David E. Boswell, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 6, 2010
0120091674 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 6, 2010)

0120091674

07-06-2010

David E. Boswell, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.


David E. Boswell,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Great Lakes Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091674

Agency No. 1J-461-0030-08

DECISION

On March 7, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's February

9, 2009 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

MODIFIES the Agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether Complainant established that he was subjected to retaliatory

terms and conditions of employment, including being subjected to

retaliatory comments, and by being required to submit his Pay For

Performance-(PFP)-core-requirements to his Manager instead of to the

Postmaster.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as

a Manager, Maintenance at the Bloomington, Indiana Mail Processing Annex.

On March 29, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he

was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity [under Title VII], when, on January 11, 2008, he was subjected to

retaliatory terms and conditions of employment, including being prevented

from submitting his PFP-core-requirements.1

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

Complainant's request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

Final Agency Decision (FAD)

The FAD found that Complainant testified that he had initially tried

to submit his PFP core requirements to the Postmaster (PM) via the

Performance Evaluation System [PES]. Complainant averred that he was

prevented from submitting his PFP core requirements to the PM and was told

to submit it to A-1, his Manager, instead. Complainant objected because

the Great Lakes Area had determined that his facility was not a plant and

that all managers should report to the Postmaster. The Agency's position

was that only A-1, the Manager, Mail Processing, was to report to the PM.

The FAD also noted that Complainant maintained that management's actions

included increased surveillance, excessive supervision, and greater

demands placed upon him, however, he provided no specific information.

Complainant did, however, specify an incident whereby A-1 allegedly

belittled him by telling a supervisor that he was going to take away

Complainant's Blackberry because Complainant did not deserve it.

The FAD then found that assuming an adverse action occurred, there

was no proof that Agency officials took the actions at issue because of

Complainant's prior protected EEO activity or sought to deter Complainant

or others from engaging in such activity. Although A-1 admitted making

comments about Complainant's prior EEO activity in casual conversation,

the FAD found that there was no evidence in the record that management

had instructed Complainant to submit his PFP core requirements to A-1

because of his prior EEO activity or to deter Complainant or others from

exercising their rights.

The FAD additionally noted that Complainant had submitted his PFP to

A-1 in previous years as well and that management's instructions merely

reflected the status quo. Accordingly, the FAD found that Complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation discrimination.

Finally, the FAD found that the Agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, A-1 that he had

handled Complainant's PFP evaluations for the past 3-4 years and that

"out of the blue", Complainant had submitted his PFP core requirements to

the PM. A-1 indicated that the PM returned Complainant's PFP submission

because he was not Complainant's direct supervisor. The PM and A-1

stated that they met with Complainant and Complainant indicated to them

that he did not think he should have to report to A-1. The PM further

explained that when he found out a few months later that Complainant had

still not submitted his PFP core requirements, he met with Complainant

and agreed to let him submit the PFP core requirements to him, but that

A-1 would review them. The FAD concluded that there was no evidence

of pretext, noting in part, that the Blackberry was never taken away

from Complainant.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant maintains that management subjected him to a series

of retaliatory adverse employment actions such as unfavorable changes in

working conditions, unjustified negative evaluations, unjustified negative

references and increased surveillance. He also states that management's

actions of not permitting him to attend important job related meetings,

a party to award a good performance year, a diminution in his job

responsibilities, and a low performance rating, are retaliatory actions

as they "in a whole are not-so-subtle ways of sending me a message that

discourages protected EEO participation." The Agency asks the Commission

to affirm the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

The statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that

is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter

the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.

Petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, as they are

not likely to deter protected activity. More significant retaliatory

treatment, however, can be challenged regardless of the level of harm.

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, the degree of harm suffered by the

individual "goes to the issue of damages, not liability." Hashimoto

v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997). Smith v. Secretary of

Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("the questions of statutory

violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct.

An illegal act of discrimination-whether based on race or some other

factor such as a motive of retaliation - is a wrong in itself under

Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong would warrant an award of

[damages]''). The retaliation provisions set no qualifiers on the term

"to discriminate," and therefore prohibit any discrimination that is

reasonably likely to deter protected activity. A violation will be found

if an employer retaliates against a worker for engaging in protected

activity through threats, harassment in or out of the workplace, or any

other adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter protected

activity by that individual or other employees. EEOC Compliance Manual

on Retaliation, No. 915.003, at 8-14 through 8-16 (May 20, 1998)

Initially, we note that Complainant has alleged that he is the victim

of reprisal for his prior EEO activity. He has listed in his complaint

a series of incidents that affected the terms and conditions of his

employment, not only the incident concerning the PFP. Further, we find,

contrary to what the Agency has found, that Complainant described several

other incidents of alleged retaliation with specificity. For instance,

he stated all of the following in his formal complaint: he was not

invited to the holiday party in December 2007; he did not receive an

award that other supervisors, managers and Postmaster received last year;

he was not permitted to interview or participate in the selection of

candidates for the Supervisor, Maintenance Operations position; and he

was not permitted to participate in the Local Memorandum of Understanding

even though there were some issues involving maintenance.

The Agency, however, focused almost entirely on the issue concerning the

submission of the PFP core requirements. The Agency provided little to

no response concerning some of Complainant's claims, i.e., he was given

unjustified negative evaluations and references. While the Agency's

burden of production is not onerous, it must nevertheless provide a

specific, clear, and individualized explanation for a challenged action

so that Complainant is provided with an opportunity to prove that the

Agency's explanation was a pretext for discriminatory animus. See Boston

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120042074 (May 26,

2004) (Commission held that the Agency failed to meet its burden of

production by merely stating in two short affidavits that the selectee

was "not the best qualified for the position").

The Agency did address the issue concerning Complainant's Blackberry.

As to the alleged comment about the Blackberry, A-1 responded as

follows:

Complainant's SMO... was a newly appointed member of the Emergency

Management Team. I mentioned that he would probably make better use

of the Blackberry than Complainant does. There have been occasions

where attempts to reach [Complainant] via Blackberry after hours have

been fruitless. [Complainant] is marginally involved in the day to day

operations of the maintenance and mail processing operation at times. [The

SMO] was very involved.

ROI, Affidavit B, at 4. We are not persuaded that this particular

statement was retaliatory in nature. In addition, the Commission

cannot conclude, based on this record, that the PM's requirement that

Complainant submit his PFP-core-requirements to A-1, as opposed to

the PM, was motivated by retaliatory animus. The Agency provided a

legitimate explanation for this action, and Complainant did not provide

persuasive evidence of pretext. There is simply no basis for concluding

that the PM required Complainant to submit the PFP core requirements to

A-1 in order to retaliate against him because of his prior EEO activity.

We note in this regard that there is no evidence that Complainant was

treated any differently than similarly situated employees who had not

engaged in prior EEO related activity. In so finding, we note that

we do not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge's findings after

a hearing, and therefore, we can only evaluate the facts based on the

weight of the evidence presented to us.

Notwithstanding the above, however, we note that A-1 was asked the

question whether he told Complainant "I know you filed an EEO. You better

be careful what you wish for. You don't always get what you want."

A-1 responded that, "In early January 2008, I may have said something

to that effect, but I don't recall the exact words. I was referring to

his previous EEO case involving him not being able to get a supervisor

quickly enough." ROI, Affidavit B, at 2.

In addition, Complainant alleged that on March 17, 2008, A-1 came to

his office and angrily said in a loud and intimidating voice, "Boy, how

many EEOs do you have going? Do you know?" A-1 responded to this claim

by stating "I think I may have said something like that in a casual

conversation. It certainly had no bearing on any of [Complainant's]

EEO activities per se." ROI, Affidavit B, at 2. We find that there

is no doubt that a supervisor twice making such comments to an employee

would be "chilling", in that they would be reasonably likely to deter the

employee or others from engaging in protected activity. The Commission

therefore, concludes that Complainant was subjected to retaliatory terms

and conditions of employment.

We are also persuaded, based on the Agency's virtual silence regarding

these claims and A-1's comments, that Complainant was subjected to

increased surveillance, excessive supervision, and greater demands because

of his EEO activity between January 2008 and March 2008. He also contends

in his formal complaint that he was not invited to the holiday party in

December 2007. The Agency also did not provide a response to this claim.

Thus, we find that Complainant was subjected to retaliatory terms and

conditions of employment during the period of time beginning with the

December 2007 holiday party through the end of March 2008.2

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the FAD.

ORDER

The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions.3

(1) The issue of compensatory damages is REMANDED to the Agency. On

remand, the Agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation on

compensatory damages, including providing the Complainant an opportunity

to submit evidence of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. For guidance on

what evidence is necessary to prove pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages,

the parties are directed to EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and

Punitive Damages Available Under � 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

(July 14, 1992) (available at eeoc.gov.) The Agency shall complete

the investigation and issue a final decision appealable to the EEOC

determining the appropriate amount of damages within 150 calendar days

after this decision becomes final.

(2) Within sixty (60) days from the date this decision becomes final,

the Agency is ordered to provide at least eight (8) hours of training to

the responsible management officials on the laws prohibiting employment

discrimination, paying particular attention to the topic of retaliation.

(3) The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against A-1.

The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action.

The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the

Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action

taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set

forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of

the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the

Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure including dates.

(4) The Agency shall post a notice in accordance with the paragraph

below.

The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0610)

The United States Postal Service is ordered to post at its Bloomington,

Indiana Mail Processing Annex copies of the attached notice. Copies

of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized

representative, shall be posted by the Agency within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted

for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all

places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency

shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice

is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in

the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision,"

within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)

If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency.

The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency --

not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal

Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming

final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___7/6/10_______________

Date

1 The Agency initially dismissed the complaint, and Complainant appealed

the dismissal to the Commission. In Boswell v. United States Postal

Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120082611 (August 14, 2008), the Commission

reversed the dismissal on the grounds that Complainant had stated a claim.

The decision noted that Complainant claimed that the Agency retaliated

against him by placing him in unfavorable working conditions, by giving

him unjustified negative evaluations and references, by not permitting

him to attend important job-related meetings, and by giving him less

than expected or deserved performance ratings.

2 We find that the Agency's failure to articulate a specific, clear,

and individualized explanation for its actions, denied Complainant a

fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. See Young v. Department of the

Treasury, EEOC Request 05940517 (October 13, 1995).

3 In his formal complaint, Complainant asked for "the most complete relief

possible to eliminate the effects of discrimination." He has therefore,

essentially, asked for compensatory damages.

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0120091674

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120091674