Rigid Pak, Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 8, 2016

12-CA-152811 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 8, 2016)

JD-47-16
Juncos, PR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
RIGID PAK CORP.
and CASE 12−CA−152811
UNION DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO
RICO, LOCAL 901, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Ayesha K. Villegas Estrada, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Bayoan Muniz-Calderon & Ian P. Carvajal,
Esqs., (Saldana Carvajal & Velez-Rive, PSC),
for the Respondent.
Jose Carreras, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. This matter arises out of a complaint
and notice of hearing (the complaint) issued on January 29, 2016, against Rigid Pak Corp.
(the Respondent or the Company), stemming from unfair labor practice charges filed by
Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the
Union).
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on April 20 and 21,
2016, at which I afforded the parties full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence.
Issues
(1) Did the February 12, 20151 contract between the Respondent and Alpla Caribe,
Inc. (Alpla), which led to the March 31 layoff of all 28 unit employees, create
a subcontracting situation coming under Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.

1 All dates hereinafter occurred in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
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NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); or a partial closing governed by First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)?
(2) Depending on the answer to that, did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by not affording the Union an adequate opportunity to bargain over the
decision to lay off unit employees and/or its effects?
(3) Since on about March 31 has the Respondent used employees of Laser
Products, Inc. and a former supervisor to perform unit work at its facility,
without affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain?
(4) If the Respondent’s conduct violated the Act, is the appropriate remedy
restoration of the status quo ante; or an effects bargaining remedy as per
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968), and making unit
employees whole for later unit work performed by nonunit employees?
Witnesses and Credibility
The General Counsel called Rafael Rosario (Rosario), the Union’s vice president, who
serviced the Respondent’s unit employees; Brenda Rosario (Brenda Rosario), who was a
production employee and shop steward; and Jose Carvajal, the Respondent’s president and
part-owner, as an adverse witness under Section 611(c). The Respondent called Carvajal as
its sole witness in its case in chief.
Most of the pertinent facts in this case are stipulated.2 All three witnesses seemed
generally candid, and I have no reason to doubt their truthfulness as far as relating
conversations. Both Carvajal and Brenda Rosario appeared to have detailed recall; Rosario
somewhat less so. Their testimony generally did not differ much in substance. I note that
Carvajal was quite consistent on 611(c) and direct examination on what was said in his
discussions with union representatives.
The Respondent’s counsel agrees with my assessment that Brenda Rosario was a
credible witness but contends that Rosario was only partially credible because he contradicted
himself on various occasions, and that on one point, Carvajal’s testimony should be credited
over his (R. Br. 3). According to the General Counsel, Carvajal’s “self-serving” and
unsupported testimony that labor costs were not a factor in deciding to close was incredible
(GC Br. 23–24). The briefs do not otherwise address credibility per se.
Facts
Based on the entire record, including testimony and my observations of witness
demeanor, documents, and stipulations, as well as the posttrial briefs that the General Counsel
and the Respondent filed, I find the following:
Jurisdiction
The Respondent is a corporation with an office and place of business in Juncos, Puerto

2 See Jt. Exhs. 1–3.
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Rico. Prior to March 31, it engaged at its facility in Juncos (the facility) in manufacturing and
distributing two types of containers and closures, injection-molded and blow-molded. The
Respondent admits to the Board’s jurisdiction,3 and I so find.
The Parties Collective-Bargaining History Prior to March
Since in about March 1983, the Respondent has recognized the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the following unit at the facility:
All production and maintenance employees, including turners; excluding all office and
clerical employees, production controllers, electricians, special project technicians,
professionals, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Such recognition was embodied in a series of collective-bargaining agreements, the
most recent of which was effective by its terms from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2014.4
Relevant provisions of the agreement are:
(1) The management rights to decide “[p]roducts to be manufactured and their
prices,” and “[m]ethods, procedures, and the means of manufacturing,
distribution and management.” Article IV.
(2) “The Company shall not subcontract any work that is normally done by [unit
employees] if that subcontract[sic] results in laying off regular employees who
are working at the time of that subcontracting.” Article XX, section A(1).
The Respondent does not argue that any provisions in the agreement amount to a
waiver by the Union of its rights to negotiate about subcontracting. Rather, the Respondent
contends that the decision to enter into the agreement with Alpla was not subcontracting but a
change in the scope and direction of the enterprise, supported by the management-rights
clause (R. Br. 20). I also note that the General Counsel does not allege that the Respondent’s
actions in this case were motivated by antiunion considerations.
By letter and email dated April 30, 2014, Union Secretary-Treasurer Alexis Rodriguez
Normadia (Rodriguez) requested that Carvajal negotiate for a new collective-bargaining
agreement.5
Not until September (according to Carvajal) or December (according to Rosario and
Brenda Rosario) did the parties meet on the subject.6 Carvajal was present for the Company;

3 GC Exh. 1(g) at 1; Jt. Exh. 1 at 2.
4 See GC Exh. 2, portions of the agreement. Part “A” of the exhibit is the original version in Spanish,
with the English translation as part “B.” The same holds true of other exhibits originally in Spanish.
5 GC Exh. 3.
6 In his affidavit, Rosario gave the month of the meeting as “around August.” No one took minutes of the
meeting or memoralized it in writing, so that when it occurred and what was said has to be based solely
on witness testimony. In any event, whether the meeting took place in August, September or December
is immaterial.
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and Rosario and delegates (shop stewards) Brenda Rosario, and David Rodriguez attended for
the Union. Carvajal, Rosario, and Brenda Rosario gave generally similar and not inconsistent
versions of what occurred.
Carvajal stated that the Company was in a bad financial situation due to sales being
down; that the Company had explored or was exploring alternatives, such as trying to get
clients outside of Puerto Rico; and that he therefore was requesting an extension of the current
collective-bargaining agreement for another year without any increases. He further stated that
he would not ask the Union for concessions because the cost of labor was not the reason for
the Company’s economic situation and would not make a difference. Carvajal offered to
show Rosario the Company’s financial statements and financial information, but Rosario
declined to see them. Rosario asked that if there was an increase in health insurance, the
Company would absorb that, and Carvajal agreed. Rosario stated that the Union would take
to its members Carvajal’s proposal for an extension.
The parties held no further negotiations and never signed an extension agreement.
Prior to March, the only further communications between Carvajal and Rosario occurred in
passing, when Rosario was at the facility and Carvajal mentioned the Company’s continued
financial difficulties.
Respondent’s Business Operation Prior to March 31
For many years, the Respondent manufactured plastic bottles made with high-density
polyethylene through a blow-molding process, and open-head containers and lids and milk
crates using high-density polyethylene through an injection-molding process.7 Totally
different equipment (machines, molds, and resins) were required for each of the processes,
which were performed in separate areas or sides. No unit employees were specifically
assigned to one side or the other; they worked on both sides and even could spend part of one
shift on one side and part on the other, depending on where they were needed.
The number of unit employees reached about 100 at one time, but by March 31, there
were only 28. They were machine operators, warehouse employees, or maintenance
employees. Unit employees were responsible for all aspects of the process at the facility,
from the manufacturing to the storing of both lines of products in the warehouse.
Nonemployee independent truckers picked up the products and delivered them to customers.
Respondent’s Financial Situation Prior to March
As a result of economic problems in Puerto Rico and declining sales, the Respondent
experienced financial difficulties in the years immediately preceding 2015. The Respondent’s
Puerto Rico income tax return, filed on February 9, 2016, for the tax year from July 1, 2014,
to June 30, 2015, shows a net operating loss of almost $903,000.8 A financial statement

7 See GC Exhs. 18, 19 (blow-molded products and injection-molded products, respectively, manufactured
in 2004); and R. Exh. 6, showing blow-molding machines for sale in November, with photographs of
the products. Some of them were still manufactured in 2015.
8 R. Exh. 1. Wages for that period were approximately $363,000. Id. at 5.
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prepared on December 18 by Luis B. Golzalez & Co., PSC, CPAs and consultants, shows the
following:9
Year ending June 30, 2014 Year ending June 30, 2015
Gross profit $374,772 minus $226,262
Income from operations minus $217,421 minus $836,408
Net loss $275,322 $908,465
Advances from Laser Products, $700,000 $1,500,000
Inc. (no interest)
Dividends declared and paid $137,320 $83,010
Carvajal looked for ways to increase sales, including exporting out of Puerto Rico;
making alliances with competitors; or going into new products, specifically clear plastic
bottles for which there was a big market in Puerto Rico. He determined that exporting was
not feasible because the Company faced major competition in the continental United States
and Latin America. Alpla was a major supplier of raw material for such bottles, and in
October 2014, Carvajal met with Richard Lisch, Alpla’s general manager, to discuss the
possibility of the Respondent’s buying raw material from Alpla to blow clear plastic bottles.
After observing Alpla’s operation and reviewing his situation, Carvajal came to the
conclusion that the Company had neither the capital nor the human resources necessary to buy
and efficiently run the sophisticated equipment needed. He further determined that the
Company could not stay in the plastic bottling manufacturing business because it did not have
the updated equipment and cost structure necessary to compete. Thereafter, he discussed with
Lisch the alternative of having the Respondent’s product produced at Alpla’s facility.
Respondent’s Agreement with Alpla
After negotiations, the Respondent and Alpla ultimately signed a supply agreement on
February 12.10 By its terms, the Respondent delivered its injection-molding equipment
(machines and molds) to Alpla’s plant but has remained the owner of that equipment; Alpla is
wholly responsible for manufacturing, packaging, storing, and delivering the containers to the
Respondent’s customers under the Respondent’s logo;11 and the Respondent pays Alpla for
those products at a discounted rate. The Respondent provides the raw materials for the
manufacturing. The Respondent also purchases blow-molding products with its logo, for
which Alpla provides the raw materials and machines. Alpla prepares and submits to the
Respondent quality control records and reports, and a reasonable number of samples from
each production run of products for quality purposes. The Respondent has the right, upon
reasonable notice, to send one or more of its employees to observe and inspect the
manufacturing, warehousing, and other facilities that Alpla uses to produce, package, store,
and ship products. Carvajal has been to Alpla’s plant four times in the past year.

9 R. Exh. 2.
10 GC Exh. 4. See also Jt. Exh. 3 (injection-molding products that the Respondent would purchase: lids,
pails, and milk crates).
11 The Company’s name is embossed in the molds and therefore on every container.
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As a result of the agreement, the Respondent planned to entirely cease manufacturing
operations at its facility and to sell the blow-making equipment. Carvajal determined that the
price Alpla would charge for manufacturing containers and selling them to the Company
would enable the Company to resell them at small profit and pay back its debt.
Carvajal testified that he wanted to keep their negotiations and the agreement
confidential prior to the cessation of manufacturing operations so that his business
competitors would not try to take away his customers in advance of the closing.
Respondent’s Notification to the Union
Carvajal testified that it took him about 2 weeks after he signed the contract, or until
late February, to determine how much time was needed to transfer the machines and have
them operating at Alpla to avoid any interruption in supplying the Respondent’s customers.
I credit Carvajal’s uncontroverted testimony as follows. On March 5, he called Union
Secretary Treasurer Rodriguez and requested a meeting. Rodriguez did not answer the phone.
Carvajal had heart surgery on March 6 and called Rodriguez again on March 9. He told
Rodriguez that it was “urgent” that they sit down and meet but did not specify why because he
“didn’t want to advance any information” concerning the shutdown.12 Rodriguez stated that
the first date he had available was on March 17.
Carvajal and Rodriguez met for about an hour at a restaurant on March 17. Carvajal
started by letting Rodriguez know that he was closing the plant because the Company’s
sustained losses were over $1 million; that the Company’s injection-molding equipment
would be moved to Alpla, which would manufacture the injection-molded products; and that
the Company would go out of the blow-molding business and sell its blow-molding
equipment. This was the first knowledge the Union had of the Alpla agreement and resulting
plant closing.
Rodriguez asked if Carvajal had any money for a severance package, and Carvajal
replied no. Carvajal asked for Rodriguez’ help in informing employees of the closing, and
Rodriguez asked if he could meet with them at the facility. Carvajal agreed. Rodriguez said
that he would contact Rosales and the union delegates to arrange to assemble the employees,
and would call Carvajal back about this.
In testifying on 611(c) examination, Carvajal said nothing about giving Rodriguez a
date for the closure; however, in later direct examination, he testified that he told Rodriguez
the closing would be “by the end of March.”13 I believe it highly likely that Carvajal either
mentioned a specific time frame for the closing or that Rodriguez would have asked for, and
been provided, with that information. It is highly implausible that the date would not have
been brought up in their conversation in light of the momentous impact on unit employees.
Accordingly, I find that Carvajal informed Rodriguez that the closure would occur by the end

12 Tr. 190.
13 Tr. 193.
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of March.
Carvajal, Rosario, and Brenda Rosario all testified about meeting after March 17
regarding the plant closure. Carvajal and Brenda Rosario testified about attending only one
meeting, but Rosario testified that there were two. Carvajal and Rosario gave a meeting date
of March 26, whereas Brenda Rosario gave it as April 5. Based on the contents of Carvajal’s
March 30 letter to Rodriguez,14 I find that one meeting was held on March 26.
On March 26, Carvajal and Eric Romero, the Company’s controller, met with Rosario
and Union Stewards Brenda Rosario and David Rodriguez in the facility’s conference room.
Carvajal repeated what he had told Rodriguez on March 17. He stated that the last day of
manufacturing operations would be the following day, March 27, and that the last work day
for unit employees would be March 31. Rosario asked if it would be a total or partial
shutdown, to which Carvajal replied that it was total, and even the official clerical employees
were going to be let go. Rosario asked whether Carvajal would consider rehiring laid-off
employees if he reopened within the next 2 years, and Carvajal said yes but that he had no
plans to reopen. Romero asked if Carvajal could give a bonus due to the closing, but he said
no because he did not have the money. Rosario asked if the Company could advance the
Christmas bonus instead of waiting until December, and Carvajal agreed to calculate the
amounts and hand them over at closing. Rosario also asked for liquidation for accrued sick
leave and vacation leave, and he and Carvajal agreed on a date on which the Company would
pay those amounts. Carvajal further stated that the employees would have a month of paid
medical insurance after the plant closed because the premiums had already been paid.
By letter and email of March 30 to Rodriguez, Carvajal confirmed some of what was
said about the closing at their March 17 meeting and at his March 26 meeting with Rosario.
On March 31, the Respondent issued layoff letters to all unit employees.15 The only
written agreement that the parties reached regarding the closure was a stipulation that Carvajal
and Rosario signed on April 15, concerning calculation of the Christmas bonus up until the
date of the closing.16
Respondent’s Operation after March 31
As per its agreement with Alpla, the Company paid to move all four of its injection-
molding machines and its injection molds to the Alpla facility, on April 15, 28, and May 29.17
The Respondent sold its biggest blow-mold machine, used to manufacture bleach bottles, for
$120,000 on about July 1; its four remaining blow-mold machines and 26 molds, which are
still at the facility, are currently on the market for sale.18

14 GC Exh. 5. The reference therein to “Rafael Rodriguez” was an error.
15 See GC Exh. 8 (sample letter).
16 GC Exh. 7.
17 See GC Exhs. 20–22.
18 See R. Exhs. 3, 6, 7.
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Since March 31, the Respondent has purchased both injection-molded and blow-
molded products from Alpla.19 Alpla delivers approximately 95 percent of the products that it
manufactures for the Respondent directly to the Respondent’s customers; the remainder is
delivered to the facility, for pickup by the Respondent’s smaller customers or for
emergencies. Alpla contracts directly with the trucking companies that make the deliveries.
Some inventory remained at the facility after March 31. The Respondent had nonunit
employees move left over inventory to containers, for delivery to customers. These included
Edward Rivera Mojica, who was working as a Company supervisor in the warehouse in
March. No raw materials are delivered to the facility; the raw materials that the Respondent
buys for its injection-molded products are delivered directly to Alpla.
Carvajal is president of Laser Products, Inc. (Laser), which owns the property on
which the facility is located and was one of Respondent’s customers. Laser is engaged in
packaging household chemicals and producing a bleach. It now has an account with Alpla,
and the Respondent no longer provides it with any product. Laser uses the facility’s
warehouse for its finished products. The General Counsel does not contend that Laser is an
alter ego of, or a successor employer to, the Respondent.
Carvajal had Laser employees perform unit work at the facility the weeks ending April
19 and May 3.20 In the first week, six employees worked for a total of 72 hours and were paid
$830.84; in the second week, eight employees worked for a total of 275 hours and were paid
$2994. They produced both injection containers and blow bottles, and some of them loaded
trailers. The Respondent never gave the Union prior notice of this.
On May 18, the Union picketed the facility. Carvajal invited Rodriguez, Rosario, and
Brenda Rosario inside. Rodriguez asked why he was still in production when he had
allegedly closed the business, and stated that unit employees should do that work. Carvajal
denied this, saying that he had to turn on the machines in order to keep them in working
condition before moving them out of the building. He explained that he did not call unit
employees because it would have been a nuisance for them due to the small amount of hours
that they have to report to the unemployment office. Brenda Rosario pointed out that there
was still product in the plant and that moving product inside the facility was unit work.
That same day, Rodriguez sent a follow-up letter and email to Carvajal, confirming
what the Union had observed as to production work and movement of stored merchandise;
reiterating that such was unit work; requesting discussions about resuming operations with
unit personnel; and demanding that unit employees be paid for the work that was performed
by nonunion personnel.21
Currently, three Laser employees, including Mojica, handle product at the facility.
Approximately 90 percent is household chemicals for Laser; the remainder is injection-mold

19 See GC Exhs. 12–16.
20 See GC Exhs. 10, 11.
21 GC Exh. 9.
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products that are manufactured by Alpla for the Company and delivered for pickup by small
customers. No manufacturing is done at the facility. The Company presently employs three
administrative employees, who work in accounting; Carvajal’s nephew; a messenger; a
handyman, who does maintenance and cleaning; and Carvajal. These employees worked for
the Company before March 31.
Prior to the closing, the Respondent’s utility and maintenance costs were nearly $2
million a year. As a result of closing the manufacturing operation at the facility, the
Respondent has greatly reduced maintenance, infrastructure, and utility costs, and is no longer
responsible for defective products.
The Respondent continues to advertise as a manufacturer of both injection-molded
and blow-molded products. See GC Exhs. 17–19.
Analysis and Conclusions
The Appropriate Analytical Framework
The threshold issue is how to properly characterize the nature of the change in the
Respondent’s operation because that will determine the scope of the Respondent’s bargaining
obligation. The General Counsel take the position that a subcontracting analysis is
appropriate and that the Respondent had an obligation to bargain over both the decision and
its effects, as per Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB (Fibreboard), 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (GC Br. 16,
et. seq.). On the other hand, the Respondent contends that it closed its operations and
changed the scope and direction of its business, so that its bargaining obligation was limited
to bargaining over the effects but not over the decision itself, under First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB (First National), 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (R. Br. 14, et. seq.).
Section 8(d) of the Act provides than an employer has the obligation to bargain with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. In Fibreboard,
above at 210, et. seq., the Court determined that contracting out of unit work that unit
employees are capable of continuing to perform comes under Section 8(d) and is therefore a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court noted, id. at 213–214:
The facts of the present case illustrate the propriety of submitting the dispute to
collective negotiation. The Company’s decision to contract out the maintenance work
did not alter the Company’s basic operation. The maintenance work still had to be
performed in the plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely
replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same
work under similar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to
bargain about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the
business.
The Court also emphasized that the respondent’s desire to reduce labor costs was at the base
of the employer’s decision to subcontract and that this was a matter “peculiarly suitable for
resolution within the collective bargaining framework.” Ibid.
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The Court clarified that its decision was limited to subcontracting where bargaining
unit employees are replaced with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment (“Our decision need not and does not encompass
other forms of ‘contracting out’ or ‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our complex
economy.” Id. at 215).
In First National, above, the Court discussed entrepreneurial management decisions
involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise that have a direct impact on
employment but have as their focus only economic profitability wholly apart from the
employment relationship. The Court, balancing the benefits to be derived from collective
bargaining with management’s need for freedom to make decisions necessary to run a
profitable business, set forth the following test:
[I]n view of an employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over
managements decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations
and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of
the business.
452 U.S. at 679. In addressing a partial shutdown for purely economic reasons, the Court
distinguished Fibreboard and concluded, id. at 686 (emphasis in original):
[T]he harm likely to be done to an employer’s need to operate freely in deciding
whether to shut down part of its business for purely economic reasons outweighs the
incremental benefit that might be gained through the union’s participating in making
the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part of § 8(d)’s ‘terms and
conditions’. . . .”
The Court noted that the employer had no intention to replace the discharged employees or to
move the operation elsewhere, that the sole purpose for the closing was to reduce economic
loss, and that the employer’s decision was based on a factor over which the union had no
control or authority. The Court was careful to clarify that its holding was limited to the
particular situation presented and was not intended to cover other types of management
decisions, such as “plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc.,
which are to be considered on their particular facts.” Id. at 686 fn. 22.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the employer’s bargaining obligation was
limited to bargaining over the effects of the decision, “in a meaningful manner and at a
meaningful time.” Id. at 681–682.
In Dubuque Packing Co., 303 NLRB 386, 390–391 (1991), the Board harmonized the
differing results in Fibreboard and First National in the context of an employer’s relocating
unit work from one of its plants to another of its plants. The Board noted that in First
National, the employer did not replace its employees or move its operation elsewhere,
whereas in Fibreboard, the employer replaced existing employees with those of an
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independent contractor (at its facility). In First National, the employer made a decision
whether to be in business at all, whereas in Fibreboard, the employer’s decision did not
change the company’s basic operation. Finally, in First National, the decision was based on
the amount of customer payment, whereas in Fibreboard, reduction of labor costs was the
core reason for the decision to subcontract.
In Torrington Industries, 307 NLRB 809, 810 (1992), the Board did not apply the
burden-shifting test set out in Dubuque Packing to a layoff of unit employees and their
replacement with a nonunit employee and independent contractors at the respondent’s facility.
Rather, the Board applied Fibreboard when the employer replaces employees in the existing
bargaining unit with those of a contractor to perform the same work and “virtually all that is
changed through the subcontracting is the identity of the employees doing the work.” Id. at
811. See also Mi Pueblo Foods, 360 NLRB No. 116, slip op. at 3 (2014).
As the Board recognized in Bob’s Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 NLRB 1369, 1370
(1982) (footnotes omitted), “The distinction between subcontracting and partial closing . . . is
not always readily apparent,” and, accordingly,
[I]t is incumbent on the Board to review the particular facts presented in each case to
determine whether the employer’s action involves an aspect of the employer/employee
relationship that is amenable to resolution through bargaining with the union since it
involves issues “particularly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining
framework.” If so, Respondent will be required to bargain over the decision. If,
however, the employer’s action is one that is not suitable for resolution through
collective bargaining because it represents “a significant change in operations,” or a
decision lying at “the very core of entrepreneurial control,” the decision will not fall
within the scope of the employer’s mandatory bargaining obligation.
Factors to be examined are the nature of the employer’s business before and after the action
taken, the extent of capital expenditures, the bases for the action, and, in general, the ability of
the union to engage in meaningful bargaining in view of the employer’s situation and
objectives. Ibid.
In that case, the respondent had completely phased out its shrimp processing operation
(one department out of five) at the facility in question, sold the department’s machines to
Fishking, and returned other machines to the lessor. The Board, in finding that this
constituted subcontracting rather than a partial closing, noted at the outset that:
Respondent did not engage in what can be objectively termed a major shift in the
direction of the Company. Both before and after the subcontract, Respondent engaged
in the business of providing prepared foodstuffs to its various stores. Indeed, it
appears that Respondent still supplies processed shrimp to its constituent restaurants.
The only difference is that the processing work is now performed by Fishking
employees pursuant to the subcontract rather than by Respondent’s employees.
Accordingly, the nature and direction of Respondent’s business was not substantially
altered by the subcontract.
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Id. at 1371 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). Secondly, the Board noted that when
the subcontracting arrangement became operative, the respondent was not required to engage
in any substantial capital restructuring or investment, that the plant area devoted to shrimp
processing remained part of the respondent’s facility, and that the respondent retained
substantial ownership of the equipment that had been used in shrimp processing. Ibid.
Accordingly, the Board concluded that the respondent’s decision to subcontract its
shrimp processing operation did not represent a substantial change in the nature or direction
of the respondent’s business and did not otherwise entail sufficient capital restructuring to
remove the decision from the scope of its mandatory bargaining obligation.
In O.G.S. Technologies, Inc., 356 NLRB 642, 645, (2011), the Board engaged in a
similar analysis in concluding that the respondent’s termination of a portion of it operation
constituted subcontracting that required bargaining over both the decision and its effects,
concluding:
In contrast to First National Maintenance, OGS made certain operational changes, but
they did not amount to a ‘partial closing’ or other ‘change in the scope and direction of
the enterprise,’ which remained devoted to the manufacture and sale of brass buttons
to the same range of customers. Before and after the decision to subcontract die
cutting, OGS produced and supplied brass buttons to customers. . . . The decision at
issue simply resulted in a marginal increase in the percentage of cutting work the
Respondent subcontracted and a modest change in the functions performed in-house,
but not the abandonment of a line of business or even the contraction of the existing
business.
See also Chemical Solvents, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 164, slip op. at 7 (2015) (outsourcing of
trucking operation at facility was appropriately classified as subcontracting, a mandatory
subject of bargaining).
The core question, then, is whether the nature and direction of Respondent’s business
was substantially altered by its contract with Alpla. If so, then the change in operation is
more appropriately treated as a partial closing that comes under First National, rather than as
a subcontract situation under Fibreboard. The Respondent argues (R. Br. 19–20) that it is no
longer a manufacturer but a reseller and that it has no control whatsoever over the Alpla
employees who now operate the machines. On the contrary, the General Counsel contends
(GC Br. at 18) that the Respondent’s basic operation continues unchanged, except for the fact
that Alpla is providing the labor, and that the Respondent remains in the business of
producing and supplying plastic bottles and containers that are sold to the same customers as
in the past.
The Respondent did not go out of business or even completely close its operation at
the facility. Thus, even today, some injection-mold products are transported from Alpla,
stored in the facility warehouse, and picked up there by customers. Prior to Mach 31,
bargaining unit employees moved product inside the facility, and some of this work continues
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today.
The Respondent is not totally divorced from the production process of injection-mold
products at Alpla. Thus, the Respondent still owns the injection-mold machinery and molds,
and provides Alpla with the raw material for those products. Alpla prepares and submits to
the Respondent quality control records and reports, and a reasonable number of samples from
each production run of products for quality purposes. The Respondent is given the right, upon
reasonable notice, to send one or more of its employees to observe and inspect the
manufacturing, warehousing and other facilities that Alpla uses to produce, package, store and
ship products, and Carvajal did this four times during the past year. The Respondent therefore
maintains some oversight authority over the manufacturing process and, consequently, Alpla
does not have unfettered sole control.
Moreover, the Respondent still sells injection-mold products (with the Respondent’s
name and logo) directly to customers that it supplied prior to the subcontracting. In sum, the
Respondent has not closed the injection-mold portion of its operation but rather transferred
the production to Alpla.
As far as the blow-mold side of the operation, no production has occurred at the
facility (other than during 2 weeks in 2015), but the Respondent does purchase some blow-
molded products from Alpla and resells them to customers that it had before March 31. One
of the five blow-mold machines has been sold; the other four are still maintained at the
facility and remain for sale. The Respondent continues to advertise itself as a supplier of both
injection-molded and blow-molded products. Finally, the Respondent engaged in no capital
restructuring.
Based on the totality of circumstances above, I conclude that despite changes in the
production situs and in the employer of the employees who produce the products, the nature
of the Respondent’s business, including many of its types of products and its customers,
remained substantially unchanged. Thus, the nature of the change in the operation was a
subcontracting situation, not a partial plant closure. Even if there was a partial closure (of the
blow-mold operation), bargaining unit employees worked interchangeably with blow-molded
and injection-molded products, and bifurcating the two operations in terms of the bargaining
obligation would be infeasible and unworkable.
The Respondent points out that its labor costs in 2014–2015 were a little over
$360,000, whereas its net losses were over $900,000, and argues that no amount of
concessions from the Union would have made any difference in the decision to contract with
Alpla. Carvajal testified to this effect. However, in Pertec Computer Corp., 284 NLRB 810,
810 at fn. 3 (1987), decision supplemented 298 NLRB 609 (1990), enfd. in relevant part sub
nom. Olivetti Office U.S.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 926 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S.
856 (1991), the Board discounted the bare assertion that bargaining over the decision to
relocate and subcontract unit work would be pointless because the union would never agree to
wage cuts substantial enough to make reversal of the decision economically sound:
Indeed, to conclude in advance of bargaining that no agreement is possible is the
antithesis of the Act’s objective of channeling differences, however profound, into a
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process that promises at least the hope of mutual agreement. See H. K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970). On the other hand, once bargaining to impasse has
occurred, the futility of continuing is clear. Also see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962).
See also Geiger Ready-Mix Co. of Kansas City, 315 NLRB 1021, 1032 (1994) (“[a]n
employer must offer something more than a self-serving assertion that there was nothing the
bargaining agent of its unionized employees could do to change its mind.”).
Nor has the Respondent shown that bargaining to impasse or agreement over the
decision would have jeopardized its business in any way. Pertec Computer Corp., above at
811; see also Olivetti Office U.S.A. v. NLRB, above at 186. In this regard, such negotiations
would not necessarily have threatened the Respondent’s confidentiality concerns during its
negotiations with Alpla. The Union presumably would have had the opportunity to provide
suggestions on ways to reduce the Respondent’s cost of conducting business at the facility
using unit employees, not to have been made privy to the details of proposed contractual
arrangements between the Respondent and Alpla. To assume that the Union would have
breached the Respondent’s confidentiality concerns is as unwarranted as assuming bargaining
over the decision would have been futile. See Pertec Computer, ibid. (disclosure of
information ordered where the respondent had not shown the union to be unreliable in
respecting confidentiality agreements); see also People Care, Inc., 299 NLRB 875, 875–876
(1990).
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent was obliged to engage in bargaining over
the decision to contract out unit work with Alpla and lay off unit employees.
Effects Bargaining
Even if the Respondent had not been obliged to bargain over the decision to
subcontract, it nonetheless remained obligated to bargain over the effects of the decision “in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.” First National, above, at 681–682; Miami
Rivet of Puerto Rico, 318 NLRB 769, 772 (1995). As the Board stated in Allison Corp., 330
NLRB 1363, 1365 fn. 14 (2000), “Effects bargaining can include such topics as layoffs,
severance pay, health insurance coverage and conversion rights, preferential hiring at other of
the employer’s operations, and reference letters for jobs with other employers.”
Effects bargaining must occur sufficiently before actual implementation of the
decision so that the union is not presented with a fait accompli. Komatsu America Corp., 342
NLRB 649, 649 (2004); Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 738 (2000). Relevant to this
determination is whether the union is afforded an opportunity to bargain at a time when it still
represents employees upon whom the company relies for services, thus allowing the union to
retain some measure of bargaining power. Komatsu America Corp., ibid; Metropolitan
Teletronics Corp., 279 NLRB 957, 959 (1986), enfd. mem. 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987).
The Respondent avers that it met its obligation to engage in effects bargaining (R. Br.
22–23). The General Counsel contends that the timing of the Respondent’s notification to the
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Union, as well as Carvajal’s misleading the Union about postlayoff labor needs, precluded
any meaningful effects bargaining (GC Br. 27–28). I agree with the General Counsel for the
following reasons.
The Respondent executed its contract with Alpla on February12 yet Carvajal
admittedly did not tell the Union of the plant closure until March 17, over a month later and
less than 2 weeks before the last working day of unit employees. Carvajal testified that it took
him about 2 weeks after February 12 to arrive at an exact closing date, but at the time he
signed the Alpla agreement, he certainly must already have contemplated a general time
frame for the closing. I would expect this of an experienced business person such as Carvajal.
Carvajal’s telling Rodriguez on March 9 that it was “urgent” that they meet failed to
amount to valid notice of the shutdown. In Penntech Papers, Inc., 706 F.2d 18, 27 (1st Cir.
1983), the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the respondents’ argument that the unions
were put on notice of a possible shutdown when a management representative made “an
oblique reference to a possible closure,” instead finding that “a vague remark cannot pass for
‘reasonable notice’ of a shutdown as mandated by the Act.” Carvajal’s remark was wholly
ambiguous and gave absolutely no hint of a shutdown.
Carvajal’s asserted reason for not disclosing the impending shutdown to Rodriguez on
March 9—confidentiality concerns—also fails as a valid defense. Indeed, in Williamette Tug
& Barge Co., 300 NLRB 282, 282–283 (1990) (footnotes omitted), the Board recognized an
employer’s need for confidentiality during negotiations to sell a business but concluded that
such a legitimate concern “does not obviate the employer’s duty to give pre-implementation
notice to the union to allow time for effects bargaining, provision for which may be
negotiated in the sales agreement.” The Board went on to hold that:
[B]arring particularly unusual or emergency circumstances, the union’s right to
discuss with the employer how the impact of the sale on the employees can be
ameliorated must be reckoned with . . . sufficiently before its actual implementation so
that the union is not confronted at the bargaining table with a sale that is a fait
accompli.
Id. at 283. See also Pertec Computer Corp., above; People Care, Inc., above.
In Williamette Tug, the Board stated that same-day notice is “clearly insufficient” but
did not determine “exactly how many days’ notice” would be adequate. Id. at 283; see also
Compact Video Services, Inc., 319 NLRB 131, 131 fn. 1 (1995) (the Board specifically
declined to pass on the judge’s conclusion that notice had to be given by the date on which the
sales contract was executed). See also Pertec Computer Corp., supra; People Care, Inc.,
supra. The Respondent has not contended any unusual or emergency circumstances.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent did not have good reason to wait until
March 17 to notify the Union of the plant closure and the layoff of unit employees, thereby
depriving the Union of more time to negotiate the effects thereof. The Union could have been
more assertive in negotiating, but I cannot say that the result would have been the same had
the Union been notified earlier and had more time to talk with employees, formulate
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proposals, and bargain over them with the Respondent.
On March 26, Rosario asked if the shutdown would be total or partial, to which
Carvajal replied that it was total, and even the official clerical employees were going to be let
go. However, it is undisputed that Carvajal had Laser employees perform unit work at the
facility the weeks ending April 9 and May 3, for a total of 347 hours. Some of them produced
both injection containers and mold bottles, and some of them loaded trailers. Merchandise
was also moved in the warehouse after March 31. Thus, contrary to what Carvajal
represented, unit work was in fact performed at the facility after all of the unit employees
were laid off.
The Respondent (R. Br. 23–24) contends that the Union waived its right to bargain
about the postclosing warehouse work related to moving merchandise produced prior to the
closing. Crediting Carvajal, the Union mentioned nothing about this during effects bargaining
even though, the Respondent argues, the Union had to know that there would be leftover
merchandise that would have to be moved and loaded into trailers.
Waiver of a right to bargain must be clear and unmistakable. Metropolitan Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983); Allison Corp., above at 1365 (“[I]t must be shown that
the matter claimed to have been waived was fully discussed by the parties and that the party
alleged to have waived its rights consciously yielded its interest in the matter.”). See also
Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808, 810 et seq. (2007). If the matter of the
above work was not even mentioned during effects bargaining, then ipso facto it could not
have been “fully discussed,” and the Union could not have “consciously yielded its interest.”
Accordingly, I conclude that there was no such waiver.
For the above reasons, I further conclude that the Respondent failed to meet its
obligation to bargain over the effects of the contracting out of unit work and layoff of unit
employees.
Nonunit Employees Performing Unit Work at the Facility after March 31
Assignment of work is a mandatory subject of bargaining. WCCO-TV, 362 NLRB No.
101, slip op. at 2 (2015); Regal Cinemas, Inc., 334 NLRB 304, 304 (2001), enfd. 317 F.3d
300 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (2003). Thus, an employer violates the Act by reassigning work
performed by bargaining unit employees to supervisors or other individuals outside the unit
without providing the collective-bargaining representative notice and an opportunity to
bargain. St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 NLRB 904, 904–906, 924 (2004), enfd. 420 F.3d
294 (3d Cir. 2005); Stevens International, Inc., 337 NLRB 143, 143 (2001); Regal Cinemas,
Inc., above. This obligation is not lessened because the transfer is motivated by economic
considerations. Talbert Mfg., Inc., 264 NLRB 1051, 1056 (1982).
Following the layoffs of all unit employees, the Respondent used employees of Laser
and former supervisor Mojica to move leftover product in the warehouse. Laser employees
performed production work at the facility during the weeks of April 9 and May 3. Carvajal
did not have the prerogative of deciding for the laid off employees that they would not want to
work a small number of hours, but should have given them the opportunity to make their own
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decisions. Currently, three Laser employees, including Mojica, at the facility handle
injection-mold products that are manufactured by Alpla for the Company and delivered for
pickup by small customers.
The Respondent does not dispute that all of the above work was performed by
bargaining-unit employees prior to March 31 and that the Union was never afforded advance
notice that any of it would be performed by nonbargaining-unit employees.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
transferring bargaining unit work to Laser employees and former supervisor Mojica without
providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By the following conduct, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Laid off all unit employees on March 31, 2015, without having
afforded the Union adequate notice and an opportunity to meaningfully bargain over the
decision to subcontract unit work and the effects of that decision.
(b) Thereafter transferred bargaining unit work at the facility to nonunit
employees without providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The General Counsel argues that the appropriate remedy would be an order directing
the Respondent to restore the status quo ante. I do not deem such remedy suitable here. As in
Bob’s Big Boy Family Restaurant, supra, where the Board declined to order such a remedy, it
is clear that the Respondent subcontracted its operation for nondiscriminatory economic and
related business reasons. The Respondent was in serious financial trouble prior to the March
31 layoffs, has a firmly-established contractual relationship with Alpla; has transferred the
entire production operation to Alpla, has gone to the expense of moving injection-mold
equipment to Alpla; and has already sold one of the blow-mold machines. This is not a case
where only one department or portion of a facility has been closed, or only some of the unit
employees have been laid off, in which event restoration would be relatively simple. In these
circumstances, I am “reluctant to compel Respondent to restore its previous operation and
modify its production one or more times depending upon the results of its bargaining with the
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Union.” Id. at 1372. In sum, ordering restoration of the status quo ante would place an
unreasonable hardship on the Respondent and possibly jeopardize its contract with Alpla,
potentially throwing its entire operation into chaos and resulting in great financial detriment to
the Company without any benefit to unit employees.22
The General Counsel contends, in the alternative, that I should order a Transmarine23
remedy, and I agree that “effectuation of the purposes and policies of the Act requires that the
discharged employees be ‘reimbursed for such losses until such times as the Respondent
remedies its violation[s] by doing what it should have done in the first place.’” Ibid, citing
Winn-Dixie Stores, 147 NLRB 788, 792 (1964).
Accordingly, I order the Respondent to bargain with the Union about the decision to
subcontract unit work to Alpla, and its effects. I further order the Respondent to pay
employees who were laid off on March 31 their normal wages when in the Respondent’s
employ from 5 days after the date of this decision until the occurrence of the earliest of the
following conditions: (1) the Respondent bargains to agreement with the Union about the
decision to subcontract unit work to Alpla, and the effects thereof; (2) the parties reach a bona
fide impasse in bargaining; (3) the Union fails to request bargaining within 5 days after the
receipt of this decision, or to commence negotiations within 5 days after receipt of the
Respondent’s notice of its desire to bargain with the Union; or (4) the Union subsequently
fails to bargain in good faith. In no event shall the sum paid to any of the employees exceed
the amount he or she would have earned as wages from the date the employee was laid off to
the time he or she secured equivalent employment elsewhere, or the date on which the
Respondent shall have offered to bargain in good faith, whichever occurs sooner. However,
in no event shall this sum be less than the employee would have earned for a 2-week period at
the rate of his or her normal wages when last in the Respondent’s employ. Backpay shall be
based on the earnings that the employees would normally have received during the applicable
period, less any interim net earnings, and shall be computed in accordance with F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
356 NLRB 6 (2010).
In addition, the Respondent shall compensate employees for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award and to file a report with the
Regional Director for Region 12, within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed,
either by agreement or Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar years. See Advoserv of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 143 (2016); Don Chavas,
LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10 (2014).
The General Counsel also seeks an order requiring the Respondent to reimburse the
laid off employees for search-for-work and work-related expenses that they have incurred
while searching for work regardless of whether they received interim earnings for a particular

22 I recognize that Carvajal has related business interests (i.e., Laser and possibly other companies ), but
the General Counsel has not alleged any alter ego relationships that might bear on this analysis and lead
to a contrary conclusion, and I will not engage in speculation over Carvajal’s overall financial situation.
23 Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).
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quarter. Those employees are entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in their search
for interim employment, but at present the Board treats such expenses as an offset to an
employee’s interim earnings rather than calculating them separately. West Texas Utilities Co.,
109 NLRB 936, 939 fn. 3 (1954). I am obliged to follow existing Board precendent. See
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378, 378 fn. 1 (2004); Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 fn.
14 (1984). Therefore, I must deny the General Counsel’s request for this additional remedy.
The General Counsel has also requested that, along with a Transmarine remedy, I
order that unit employees be made whole for later unit work performed by nonunit employees.
However, but for the Respondent’s agreement with Alpla and the elimination of all
production at the facility, this would not have occurred. As such, the violation appears to be
subsumed within the violation of failing to bargain over the decision to subcontract to Alpla,
and the effects thereof.
I order that the appropriate notice be posted in Spanish and English.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended24
ORDER
The Respondent, Rigid Pak Corp., Juncos, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Laying off unit employees and subcontracting their work without first
affording the Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (the Union) adequate notice and an opportunity to bargain over the decision to
subcontract the work, and its effects.
(b) Transferring bargaining unit work at the facility to nonunit employees
without first affording the Union adequate notice and an opportunity to bargain.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
(a) Bargain, on request, with the Union about the decision to subcontract
unit work to Alpla, and its effects.

24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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(b) Bargain, on request, with the Union about using nonunit employees to
perform bargaining unit work at the facility.
(c) Pay employees who were laid off on March 31 in the manner set forth
in the remedy section of this decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated
by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such
records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Juncos,
Puerto Rico, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix,”25 in Spanish and English.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 12, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since March 31, 2015.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 8, 2016

25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
An employer subject to the National Labor Relations Act must collectively bargain with the
labor organization that represents its employees concerning wages, hours, and working
conditions.
The Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(the Union) represents a unit of our production and maintenance employees.
WE WILL NOT subcontract unit work and lay you off without first affording the Union
adequate notice and an opportunity to bargain over the decision to subcontract the work, and
its effects on you.
WE WILL NOT transfer unit work at our facility to nonunit employees without first affording
the Union adequate notice and an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of your rights under Section 7 of the Act, as set forth at the top of this notice.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the Union about our decision to subcontract
unit work to Alpla Caribe, Inc., and its effects on you.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the Union about our using nonunit
employees to perform unit work at our facility.
WE WILL pay you in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
RIGID PAK CORP.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how
to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov.
201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 530, Tampa, FL 33602-5824
(813) 228-2641; Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/12-CA-152811 or by using
the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary,
National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202)
273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (813) 228-2455.