The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
Ohio. R. Evid. 803
Staff Note (July 1, 2006 Amendment)
The 2006 amendment adds a new hearsay exception for statements in reliable learned treatises that are relied on by expert witnesses on direct examination or are called to the attention of expert witnesses on cross-examination. The 2006 amendment also renumbers five existing hearsay exceptions to reflect the insertion of Evid. R. 803(18).
Evid. R. 706, adopted in 1998, is repealed in view of the adoption of Evid. R. 803(18).
Rule 803 (18) Learned Treatises
Evid. R. 803(18) is modeled on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), which has been described as a "carefully drafted rule [that] appears to work well in practice." Robert F. Magill, Jr., Issues Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18): The "Learned Treatise" Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 9 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 49 (1993). Although a departure from the common law and Ohio practice, substantive use of learned treatises is now accepted by the majority of states, Clifford Fishman, Jones on Evidence 316 (7th ed., 2003).
There are a number of reasons for creating a hearsay exception for statements in learned treatises under the circumstances in the proposed rule. Every expert brings a certain amount of "background hearsay" to his or her opinion, in the form of the out-of-court statements of textbook authors, colleagues, and others, that forms much of the basis of the expert's training and education. Paul Gianelli, Understanding Evidence 347 (2003). Ohio law now allows experts to rely on that knowledge in establishing their qualifications and in forming opinions. Worthington City Schools v. ABCO Insulation, 84 Ohio App. 3d 144, 152 (1992); State v. Echols, 128 Ohio App. 3d 677, 698 (Ham.1998). The rule makes explicit the sources of the expert's opinion, and in doing so both avoids disputes about the level of detail in their testimony and assists the trier of fact in evaluating that testimony. Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787. Similarly, while former law permitted the use of learned treatises for impeachment on cross-examination, Ohio Rule of Evidence 706, and on redirect examination after impeachment, Hinkle v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 159 Ohio App. 3d. 351, 365 (Cuy. 2004), it is often difficult for a jury to understand or maintain the distinction between impeachment or rehabilitation, on the one hand, and substantive use on the other.
Importantly, commentators agree that statements in learned treatises come within the two major justifications for most hearsay exceptions: reliability and necessity. David H. Kaye, et. al., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence 132 (2004). Authors of scholarly works usually have no connection to the litigation and no motive to misrepresent. Their scholarly reputations are at stake when peers review their work for accuracy, enhancing reliability. With respect to necessity, there is often no other way to get the opinions of the most highly qualified researchers and scholars before the court.
Evid. R. 803(18) contains a number of safeguards against unreliability and misuse. Misunderstanding is guarded against by the fact that the statements in learned treatises come to the trier of fact only through the testimony of qualified experts who are on the stand to explain and apply the material in the treatise. The rule provides that the treatise may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit to prevent the trier from giving it excessive weight or attempting to interpret the treatise by itself. The rule applies only to a learned treatise found by the judge to be a "reliable authority" under Evid. R. 104(A).
Staff Note (July 1, 2016 Amendment)
The amendment adopts the 2011 federal stylistic changes made to the introductory language of Fed.R.Evid. 803 and to Fed.R.Evid. 803(10).
The amendment also adds Evid.R. 803(10)(b) which is modeled on a similar amendment made to Fed.R.Evid. 803(10) in 2013 in response to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557. U.S. 305 (2009). As explained in the Federal Advisory Committee notes to the 2013 amendment, the Melendez-Diaz Court declared that a testimonial certificate could be admitted if the accused is given advance notice and does not timely demand the presence of the official who prepared the certificate. The language of Fed.R.Evid. 803(10)(B) and Ohio Evid.R. 803(10)(b) incorporates, with minor variations, a "notice-and-demand" procedure that was approved by the Melendez-Diaz Court.