Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 4.5

As amended through November 4, 2024

Rule 4.5 - Judges and Judicial Candidates Seeking Nonjudicial Office

(A) Upon becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial elective office, a judge shall resign from judicial office, unless permitted by law to continue to hold judicial office.

(B) Upon becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial appointive office, a judge is not required to resign from judicial office, provided that the judge complies with the other provisions of this Code.

(C) No judicial candidate may also simultaneously be a candidate for an elected nonjudicial position.

Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 4.5

As adopted by order filed January 4, 2012, effective 7/1/2012, by order filed June 26, 2012, effective 7/1/2012; by order filed June 29, 2012, effective 7/1/2012, by order filed February 27, 2013, by order filed September 3, 2013, and by order filed December 2, 2015.

Comment

[1] In campaigns for nonjudicial elective public office, candidates may make pledges, promises, or commitments related to positions they would take and ways they would act if elected to office. Although appropriate in nonjudicial campaigns, this manner of campaigning is inconsistent with the role of a judge, who must remain fair and impartial to all who come before him or her. The potential for misuse of the judicial office, and the political promises that the judge would be compelled to make in the course of campaigning for nonjudicial elective office, together dictate that a judge who wishes to run for such an office must resign upon becoming a candidate. For the same reasons, paragraph (C) precludes a person who is not already a judge from simultaneously being a candidate for an elected judicial position and an elected nonjudicial position.

[2] The "resign to run" rule set forth in paragraph (A) ensures that a judge cannot use the judicial office to promote his or her candidacy, and prevents post-campaign retaliation from the judge in the event the judge is defeated in the election. When a judge is seeking appointive nonjudicial office, however, the dangers are not sufficient to warrant imposing the "resign to run" rule.