Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 19, 1972

199 N.L.R.B. 120 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc. and International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge
No. 63, AFL-CIO. Case 6-CA-5441
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
September 19, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS , AND PENELLO
On April 19, 1972, Trial Examiner Fannie M.
Boyls issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions
and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial
Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to
adopt her recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., its officers , agents, successors,
and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner 's recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FANNIE M. BOYLS, Trial Examiner: This case, initiated
by a charge filed on March 29 and a complaint issued on
October 29, 1971, was tried before me at Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, on January 11, 12, and 13, 1972. The complaint,
as amended at the hearing, alleges that Respondent, Beyerl
Chevrolet, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act by engaging in numerous acts of
interference with and restraint and coercion of its employ-
ees in their organizational rights and by refusing to bargain
with the Charging Party, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 63,
AFL-CIO. Respondent filed an answer in which it denied
that it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices
alleged. Subsequent to the hearing counsel for the General
Counsel and for the Respondent filed helpful briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case and my observation
of the demeanor of the wintesses, and after due considera-
tion of the briefs, I make the following:
Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation having an of-
fice and place of business in Monroeville, Pennsylvania, is
engaged in the retail sale and service of automobiles. During
the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the com-
plaint, Respondent had a gross volume of business in excess
of $500,000 and received goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 for use at its Monroeville dealership di-
rectly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania. On the basis of these admitted facts, I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO (herein
called the Union), is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent's Admitted Refusal to Bargain: Contentions
of the Parties
Following an organizational campaign which started
about October 1970, Union Representatives Ted Bold and
Leonard Schloer, on February 10, 1971, approached
Respondent's president, Jack McTigue, claimed that a ma-
jonty of Respondent's service department employees had
designated the Union to represent them, offered to show the
authorization cards, and requested recognition and bargain-
ing. McTigue declined to look at the cards or to recognize
the Union as the employees' bargaining representative. He
told the union representatives that any further discussions
should be had with Respondent's legal department and gave
the representatives the name and telephone number of an
attorney (different from Respondent's present counsel).
Union Business Agent Bold thereafter twice called the
attorney's office but was unable to reach him. On February
11, February 24, and March 2, Bold wrote McTigue, renew-
ing the Union's request for recognition and bargaining and
claiming that it represented a majority of Respondent's em-
ployees in an appropriate unit consisting of the following
specifically defined category of employees:
All automotive mechanics, body and fendermen, ap-
prentices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners,
partsmen, parts truck drivers, car jockeys, and other
employees of the service department, excluding all of-
fice clerical and professional employees, watchmen,
guards, salesmen and supervisors.
Although each of these letters was sent by certified
1 This is the unit which Bold testified he orally described to McTigue on
February 10 as that which the Union was representing It is also the unit
alleged in the complaint as appropriate and which is herein found to be
appropriate
199 NLRB No. 24
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC.
mail, each was returned to the Union, marked "Refused" or
"Unclaimed."
Respondent admits that it refused to recognize and
bargain with the Union on and after February 10, 1971. In
defense of its action it makes several contentions. It asserts
(1) that the Union never made a clear and unequivocal
bargaining demand; (2) that the Union did not represent a
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
at any time; and (3) that, in any event, Respondent should
not be required to bargain with the Union in the absence of
a representation election in which the Union establishes its
majority status.
The General Counsel contends, on the other hand, that
the Union did, on February 10, 1971, make a clear and
unequivocal request for bargaining, which Respondent de-
clined; that the Union had in fact been designated by a
majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit as their representative; and that Respondent,
commencing before and continuing after its initial refusal
to bargain, engaged in numerous and serious independent
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which would tend to
undermine the Union's majority status and make it unlikely
that an election could reflect an uncoerced desire of the
employees.
B. The Bargaining Demand
Respondent's president, McTigue, testified that when
Union Representatives Bold and Schloer came to his office
on February, 10 and requested recognition, they said that
the Union represented Respondent's "people" or its "shop"
and asked McTigue how many employees were in each
section and in the shop. McTigue did not think they spelled
out the exact categories of the employees they purported to
represent.
Union Representative Bold, on the other hand, testi-
fied that he told McTigue that the Union represented
Respondent's service employees, listing their job classifica-
tions substantially as spelled out in the demand letters
which he sent Respondent on February 11, February 24,
and March 3 and which Respondent refused to accept. Bold
and Schloer acknowledged that they did not know the exact
number of employees in each category but believed that the
total number of service department employees was about 64
or 65. Bold asked McTigue the exact number. McTigue
admittedly replied that he did not know the exact number.
It is undisputed that Bold had in his possession at that
time the cards of the employees who had designated the
Union to represent them-all of them service department
employees-and offered to let McTigue see them or have
their authenticity checked by an impartial third party. Mc-
Tigue did not then raise any question about the unit the
Union was purporting to represent and I am satisfied that
any question raised in this regard at the hearing was an
afterthought and had no bearing on McTigue's refusal to
recognize the Union and bargain with it. Moreover, I am
satisfied from all the evidence that Bold did, as he testified,
inform McTigue that the Union represented Respondent's
service employees. Whether he named all the job classifica-
tions in the service department is immaterial.
C. The Union's Majority Status in an Appropriate
Bargaining Unit
121
1. Unit placement of certain employees in service
department unit
Respondent and the Union, while agreeing in general
that a unit of Respondent's service department employees
is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, do not
agree as to some of the specific inclusions or exclusions of
individual employees or job classifications in that unit. At
the hearing the parties submitted a list of employees (num-
bered 1 through 76) grouped in job classifications which
Respondent claims should be in the appropriate bargaining
unit (Joint Exh. 1). The General Counsel prior to the hear-
ing drew a line through 14 of these names , claiming that
they were not appropriately included in the service depart-
ment unit. He subsequently withdrew his objection to the
inclusion of two of these names, R. Lydic (#35) and Jerry
Unck (#27).2 Among the remaining 12 deletions are 4 em-
ployees listed as "Fire Guards (Watchmen)," 6 employees
listed as "Custodians," 1 new-car conditioner, E. Fisher
(#25) whose employee status on February 10 is in issue,
and 1 service assistant, L. Pickens (#34) whose former
supervisory position and special status with Respondent are
alleged to cause him,to lack a community of interest with
other unit employees. These contested inclusions will now
be considered.
a. "Fire guards (watchmen)" is the appellation given by
Respondent at the hearing to four men whose duties and
responsibilities, it was stipulated, are substantially the same
as those described by one of them, John Gorazd, at the
heanng.3 Gorazd is an elderly pensioner, who, during the
period here relevant, worked 19-1/2 hours a week in the
performance of watchman and custodial duties for Respon-
dent. He worked principally in the main building which
contains the sales offices, management offices, accounting
department, and new-car showroom. The service area ad-
joins the main building and both are enclosed by a fence
having two access gates. It was the duty of Gorazd and the
other three men in his category (all of whom worked at
hours when most of the other employees were not present)
to keep the doors and gates locked, to let the salesmen and
other personnel working in the evenings or on Saturdays out
of the doors, and to admit authorized personnel having
passes or whom they recognized as having duties to perform
after regular working hours. They carried no firearms but
were instructed to call the fire department in case of a fire
or the police department in case of anyone trying to break
into the place. One of these men actually had called the
police on one occasion. On another occasion, Gorazd com-
plained to President McTigue and later to the night-shift
foreman about a mechanic who was developing a habit-
of staying around a half hour or an hour after his shift
2 At pages 315 , 317 and 318 of the transcript of record the name Urick
(#27) has erroneously been spelled "Vuick " The transcript has accordingly
been corrected to reflect the proper spelling. Another employee named Jerry
Vuick is listed as # 70 in Joint Exh I No one has questioned the propriety
of his inclusion in the appropriate unit.
3 The other three men in this category are P . Turock, C. Saunders, and A
Miezo
122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ended.4 They stopped this practice. It was also the duty of
these men to answer the telephone and to perform cleanup
services in the offices, salesroom, and lavatory of the build-
ing in which they worked. They spent 60 or 70 percent of
their time on cleanup duties and 30 or 40 percent on watch-
man duties.
On the basis of all the evidence I am persuaded that a
substantial part of the duties of the four men involved work
as guards "to enforce against employees and other persons
rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the
safety of persons on the employer' s premises" and that they
therefore may not, under Section 9(b) of the Act, be includ-
ed with nonguards in a bargaining unit. Augusta Chemical
Co., 124 NLRB 1021, 1023-25; St. Regis Paper Company,
128 NLRB 550, 551-552; W. W. Chambers Co., Inc., 124
NLRB 984, 988. Moreover, even their nonguard duties-
their custodial work-is not performed in the service de-
partment and they have little contact with service depart-
ment employees. Accordingly, even if they should not be
considered as guards within the meaning of the statute, they
lack a community of interest with the service department
employees and for that reason should be excluded from the
service department unit. Helms Motor Express, Inc., 107
NLRB 132, 135; J. Heber Lewis Oil Company, Inc., 123
NLRB 1115, 1116.
b. The "custodial employees" listed by Respondent
among those employees Respondent claims are appropri-
ately within the unit consist of five, Ottavian, Haines, Baird,
Duschel, and Milne, who do cleanup work in the service
department area and one, McCrea, who spends 1-1/2 or 2
hours of his 5-hour day at cleanup work in the showroom
and conference room.
McCrea's duties and responsibilities clearly differenti-
ate him from the other employees in this group. He is a
social security annuitant who normally works 5 hours a day
and 4 days a week. On his way to work he picks up the mail
at the post office and delivers it to McTigue's office. He then
puts out the flags, opens the showroom doors, cuts ads from
papers and posts them on a bulletin board in the office and
in the showroom, sweeps the showroom floor and also
cleans the conference • room if the salesmen have had a
meeting there, again goes to the post office for mail, runs
errands at a drugstore or bank for office personnel, and
makes daily deposits for Respondent at the bank. He does
no work in connection with the service department and sees
a service department employee only rarely when the latter
comes into the showroom to charge a battery or clean wind-
shields. He is supervised by McTigue, by the showroom
manager, Stockman, and by the auditor, Hann, and not by
any service department personnel. His custodial duties con-
sume only about 1-1/2 or 2 hours a day. Most of his time
is consumed with clerical or messenger rather than custodial
duties and all of his duties are closely related to those of the
office and sales personnel . I find that McCrea does not
share any discernible community of interest with the service
department employees and should not be included in the
same unit with them.
The other five custodial employees are regular part-
4 Gorazd testified that he was apprehensive that the mechanic, working
alone, might get hurt For safety reasons, Respondent 's practice was to forbid
employees to work any in department alone.
time employees who work exclusively at custodial work.
They clean the areas used by the service department em-
ployees and would therefore fall within the general category
of service department employees . Although the Charging
Union has not sought to organize them , does not normally
include them in units with other service department employ-
ees, and does not want them in that bargaining unit, Union
Business Representative Bold testified that he has consent-
ed that one custodial employee be included in the service
department unit where an employer has insisted upon such
inclusion in connection with consent election agreements.
The Board, however, noted in Somerville Buick, Inc., 93
NLRB 1603, that both the Teamsters and Machinists Un-
ions have in numerous cases involving automobile dealer-
ships claimed to represent this class of employees and they
have been included in the unit with other service employees.
Moreover, it does not appear that any other union is seeking
to represent the custodial employees separately and this
consideration , in addition to the fact that the service depart-
ment custodial employees do have some community of in-
terest with other service department employees , leads me to
conclude that they should be included in the same unit.
Ideal Laundry and Dry cleaning Co., 152 NLRB 1130, 1134
-35, enfd. 372 F.2d 307 (C.A. 10); The Sheffield Corporation,
134 NLRB 1101, 1105.
c. Employee Fisher , listed by Respondent as an em-
ployee of the service department on February 10, 1971, was
first employed by Respondent in January 1969, was laid off
in November 1969, and was recalled in February 1970 but
then declined to return . At his request in March 1970, how-
ever, he was taken back and worked until October 1970,
when he was again laid off. He had not been recalled by
Respondent by the date of the Union 's bargaining request;
nor was he thereafter recalled . In November 1970 he ob-
tained higher paying employment at another location but
did not inform Respondent of this. Respondent carried him
on its records as an employee in layoff status and he was
covered by its fringe benefit insurance program through
May 31, 1971. Prior to that date Respondent had received
no notice that he had taken employment elsewhere and
would not return . In these circumstances , it would appear
that he had a reasonable expectancy of recall on the date
of the bargaining request and should be considered as in the
appropriate bargaining unit as of that date.
d. Employee Pickens who, prior to 1967, worked for
Respondent as a body shop foreman and as its service man-
ager, is listed by Respondent as one of its three service
assistants . The General Counsel , while not contending that
the other two service assistants are improperly included in
the bargaining unit , contends that Pickens ' status and duties
are different from those of the other two and that he should
be excluded from the unit because he does not share a
community of interest with the other service department
employees . Pickens is now an elderly man who regularly
works for Respondent about 2 days a week and about 5
hours each of those days . He works with the warranty clerk,
Sullivan , handling the orders on warranty work by drawing
the record cards from Respondent 's files, attaching them to
the repair orders, and giving them to Sullivan for transmittal
to the men who perform the repair work . Pickens works at
a desk and does not normally have much contact with the
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC.
men who actually service the cars. By reason of his past
experience as body shop foreman and service manager,
however, he offers advice to the men at times when an
emergency or unusual situation arises. Also, because of his
past valuable services, Respondent granted his request for
the use of a company car when he started working part-time
as one of the service assistants. The record does not show
the duties of the other service assistants, who are concededly
in the bargaining unit . I find that there is a sufficient com-
munity of interest between Pickens and the other service
department employees to warrant his inclusion in the same
bargaining unit with them. I do not regard his past supervi-
sory status or Respondent's loan to him of a company car
for his personal use as factors justifying his exclusion from
the unit to which the other service assistants belong.
2. The Union's majority status
The list of service department employees with the in-
clusions and exclusions noted in the preceding subsection of
this Decision shows 10 body shop employees; 9 parts de-
partment employees; 8 new- and used-car conditioner em-
ployees; 3 service assistants; 4 service consultants; 32
mechanical shop employees; and 5 custodians-a total of
71 employees in the unit herein found to be appropriate.
Union authorization cards signed by 38 of these 71
employees prior to February 10, 1971, were duly authenti-
cated at the hearing by the employee who signed his card
or by an employee who witnessed his signature on the card
and received in evidence.5 The Union, therefore, had been
designated by a majority of Respondent's employees in the
unit herein found appropriate for purposes of collective
5 Thirty-one of these employees whose cards were not in controversy were
received in evidence as G C. Exh. 5(1) through 5(3 I) The cards of the
remaining employees are identified in the transcript of the record as follows.
Carl Polhamus-GC 5 (32) (Polhamus credibly testified that his card,
dated February 1, 1970, was in fact signed on February 1, 1971 )
Anthony Palanno, Jr.-GC 5 (32) (It was stipulated that this card,
dated January 5, 1970, was in fact signed on January 5, 1971 )
Edwin Spiegel-GC 5 (34) (Respondent initially challenged the authen-
ticity of the signature of this card but later withdrew its objection after
talking to Spiegel )
Robert Brosius-GC 5 (35). (Respondent also initially challenged the
authenticity of the signature on this card but later withdrew its objec-
tion )
Ronald Salsgiver-GC 5 (36). (Employee Pyle witnessed the signature
on this card and it was stipulated that the signature is authentic The
name on this card does not appear from the transcript and has been
supplied by the Trial Examiner from a descriptive list of the exhibits
made at the hearing.)
Harry Hadden-GC 5 (37) (This card is undated but employee Fannin
credibly testified that he saw Hadden sign it at a union meeting in late
December 1970 or early January 1971.)
Robert Kowalczuk-GC 5 (38) (Kowaiczuk credibly testified that he
initially signed a union card about January 15, 1971, at the request of
employee Campbell, and that on September 22, 1971, upon being in-
formed by Campbell that the card had been lost, signed another card-
the one received in evidence-dating it January 15, 1971 His testimony
was corroborated by Campbell, by employee Stahovic who received the
card from Campbell and listed it on a slip of paper with other employees'
cards received by him and turned over to Union Representative Schloer
poor to February 10, 1971, and by Union Representative Schloer who
received the original card from Stahovic )
All 38 cards were arranged in alphabetical order and marked by the reporter,
seriatim, GC 5(A) through 5 (LL). The identity of these cards in the folder
of exhibits has been corrected to conform to the transcript of record as above
described.
123
bargaining by the date the Union requested recognition and
bargaining and Respondent refused such request.
D. Respondent's Acts of Interference, Restraint, and
Coercion
Prior to his layoff between December 3 and December
27, 1970, employee Ralph Stahovic had talked to his fellow
mechanics about organizing and had taken a poll among the
service department employees which convinced him that a
majority of them wanted representation by the Union. Dur-
ing the period of his layoff, he called the Union's business
representative, Ted Bold, and they set up a union meeting
for December 17. Only Stahovic and three other employees,
Pyle, Green, and Fannin, attended the meeting. They signed
union authorization cards and were given cards to distribute
to other employees. Thereafter, as shown below, Respon-
dent through a number of its management representatives
engaged in numerous acts' of interference, restraint, and
coercion designed to discourage the employees in their un-
ion affiliation or adherence and to preclude a free choice in
any representation election.
1. Interrogation, giving impression of surveillance, and
threats of reprisal
On December 27, 1970, Service Manager Coyne tele-
phoned Stahovic, asking him to return to work on the next
day. Either during the telephone conversation or when Sta-
hovic returned the next morning, Coyne asked him if he was
the "instigator" or "organizer, trying to organize a union."
Stahovic replied, "not me," and inquired where Coyne got
"that idea." Coyne replied that he just happened to hear it
from someone but did not believe it. He refused to reveal
the source of his information.
Shortly thereafter, around the first of January 1971,
Coyne called employees Green and Pyle to his desk, told
them that he had heard they were trying to organize the
shop, and asked them if they were the organizers. Green
replied that he was not the organizer but was definitely
prounion. Coyne told them that he understood they were
passing out union cards. Green acknowledged that he was
passing out cards. Coyne then asked if Green had a card.
Green gave Coyne a card and asked if he wanted to sign it
but Coyne declined. Pyle appeared upset by the questions
Coyne was' asking. He assured Coyne that although he was
not the instigator, he was definitely in favor of a union and
asked Coyne who told him that he, Pyle, was one of the
organizers. Coyne refused to divulge the source of his infor-
mation and Pyle told him he did not like anyone "going
behind [his] back" and making such an accusation. Coyne
stated that of all people, he did not think that Pyle and
Green would be involved with anything like that.6
Around that time, in late December or early January,
Coyne called together about 18 or 19 shop employees. Ac-
cording to employee Gunther's credited testimony, the fol-
lowing took place:
Well, he started out by saying that he heard rumors of
6 There is no substantial dispute concerning the facts set forth in the two
preceding paragraphs, which are based on the testimony of Stahovic, Green,
Pyle, and Coyne
124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trying to organize the union in the shop, he knew the
guys that were behind it, and he knew the guys who
signed cards and the ones who didn't, he told us at that
time of the GM strike and we were slow and we could
probably operate with four or five less men. He said
you know that will affect the younger guys, they would
have to go and that was about the extent of all that was
said that day.
Coyne denied threatening employees with a layoff if they
brought the Union in and testified that he merely asked the
employees whether they preferred a layoff or a short week.
Respondent had already laid off some employees, including
Stabovic, because of the GM strike which adversely affected
its business and had recalled Stahovic. Coyne's mention of
further layoffs or a reduction in hours at the same time he
told the employees he knew who had signed union cards
plainly warranted an inference by the employees that there
might be a connection between the two events.
In January, as employee Campbell was walking toward
the timeclock at quitting time, Coyne approached him and
said, "you know lust between you and I I think we got a
union organizer down there." When Campbell asked who,
Coyne named Ralph Stahovic. Campbell replied "Well I
don't know" and left the shop.
In February, Coyne approached employee Coudriet at
his work station and remarked, "I understand that you are
a union instigator." When Coudriet did not reply imme-
diately, Coyne stated that he was surprised to learn that
Coudriet was involved. Coudnet then told Coyne that he
did not know what Coyne was talking about.
On June 3, during Coyne's employment interview with-
John Johns and while introducing him to Foreman Andy
Rudolf, with whom it was expected Johns might be working
on the following day, Coyne told Johns that Respondent's
establishment was a nice place to work and Rudolf agreed.
Coyne added, however, that Respondent was "having a
little trouble right now" and had "a few troublemakers"
who were trying to get a union started. He told Johns, "if
you want some advice from me you will just stay away from
these guys as much as you can and you won't get into any
trouble." Foreman Rudolf volunteered, "if it was up to me,
and if I knew who these fellows were ... you know what
I would do" and at that point he made a gesture with his
thumb. Coyne stated that he "had a pretty good idea" as to
who some of them were but did not name anyone.'
I find that the conduct of Service Manager Coyne in
asking individual employees whether they or named fellow
employees were the instigators or organizers of the Union
and in telling some of them that he heard they were the
7 The above account is based on Johns' credited testimony Coyne denied
mentioning the Union during this conversation and testified that he merely
told Johns, "We're having some problems in the shop. Now, what I want you
to do is do your work, mind your own business . If you have any problems,
you come and see me ." He did not recall Rudolf giving Johns "the thumb "
He further testified that he did not know at that time who was trying to
organize for the Union. Rudolf confirmed Johns' testimony to the extent that
he agreed with the statement that Respondent was "a pretty good outfit to
work for" but testified that to his "knowledge" he, Rudolf, had not made any
gesture like giving someone the thumb and that no mention of the Union was
made during that conversation Johns testified in a straightforward and
convincing manner and I am satisfied that his recollection of the conversa-
tions with Coyne and Rudolf was more accurate than theirs I credit Johns'
account.
organizers and expressing disappointment about their ac-
tion when they acknowledged support or sympathy for the
Union constituted coercive interrogation of the employees.
I further find that Coyne's statements that he had heard
certain employees were the organizers and knew the identity
of those who had signed union cards, along with his refusal
to divulge the source of his information, were designed to
and did give the employees the impression that Respondent
was engaging in surveillance of the employees' union activi-
ties.8 I also find that Coyne's statement to the 18 or 19
assembled employees that Respondent could probably get
along with 4 or 5 less men, at the same time he told the
employees that the Respondent knew which employees had
signed union cards, and Foreman Rudolf's statement to
new employee Johns that he would give the thumb to the
employee organizers if he knew who they were, after Coyne
had advised the new employee to stay away from the "trou-
blemakers" who were trying to get a union started, consti-
tuted veiled threats of reprisal against employees for
engaging in union activities. All this conduct was clearly in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Foreman Giles' threatened loss of benefits and other
coercive conduct
In February, Donald Giles, foreman over used-car
body reconditioning, told employees Lawrence and Burton
that Respondent had been good to them and that if the
Union became their bargaining representative, they would
have to pay for their hospitalization and uniforms. He ad-
vised them not to sign union cards if they had not already
done so. Respondent currently pays the cost of its employ-
ees' uniforms and hospitalization and life insurance.
Later, in September, Giles approached a group of em-
ployees who were standing in the used-car department
about lunchtime and asked one of them, Thompson, what
he thought of the union situation. Thompson replied that he
was not very well informed about the situation. Giles then
stated that it was his understanding that if the Union came
in, the employees would be required to pay half the cost of
their uniforms and their hospitalization and life insur-
ance.9 Giles also told employee Kowalczuk the same thing
later in September.
I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Respondent
through Foreman Giles threatened employees with a loss of
benefits if they selected the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative and that this constituted a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
In about April Foreman Giles was sitting at the bar in
a restaurant talking about the Union to employee Stanger-
one when employee Coudriet joined them. After Stangerone
8 American National Stores, Inc, 195 NLRB No 3, Associated Mills, Inc,
190 NLRB No 8
9 The above findings are based upon the credited testimony of employees
Campbell and Thompson Giles admitted asking Thompson, "What's hap-
pening with the Union9" and adding, "Paid uniforms and paid hospitaliza-
tion ," but testified that he said nothing further and that both of them
laughed He testified that he did not remember what he said to Campbell but
denied telling any employee he would have to pay a portion of the cost of
his insurance or uniforms. It does not sound reasonable to me that Giles
would merely have said "Paid uniforms and paid hospitalization," as he
testified, without any explanation as to what he meant . I find the testimony
of Campbell and Thompson more convincing and I credit it
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. 125
left, Giles told Coudriet that a mutual friend of theirs was
mad at him for being antiunion. He explained to Coudriet
that he was not in fact antiunion but did not want to get
involved. He added, "you know, the company has the
names of all the people that signed cards and ... there is
five or six guys that had better watch their step."" I find,
as alleged in the complaint, that Respondent through Fore-
man Giles on this occasion indicated to Coudriet that Re-
spondent was keeping its employees' union activities under
surveillance, and that his statements, particularly in warn-
ing that five or six of the employees had better watch their
steps, were clearly coercive and in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The meetings called by Vice President Grimes
Within a few days after the union representatives, on
February 10, had called upon Respondent's president, Mc-
Tigue, and requested recognition and bargaining, manage-
ment representatives decided that Vice President Grimes
should call meetings of the service department employees to
inform them of the demand and to ascertain the basis of the
employees' dissatisfaction.
The employees were called to the lunchroom in the
early afternoon by Service Manager Coyne and told that
Grimes had heard something from some union people and
wanted "to get ideas as to what it [was] all about." Grimes
then took charge of the meeting and told the employees
about the visit of the two union representatives to Mc-
Tigue's office, claiming to represent the employees, and
McTigue's referral of the matter to Respondent' s counsel.
He stated that Respondent had always operated in a family
atmosphere and wanted to keep it that way. He gave as an
example of the family atmosphere that if an employee had
a friend or relative who needed work, he could sometimes
get the friend or relative a job with Respondent, but that if
the Union came in, it would be harder to do so. I t Grimes
asked the employees why they were dissatisfied or unhappy
and whether they and management could not settle things
among themselves. The complaints then aired by the em-
ployees and management's disposition of the complaints is
described below:
Respondent's pay system: Respondent's standard prac-
tice was to pay a higher rate of pay for what was termed
productive time (for which the customer could be billed)
than for nonproductive time . In early December 1970, due
to economic hardships caused by the General Motors strike
then in progress, the employees were told that they would
be paid only for productive time. This meant that the em-
ployees might be paid for only part of their 8-hour workday.
At the meeting with Grimes, employee Brinley asked, "Are
we on the productive rate system or do we go back to our
10 The above finding is based upon the credited testimony of Coudriet, not
specifically denied by Giles
11 Coyne at first testified that Gnmes told the employees that if the Union
came in , Respondent "would not be able" to give an employee 's friend or
relative a job when an opening was available but he later corrected his
testimony by stating that Gnmes said it "would be harder" to do this In any
event, it would appear , as the General Counsel contends , that Grimes' state-
ment constituted a threat of loss of benefit if the Union became the employ-
ees' bargaining representative and was therefore in violation of Sec 8(a)(l)
of the Act.
standard system of being paid our hourly rate." Gnmes
replied that he did not know and asked Service Manager
Coyne to answer this question. Coyne assured Brinley,
"don't worry, it has all been taken care of." Brinley never-
theless insisted on a more precise answer, whereupon
Grimes said, "I don't care what it was before ... right now,
if you work 8 hours you get paid for 8 hours."12
Parts department problem: Another employee com-
plained that mechanics were having to lose too much pro-
ductive time lining up and waiting for parts in the parts
department while employees there were answering the tele-
phones or waiting on customers. Grimes agreed that this
was an unsatisfactory situation and asked Parts Manager
Ottavian if something could not be done about it. Ottavian
said that the situation could be improved some if there was
only one telephone line to the parts department and a man
was assigned to answering that phone. This suggested im-
provement was instituted during the following week. Al-
though the problem of mechanics having to wait for parts
has not been entirely solved yet, the situation has improved
some.
Diesel fumes: Employee Carlson complained about the
diesel fumes in the shop and the inadequate exhaust system
for drawing the fumes out, a problem about which the em-
ployees had theretofore complained and on which Respon-
dent had been working intermittently for years. Grimes
asked Mechanical Service Foreman Baird what could be
done about the problem. Baird replied that he had ordered
larger hose or pipes which would fit over the exhaust pipes
of the diesels and would have them installed. The pipes had
arrived shortly after the first of the year 1971 or at least prior
to the meeting but had not yet been installed, according to
Baird, because he would have to use his own maintenance
men to make the adapters required to install the pipes and
the men would have to do this in between production sched-
ules. Grimes told the men that the exhaust problem would
be taken care of and the pipes were installed within 10 days
or 2 weeks thereafter.
Electrical outlets: Employees Carlson and Pyle brought
out the fact that all the welding on tractors and trailers was
having to be done inside the shop, even in good weather,
because outside electrical outlets, which at one time had
been started, had never been completed. They complained
of the welding flashes in the shop. Grimes promised to get
the electrical contractor back on the premises to finish this
work and the work was in fact done about a week later.
Toolroom problem: Employee Pyle complained that the
mechanics were having a hard time making a full productive
8-hour day because they had to spend too much time hunt-
ing needed tools in the toolroom. Grimes asked if there was
not a toolman in the toolroom to take care of this problem
and when Pyle explained that Respondent no longer had a
toolroom employee, Grimes asked Baird and Coyne to see
about getting such an employee back. Within about a week
thereafter a toolroom employee was supplied.
Movement of tractors. and trailers in and out of the shop:
12 It is not clear from the record whether Respondent before the meeting
had gone back to its standard system of paying employees. Those employees
who had recently been working 8 hours a day on productive work would have
had no occasion to know if the system had changed . In any event, it is clear
that no announcement had been made prior to the meeting that Respondent
was back on its standard system
126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pyle also complained that for about the last month, since
Respondent had fenced in its premises and kept the lower
gate locked , the employees were unable to turn their trucks
and trailers around and get them in and out of the shop
without backing them onto the highway-an obviously un-
safe practice . Grimes promised to see what could be done
about this movement problem and shortly thereafter the
lower gate was opened so that the trucks and trailers could
make a loop around the building to get in and out. Prior to
the meeting, Pyle had complained to Foreman Baird,
Service Manager Coyne , and Showroom General Manager
Stockman about the problem but nothing had been done to
alleviate it.
The ladder problem : Employee Green told Grimes that
he had been asking for 4 or 5 years that management furnish
a good strong ladder on which the men could climb to the
top of the trailers on which it was necessary that they fre-
quently weld and that the maintenance man's ladder which
they had been using was extremely unsafe to use. Grimes
instructed Foreman Baird to furnish the men with a good
wooden ladder and this was furnished within about 3 days
after the meeting.
Vacuum cleaner: Green also suggested that Grimes pro-
vide "black lung benefits" for the shop employees because
of the clouds of dust arising and polluting the air throughout
the shop whenever the high -pressure airhose was used in
connection with cleaning around the rear wheels when they
were removed from the tractor trailers . Green explained
that a vacuum cleaner was needed for this cleaning job.
Baird or Coyne promised to furnish such a vacuum cleaner
and it was brought to the shop from the used-car depart-
ment that same day or, the next . Other mechanics had com-
plained to Baird and Coyne about the dust problem on prior
occasions but nothing had been done about it.
Pension plan : Employee Stahovic complained that
Respondent's pension plan was inadequate and mentioned
that one employee who was about to retire would receive
only $32 a month . Grimes replied that he and President
McTigue were constantly researching and trying to improve
on such matters.
Although it may be true , as Respondent asserts, that
Respondent had in the past occasionally held meetings of
its employees and invited a discussion of their problems or
grievances , this practice had been abandoned and no such
meeting had been held during the period of about 6 months
prior to the Union's bargaining demand . Respondent had
discontinued such meetings because of a lack of participa-
tion by the employees in them . The record leaves no room
for doubt that the February meeting called by Vice Presi-
dent Grimes only a few days after the Union 's request for
recognition and bargaining , and prefaced by Grimes' in-
quiry whether Respondent and the employees could not
settle their differences among themselves rather than
through a union , was motivated by Respondent 's desire to
discourage the employees ' interest in or allegiance to the
Union . Respondent sought to do this by soliciting their
complaints and promising to eliminate , insofar as it could,
the dissatisfaction which had caused a majority of the em-
ployees to join the Union . It is well settled that conduct of
this type constitutes unlawful interference with the employ-
ees' organizational rights protected by the statute and was
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . N.L.R.B. v. Ex-
change Parts Co., 375 U. S. 405 ; Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB
No. 56; Jerry Davidson Buick Sales & Service, Inc., 172
NLRB No. 203. Moreover , to the extent that Respondent
remedied these solicited complaints by actually making
changes in the employees ' working conditions , its conduct
was additionally and independently violative of Section
8(a)(1). Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 171 NLRB 293.
4. President McTigue 's speech and distribution of rule
books on March 25, 1971
On March 25 President McTigue called meetings of the
service department employees immediately after work. Af-
ter presenting some of the employees with Chevrolet techni-
cian awards and service pins , he distributed to all the
employees a manual or rule booklet in which was set forth
certain company policies and rules, most of which McTigue
testified were already being followed, but some of which
were new or revised rules. He read to the employees a pre-
pared speech on the subject of the Union 's attempt to get
the employees to sign authorization cards and warned the
employees , inter alia, that an employee who signs such a
card "relinquishes numerous rights and privileges which he
has as an individual to deal with his employer , as he may
see fit, concerning his job and his future ," and "puts his
individual rights in the hands of third parties or strangers."
He also referred to or read from that part of "Beyerl Chev-
rolet Policy Statement" on page 1 of the booklet in which
the employees were warned "that where unions are , is where
strikes happen" and were told that five other named Chev-
rolet dealerships had suffered long strikes or had closed
because of unions . The written speech and policy statement,
though not alleged to be unlawfully coercive , are definitely
antiunion in tone and warranted the employees in inferring
an antiunion motivation for some of the policies or rules
included in the booklet . The General Counsel has pointed
out several provisions which he contends constitute unlaw-
ful interference with the employees ' organizational rights.
These are considered below:
Good Friday: Prior to 1971, it had been Respondent's
practice to grant employees 3 hours off , at their request, to
attend church services on Good Friday without any loss of
pay. In the policy , statement booklet, employees were given
a half day (4 hours) paid holiday on Good Friday and those
employees who preferred to work were paid double for the
4 hours they worked . In prior years if they worked on Good
Friday during the 3 hours they could have taken off, they
were paid only for the 3 hours. It is a fair inference, and I
find , that the grant of this benefit to the employees follow-
ing the Union 's demand for recognition and in the context
of Respondent 's expressed opposition to the Union had the
natural effect of chilling unionism among the employees
and was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . N.L.R.B. v.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U .S. 405.
Rule restricting movement of employees: Rule No. 3,
Group I , page 16 , of the booklet prohibits "Leaving own
department during working hours without permission of
supervisor, except for use of restrooms or lunch ." The pen-
alties provided for violations of this rule were : "First Of-
fense: Written reprimand and/or suspension for a period of
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC.
one week without pay" and "Second Offense: Termination
of employment ." It is clear from the credited and undisput-
ed testimony of employees Stahovic and Green that no such
rule had existed prior to March 25 and that employees had
freely moved from one department to another for personal
or other reasons without requesting permission from their
supervisors and without being reprimanded for doing so.
Rule restricting use of bulletin boards: Rule No. 7,
Group I , page 16 , prohibited "Posting or removal of notices,
signs or writing in any form on any bulletin boards on
company property without permission of the management."
The same penalties were provided for violations of this rule
as were provided for violations of the rule restricting the
movement of employees . It is clear from the record that no
such restrictions had been placed upon the employees' use
of the bulletin boards prior to March 25 . The employees had
freely used these bulletin boards for the posting of cartoons,
letters , the listing of items for sale, and other matters. Al-
though McTigue had occasionally removed matters which
he considered offensive , he concededly had not in the past
attempted to censor matters before they were posted.
By imposing upon employees these restrictive rules,
Respondent not only violated its duty to bargain with the
Union about these changes in working conditions of its
employees but otherwise tended to chill unionism by requir-
ing management 's permission to post such things as union
notices and to move from one department to another on
union business , contrary to prior practice . Respondent's
institution of these rules were therefore in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent 's establishment of an employee committee to
handle grievances and other employee problems : Respondent's
rule book also established a formal grievance procedure
which had theretofore been nonexistent at the dealership. It
provided for a Step One in which the employee was to
present his grievance within a prescribed time directly to his
immediate supervisor and for a Step Two in which the griev-
ance , if not settled at the first step, would be presented
within a prescribed time to higher management . A griev-
ance form to be used for Step One was attached to the back
of the rules booklet . McTigue conceded that Respondent
had never prior to March 25 had any formal grievance
procedure . He testified that his door has always been open
to anyone wanting to discuss any grievance or problem and
is still open and that no employee has yet used the formal
grievance procedure but that it is available to him if he
wants to use it.
The rules booklet at page 19 provides:
Indirectly allied to the grievance procedure is an em-
ployee committee representing all departments . Infor-
mal, 30-minute meetings are held once a month with
the service manager . The six committee men (rotated
every month) by seniority in each department bring up
whatever individual or shop problem they choose.
There is no formal agenda . The objective is not to
supplant the grievance procedure , but to supplement it.
Minutes from each meeting are posted on company
bulletin boards . One representative from the following
groups will attend.
There are then listed the six service employee departments
and the "Service Manager and all foremen ." It was also
127
provided that "Management will sit in whenever request-
ed."
It is undisputed that no employee committee had ex-
isted prior to the publication of the rules booklet . McTigue
told the employees at the March 25 meeting that the griev-
ance procedure and the employee committee were some-
thing new and that the employees would have a committee
of six in each department . He asked them to take the book-
let home and study it and stated that he would have another
meeting shortly thereafter "for any explanations that were
necessary ." On advice of his present counsel , however, Mc-
Tigue did not call another meeting of the employees and the
committeemen provided for in the rules booklet had not
been appointed by the date of the hearing. The provisions
for this committee , as well as the formal grievance proce-
dure , however, remain in the rules booklet as a part of
Respondent 's policy to deal with its employees through an
employer sponsored and dominated committee rather than
through a freely chosen labor organization . This Respon-
dent clearly could not lawfully do. And its attempt to foist
such a committee upon its employees was a clear violation
of Section 8(a)(1). N.L. R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S.
203; N L.R.B. v. Norfolk Southern Bus Corporation , 159 F.2d
516, 517-518 (C.A . 4), cert . denied 330 U.S. 844.
5. The alleged restrictive change in policy regarding work
by employees on own cars
It is the general Counsel 's contention that in March
1971 in order to make the employees ' working conditions
more onerous because of their union sympathies , Service
Manager Coyne started requiring the employees to obtain
a work or repair order before being permitted to work in the
shop on their own cars during their nonworking time. It is
undisputed , however , that Respondent did have a policy,
announced and posted on its bulletin boards on February
6, 1967 , which required employees to obtain written permis-
sion from Service Manager Coyne before doing any work
in the shop on their own cars and which forbade any em-
ployee (for safety reasons) to work in the service department
alone at any time. The written permission was usually in the
form of a work order . I have no doubt , as employee Stahovic
testified , that he and other employees had in fact in more
recent times worked on their own cars in the shop without
a work order , but this fact , I am convinced , was merely the
result of a careless laxity in the enforcement of
Respondent 's policy and not a deliberate nonenforcement
or abandonment of the policy. In these circumstances, I do
not infer any antiunion motivation in Coyne 's statement to
several of the employees in March 1971 that they must
obtain repair orders for work on their own cars.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent has violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act
by coercively interrogating employees about their own and
their fellow employees ' union leadership or sympathies; by
making statements designed to give the employees the im-
pression that Respondent was engaging in surveillance of
their union activities ; by making veiled threats of layoff or
other reprisals because of the employees ' selection of the
128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union; by threatening a loss of paid uniforms and hospitali-
zation and life insurance if the employees selected the Un-
ion to represent them; by soliciting employee complaints
which had caused the employees to select a union to repre-
sent them; by promising to remedy the complaints and by
actually remedying most of them; by granting its employees
an additional holiday pay on Good Friday in order to dis-
courage their union allegiance; by inaugurating rules re-
stricting the normal movement of its employees from one
department to another and their customary use of company
bulletin boards in order to impede the employees' union
activities; and by providing for its employees, as a part of
its published employer policy, a committee to be created by
the Respondent, and in which employees were to partic-
ipate, to handle employee grievances and other problems.
2. At all material times, the Union has been the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of Respondent's employees
in the following appropriate bargaining unit:
All service department employees at Respondent's
Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all
auto mechanics, body and fendermen, apprentices,
helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen,
parts truck drivers, and car jockeys; but excluding all
office clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen and
guards, professional employees, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
3. By refusing on February 10, 1971, and at all times
thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union as the ex-
clusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the
Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY, NECESSITY FOR A BARGAINING ORDER
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act, my recommended Order will require that Re-
spondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Respondent, while conceding that it has refused to bar-
gain with the Union, asserts that a bargaining order, under
the criteria spelled out by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B.
v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575, is not warranted.
I do not agree.
In refusing to bargain with the Union on and after
February 10, 1971, Respondent, I am convinced, was not
motivated by any good-faith doubt as to the Union's major-
ity status in an appropriate bargaining unit but, rather, by
a rejection of the principle of collective bargaining and a
desire to dissipate the Union's strength. Respondent not
only refused the Union's offer to prove its majority status
through a card check by an impartial third party and failed
to file any representation petition with the Board to resolve
any doubts it belatedly asserted at the hearing but also
immediately intensified its campaign to interfere with, re-
strain, and coerce its employees in the exercise of their
organizational rights.
It did this by the use of both the carrot and the stick.
Thus, while continuing to give the impression that it was
engaging in surveillance of the employees' union activities,
it made veiled threats of reprisals against employees for
engaging in union activities, warned a new employee to stay
away from the union troublemakers, threatened that if the
Union was their bargaining representative, employees
would have to pay all or parts of the cost of their uniforms
and their hospitalization and life insurance, the total cost of
which Respondent was then itself paying, threatened that
with the advent of the Union it would be harder for employ-
ees to get jobs with Respondent for their friends and rela-
tives, and inaugurated rules prohibiting the employees, on
the penalty of reprimand, suspension, or discharge, from
continuing their long established practice of moving freely
from department to department and of using company bul-
letin boards without prior permission from management. At
the same time, as an inducement to the employees to reject
union representation, Respondent solicited its employees to
air the complaints which had caused them to want a union
to represent them and promised to try to do something
about the complaints. It did soon thereafter remedy the
complaints in whole or in part-though the employees had
theretofore sought, without success, to have them resolved.
Respondent also granted its employees an extra 4-hour paid
holiday on Good Friday and presented them with a formal
grievance procedure and a plan for an employee committee
to handle their grievances and other problems-an obvious
attempt to furnish a substitute for the Union which the
employees had already chosen as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
The cumulative effect of this wide range of unfair labor
practices had a natural effect of dissipating the Union's
majority status and was, in my view, sufficiently serious to
make it doubtful, if not impossible, that a fair election can
be held in the near future at which the employees can ex-
press a free choice as to bargaining representation. Al-
though some of Respondent's unfair labor practices can
readily be remedied by compliance with the traditional
cease-and-desist type of order, some of Respondent's other
unlawful conduct-such as its improvement of the employ-
ees' working conditions in response to their complaints
which Respondent had solicited and its grant of the extra
one-half day holiday-is not so easily susceptible to reme-
dy. As a practical matter, the Board does not normally
require an employer to take back from employees the bene-
fits it has unlawfully granted them in order to defeat a union
and I shall not in this case require Respondent to do so.13
Under all the circumstances, I find that the employees'
choice of a bargaining representative as evidenced by the
cards which they signed is more likely to reliably reflect
13 Respondent will, however, be required by my recommended Order to
rescind and delete from its rules booklet those provisions setting up a formal
grievance procedure and an employee committee to handle the grievances
and other employee problems. It will also be required to rescind and delete
from its rules booklet the rules restricting movements of its service depart-
ment employees and their use of company bulletin boards.
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC.
their free choice than would an election and that a bargain-
ing order is necessary to remedy Respondent's unlawful
refusal to bargain with the Union . But independently of the
necessity of such an order to remedy the 8(a)(5) violation,
I find that a bargaining order is necessary and appropriate
to remedy the serious 8(a)(1) violations herein found . Ameri-
can National Stores, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 3; General Stencils,
Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of
law, and the entire record herein , and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act , it is recommended that there be issued the
following.14
ORDER
Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a)Coercively interrogating employees about their own
or their fellow employees' union activities or sympathies.
(b) Making statements designed to give the employees
the impression that Respondent is engaging in surveillance
of their union activities.
(c) Threatening layoffs or other reprisals against em-
ployees because of their selection of International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge
No. 63, AFL-CIO, to represent them.
(d) Threatening loss of paid uniforms, paid hospitaliza-
tion and life insurance premiums, or other benefits because
of the selection by employees of the Union to represent
them.
(e) Soliciting, or promising to remedy, employee com-
plaints for the purpose of influencing its employees to reject
representation by the Union.
(f) Granting extra paid holiday time or other improve-
ments in working conditions for the purpose of influencing
employees to reject the Union as their bargaining represent-
ative, provided, however, that nothing herein shall be con-
strued as requiring Respondent to withdraw, change or
abandon any benefits or improved working conditions cur-
rently enjoyed by its employees.
(g) Inaugurating rules restricting the movement of em-
ployees at Respondent's dealership and their use of
Respondent's bulletin boards in order to impede the em-
ployees' union activities.
(h) Presenting or suggesting to its employees a plan for
a formal grievance procedure or an employee committee to
handle their grievances and other problems.
(i) Refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees in the following unit found
to be appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining:
All service department employees at Respondent's
Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all
auto mechanics, body and fendermen, apprentices,
helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen,
parts truck drivers, and car jockeys; but excluding all
office clerical employees, salesmen , watchmen and
guards, professional employees and Supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(j) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
129
teed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Rescind and delete from its rules booklet issued on
March 25, 1971, those provisions which set up a formal
grievance procedure and an employee committee to handle
employee grievances and other problems and also those
rules which restrict the movement of its service department
employees and their use of Respondent's bulletin boards.
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in the unit set forth
above.
(c) Post at its Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."15 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 6, shall, after being duly signed by the Respon-
dent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has
taken to comply here herewith.16
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided Sec. 102 46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, con-
clusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of
the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings,
conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for
all yurposes
1 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
i6 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of our employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All service department employees at our Monroe-
ville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all auto me-
chanics, body and fendermen, apprentices, helpers,
lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen, parts
truck drivers, and carjockeys; but excluding all of-
fice clerical employees, salesmen , watchmen and
130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
guards, professional employees, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL rescind and delete from our rules booklet
issued on March 25, 1971, those provisions which set
up a formal grievance procedure and an employee
committee to handle employee grievances and other
problems; WE WILL also rescind and delete from that
booklet those rules which restrict the movement of our
employees and their use of our bulletin boards.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
about their own or their fellow employees' union activi-
ties or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT make statements designed to give our
employees the impression that we are engaging in sur-
veillance of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten layoffs or other reprisals
against our employees because of their selection of the
Union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT threaten loss of paid uniforms, paid
hospitalization and life insurance premiums, or any
other benefits because of the selection by our employ-
ees of the Union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT solicit or promise to remedy employee
complaints for the purpose of influencing our employ-
ees to reject representation by the Union.
WE WILL NOT grant improvements in the working
conditions of our employees for the purpose of influ-
encing them to reject representation by the Union, pro-
vided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed
as requiring us to withdraw, change, or abandon any
benefits or improved working conditions currently en-
joyed by our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
organizational rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the
Act.
Dated By
BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office,
1536 Federal Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania 15222, Telephone 412-644-2977.