
think” of themselves as professional employees. We find
that, on the contrary, Peck’s and Mathew’s primary con-
cern after Polovetz’ appointment as acting director was
that they were without adequate supervision because
Polovetz had neither the training nor the experience nec-
essary to provide them with guidance in their cases and
could not sign off on case files that included recom-
mended courses of action. Such lack of proper supervi-
sion is the primary concern of the employees expressed
in their August 4 letter. Thus, we find, contrary to our
dissenting colleague, that the August 4 letter, on its face,
asserted that lack of proper supervision directly affected
Peck’s and Mathew’s working conditions. Therefore
their activities in seeking a replacement for Polovetz
were protected under the Act. See NLRB v. Phoenix Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983, 987–988 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (where compe-
tency of cashier affected salesmen’s conditions of em-
ployment, their concerted effort to recommend a particu-
lar individual was protected by Section 7 of the Act);
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-Op, 285 F.2d

14 See fn. 12, above.
8, 11–13 (6th Cir. 1960) (concerted protest over identity
of new foreman protected where the foreman’s lack of
experience made the crew’s work more difficult).
That a lack of proper supervision impacted the social
workers’ working conditions is further evidenced by the
fact that they had to take time away from their own case
work to advise each other on cases and to enter work into
the computer, tasks performed by Austin prior to his res-
ignation. Although these concerns are not mentioned in
the August 4 letter,15 we find that they were of actual
concern to Peck and Mathew at the time the letter was
written and were not, as the judge found, mere post hoc
rationalizations. Indeed, as explained above, Peck and
Mathew raised these concerns during their meetings with
Kirkland and Mercado prior to sending the August 4 let-
ter. We find that these concerns were subsumed in the
employees’ protest in support of their request for quali-
fied supervision and their threat of a work stoppage
unless they saw “movement in the hiring of a new direc-
tor (without interference and with significant DFTA in-
volvement).”
We further find that the employees’ demand for quali-
fied supervision had a direct impact on their terms and
conditions of employment because the employees could
reasonably believe that their jobs might be in jeopardy if
the Multi-Service Center’s work did not meet with
DFTA’s approval and if, as DFTA required, the Respon-
dent did not hire a qualified director.16 In this regard, the
employees knew that DFTA was the Multi-Service Cen-
ter’s primary funding source, that DFTA had required the
Respondent to find a qualified director for the Multi-
Service Center, that DFTA had to approve the choice as
new director, and that DFTA would not assume any re-
sponsibility for any actions or decisions by Polovetz that
adversely affected the program or the clients. In these
15 Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s assertion, the fact that these
issues are not mentioned in the August 4 letter does not mean that we
cannot take them into account in determining whether Peck’s and
Mathew’s activities were protected. See Atlantic-Pacific Construction
Co. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995), where the court, in
considering whether the sending of the letter at issue there related to
terms and conditions of employment, conceded that it was not clear
from its text that the letter was related to legitimate, protected concerns,
but then explained:
This may be true, but “[s]pecificity and/or articulation are not the
touchstone of . . . protected concerted activity.” Springfield Library
and Museum Assoc., 238 NLRB 1673 (1979). The nexus between the
activity and working conditions must be gleaned from the totality of
the circumstances[.]
Thus, while the Respondent may not have known of these concerns, it
did know of Peck’s and Mathew’s concerns regarding lack of “appro-
priate supervision.” That they did not list in the letter all of their rea-
sons for their concern about lack of proper supervision does not render
their activities in composing and sending the August 4 letter unpro-
tected.
16 As explained in Tyler Business Services, 256 NLRB 567, 568
(1981), enf. denied on other grounds 680 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1982):
“[t]hat an employee’s perception of working conditions may have been
incorrect is not sufficient reason to remove the protected activity based
on those perceptions from the protection of the Act.”
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1105
circumstances, we find that the employees could rea-
sonably believe that if the quality of the Multi-Center’s
work fell below an acceptable level because of lack of
proper supervision, and if, contrary to DFTA’s direction,
the Respondent did not hire a qualified director who met
with DFTA’s approval, DFTA could refuse to renew its
contract with the Multi-Service Center or otherwise re-
duce its funding. Obviously, such eventualities could
have a direct impact on the employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment because with less funding the em-
ployees might be required to work fewer hours or could
lose their jobs altogether. Thus, we find that Peck’s and
Mathew’s activities in composing and sending the Au-
gust 4 letter were protected under the Act.17 Finally, we
find that although the employees may have suggested to
DFTA officials that Chimkin would be a qualified candi-
date for the director’s position, merely informing DFTA
of individuals qualified to be director does not render the
employees’ activities unprotected.18
For the following reasons, we reach the same conclu-
sion as to Mercado. Although Mercado was not a social
worker, she shared Peck’s and Mathew’s reasonably held
belief that if DFTA did not find the Multi-Service Cen-
ter’s work satisfactory, it could reduce or eliminate its
funding for the Center. If such a reduction occurred,
Mercado could also face a reduction in her hours or
elimination of her job. Further, although Mercado may
not have been affected personally by some of the changes
brought about by Polovetz’ appointment as acting direc-
tor, her personal involvement in assisting Peck and
Mathew, who were more immediately affected by the
changes, falls within the “mutual aid or protection”
clause of Section 7. See, e.g., Delta Health Center, 310
NLRB 26, 43 (1993).

17 Although the August 4 letter contains several misstatements, the
employees do not lose the protection of the Act because of these mis-
statements. As explained in Guardian Industries Corp., 319 NLRB
542, 549 (1995), “[P]rotection is not denied to an employee regardless
of the inaccuracy or lack of merit of the employee’s statements absent
deliberate falsity or maliciousness, even where the accusatory language
used is stinging and harsh.”
We also note that the fact that the employees sent the August 4 letter
to outside officials and sought to improve their lot through outside
channels does not render their actions unprotected absent a showing
that the employees sought to disparage the Respondent to DFTA or that
the letter was disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue. Delta Health
Center, 310 NLRB 26, 43 (1993), affd. mem. 5 F.3d 1494 (5th Cir.
1993). We find such circumstances absent here.
18 Since we find that the employees’ activities were protected be-
cause the employees’ protests involved issues that had a direct impact
on their terms and conditions of employment, we find the present case
distinguishable from Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota, 250 NLRB
35 (1980) (employees protested program decisions by management and
the perceived lack of competency of management); and New York
Chinatown Senior Citizens Coaltion Center, 239 NLRB 614 (1978)
(employees criticized executive for his conceit and pride, belittled him
for teaching a course, and conveyed belief executive was not running
center so as to achieve the social objective for which public funds were
being spent), cases relied on by the judge in finding the concerted ac-
tivities unprotected.
This, however, does not end our analysis. The judge
found that the Respondent would have terminated Mer-
cado even if she had not participated in the protected
concerted activity because of her “insubordination” in
refusing the Respondent’s direction to pay Polovetz at
the director’s salary level. In cases that turn on employer
motivation, the Board applies the test set out in Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); approved in
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393 (1983). First, the General Counsel must establish
that protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in the
employer’s decision. Thus, the General Counsel must
show “that the employees engaged in [protected con-
certed] activity, that the [employer] had knowledge of
that activity, and that the [employer] demonstrated . . .
animus [toward that activity].” Regal Recycling, Inc.,
329 NLRB 355 (1999) (footnote omitted), citing Wright
Line, 251 NLRB at 1090. Upon such a showing, the
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
same action would have been taken even in the absence
of the protected conduct.
Applying that test here, we find that the General Coun-
sel has established that Mercado’s protected activities
were a motivating factor in the Respondent’s decision to
terminate her. In this regard, as explained above, the
Respondent knew that Mercado had signed the August 4
letter, the Respondent exhibited animus toward the em-
ployees for sending the letter, and the Respondent termi-
nated Mercado on August 21, only 2 days after Harris
learned of the August 4 letter. In rebuttal, the Respon-
dent, in effect, argues that it would have discharged Mer-
cado even absent her protected activities because it had
decided to contract out the bookkeeping work prior to
learning of the August 4 letter and that Mercado’s in-
subordination in refusing to pay Polovetz as directed by
the Respondent only reinforced its decision to contract
out the bookkeeping work.
We find this argument without merit for the following
reasons. First, the outside bookkeeping contract is dated
August 25, 4 days after the Respondent terminated
Mercado. The Respondent produced no evidence that it
had decided to contract out the bookkeeping work or had
even contemplated such a move prior to the August 25
date. Further, although Harris continued to be director of
the Nutrition Program, that program did not contract out
its bookkeeping work. The Respondent offered no ex-
planation of why it was necessary to contract out the
Multi-Service Center’s bookkeeping work, but not that of
the Nutrition Program. As to Mercado’s supposed in-
subordination, the Respondent did not discipline
Mercado when she insisted on receiving written authori-
zation prior to issuing the requested checks to Polovetz.
It discharged her only after it learned that she had signed
the August 4 letter. That Mercado’s participation in the
composing, executing, and sending of the August 4 let-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1106
ter, and not her supposed insubordination, was the real
reason for her discharge is underscored by the fact that at
the August 21 meeting in which Harris discharged Mer-
cado, the alleged insubordination was not mentioned.
Rather, as explained above, Harris asserted that the Au-
gust 4 letter was “vile” and poorly thought out and
Polovetz referred to the “beautiful letter” that Mercado
had sent to Whitaker and interjected several times that
the letter was vicious and vindictive. In such circum-
stances, we cannot agree with the judge that the Respon-
dent, having taken no disciplinary action against Mer-
cado initially, later decided, without further payment
incidents, to terminate Mercado because of her supposed
insubordination. Rather, we find that the Respondent
terminated Mercado because of her participation in the
protected activities discussed above.19 Accordingly, we
find that Mercado was unlawfully discharged for her
protected activities.
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by discharging Peck, Mathew, and Mercado for
engaging in protected concerted activities, it follows that
the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1) through
Harris’ statement to Peck and Kirkland on August 22 that
they either had to sign a memorandum retracting their
protected concerted activities or be terminated. In the
circumstances present here, the employees could only
construe Harris’ statement as a warning that they had to
cease and desist from their protected concerted activities
or be terminated. See Delta Health Center, 310 NLRB at
34.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist from such activity and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent will be ordered to offer Hubert Peck,
Barbara Mathew, and Michele Mercado reinstatement to
their former positions or, if such positions no longer ex-
ist, to substantially equivalent positions, and to make
them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, in
the manner set out in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), plus interest as computed in accordance with
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
We shall also order the Respondent to remove from its
files any reference to these unlawful discharges.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Senior Citizens Coordinating Council of
Riverbay Community, Inc, a/k/a Senior Citizens Coordi-

19 As explained in Holsum Bakeries of Puerto Rico, 320 NLRB 834,
837 (1996), affd. mem. 107 F.3d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522
U.S. 817 (1997), a “delay in taking adverse action until after there is
knowledge of [protected] activity evidences Respondent’s unlawful
motivation.”
nating Council of Co-op City, Bronx, New York, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Warning employees to sign a memorandum retract-
ing their protected concerted activities or be terminated.
(b) Terminating employees because they engage in
protected concerted activities.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Hubert Peck, Barbara Mathew, and Michele Mercado full
reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Hubert Peck, Barbara Mathew, and Michele
Mercado whole for any loss of earnings and other bene-
fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharges,
and within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in writ-
ing that this has been done and that the discharges will
not be used against them in any way.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the letter signed by em-
ployee Connie Kirkland retracting her protected con-
certed activities, and within 3 days thereafter notify her
in writing that this has been done and that the letter will
not be used against her in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Bronx, New York Multi-Service facility copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”20 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1107
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since August 21,
1995.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

MEMBER BRAME, dissenting.
Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by discharging three employees, social workers Hubert
Peck and Barbara Mathew, and part-time bookkeeper
Michele Mercado, because they composed, signed, and
sent out a letter that threatened a work stoppage with the
object of influencing the Respondent to replace the act-
ing director of its Multi-Service Center, Blanche
Polovetz? The resolution of this issue depends on
whether Peck’s, Mathew’s, and Mercado’s activities con-
stituted protected, concerted activity under Section 7 of
the Act. The judge found that the three employees’ ac-
tivities were concerted, but that they were not protected
under the Act because the issues addressed in the letter
did not concern wages, hours, or other terms and condi-
tions of employment. To reverse the judge and find that
these employees’ activities were protected as well as
concerted, my colleagues are compelled to go outside the
four corners of the letter and engage in speculation about
their concerns. I reject such an “analysis” here and find,
in agreement with the judge, that these employees’ ac-
tivities were not protected under the Act. I would there-
fore dismiss the complaint.1
The judge has fully set out the facts. In brief, the Re-
spondent is a nonprofit corporation engaged in providing
social services at Co-op City, a large housing project in
the Bronx, New York. It has two divisions, the Nutrition
Program and the division at issue here, the Multi-Service
Center (the Center), which provides social services for
aged residents of Co-op City. The Respondent is funded
through the New York City Department for the Aging
(DFTA) and the New York State Office for the Aging
(SOFA). Hubert Perry, Connie Kirkland, and Barbara
Mathew were the Multi-Service Center’s three social

1 A subsidiary issue here is whether the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by instructing employees to sign a memorandum retracting their
alleged protected concerted activities. Since I find that the activities at
issue here were not protected under the Act, I would adopt the judge’s
dismissal of this allegation also.
Finally, a third issue, addressed at fn. 6 below, is whether the Re-
spondent would have discharged Mercado, even absent her participa-
tion in composing and sending the letter at issue here, because of her
insubordination in refusing to obey repeated requests by management
officials to pay Polovetz at the director’s salary level after she became
acting director.
workers and Michele Mercado was its part-time book-
keeper. Blanche Polovetz, who had worked at the Center
longer than anyone else, took care of office clerical work
and minor casehandling matters. William Austin, as the
director of the Multi-Service Center, was its highest
management official. He was also the first-line supervi-
sor of the Multi-Service Center employees. When Aus-
tin resigned his position in March 1995,2 Polovetz, who
had previously served as acting director when the posi-
tion of director was vacant, was appointed acting director
until a new director was found.3
Polovetz was authorized to be paid at the director’s
salary level while she was acting director. She did not,
however, provide professional supervision to the case
workers who, as found by the judge, needed a minimum
of direct supervision in the performance of their case
work. The appointment of Polovetz as acting director
did not result in any changes to the case workers’ wages,
hours, benefits, or other conditions of employment.
About August 10, Peck, Mathew, Kirkland, and Mer-
cado sent the letter at issue here, dated August 4, to
Linda Whitaker, DFTA’s assistant commissioner, Bureau
of Community Services, with copies to local officials,
politicians, and members of the Senior Citizens Coordi-
nating Council’s board of directors. The letter set out
both the employees’ concerns about the relative power of
certain individuals, including Polovetz and Candice Har-
ris, the Respondent’s executive director,4 within the cor-
porate hierarchy and the employees’ dissatisfaction with
Polovetz’ appointment as acting director. As to the latter
issue, the letter states:

Our dilemma has made it difficult for us to give our cli-
ents the highest quality care management. Instead, we
are distracted by issues of office status, power and
monetary gain, forcing us to ask ourselves questions
like these:
Who can we turn to when we have a question re-
garding a case? Again, Mrs. Polovetz is not quali-
fied and Ms. Harris’ agency has never provided case
management.
Who is supervising us on a regular basis and re-
viewing our cases?
Who is updating us on new policies and proce-
dures?
. . . .
The Multi-Service staff has met and composed
this letter. We are writing to you urging you to take
immediate action concerning this matter. We each
2 All dates hereafter refer to 1995.
3 The judge stated incorrectly that Austin had retired from his posi-
tion.
4 Harris had been the director of the Nutrition Program before her
appointment as executive director of the Senior Citizens Coordinating
Council in June 1995. She retained that position after her appointment
as executive director, but after that time she also oversaw the Multi-
Service Center.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1108
feel very strongly and united in this cause and are
ready to take further action if our pleas go unan-
swered. Therefore, if we do not see movement in
the hiring of a new Director (without interference
and with significant DFTA involvement) we, the
staff of the Co-op City Multi-Service Center, are
prepared to take a job action wherein we will begin
not reporting to work until sufficient measures are
taken to hire a new Director.5

Harris first learned of the letter from Florence Mack, the
Respondent’s president, on about August 19. Both Har-
ris and Mack were extremely upset by the letter because
it was sent both to DFTA and to various local politicians.
On Monday, August 21, Harris and Mack visited the
Multi-Service Center and met with Mercado. Polovetz
was present at the meeting. Mercado was informed that
the bookkeeping had been contracted out and was given
2 weeks’ notice.6 After the meeting, Harris and Mack,
with Polovetz present, met with Peck and Mathew (Kirk-
land was not available for the meeting). Harris told Peck
and Mathew that she and the Board were upset that they
had gone outside the agency. She stated that the em-
ployees had taken the position that they were employed
by the Department for the Aging and that Polovetz
should neither get the job of director nor the director’s
salary because there were personality problems with her
and because she did not have the proper credentials.
After further discussion, Harris said that they would meet
again on Wednesday, August 23.
On August 22, Mathew called Harris and told her, in
effect, that the employees did not want to meet with her
unless a representative of DFTA was present. Mathew
testified without contradiction that after the phone call,
Polovetz told her that what she had just done was the
straw that broke the camel’s back and that Harris and
Mack were on their way over. Mathew further testified
that she then left the facility to attend a funeral.

5 The letter (GC Exh. 4) is set out in full at Appendix A of the
judge’s decision.
6 As noted above, Polovetz had been authorized to be paid at the di-
rector’s salary level while she was acting director. Mercado, however,
had refused to issue her paychecks at the director’s salary level despite
repeated directives that she do so. I agree with the judge that
Mercado’s refusal to issue the correct paychecks to Polovetz consti-
tuted insubordinate behavior and that this insubordination justified the
Respondent’s decision to discharge her. As explained below, I further
find that Mercado’s activities regarding the August 4 letter were not
protected under the Act, and that therefore the Respondent’s decision to
discharge her was not unlawful on this basis also. Thus, since the Gen-
eral Counsel has failed to establish a prima facie case under Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); approved in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), that Mercado’s discharge was
unlawfully motivated, the burden of proof does not shift to the Respon-
dent to explain why it discharged Mercado, and it is therefore unneces-
sary to decide which of these lawful reasons prompted the Respon-
dent’s decision to discharge her.
When Harris and Mack got to the facility on August
22, they met with Peck and Kirkland and presented them
with a letter retracting the August 4 letter. They told
Peck and Kirkland that they must sign the letter in order
to retain their jobs. Peck refused and was fired. Kirk-
land signed the letter and retained her job. On August
23, Harris returned to the Multi-Service Center and gave
Mathew a termination letter dated August 22. Harris told
Mathew that her services were no longer needed and that
she should clean out her desk and leave.
As explained in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556,
563 (1977), “Section 7 [of the Act] provides that
‘[e]mployees shall have the right . . . to engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection . . . .’”7 Thus, the
underlying conduct must be both concerted and protected
to fall within Section 7.8 I find that Peck’s, Mathew’s,
and Mercado’s activities in copying and sending the Au-
gust 4 letter were concerted within the meaning of Sec-
tion 7.9 However, in agreement with the judge, and con-
trary to my colleagues, I find that these employees’ ac-
tivities were not protected under the Act.
In determining whether the employees’ activities re-
lated to the August 4 letter were protected under the Act,
the following language from Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB,
163 F.3d 1012, 1020–1021 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added), is particularly helpful:

Concerted activity is generally protected under the Act
provided it is conducted “for the purpose of mutual aid
and protection.” 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1). This has been
interpreted to mean that the underlying dispute must re-
late to the terms and conditions of work. . . . Thus, the
Act does not protect employees who protest a manage-
rial action that has no bearing on such terms and condi-
tions. Although the line between an employer’s busi-
ness practices and its employment practices can be dif-
ficult to draw, it is generally accepted that the hiring
and firing of supervisory personnel is a managerial ac-
tion unrelated to the terms and conditions of the work
of non-supervisory employees . . . . [There is] a narrow
but well recognized exception to th[is] general rule:
7 Sec. 7 states in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion[.]
8 As stated in Yesterday’s Children, Inc. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 36, 44
(1st Cir. 1997):
There can, of course, be no violation of § 8(a)(1) by the em-
ployer if there is no underlying § 7 conduct by the employee.
Conduct must be both concerted and protected to fall within § 7.
9 As explained in KNTV, Inc., 319 NLRB 447, 450 (1995):
An employee’s activity will be deemed concerted, when it is
engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself. Pacific Electri-
cord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310, 310 (9th Cir. 1966), enfg. 153
NLRB 521 (1965).
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1109
concerted activity over the firing of a supervisor [or to
effect the discharge or replacement of a supervisor] is
protected when the identity and capabilities of the su-
pervisor have a direct impact on the employees’ own
job interests and work performance.[10]

Thus, the specific issue here is whether Peck’s,
Mathew’s, and Mercado’s activity in composing and
sending the August 4 letter which sought the discharge or
replacement of Acting Director Polovetz falls within the
“general rule” set out above and is therefore unprotected,
or whether their activity falls within the “narrow excep-
tion” to the general rule and is therefore protected. The
answer to this question depends solely on whether the
August 4 letter, on its face,11 raised issues relating to

10 As explained in Puerto Rico Food Products Corp. v. NLRB, 619
F.2d 153, 155–156 (1st Cir. 1980) (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted):
[W]e [have] concluded, in conformity with the majority of the courts
which have addressed this issue, that not all forms of employee protest
over supervisory changes are per se protected. Two basic criteria
must be satisfied before employee concerted action over supervisory
staffing matters will be protected. First, the employee protest over a
change in supervisory personnel must in fact be a protest over the ac-
tual conditions of their employment . . . . Secondly, the means of pro-
test must be reasonable.
Since, as explained below, I find that the activity at issue here was not
protected under the Act, I find it unnecessary to determine whether the
means of protest, the August 4 letter, constituted a reasonable means of
protest in the circumstances here where the letter was sent to DFTA,
one of the Respondent’s primary funding sources, and to local politi-
cians before the employees had first made their concerns known to the
Respondent.
11 Contrary to my colleagues, I would not look outside the contents
of the August 4 letter to determine whether the employees were en-
gaged in protected concerted activity. As explained in Ajax Paving
Industries v. NLRB, 713 F.2d 1214, 1216 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added):
Section 8(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce” employees in the exercise of their right
to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection” as guaranteed in section 157. To establish a violation of
section 8(a)(1) the Board must demonstrate that the employee was en-
gaged in such protected concerted activity, that the employer knew
of the activity and its concerted nature, and that the employee’s
protected activity was a motivating factor prompting some adverse ac-
tion by the employer.
Here the Respondent knew that the employees had sent the August 4
letter and the contents of that letter. But that is all. Thus, in evaluating
what action to take against the employees for their actions, the Respon-
dent could only rely on the contents of the letter to determine whether
the employees’ actions were protected because the letter raised issues
related to their actual conditions of employment. Since the General
Counsel has not established that the Respondent knew of these employ-
ees’ alleged concerns regarding the entering of data in the computer
and a lack of case discussion, I find that the majority improperly relies
on these, in effect, post hoc rationalizations to bolster its finding that
the activity at issue here was protected. For these same reasons, I reject
the majority’s attempt to bolster their finding that the activity at issue
here was protected on the ground that the employees feared that DFTA
might cut off its funding of the Multi-Service Center if Polovetz were
not replaced. DFTA officials never made such a threat or even sug-
gested that this might occur, and the August 4 letter does not raise the
issue.
Polovetz’ supervision of Peck, Mathew, and Mercado
that had “a direct impact on the employees’ own job in-
terests and work performance.” I find that it did not.
Initially, as the judge explained, the employees’
wages, benefits, and hours were not changed when
Polovetz was appointed acting director of the Multi-
Service Center and the August 4 letter does not raise
such issues. In fact, the only issue raised in the August 4
letter that might possibly impact the social workers’
(Peck’s, Kirkland’s, and Mathew’s) job performance was
Polovetz’ alleged lack of qualifications to serve as acting
director. However, the August 4 letter merely asserted
that the social workers were without “appropriate super-
vision.” It never explained how such an alleged lack of
“appropriate supervision” affected the employees’ terms
and conditions of employment. Rather, the letter simply
asserted, inter alia, that Polovetz had been “given the
authority to supervise and make decisions over those
who are trained to do [home] assessments.” I find that
such statements evidence not concern for “appropriate
supervision,” but resentment that a person who was, in
effect, the office manager of the Multi-Service Center,
had been promoted to the position of acting director over
the professional social workers.
That management power and hierarchy were the sub-
jects of the August 4 letter is further evidenced by the
letter’s statement that Harris, who did not supervise the
employees, wanted Polovetz to become the permanent
director of the Multi-Service Center because Harris was
“positioning herself to become Executive Director of the
Senior Citizens Coordinating Council, thereby merging
the two programs together.”12 The letter did not attempt
to explain how this issue could affect the employees’
terms and conditions of employment. Finally, in the only
section of the letter where the employees set out why
they allegedly were not able to give their clients the
“highest quality care management,” the reason given was
their distraction “by issues of office status, power and
monetary gain[.]” It was on this basis, and this basis
alone, that the social workers threatened to take a job
action and not report to work unless “sufficient measures
[were] taken to hire a new Director.” Again, the letter
failed to explain how issues of “office status, power and
monetary gain” affected the employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment. In sum, the letter’s mere mention
of “appropriate supervision” is not enough to transform
a letter that is concerned with “office status, power and
monetary gain” into a letter that deals with the employ-
ees’ “direct concerns,” i.e., their terms and conditions of
employment.13
12 The social workers were apparently unaware that Harris had been
appointed executive director of the council in June.
13 See NLRB v. Sheraton Puerto Rico Corp., 651 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.
1981) (emphasis in original), where the court, in finding that the con-
cerns raised in the letter at issue did not concern employees’ terms and
conditions of employment and were therefore unprotected, stated:
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1110
Since the August 4 letter did not address Polovetz’
“identity and capabilities” and any “direct impact” that
they might have had on “the employees’ own job inter-
ests and work performance,” the August 4 letter does not
fall within the narrow exception to the general rule that
“the Act does not protect employees who protest a
managerial action that has no bearing on . . . terms and
conditions [of employment].”14 Accordingly, I find that
Peck’s, Mathew’s, and Mercado’s composing and send-
ing of the August 4 letter was not protected under the
Act. Therefore, as noted above, I further find that the
Respondent’s instruction that the employees sign a
statement retracting the August 4 letter was not unlawful.
Since I find that the Respondent has not violated the Act,
I would adopt the judge’s dismissal of the complaint.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT warn employees to sign a memorandum
retracting their protected concerted activities or be termi-
nated.
WE WILL NOT terminate employees because they en-
gage in protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Hubert Peck, Barbara Mathew, and Michele
Mercado full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.

Even when the letter speaks of “promotions, salary scales and working
conditions”, it immediately uses as examples “company car, expense
account, room and board”. At least the first two of these do not sound
as if they concern the ordinary worker. The occasional use of the
words “working conditions” and the fact that some of the words used
could refer to ordinary workers as well as managers are not enough to
transform a letter that is managerial in tone and content into a letter
that deals with the direct concerns of the average worker
14 Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB, 163 F.3d at 1021.
WE WILL make Hubert Peck, Barbara Mathew, and
Michele Mercado whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits resulting from their discharges, less any
net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharges of Hubert Peck, Barbara Mathew, and
Michele Mercado, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify each of them in writing that this has been done and
that the discharges will not be used against them in any
way.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the letter
signed by employee Connie Kirkland retracting her pro-
tected concerted activities, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done
and that the letter will not be used against her in any
way.

SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF
RIIVERBAY COMMUNITY, INC. A/K/A SENIOR
CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OP
CITY

Eric H. Brooks Esq., for the General Counsel.
Paul Goodman Esq., for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in New York, New York, on May 8 and 9 and June
26, 1996. The charge was filed on August 30, 1995, and the
complaint was issued on November 30, 1995. In substance the
complaint alleged:
1. That on August 4, 1995, employees Barbara Mathew,
Hubert Peck, and Michele Mercado “engaged in concerted
activities with each other for the purpose of mutual aid and
protection, by writing a letter to the New York City Department
for Aging, regarding, among other things their terms and condi-
tions of employment.”
2. That on August 22, 1995, the Respondent by Candice Har-
ris, its executive director warned the three employees to sign a
memorandum withdrawing the August 4, 1995 letter and
warned that if they did not do so, they would be fired.
3. That on or about August 22, 1995, Respondent terminated
the aforesaid employees because they wrote the letter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, is a not-for-profit corporation which is en-
gaged in providing social services at a large housing project in
the Bronx known as Co-op City. It has two divisions, one
called the Nutrition Program and the other called the Multi-
Service Center. The latter division is where the Charging Party
and the other employees involved in this case were employed.
The Nutrition Program which operates a kitchen, dining room,
and “meals on wheel” is much the larger of the two divisions
and employs many more people. Funding for the Respondent
comes mostly from governmental sources, through the New
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1111
York City Department of Aging (DFTA) and the New York
State Office for the Aging (SOFA).
Although the Multi-Service Center, by itself, has gross reve-
nues below $250,000, the Respondent, as a whole, has reve-
nues, (in the form of grants), in excess of $1 million, and it
purchases goods and materials from directly outside the State in
excess of $5000. Inasmuch as the Respondent is a single legal
entity, jurisdiction is properly based on the totality of its opera-
tions. Potato Growers Cooperative Co., 115 NLRB 1281
(1956). The jurisdictional standard for social service organiza-
tions is $250,000 in gross revenue. Hispanic Federation for
Development, 284 NLRB 500 (1987). As the Respondent,
meets this standard, I therefore conclude that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Until March 1995, the Multi-Service Center, had a director
(William Austin), three social workers (Hubert Peck, Connie
Kirkland, and Barbara Mathew), a bookkeeper (Michelle
Mercado) and a longtime employee named Blanche Polovetz,
whose job involved office clerical work and minor case han-
dling tasks Polovetz, who apparently had been working at this
Center for longer than anyone else, had on previous occasions,
been appointed the acting director when the director’s job be-
came vacant.
Two of the social workers, Hubert Peck and Connie Kirk-
land, had academic credentials. Matthew, although not having
a Masters of Social Work degree (MSW), nevertheless had
social work responsibilities which she learned from experience
in the job.
The Multi-Service Center provides various kinds of social
services for aged residents of Co-op City and although respon-
sible to the Respondent’s board of directors, it had and contin-
ues to have a good deal of autonomy. Within the organizational
structure of the Respondent, the director of the Multi-Service
Center would be highest managerial official of this program.
Thus, although he or she would be the employees’ first line of
supervision, the director would also be the top managerial rep-
resentative in charge of this division.1
Mr. Austin retired in March 1995 and Polovetz was ap-
pointed by the Respondent to be the acting director until an-
other director was hired. In this regard, Polovetz was author-
ized to be paid at the director’s salary while she occupied this
position. She did not, however, provide professional supervi-
sion to the social workers who essentially continued to do what
they had done before. And I presume that because the social
workers should be considered as professional or quasi profes-
sional employees, they had sufficient knowledge and experi-
ence to do their jobs with a minimum of direct supervision vis a
vis the clients that they served. The appointment of Ms

1 GC Exh. 29 is a job description for the director dated March 1996.
It states that the director, who reports to the executive director is in
charge of the day-to-day operations of the program, including fiscal
management, provision of services, recordkeeping, and reporting to
funding agencies. Among other things, it states that the director will be
the person to select and terminate professional staff; that he or she is to
establish and maintain relationships with other community agencies;
that he or she may direct and coordinate fund raising and community
activities; and that he or she, in cooperation with the executive director
and casehandling supervisor, will assist the Board in evaluation of the
program and policy development.
Polovetz as the acting director was not accompanied by any
change in the wages of the employees, nor any change in their
assigned hours of work. There were no other changes in their
existing benefits or other conditions of employment.
It may be the case that with the loss of Austin, the remaining
staff felt as if there was more work for each to do. Neverthe-
less, they were not ordered by the employer, to work more
hours and were not told that they could not put in for overtime
if they worked in excess of their assigned hours. While Mat-
thew testified that without a director there were many case files
that were not signed off on, this is merely a ministerial task and
signing off merely means that a case has been reviewed by a
supervisor. There is no evidence that the failure to sign off on
cases affected the actual job tasks of the employees in question.
To some degree, the loss of Austin perhaps meant that the
social workers could not turn to him for advice regarding par-
ticular cases. But this simply meant that they could talk to each
other and/or had to take professional responsibility and use
their own discretion in handling their own cases. His loss may
also have meant that they would have to learn to operate the
computers that were used to manage case files.
In the case of Mercado, the bookkeeper, she refused to issue
paychecks to Polovetz in the amount authorized by the Respon-
dent. She asserted that she felt that despite her appointment as
acting director, Polovetz was not entitled to be paid at the direc-
tor’s salary and insisted that she be given written authorization
before issuing a check in this amount. According to Mercado,
she felt that she needed written authorization from DFTA and
the Respondent’s board. She concedes however, that in July
1995, she spoke to Jorge Romero from DFTA who told her that
the Respondent could pay Polovetz at the director’s salary.2
Notwithstanding that information, Mercado still refused to
issue an appropriate check to Polovetz even after Respondent’s
president, Florence Mack, gave her a letter dated August 8,
advising her that Polovetz was named as acting director. Insist-
ing that the letter was not sufficiently clear, Mack sent another
letter on August 14 which finally resulted in Polovetz obtaining
a check for the amount authorized.
The contention that Mercado reasonably feared that she
might be subject to discipline or discharge if she paid Polovetz
at the director’s salary line in accordance with the Board’s
wishes, is, in my opinion, patently ridiculous. Discharged by
whom? By the people whose wishes she ignored by her insub-
ordinate behavior? There is no evidence that DFTA could or
would have caused the Respondent to discharge Mercado if she
signed the paychecks to Polovetz in the amount authorized by
the Respondent.
In June 1995, Candice Harris was appointed to be the execu-
tive director of the Council while retaining her position as the
director of the Nutrition program. This meant that the Multi-
Service Center reported to her, albeit she did not really begin to
2 On June 1, 1995, Jorge Romero of DFTA wrote to Margaret Wat-
son, the acting president of the Respondent, confirming a meeting held
on May 15, 1995. He wrote that Polovetz did not meet the minimum
requirements to be acting director because she didn’t have a degree in
social work, counseling, psychology, gerontology, and 2 years of hu-
man services experience, etc. He continued that if the Respondent
insisted on having Polovetz as acting director, DFTA would not assume
any responsibility for any actions that she might take. He further wrote
that it was expected that the position of director would be advertised
and that when a qualified candidate was chosen, a copy of the resume
had to be forwarded to the department for approval.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1112
become directly involved in its affairs until she learned that
Michelle Mercado took it upon herself to refuse to pay Polovetz
at the director’s salary level. Upon being appointed to the posi-
tion of executive director, one of Harris’ first tasks was to set
up a plan to reorganize the Multi-Service Center and to recruit a
new permanent director for that program.
As noted above, the complaint alleges that the Charging
Party, Barbara Matthew, in conjunction with, Hubert Peck,
Michelle Mercado, and Connie Kirkland wrote a letter on Au-
gust 4, 1994, which they sent to DFTA, to the board of direc-
tors and to others including local politicians. According to the
General Counsel, this letter concerned the employees’ terms
and conditions of employment and therefore constituted pro-
tected activity.
In fact, the letter does not, by its terms, talk about the wages,
hours, and/or terms and conditions of employment for the em-
ployees of the Multi-Service Center who signed the letter. In-
stead, a perusal of the letter shows that it speaks about either (a)
political matters concerning the relative power of certain indi-
viduals, (particularly Blanche Polovetz and Candice Harris),
within the hierarchy of the corporation and their relationship to
the board of directors or; (b) about the employees’ dissatisfac-
tion that Polovetz, a longtime employee, was temporarily as-
signed to be the acting director of the Multi-Service Centers.
And in this regard, the entire tenor of the letter is that Mrs.
Polovetz, who does not have the proper academic credentials,
was promoted to be the nominal supervisor of the social work-
ers and to receive (at least for a while), the director’s salary
which is more than what the social workers earned. Insofar as
what was stated in the letter, it was not their own salaries and
working conditions that worried these employees, but rather the
salary, status and title given to Ms. Polovetz. As pointed out by
the authors of the letter:

Our dilemma has made it difficult for us to give our
clients the highest quality care management. Instead, we
are distracted by issues of office status, power and mone-
tary gain, forcing us to ask ourselves questions like these:
Who can we turn to when we have a question regard-
ing a case? Again, Mrs. Polovetz is not qualified and Ms.
Harris’ agency has never provided case management.
Who is supervising us on a regular basis and reviewing
our cases?
Who is updating us on new policies and procedures?

The letter does not indicate what, if any, direct impact,
Polovetz’ selection as acting director, had on the employees’
terms and conditions of employment. Nor does the letter state
what if any impact on employee work conditions, would result
from the failure to appoint a director who has what they con-
sider to be the appropriate qualifications and credentials. The
letter goes on to state:

The Multi-Service staff has met and composed this letter. We
are writing to you urging you to take immediate action con-
cerning this matter. We each feel very strongly and united in
this cause and are ready to take further action if our pleas go
unanswered. Therefore, if we do not see movement in the
hiring a new Director (without interference and with signifi-
cant DFTA involvement) we, staff of the Co-op City Multi-
Service Center are prepared to take a job action wherein we
will begin not reporting to work until sufficient measures are
take to hire a new Director.

In my opinion, the evidence in this case shows that for at
least two of the letter’s authors, Barbara Mathew and Hubert
Peck, that they would not have been discharged had they agreed
to retract this letter. Connie Kirkland who did agree to retract
the letter was retained. In the case of Michelle Mercado, al-
though Harris testified that there had been a prior decision to
contract out the bookkeeping work, she testified that the letter
confirmed her decision to do so.3
With respect to Polovetz, the employees assert that they
merely sought to have her return to her previous job and to
have the director’s position filled, as soon as possible, by a
person with the proper qualifications. Moreover, as stated in the
letter, the authors apparently sought to have DFTA, a govern-
mental agency, be significantly involved in the selection and
hiring of any new director by this private corporation without
any interference. (Interference by whom? By Candice Harris or
Respondent’s board of directors?)
In fact, before this letter was sent, Michelle Mercado’s boy
friend, Frank Chimken, who had previously worked at the
Multi-Service Center, had applied for the director’s job and
Barbara Matthew had lobbied people at DFTA for his appoint-
ment. It therefore seems to me that one of the prime reasons
why this letter was sent and why the employees sought to have
DFTA play a major role in the selection of the new director,
was to obtain this job for Frank Chimken.
It is noted that although Matthew testified that the employees
felt that a director should have computer skills so as to help
them in using the computers, this is not a qualification for the
job and there is no assurance that a new director hired by the
board of directors would have had such skills. (Nor was this
purported qualification mentioned in the letter.) I note too that
there is nothing in this record that would indicate that the op-
eration of the computers was so difficult or that their operation
was so arcane that reasonably intelligent people could not learn
to use them in a reasonable amount of time.
Since this letter is the crux of the General Counsel’s case and
is claimed to be the reason why the three employees were dis-
charged, it is set forth, in its entirety, at Appendix A. If the
statements contained in this letter do not relate to terms and
conditions of employment for the Respondent’s employees,
then the sending of this letter would not be protected concerted
activity within the meaning of the Act. And in that case, the
complaint should be dismissed.
Although the letter is dated August 4, it was not actually put
in the mail until about August 10, 1995. It therefore was not
received by anyone until some time during the middle of the
week and Candice Harris testified that she first heard of the
letter when she got a phone call from Florence Mack on or
about August 19.
There is no question but that Candice Harris and Florence
Mack were extremely upset by the letter, particularly because it
was sent to DFTA and to various local politicians.
Hubert Peck testified that on Friday, August 18, he had lunch
with Polovetz who indicated that she had read the letter and
said, “[H]ow could you do this to me” and “[D]o you realize

3 Assuming that there was a decision to contract out the bookkeeping
work before the letter was received, I suspect that a reason for doing so
was Mercado’s refusal to follow orders regarding the Polovetz pay
matter. The Respondent offered into evidence a letter dated August 25,
1995, regarding the subcontracting arrangement. It did not have any
other documentary evidence showing that the subcontract was decided
on prior to Respondent’s receipt of the employee letter.
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1113
what you have done?” He states that he told her that he didn’t
want to discuss the letter and that the matter was dropped.
On Monday, August 21, Harris and Mack visited the Multi-
Service Center and over the objections of the other employees,
insisted on talking first to Mercado. At this meeting, also at-
tended by Polovetz, Mercado was told that the bookkeeping
function had been contracted out and that she was given 2
weeks’ notice. According to Mercado, when she claimed that
her job was being eliminated because of the letter, Harris said
that this was not the case. Mercado also testified that Polovetz
interrupted a few times saying that the letter was viscous and
vindictive. She also testified that Harris said that the letter was
vile and poorly thought out and that when you put things in
writing, you have to be on firm ground before making charges.
After the meeting with Mercado, Harris and Mack met with
Peck and Mathew. Polovetz was also present. Connie Kirkland
was not present at the time and Harris rejected the employees’
request to delay the meeting until Kirkland was available. At
this meeting, Harris did most of the talking and she states that
she told the employees that she and the Board were upset that
they had gone outside the agency. She states that the employ-
ees took the position that they were employed by the Depart-
ment of Aging and that Polovetz should not get the job of direc-
tor and not get the director’s salary because there were person-
ality problems with her and because she did not have the proper
credentials.
According to Barbara Matthew, Harris said that the letter
was damaging to the Board’s reputation and might affect fund-
ing. She states that Harris asked why they had not come to her
as executive director and Matthew states that she replied that
they were not aware that Harris was the executive director.
Matthew testified that Polovetz stated that the letter besmirched
her reputation to which she replied that it wasn’t personal and
was a matter of professional concern. According to Matthew,
she said that there were hundreds of cases that were not signed
off on and that Harris said that they were going to put someone
in position to take care of that matter. Matthew claims that
Peck complained about no supervision and extra work. She
also testified that Polovetz denied that she ever asked Matthew
to lie about reports. (There is nothing in the letter about this
last allegation.)4
Hubert Peck’s testimony regarding the August 21 meeting
was that Harris said that she and the Board were outraged by
the letter. He states that Harris said that the case managers’
concerns were legitimate and that Mack said that there were
communications problems. According to Peck, Polovetz said
that the employees had defamed her whereupon Harris inter-
rupted and told Polovetz that this was not the time to talk about
her feelings. He states that Harris said that the board of direc-
tors were concerned about the Multi-Service Center but had not
yet decided what to do. Peck did not testify that he complained

4 Mathew testified that on one occasion during a survey, Polovetz,
while acting director, asked Mathew to say that she had more social
work credits than she actually had, thereby justifying certain work that
she otherwise would not be qualified to do. This was not denied by
Polovetz because she was not asked to testify in this proceeding. As-
suming that this occurred as asserted by Matthew, it seems that the
issue here had to do with a periodic governmental survey of the Center
to insure that its operations were in compliance with State or city regu-
lations. Whatever the ethics, of this alleged request, which was refused
by Mathew, the underlying issue to which it was addressed was not
employee working conditions.
about having to do more work. Nor did he testify that there
was any discussion at this meeting about signing off on cases or
about any allegation that Polovetz had asked Matthew to lie.
At the conclusion of the August 21 meeting, Ms. Harris said
that they should have another meeting on Wednesday, August
23. Harris states that at that point, she had not yet decided to
discharge anyone apart from the previous decision to contract
out the bookkeeping work.
According to Harris, she received a phone call from Matthew
on August 22 who said that the employees would not meet with
her unless a representative of DFTA was present. This is, to an
extent, corroborated by Matthew, who testified that she asked
Harris if the meeting could be postponed because she wanted
someone from DFTA to be present at the meeting. According
to Mathew, Harris said that the meeting was not a request and
that she (Mathew) would pay the price of her action. Ms.
Mathew denies that she stated that the employees would not
meet with Harris unless a DFTA representative was present.
According to Mathew, after her phone call with Harris,
Polovetz told her that what she had just done was the straw that
broke the camel’s back and that Harris and Mack were on their
way over. Mathew then left the facility and testified that she
went to a funeral.
On August 22, Harris and Mack met with Kirkland and Peck.
According to Peck the employees had tried to get someone
from DFTA to come to the meeting and he said that they should
wait until Mathew returned. This request was granted by Har-
ris, but after about a half hour, she said that she could not wait
any longer; that she was not acceding to Mathew’s request to
delay the meeting until a representative from DFTA came and
that they didn’t answer to DFTA. At the meeting which then
ensued, Peck and Kirkland were presented with a letter retract-
ing their August 4 letter and told that they must sign it in order
to retain their jobs. Peck refused and was fired. Kirkland
signed and was retained. Matthew, as she wasn’t there, was not
given the option of signing the retraction letter. As Harris be-
lieved that Matthew had evaded the meeting, she must also
have assumed, (correctly), that Matthew would not have signed
the retraction letter. In any event, Matthew was also discharged
on this date. In a letter dated August 22, 1996, Mathew was
told:

This serves as official notification that as of Tuesday
August 22, 1995, your services are no longer required as a
member of the staff of our Senior Multi-Service Center.
Your deliberate attempts to impugn the reputation of
the Board and circumvent our authority cannot and will
not be tolerated.
This action is taken with the full support and authori-
zation of the Senior Citizens Coordinating Council.
III. ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, employees have the right to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and
protection. Concomitantly, an employer may not, without vio-
lating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, discharge or otherwise
threaten, restrain, or coerce employees because they engage in
such activities.
The question here is whether a group of employees may
threaten a work stoppage with the object of influencing or co-
ercing the Respondent in the manner and means by which it
selects its management personnel; namely, the director of its
Multi-Service Center.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1114
There are several cases dealing with this type of issue and
the results have varied depending upon circumstances. In some
cases, the Board has held that employees have engaged in pro-
tected activity within the meaning of the Act where they have
engaged in concerted protests regarding the retention or termi-
nation of a supervisor. On the other hand, there are cases
where the Board or the courts have held that such activity is not
protected activity.
In Dobbs Houses, Inc., 135 NLRB 885, 888 (1962), enfd.
denied on other grounds 325 F.2d (5th Cir. 1963), the Board
held that employees who concertedly protested the discharge of
their supervisor were engaged in protected activity within the
meaning of Section 7 of the Act. In this case, the employees
went on strike over working conditions and to protest the dis-
charge of the assistant manager who assisted them in confront-
ing the manager about the latter’s alleged abusive behavior
toward the waitresses. The Board stated:

[C]oncerted action by employees to protest an employer’s se-
lection or termination of a supervisory employee is not auto-
matically removed from the protection of the Act. Each case
must turn on its facts. Where, as here, such facts establish that
the identity and capability of the supervisor involved has a di-
rect impact on the employees’ own job interests and on their
performance of the work they are hired to do, they are legiti-
mately concerned with his identity. Therefore, concerted ac-
tion which evidences the employees’ concern is no less pro-
tected than any other strike which employees may undertake
in pursuit of a mutual interest in the improvement of their
conditions of employment.

On the other hand, in Retail Clerks Local 770, 208 NLRB
356 (1974), the Board held that such activity, although con-
certed, was not protected. In that case, the Union, as the em-
ployer, discharged several employees who supported a candi-
date who opposed the incumbent president in an intra-union
election. The Board stated:

Turning to the question of whether the discharge of the
six employees by Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
our Act, we would reiterate the fact that these employees
were not engaged in organizing activities for the purpose
of seeking a separate and independent representative. Nor
were they seeking to redress grievances within the frame-
work of the existing employer-employee relationship.
Rather, it would seem that the thrust and purpose of their
activities was to effect a change in the top management of
their Employer Union, the election activities merely serv-
ing as the means by which this goal could be accom-
plished. However, an employee of a union like any other
employee, has no protected right to engage in activities
designed solely for the purpose of influencing or produc-
ing changes in the management hierarchy. Nor in pursu-
ing such an object, are the employees in any more favor-
able posture when these efforts are directed toward a
group inside the internal organization itself, such as the
union membership or the stockholders of a corporation.
An attempt by the dischargees to influence the selection of
their chief executive officer is not brought within the pro-
tection of the Act because the employer happens to be a
union.
In Puerto Rico Food Products Corp., 619 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.
1980), the court refused to enforce a Board Order and agreed
with the administrative law judge, that the employees, who
engaged in a work stoppage to protest the discharge of a low
level supervisor, were not engaged in protected activity within
the meaning of the Act. Although the Board had concluded
that this supervisor had befriended employees and cautioned
them about engaging in visible union activity, the court held
that this was essentially irrelevant and that there was insuffi-
cient nexus to show that the discharge of this particular super-
visor had a direct impact on the employees’ job interests out-
side the scope of their usual supervisor-employee relationship.
The court stated:

We have recently addressed the issue presented here—the cir-
cumstances under which an employee protest over a change
in management personnel is within the protection of section 7.
Abilities and Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1979). While on the one hand we recognized that employees
may have a legitimate concern with the composition of man-
agement personnel, especially when a “low-level foreman or
supervisor who deals directly with the employee” is involved,
we also acknowledged that traditionally “the interest of the
employer in selecting its own management team has been . . .
insulated from protected employee activity.” Furthermore, we
noted that the employees’ interest in the identity of their su-
pervisors has been “subject to the legitimate claim of employ-
ers to a minimum of interference” in the area of supervisory
personnel changes. Consequently, we concluded, in confor-
mity with the majority of the courts which have addressed the
issue, that not all forms of employee protest over supervisory
changes are per se protected. Two basic criteria must be satis-
fied before employee concerted action over supervisory staff-
ing matters will be protected. First, the “employee protest
over a change in supervisory personnel [must] in fact [be] a
protest over the actual conditions of the employees. See e.g.
NLRB v Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1973) (discharged
supervisor had attempted to alleviate employees’ oppressive
workload); NLRB v Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Coop,
Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960) (foreman allegedly made em-
ployees’ job harder because foreman was inexperienced and
did not understand the work).
. . . .
Secondly, the means of protest must be reasonable. Gener-
ally, “strikes over changes in even low level supervisory per-
sonnel are not protected.”
. . . .
To conclude on the present record, as the Board did,
that the first criterion was satisfied is to go far in the direc-
tion of establishing a per se rule that the identity of a su-
pervisor automatically affects the employees’ working
conditions. That Perez instructed the employees on the
manner of performing their jobs would not appear to dis-
tinguish him from any proper supervisor. Generally where
employee protests over supervisory personnel have come
within the arguable purview of section 7, the supervisor
has been linked with an underlying employment related
concern. The supervisor has either contributed to the un-
derlying complaint (or been the cause of it) or has sought
to alleviate the pre-existing grievance. While protest may
have centered on the supervisor’s tenure, the problem has
been deeper. [619 F.2d 155–156.]

In NLRB v. Puerto Rico Sheraton Hotel, 651 F.2d 49 (1st
Cir. 1981), the facts involved a letter written mainly by a group
of supervisors, but also signed by a group of employees, which
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1115
purported to protest against certain “working conditions” and
in which there was a request of the Respondent to discharge the
Hotel’s Manager. The court, speaking through Judge Breyer,
(since elevated), reversed the Board conclusion that this letter
constituted protected concerted activity within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Act and stated, inter alia:

Second, the letter itself had only one object; the re-
moval of Mr. Orenstein as the hotel’s general manager.
Mr. Orenstein was not a “low-level foreman or supervisor
who deals directly with the employees.” [B]ut rather, the
highest ranking officer at the hotel. Thus management’s
interest in securing his loyalty, and maintaining his author-
ity are unusually strong while the interest in extending the
National Labor Relations Act’s protection of concerted
employee activity related to his tenure of office is corre-
spondingly weak (at least absent a distinct showing of a
particular harmful effect on employees working conditions
as perceived by employees).
Third, the complaints contained in the letter are almost
exclusively managerial. They are complaints of lower
level managerial staff about higher level managers . . . .
Even when the letter speaks of “promotions, salary scales
and working conditions,” it immediately uses as examples,
“company car, expense account, room and board.” At
least the first two of these do not sound as if they concern
the ordinary workers. The occasional use of the words
“working conditions” and the fact that some of the words
used could refer to ordinary workers as well as managers
are not enough to transform a letter that is managerial in
tone and content to a letter that deals with the direct con-
cerns of the average worker. [651 F.2d at 52–53.]

There have been cases since Dobbs Houses, supra, where
employee protest which encompassed or included the selection
of a supervisor has been held to be protected activity.
In Fair Mercantile Co., 271 NLRB 1159, 1162 (1984), the
administrative law judge, with Board approval, held that the
discharge of two employees who jointly complained about their
supervisor to higher management violated the Act. The judge
stated:

Thus the evidence reflects that the two employees discussed
the problems they felt they were having with Morton among
themselves and went together, on each occasion, to discuss
those problems with higher management. . . .
Moreover, although the complaints . . . may not have
been earth shattering, they were protected. . . . Their com-
plaints included such matters as being blamed for the mis-
takes of others, hostility or rudeness in the way job as-
signments were made, and other actions by Morton indi-
cating hostility toward them and possible favoritism of
other employees.

In the Hoytuck Corp., 285 NLRB 904 (1987), the Board held
that a petition complaining of the respondent’s cook and
kitchen supervisor was protected. The petition stated that the
supervisor had used “unrestrained profanity in a malicious
manner” against employees in the presence of customers and
coworkers and it further asked that he be removed from his
position immediately, “to avoid any further reoccurrence of
harassment.” At footnote 3, the Board stated:

We agree . . . that employee Cline’s conduct in prepar-
ing and circulating an employee petition that complained
of the conduct of the Respondent’s cook and kitchen su-
pervisor, Whitaker, towards employees and that further
sought his discharge is protected activity here because it is
evident that Whitaker’s conduct had an impact on em-
ployee working conditions. We further note that the find-
ing that an employee protest regarding the selection or
termination of a supervisor who has an impact on em-
ployee working conditions is protected is consistent with
long-standing Board precedent. See, e.g., Dobbs Houses,
Inc. . . . We wish to make it clear, however, that cases in-
volving employee concerted activity regarding the selec-
tion or termination of a supervisor, who has an impact on
employee working conditions are distinguishable from
cases in which employee concerted activity is designed
solely to effect or influence changes in the management
hierarchy. In the latter cases, the Board has found that
such conduct does not constitute protected activity. See,
e.g., Retail Clerks, Local 770 . . . .

In Atlantic-Pacific Management, 312 NLRB 242 (1993), the
administrative law judge stated:

The main thrust of the Respondent’s defense . . . is that
Davis was not engaged in protected concerted activity in
expressing his opposition to the selection of Hart as the
property manager.
Although not well drafted, the letter of September 17
opposing the selection of Hart as the property manager,
demonstrates the employees’ collective concern about the
effect that Hart’s selection would have on their working
conditions at Parcwood. Indeed, if any doubt existed as to
this being the underlying motive for the opposition letter,
it is dispelled by the unrefuted testimony of Davis that
employee Keenan expressed concern that Hart would im-
pose a shorter cleanup time to prepare apartments for
rental, and that employee Garvin expressed concern that
Hart would change his hours. [Id. at 244.]

In Korea News, 297 NLRB 537 (1990), an employee petition
was held to be protected and their discharges unlawful when it
contained, among other things, (a) a request for resignation of
the printing department director, (b) a request for more pay, and
(c) a request that time and a half rates be paid for work beyond
40 hours per week. The petition pointed out that the resigna-
tion request was the most important point because of the em-
ployees perception that the supervisor’s behavior was intimidat-
ing and overbearing. Unlike the present case, the letter in Ko-
rea News, on its face, stated specific items which directly dealt
with wages and working conditions. The letter also stated what
the employees’ specific complaints were in relation to the su-
pervisor. (Conditions in the department are “warlike due to the
director’s curses and his complete ignorance of the ordinary
staff’s opinions,” which have led to numerous resignations.)
On the other hand, there exists a series of cases where peti-
tions, protests or letters by employees concerning the com-
pany’s selection of managerial personnel were not considered
to be protected activity within the meaning of the Act. Cases
such as N.Y. Chinatown Senior Citizen Coalition, 239 NLRB
614 (1978), and Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota, 250
NLRB 35 (1980), involved social service organizations similar
to the Respondent in the present case. And both involved situa-
tions where internal politics relating to the selection of manage-
rial personnel and each agency’s policy goals were the primary
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1116
concerns of the employees. To my mind, both of the cited cases
are very similar to the facts in the present case.
In Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota supra, the employer
was a social welfare agency which, among other things, oper-
ated a home for children. The charging party, had applied for
the job of assistant director on two previous occasions and he,
along with another employee, were constant critics of the pro-
gram who expressed their opinion that the director was incom-
petent. The ALJ, in a decision adopted by the Board, con-
cluded that their activities, although concerted were not pro-
tected. He stated:

While the conduct of Johnson and Schaefbauer was
loosely concerted, it is hard to say that it was directed to-
ward any particular objective. There is no evidence that
they were attempting to organize a labor organization;
they made no effort to invite the other employees into
some informal coalition; they formulated no agenda; they
filed no grievances; and they made no demands. What
they did, essentially, was to complain, criticize and carp
from, as it were, the sidelines.
The statute protects protests in which there inheres ac-
tion or the possibility of action. It has been applied even
in cases where the dissatisfaction is embryonic and only
hints at future group behavior . . . .
. . . . .
Beyond that question is the equally troublesome one of
whether the nature of the concerns . . . fall within the range
if interests to which Section 7 is addressed. . . . As the Su-
preme Court has recently pointed out in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), there has been some conflict
in the precedents, and perhaps as authoritative a definition
as may be found anywhere was essayed in that case, to
wit: “legitimate activity that could improve [the employ-
ees’] lot as employees.” 437 U.S. at 567.
Ordinarily, the applicability of the clause is not seri-
ously in question . . . . On the periphery of the clause,
however, there appears to be a tacit assumption that em-
ployee efforts to affect the ultimate direction and manage-
rial policies of the business are beyond the scope of the
clause. This distinction seems to be implicit in the line of
cases which holds that protests against the appointment or
termination of “low-level” supervisors may be protected
when directly related to the employees’ conditions of em-
ployment (NLRB v Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany, 167 F.2d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Okla -
Inn, d/b/a Holiday Inn of Henryetta, 488 F.2d 498, 503
(10th Cir. 1973)), while similar activity with regard to “top
management” of the employer is not safeguarded. (Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, Retail Clerks International As-
sociation, 208 NLRB 356, 357 (1974); New York China-
town Senior Citizens Coalition Center, Inc., 239 NLRB
614, fn. 1 (1978).
. . . .
These statements . . . leave little doubt that Johnson
and Schaefbauer were not at all troubled by any additional
demands imposed upon them directly by the policy
changes; what did disturb them were program decisions by
management and the concomitant perceived lack of com-
petency of management which, in their view, threatened
the “quality of care,” “ the quality of the program,” and the
“welfare of the children.” This sort of concern is wholly
professional and commendable. It is, nonetheless, the kind
of concern in the first instance confided by the statute, and
our society, in management. Protest against the quality of
the product ... and those vested with the ultimate authority
to establish basic managerial guidelines and philosophy is
not activity which could improve the employees’ “lot as
employees” (Eastex, Inc., supra); that sort of interest is not
encompassed by the “mutual aid or protection” clause, as
the Board has made clear in the cases, previously cited,
dealing with employee efforts to affect “top manage-
ment.”5 [250 NLRB at 41–42.]

As noted above, the letter which is alleged as the protected
concerted activity in this case, deals with several concerns, and
does not, on its face, deal with any specific working conditions
that the employees allege were of concern to them. A principle
complaint of the letter deals not with their own terms and con-
ditions of employment but rather with the status, power and
money being paid to Blanche Polovetz, who was appointed
temporarily as the acting director. The letter, although not
calling for her replacement, demands, upon threat of a work
stoppage, that the Respondent appoint a new director as soon as
possible and that it do so in conjunction with DFTA, and with-
out “outside interference.”
The General Counsel contends that the appointment of
Polovetz as acting director and the failure to appoint a new
director, affected the jobs of the Respondent’s employees.
Counsel for the General Counsel in its brief makes the follow-
ing contentions regarding the affects on working conditions.
1. That former Director Austin had skills operating the com-
puters and because Polovetz had limited skills “a heavier bur-
den fell on the employees.” He claims that Peck and Mathew
had to spend more time working on the computer, doing case
inputs, closing cases, statistics, etc. He also claims that Peck
had to deal with system malfunctions and had to spend time
training Polovetz on the computer system.
2. That Austin was responsible for case decisions whereas
Polovetz was unable to make decisions about cases or contrib-
ute meaningful assistance to case managers. He asserts that in
the absence of an experienced director, case workers had to
spend more time discussing cases among themselves and giving
each other advice about case handling He claims that this had
two results; first the employees spent less time on cases and
second that Mathew and Peck worked greater hours without
compensation by staying late and working weekends.
3. That Polovetz was a poor supervisor who adversely af-
fected the office atmosphere, for example, by interrupting tele-
phone calls between case workers and clients. He also claims
that on one occasions, Polovetz asked Matthew to misrepresent
to DFTA, during a periodic survey, that Matthew had credits
towards a MSW. In this regard, the General Counsel asserts,
without any supporting evidence, that if Matthew had acceded
to this request and DFTA had found out about it, this might

5 Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota, supra, was cited with ap-
proval in Mitchel Manuals, Inc., 280 NLRB 230, 232 fn. 7 (1986). The
General Counsel cites a number of other cases which, because they do
not deal with actions by employees to influence the selection of super-
visors or managerial personnel, are not, in my opinion, really relevant
to the present discussion. These included Reading Hospital & Medical
Center, 226 NLRB 611 (1976); Victoria Medical Group, 264 NLRB 99
(1982); Oakes Machine Corp., 288 NLRB 456 (1988) United Enviro
Systems, 301 NLRB 942 (1991); Mapleview Nursing Home, 302 NLRB
211 (1991); and Delta Health Center, 310 NLRB 26 (1993).
SENIOR CITIZENS COORDINATING COUNCIL OF CO-OF C 1117
have resulted in DFTA requesting the Center to take discipli-
nary action including discharge against Matthew.
4. That requiring Mercado to issue paychecks to Polovetz in
the amount authorized by the Board, without written authoriza-
tion, would violate DFTA regulations and could somehow lead
to her discharge or discipline.
Notwithstanding that the retirement of Austin left one fewer
person to do the work at the Multi-Service Center, there is no
evidence that the remaining employees were required by their
employer, to work longer hours or to work without overtime
compensation. No one told them that they had to work more
hours or on weekends and no one told them that they could not
put in for premium pay if they did so.
In the absence of Austin, it may be true that the social work-
ers consulted more with each other about the care of their cli-
ents. But these were people who had training and experience in
what I believe they would like to think of as a professional job,
requiring independent judgment on their part.
Regarding the computers, the testimony of the employees
was that they needed help from Mr. Austin and that their work
was harder in his absence. Inasmuch as this record sheds little
light on the computers, the software involved, or the purposes
for which they were used, these generalized assertions have
little weight. (Most basic computer skills such as word
processing and the basic use of spreadsheets and data bases, do
not require much training and often can be learned by reasona-
bly intelligent people from the manuals that accompany the
machines.) In the absence of such evidence or evidence that
the employees were required by their employer to have such
skills, I really don’t know what they were complaining about.
Moreover, there is no requirement that the director of the Cen-
ter have computer skills at all, much less such skills that the
staff seems to have believed would have been useful for their
convenienc

e.
I have already discussed the situation with Mercado and her
refusal, as the bookkeeper, to issue a paycheck to Polovetz in
the amount authorized by the Respondent’s Board. Rather than
being protected concerted activity, I view her actions in this
regard, as insubordinate behavior, which would have justified
her discharge. Indeed, as she was told on Monday, April 21,
that her job had been contracted out, whereas the decision to
discharge the other employees had not yet been made, I would
conclude that the decision to contract out her job was motivated
not by her signature on the letter, but rather by her past refusals
to pay Polovetz.
One of Ms Mathew’s objections to Polovetz was her asser-
tion that on one occasion, Polovetz asked her to misrepresent
her academic credits to DFTA. As noted, I do not consider this
to relate to her terms and conditions of employment and the
General Counsel’s assertion that there might be some causal
link between her acceding to this request and the possibility
that it could have led to Mathew’s discipline or discharge, is so
conjectural as to be outside the range of reasonable possibility.
Notwithstanding the alleged affects of having Polovetz as the
acting director and not having a properly credentialed person as
director, the alleged affects were not stated in the August 4
letter, and in this regard, the testimony sounds to me like a post
hoc rationalization.
The evidence as a whole is consistent with the assertion by
the employees in their letter, that they were distracted by issues
of status, power and money when Blanche Polovetz was ap-
pointed as acting director. It is completely understandable that
people with “proper credentials” might exhibit jealousy to
someone who did not have such credentials and who was “ele-
vated,” even for a short time, to a position having more status,
more potential power and more money than they. Moreover,
the record indicates that in addition to these concerns, the em-
ployees’ other major objective was to promote the hiring of Ms.
Mercado’s boyfriend to the director’s job which was the highest
ranking position at the Multi-Service Center.
For all of the reasons stated above, it is my conclusion that
the August letter did not constitute protected concerted activity
and therefore that the discharge of Peck, Mathew, and Mercado
did not violate the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Respondent has not violated the Act in any manner as
alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publica-
tion.]
APPENDIX A
Letter dated August 4, 1995.
The Co-op city Multi-Service Center for Senior Citizens is in
a state of crisis and we are asking for help from the New York
City Department for the Aging.
On March 10, 1995, Mr. William Austin, MSW, resigned as
director of the Co-op city Multi-Service Center. Since that time
the office has been without a director and there are currently no
plans to find a replacement. We are without appropriate super-
vision, and like any other agency, require professional social
work supervision. In response to Mr. Austin’s resignation, the
sponsor of the Multi-Service Center, the Senior Citizens Coor-
dinating Council (SCCC) has voted to make Mrs. Blanche
Polovetz the acting director of our agency. Mrs. Polovetz has
been the OFFICE MANAGER/CASE AIDE of the agency
since its inception. She has made ( and continues to make)
important contributions to our agency in this capacity. But
because of her previous position and her lack of qualifications
(no college degree or formal social work training), we as a staff
are placed in an awkward position for several reasons:

1. As the Office Manger / Case Aide, under DFTA
regulations, Mrs. Polovetz has never been authorized to do
home assessments for EISEP services. Now, as Acting
Director, she is being given the authority to supervise and
make decisions over those who are trained to do those as-
sessments.
2. Two staff members from each of the programs un-
der the Senior Citizens Coordinating council (the Multi-
Service Center and the Co-op City Nutrition Program) are
members of the SCCC board which governs the programs
(see enclosed board list). These staff members are the Di-
rector of the Multi-Service Center (now vacant), Mrs.
Polovetz, Ms. Candice Harris, Director of Co-op City Nu-
trition, and Mrs. Ceil Goodman, Assistant Director of Co-
op City Nutrition. We believe this creates a serious con-
flict of interest. there are not checks and balances. There
is no one to take responsibility over the agency staff mem-
bers’ practices. As it is, it seems to us that DFTA is also
reneging on this responsibility.
3. To compound #2 above, the board of SCCC was put
together with representatives of the many senior clubs in
Co-op city 18 years ago. Many of these members are still
on the board and are friends with Mrs. Polovetz. The
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1118
board does not have authority over Mrs. Polovetz and Ms.
Harris. Mrs. Polovetz and Ms. Harris have authority over
the board. In short, Mrs. Polovetz and Ms. Harris are the
board. This is why they voted Mrs. Polovetz to be Acting
Director. The board does not understand the implications
of this. We believe Ms. Harris would like Mrs. Polovetz
to become permanent Director of the Multi-Service Center
because she is positioning herself to become Executive Di-
rector of the Senior Citizens Coordinating Council,
thereby merging the two programs together.

Our dilemma has made it difficult for us to give our clients
the highest quality care management. Instead, we are distracted
by issues of office status, power and monetary gain, forcing us
to ask ourselves questions like these:
Who can we turn to when we have a question regard-
ing a case? Again, Mrs. Polovetz is not qualified and Ms.
Harris’ agency has never provided case management.
Who is supervising us on a regular basis and reviewing
our cases?
Who is updating us on new policies and procedures?

Having nowhere else to turn, we have looked to the Depart-
ment for help. Several weeks ago, we began contacting the
Department to inform the Program Officer, Program Director
and Director of Bronx Programs of the urgent status of our
agency’s situation. We were hoping to solve this problem in a
discreet manner, with as little disruption as possible. Unfortu-
nately, we have received an inadequate response and believe
we have no alternative but to take this course of action. The
following is a summary of what we know has happened so far:

1. Mrs. Polovetz and SCCC board member Sylvia
Halpern met with Jorge Romero of DFTA on May 15,
1995 regarding Mrs. Polovetz’ qualifications for the posi-
tion of director. According to Mr. Romero, Mrs. Polovetz
is not qualified for the position. In addition, DFTA did not
approve Mrs. Polovetz as Assistant, Acting or permanent
Director of the Multi-Service Center due to her lack of
qualifications. He said, however, that if the SCCC board
wanted to do so, they could make Mrs. Polovetz Acting
Director, but DFTA could assume no responsibility for
this decision and its resulting implications.
2. This message from Mr. Romero was in direct re-
sponse to any inquiry from the Multi-Service Center
bookkeeper asking for written DFTA approval to pay Mrs.
Polovetz on the Director’s salary line. Mr. Romero in-
formed the bookkeeper that an agreement was reached be-
tween DFTA and SCCC at the May 15, 1995 meeting. If
SCCC wanted to do so, they could pay Mrs. Polovetz on
the Director’s salary line with the following stipulation:
this was to be a temporary situation while SCCC con-
ducted a search for a new Director, and an advertisement
for a new Director must be placed in the newspaper. To
date, this has not been done. In addition, Mr. Romero
stated that the bookkeeper must get written approval from
SCCC in order to pay Mrs. Polovetz on the Director’s sal-
ary line. Since then, the bookkeeper has not gotten SCCC
written approval and has not paid Mrs. Polovetz on the Di-
rector’s line.
3. The Multi-Service staff has met and composed this
letter. We are writing to you urging you to take immediate
action concerning this matter. We each feel very strongly
and united in this cause and are ready to take further action
if our pleas go unanswered. Therefore, if we do not see
movement in the hiring a new Director (without interfer-
ence and with significant DFTA involvement) we, staff of
the Co-op City Multi-Service Center are prepared to take a
job action wherein we will begin not reporting to work un-
til sufficient measures are take to hire a new Director.