Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2A-214
Oklahoma Code Comment
Subsections (2) and (3) allow one or both implied warranties of quality to be disclaimed by the parties; that is, removed as a term of the lease contract. As to the distinction between "lease agreement" and "lease contract" in relation to warranty, compare § 2A-103(1)(k) with § 2A-103(1)(1). Subsection (4) permits the same result for the implied warranties against interference or infringement. Circumstances and conduct also may operate to exclude implied warranties.
These provisions would not appear to change Oklahoma law as to the ability of a lessor to disclaim warranties. In Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Institutional Distrib., Inc., 454 F.Supp. 511 (W.D.Okla.1977), the court cited Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla.1974), as an opinion where the Oklahoma court upheld a warranty disclaimer in a lease with reference to the rule expressed in 12A Oklahoma Statutes § 2-316(2). As the transaction in the Smith case was described as a "lease-purchase", it is not clear whether the court was applying § 2-316(2) directly to what it considered to be a sale, or extending its policy as appropriate to a lease transaction. In any event, the older decision in Oklahoma Petroleum & Gasoline Co. v. Winship, 200 P. 844 (Okla.1921), clearly held that no implied warranty of fitness was applicable where the express contract of bailment fixed the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties.
The Article 2A provisions are more protective than the rules articulated in the above cases. Not just any written or oral disclaimer will suffice; under the provisions of Article 2A a disclaimer must be written and conspicuous and use language that in common understanding calls the attention of the lessee to the exclusion and makes it plain that there is no implied warranty. Subsections (2), (3) and (4) then provide further guidance and some statutory examples of sufficient wording for particular disclaimers. It is open to question whether the latitude allowed in the Smith case for a disclaimer which did not meet the statutory standard, but which was upheld because it was read and assertedly understood by the person against whom it was asserted, is good law. Utilizing a subjective standard as in the Smith case can open a pandora's box; the protection of the Article 2A provisions (as well as those of Article 2) should be interpreted to involve an application of objective tests of notice and of understanding.
The 1991 amendments make no change here.