Clarke Manufacturing, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 10, 2007

30-CA-017472 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 10, 2007)

JD–23–07
Milwaukee, WI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CLARKE MANUFACTURING, INC.
And Case 30–CA–17472
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 2-200
Andrew S. Gollin, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Russ R. Mueller, Esq.,
of Glendale, WI,
for the Respondent.
Ernest L. Dex, Sub-District Director,
of West Allis, WI,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Karl H. Buschmann, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, on October 25, 2006. The charge was filed April 28, 2006, as amended on June 22,
2006, and the complaint was issued on July 28, 2006. The complaint alleges that the
Respondent, Clarke Manufacturing, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) by prematurely declaring an impasse in bargaining, by unilaterally
replacing the United Healthcare plan for its employees with a plan referred to as the Federated
plan #5677, and by presenting a “post-final offer” proposing the elimination of the union security
provision and the elimination of the employees’ pension plan, i.e., submitting regressive
bargaining proposals. The Respondent filed a timely answer admitting the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint, as well as some of the factual aspects of the complaint, but denying
the commission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Clarke Manufacturing, Inc. is a Wisconsin corporation, engaged in the operation of a
machine shop at its facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it annually sold and shipped goods
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and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of
Wisconsin. The Company admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Union, United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union, Local 2-200, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
For more than 20 years, the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of
the following unit of the Respondent’s employees:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding office
clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and supervisors.
The most recent of a series of collective-bargaining agreements was effective March 1, 2003 to
February 28, 2006 (Jt. Exh. 1). In a telephone conversation in early January, Ernest Dex, union
staff representative, requested Thomas Nelson, Respondent’s president, to set dates for
negotiations. By letter of December 15, 2005, the union representative demanded certain
information from the Company and suggested several days in February for contract negotiation
meetings (GC Exh. 2). Thereafter, the parties held eight negotiation sessions. The substance
of the discussions during these meetings is contained in the notes taken by Dex, as supported
by his testimony (GC Exh. 3). The testimony of Thomas Nelson about the same negotiations
was brief and differed in only minor respects.
Attending the first meeting on February 21, 2006, as well as most subsequent meetings,
were Thomas Nelson, president, and Russ R. Mueller, attorney, for the Company, Ernest Dex,
union staff representative, Maria Favell, chief steward, and Ray Gnadt, an employee, for the
Union. The parties discussed various issues, including the high cost of health insurance
currently in force, the Company’s arrears in the employees’ 401(k) plan and a date for the next
meeting (GC Exh. 3). The Respondent submitted a contract proposal in the form of a 2-page
document which incorporated by reference certain articles of the expired contract (Jt. Exh. 6).
At some point, the Respondent stated that it was unable to meet for the next scheduled
meetings during that week, because it needed to go over health insurance information (Jt. Exh.
6). The Union immediately accused the Respondent of committing an unfair labor practice. The
Union presented a comprehensive contract proposal which dealt with most terms and conditions
of employment. Of importance was its proposal to eliminate the “right to change” provision in
article IV, section 6, under the heading “Medical-Hospital-Physician” of the expired contract (Jt.
Exh. 1). Ernest Dex, staff representative of the Union, testified that the change was necessary,
because the Union believed that all changes needed to be negotiated. The Union’s position on
that issue never changed during the subsequent negotiations.
The next meeting on February 24, 2006, dealt mainly with health care issues. The
Respondent disclosed to the Union the costs incurred by the Company for the employee’s
benefits, including health insurance, pensions, 401(k), and wages (Jt. Exh. 9). The Respondent
furnished the Union with the health care cost chart of the United Healthcare Plan and brought
two representatives from a new insurance carrier, Federated Insurance Company, to present
their plans (Jt. Exh. 10, GC Exh. 3). The Respondent’s position was clear, that current health
care costs were excessive and that the negotiations depended on an acceptable insurance
policy.
The parties met for their third meeting on February 27, 2006, for an extended session
lasting into the afternoon, where the Respondent presented additional and detailed information
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on the Federated Insurance Plan. The Respondent also offered a contract proposal for the
renewal of the current agreement (Jt. Exh. 12). Attached to the proposal was a comprehensive
medical plan known as Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677 offered by Federated Insurance.
That plan differed from the existing health insurance plan, the United Healthcare Plan.
According to the Union, the new plan was less advantageous for the employees and offered
fewer benefits than the existing one. “There were higher deductibles, higher out of pocket
expenses, “as recalled by Union Representative Dex. The meeting ended with an agreement to
extend the current agreement until March 20, 2006 (Jt. Exh. 14).
On March 20, 2006, the parties met for their fourth session. The parties continued to
discuss the alternatives to the employees’ medical insurance. The Union adhered to its position
that the United Healthcare Plan be retained. The Respondent submitted more information to
the Union about the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan # 5677. In the meantime, the
Respondent had presented the Union in advance of the session with detailed information about
the two health insurance plans, sending comparative charts showing monthly costs under the
UHC plan and the proposed Federated plan (Jt. Exhs. 18–24). Also sent to the Union were
detailed charts showing covered services, including deductible expenses and options, as well as
prescription drugs. The Union indicated that the benefits offered by the Federated Plan #5671
were similar to those under the existing UHC plan, except that the “deductibles were somewhat
higher than United Health and the out of pocket was somewhat higher,” but the union
representatives informed the Company that its proposal was not acceptable (Tr. 56). The Union
proposed again that the “right to change” language be taken out of the contract. The Union
requested a further extension of the existing contract. The Respondent refused to agree to
another extension, and the Union stated that it would seek authorization to strike.
The parties met again on April 3, 2006, and resumed negotiations, even though the
Union informed the Respondent that the employees had authorized a strike. According to Union
Representative Dex, the Union had hopes to reach an agreement. Again, the main topic was
health insurance. The Respondent presented the Union with a second complete proposal for
renewal labor agreement (Jt. Exh. 27). Attached to the proposal was the Federated Insurance
Plan # 5677. The Respondent agreed not to make substantial changes in the level of health
benefits and to discuss any changes with the Union before any changes, provided the Company
had the right to change insurance carriers. The Company’s proposal also reflected
improvements on other terms, such as wages and grievance procedures. The Union responded
orally with counteroffers on several issues. It insisted again on eliminating the “right to change”
provision in the management rights clause contained in article IV, section 6.
The sixth meeting was held on April 6, 2006. Initially, the parties discussed the
grievance procedure. The Respondent also indicated that it needed a loan to cover the
Company’s obligation under the health insurance plan for the employees’ $2000 deductible
amounts. The Union expressed acceptance of the new insurance plan, provided that the 77 to
23 percent ratio in premiums in favor of the employees and the current benefits would be
retained. The Union emphasized again the importance of eliminating the “right to change”
language of the old contract to ensure that the Company would not change any benefits. The
Respondent presented its final offer for renewal of labor agreement, which contained better and
enhanced terms, especially an increase in wages and an improved split on health care. The
Respondent expressed hope that the Union would submit the package to its membership for
approval (Jt. Exh. 31). Instead the Union requested additional information about the effects of
the overtime proposal on the employees and the Company’s cost of the final proposal, and
promised to examine the Company’s final offer and submit a counteroffer. The Respondent
showed the Union a monthly cost comparison for each employee under the two health
insurance plans (Jt. Exh. 30).
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The Union failed to receive the Respondent’s letter of April 11, 2006, containing the cost
calculation for the first year of the Company’s final offer, the information requested by the Union
(Jt. Exh. 33). The Respondent sent the letter again on April 20, 2006. It not only provided the
information, but also stated that any counterproposal by the Union greater than the
Respondent’s final offer would underscore the current impasse in the negotiations. It advised
the Union that Federated had offered a reduction in rates, effective May 1, 2006, which would
not be extended to June 2006 (Jt. Exh. 36).
By letter, dated April 17, 2006, the Respondent explained its reasons for asking the
Union’s acceptance of the offer, stating as follows (Jt. Exh. 34):
This is to request the Union’s approval of the Implementation of the Federated
Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677, effective on May 1, 2006, as a substitute
for the UHC Plan.
In response, the Union informed the Respondent by letter of April 21, 2006, that “the Union is
not interested in agreeing to implement the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan #5677
effective May 1, 2006,” that the Union needed additional information for further negotiations,
including insurance, and that the Company’s position to retain “the right to change” insurance
benefits during the life of the contract amounted to “an unfair labor practice and a violation of the
National Labor Relations Act” (Jt. Exh. 38).
The Respondent provided the Union with additional information and informed the Union
by letter of April 21, 2006, that it would implement the Federated Defined Reimbursement Plan
#5677, effective May 1, 2006, in lieu of the insurance plan by United Health Care (Jt. Exh. 37).
The letter stated:
This implementation is made pursuant to the existing impasse in the negotiations for
terms of a renewal labor Agreement and as a result of the Union’s refusal to approve the
same, which refusal was communicated in yesterday’s telephone conversation.
The letter stated five reasons for the “impasse in the negotiations,” among them the Union’s
insistence to delete “the right to change language,” and to condition its acceptance of the health
plan on that proposal, the Union’s position to increase costs in areas other than wages and the
Union’s proposal to require information to be submitted to the International Union.
A comparison between the two insurance plans shows that the benefits offered to the
employees were substantially similar. In any case, the Respondent implemented the Federated
plan on May 1, 2006, based on the impasse in the negotiations.
The Company also sent a letter, dated April 24, 2006, to the Union in response to the
Union’s April 21 letter, in which the Union accused the Respondent of violating the Act. The
Respondent stated that its rejection of the Union’s proposal to eliminate the “right to change
“provision in Article IV, Section 6 of the prior agreement did not amount to an unfair labor
practice, but that the Union’s insistence to reverse its prior waiver on the subject contributed to
the existing impasse in the negotiations (Jt. Exh. 39).
The parties did not meet for several weeks. But in a letter, dated May 22, 2006, to the
Respondent, the Union requested dates in order to resume contract negotiations, suggesting
June 7 or 8, 2006 (GC Exh. 4). The parties met on June 8, 2006. The Union presented a
counterproposal to the Respondent’s final offer. The Respondent also made a proposal,
entitled statement of position in which the Company explained why the pension fund was a bad
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investment which should be terminated and why the union security provision, requiring union
membership, should be cancelled (Jt. Exh. 40). The Respondent also presented a “Post-Final
Offer Negotiation Proposal,” dealing with leave of absence, check-off, a 401(k) plan, and a
union pension fund, known as the PIUMPF plan (Jt Exhs. 41–44). The Union considered the
proposal as regressive, accused the Company of bargaining in bad faith, and asked whether it
was looking for a strike. The Respondent promised that it would respond to the Union’s
counterproposal and agreed to meet again on June 19, 2006.
The next and final meeting was held on June 19, 2006. The Respondent provided the
Union with a post-final offer, containing 14 specific provisions dealing with pay, hours of work,
401(k) plan, vacations, leave of absence, pension fund, and other terms of employment (Jt. Exh.
45). For example, the Respondent increased the first year’s wages. Except for the specific
provisions enumerated in the post–final offer, the proposal stipulated that the terms of the
expired contract would remain the same. The Respondent asked for the Union’s reaction. But
the Union again requested more information in order to make an informed response. The
Company indicated that it was not interested in a counterproposal, because it needed to get on
with its other business, including getting sales and production.
In sum, the parties held eight meetings from February 21, to June 19, 2006, in order to
negotiate a contract. Each side made concessions on terms and conditions of employment.
From the outset, the Respondent provided extensive and exhaustive information to the Union on
what the Company considered the most important issue, namely medical insurance for the
employees. Only after the Union had repeatedly rejected the Company’s proposal to change
insurance plans from United Health Care to the Federated Plan #5677, did the Company
implement the plan based on the assumption that the negotiations had reached an impasse.
Another point of contention beginning with the first meeting on February 21, 2006, was the
Union’s insistence that the “right to change” language which had been in all prior contracts
between the parties be deleted. This proviso had been part of article IV, section 6, entitled
“Medical-Hospital-Physician,” and provided in substance that the Company had the right to
change insurance carriers and the means of providing benefits, including the level of benefits,
without causing a substantial lowering of benefits and with prior notice to the Union (Jt. Exh. 48).
ANALYSIS
The complaint alleges that the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by proposing to replace the United Healthcare Plan
with the Federated Plan #5677, declaring an impasse in bargaining for a successor agreement,
by implementing the Federated Plan, and by proposing in its “post-final offer” the elimination of
the union security provision and the employees’ pension benefit plan. The General Counsel
argues that the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith by (1) prematurely
declaring an impasse in the negotiations, (2) unilaterally changing health insurance plans and
implementing its Federated Plan #5677, and (3) by submitting regressive proposals. The
Respondent counters and refers to a deadlock generated by the Union’s inflexible and
uncompromising positions, especially the demand to eliminate the “right to change” language,
and the refusals to approve the change in insurance plans, all of which made a continuation of
any further discussions hopeless.
The record, as summarized above, is not in dispute. Two factors changed the dynamics
of the parties’ longstanding bargaining relationship, first, the health insurance issue, and
second, the change in management involving Tom Nelson as the new president. As to the
former, the record shows that the Company struggled with the health insurance plans, and
made it clear from the inception of the negotiations that medical insurance would be a deciding
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factor. It invited the Union at the outset to participate and to get involved, providing the Union
with all relevant information, such as cost comparisons and charts showing the insurance
coverage for each employee and more. The Company invited representatives from a new
insurance carrier under consideration to explain the benefits. Indeed, the Respondent had
included the Union from the outset in its selection process of other insurance companies to
provide the employees with adequate, but lower cost health benefits. The Union was not
impressed, although receptive at one point during the fifth meeting, it subsequently rejected the
Company’ s offer to accept the new plan, even though the benefits were substantially the same
under either plan.
The other concern which affected the negotiations was the Union’s distrust of Tom
Nelson, the new president. In his brief, the General Counsel frankly stated that the Union was
so concerned about the new president that it decided “to propose more explicit, limiting
language for the new contract” by insisting to eliminate the “right to change” language from the
agreement which would have authorized the Respondent to change insurance carriers so long
as the benefits remained substantially the same. The General Counsel conceded that the
Union wanted that proposal, and that it was important to the Union. Clearly, the Union never
conceded its position on that issue.
In all other respects, the Respondent did not appear to be evasive, dishonest or
uncooperative. It gave no indication to the Union that it was not interested in reaching an
agreement. To the contrary, the Union unjustly accused the Company repeatedly with engaging
in unfair labor practices, and threatened to strike at a time when such a threat was unjustified.
In spite of a confrontational demeanor by the Union, the Respondent agreed to meet at
reasonable times and for reasonable durations to negotiate. It made significant concessions in
its proposals on economic issues to meet the Union’s demands. I cannot find fault with the
Respondent’s manner of bargaining, with one important caveat, the regressive proposals at the
June 8, 2006 meeting.
It is well settled that an employer’s unilateral changes during the course of a collective-
bargaining relationship concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining is unlawful. Health
insurance is a recognized subject of bargaining. Recognized exceptions to an employer’s
unilateral action are those instances where an impasse is reached or where a waiver can be
established. Here, under the terms of the expired contract, namely the “right to change”
language, the Union had waived its right to bargain over the employer’s right to change
insurance plans. However, the Board has held that such a waiver does not survive the expired
contract. And the record does not show whether the Respondent relied on that waiver of the
expired contract. The issue is whether the parties have reached a lawful impasse.
Paperworkers v. NLRB, 981 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1992). In other words, a party which prematurely
declares an impasse and makes unilateral changes in health care coverage violates the Act.
Torrington Extend-A-Care Employee Assn. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580 (2nd Cir. 1994); CBC
Industries, 311 NLRB 123 (1993). Whether or not an impasse is reached is a question of
various factors. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475 (1967). In NLRB v. Triple A Fire
Protection, Inc., 136 F.3d 727, 738 (11th Cir. 1998), the Court stated as follows:
The determination of impasse involves an inquiry into “a myriad of circumstances,”
including (1) the background and relationship of the parties, (2) their willingness to
negotiate, (3) the extent and frequency of bargaining, (4) the integrity of the bargaining,
and (5) the good or bad faith of the parties.
Applying that test to the instant situation, I find that the declaration of the impasse was not
unlawful. Here, the parties had a well established and successful bargaining relationship, as
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exemplified by a series of collective-bargaining agreements. Dex testified that Robert Nelson,
the Company’s past president, was tough but fair, and that he had a cordial relationship with
him. As already observed, the Union was not convinced that his son, Thomas, was of equal
caliber. Nevertheless, the course of the negotiations do not justify the Union’s changed attitude
vis-à-vis this Employer.
The second element, the parties’ willingness to negotiate, is shown by the Respondent’s
cooperation in agreeing to set dates and in attending meetings. Both parties presented
proposals based on the expired contract and made concessions. The Respondent furnished
detailed information, especially on the health insurance plan, and gave serious consideration to
the Union’s proposals.
Unlike the circumstances in Triple A Fire Protection, Inc., supra, where the respondent
attended only one negotiation session, here the Company attended a total of eight meetings,
and declared the impasse after the sixth meeting. The record does not show that the
Respondent rejected the Union’s invitation to meet even after May 1, 2006, when the
Respondent had implemented the new insurance plan.
The fourth criterion, the integrity of the bargaining, was shown by the sincerity of the
parties in attempting to arrive at an agreeable solution to the problems. There is no dispute that
the Respondent was faced with increasing cost of the existing health plan, and tried to involve
the Union from the outset in the negotiations, by supplying financial information, by presenting
insurance representatives, and by making significant concessions. Significantly, the
Respondent acted honestly and kept the Union informed at all stages, even though the Union
accused the Company of bad faith and threatened a strike.
Finally, as to the good faith of the parties, the General Counsel faults the Company for
overemphasizing the insurance issue at the expense of other outstanding issues. To be sure,
the parties could have come to an agreement on a few other outstanding issues, such as life
and sickness insurance, the pension plan, the elimination of the management right clause, and
other, more minor matters. But it is also clear that the parties were deadlocked on two issues
and unable to overcome their differences. At one point the Union had indicated its acceptance
of the new Federated Health Plan after the Company had agreed to substantially identical
benefits of the existing UHC plan. But the Union changed its position and rejected the
Company’s request to accept the proposal. The record suggests that the Union conditioned its
acceptance on the elimination of “the right to change” language. That issue was never
resolved, although the parties had come close to an agreement at one point on the health plan.
The parties resumed negotiations with revised proposals on two occasions, but were unable to
overcome their fundamental differences and remained deadlocked. Bottom Line Enterprises,
302 NLRB 373 (1991), enfd. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).
Mindful that parties deadlocked on certain issues are not free to implement, unless an
overall impasse is reached, I am convinced that further meetings would not have been
productive. Here, any further negotiations were futile, because the parties were simply unable
to resolve the fundamental issues and any agreements on other issues would not, in my
opinion, have resolved the impasse.
I accordingly find that the evidence does not indicate that the Respondent declared the
impasse prematurely and I find that the unilateral implementation of the Federated Plan did not
violate the Act. I would therefore dismiss those allegations in the complaint.
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However, I agree with the General Counsel that the Respondent violated the Act after
the parties had resumed negotiations at the behest of the Union. By submitting regressive
proposals, the Respondent did not bargain in good faith. The Respondent admits that it
presented four proposals at the last negotiation session on June 8, 2006, among them the
proposal to terminate the pension plan, and the union security provision. In its post-final offer,
dated June 8, 2006, the Respondent proposed that upon ratification by the employees of the
renewal labor agreement, “the Company’s participation in Pension Fund will be terminated” (Jt.
Exh. 42). And the other proposal states that employees do not have to be a member of the
Union. Clearly, those provisions would have changed two important and longstanding terms of
employment.
The Company’s explanation that it considered to make the pension fund issue as an
initial proposal, because it is in financial trouble seems like an afterthought and clearly designed
to undermine the bargaining relationship. The Respondent’s demeanor was also inconsistent
with its earlier dealings involving the health plan, where the Company gave advanced notice
and kept the Union fully informed. With regard to the union security issue, the Company
referred to certain antiunion sentiment expressed by employees earlier in the year to a
supervisor. Again, the Respondent’s explanation seems contrived and farfetched. Even if true,
it was out of place at that juncture to present an issue designed to undermine the Union’s
position. The Respondent offered no evidence to support its explanations. The law is clear:
“Where the proponent of a regressive proposal fails to provide an explanation for it, or the
reasons appears dubious, the Board may weigh that factor in determining whether there has
been bad-faith bargaining.” Mid-Continent Concrete, 336 NLRB 258, 260 (2001). On that basis
I find that the Respondent failed to bargain in good faith.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of the Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the
purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
Production and Maintenance employees of the Company, excluding office
clerical, management, and professional employees, and guards and supervisors.
4. By submitting regressive proposals during the negotiations without sufficient
explanations, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices found above affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent failed to bargain in good
faith with the Union by making regressive proposals during the negotiations, the Respondent
must be ordered to cease and desist and be ordered to bargain in good faith with the Union as
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the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees. On these findings of fact and
conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended1
ORDER
The Respondent, Clarke Manufacturing, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Making regressive proposals in terms and conditions of employment during the
negotiations without sufficient explanations.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment
and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding office
clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and supervisors.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since June 8, 2006.

1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
(d) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., April 10, 2007.
____________________
Karl H. Buschmann
Administrative Law Judge
JD–23–07
Milwaukee, WI
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT make regressive proposals in terms and conditions of employment during the
negotiations without sufficient explanations.
WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement:
Production and maintenance employees of the Company, excluding office
clerical, management and professional employees, and guards and supervisors.
CLARKE MANUFACTURING, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations
Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a
charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may
also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Federal Plaza, Suite 700
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203-2211
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414-297-3861.
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