N.M. R. Evid. 11-701
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is
N.M. R. Evid. 11-701
Committee commentary. - The language of Rule 11-701 NMRA was amended in 2012 to be consistent with the restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective December 1, 2011, to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on admissibility.
The committee deleted all references to an "inference" on the grounds that the deletion made the rule flow better and easier to read, and because any "inference" is covered by the broader term "opinion." Courts have not made substantive decisions on the basis of any distinction between an opinion and an inference. No change in current practice is intended.
The addition of Paragraph C in 2006 brought this rule into alignment with federal rule 701. This amendment was made to the federal rule in 2000 to avoid the misuse of the lay witness opinion rule as a guise for offering testimony that in reality is based on some form of claimed expertise of the witness. The amendment reflects New Mexico and federal case law. The amendment was a non-substantive change designed to clarify that lay witness testimony under this rule should not be based on "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge". If the witness testifies to such scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, then the admissibility of such testimony must be analyzed under Rule 11-702 NMRA for expert testimony.
[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2012 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 12-8300-015, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after June 16, 2012, rewrote the rule to make stylistic changes, including the deletion of references to "inference". The 2006 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 06-8300-025, effective December 18, 2006, added Paragraph C. The 1993 amendment, effective December 1, 1993, substituted "the witness's" for "his" in two places. Compiler's notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Opinions rationally based on own perceptions are admissible. - Plaintiff farmer's opinion that the chemical which admittedly caused damage to two fields of corn was also the cause of the damage to the third, founded on his observation of the fields and the characteristics of the damage was rationally based on his own perceptions, was helpful to the determination of the causation issue and was admissible. Jesko v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 1976 -NMCA-117, 89 N.M. 786, 558 P.2d 55. Officer's lay testimony regarding defendant's performance on field sobriety tests was permissible. - Where, during defendant's trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the arresting officer limited his testimony to a recitation of what he said and did in administering field sobriety tests, and to his observations of defendant's actions during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg-stand test, never summarizing his observations into a conclusion regarding defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests or correlating defendant's performance on the tests with a blood alcohol content, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony as lay witness testimony, because the officer's testimony was limited to testimony that is rationally based on the witness's perception, and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Town of Taos v. Wisdom, 2017-NMCA-066, cert. denied. Foundation required for admitting opinion testimony of layman is a showing of first-hand knowledge on the part of the witness and a rational connection between the observations made and the opinion formed. If these two requirements are present and the witness' opinion might be helpful in the determination of the facts in issue, the opinion is admissible. The requirement of a rational basis is satisfied if the opinion or reference is one which a normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts. State v. Luna, 1979-NMCA-048, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340. Two-step analysis in admitting lay opinion testimony. - Whether lay opinion testimony is admissible requires a two-step analysis. First, the court must find that the opinion is based on personal perception or personal observation by the witness. Second, the opinion must be rationally based on the witness's own perception or observation. The content of such testimony is generally confined to matters which are within the common knowledge and experience of an average person. State v. Vargas, 2016-NMCA-038. Where defendant was charged with intentional child abuse by torture for using a stun gun on his foster child, the investigative detective's testimony about the technical properties of stun guns, the nature of stun gun injuries and the manner in which they heal, similarities and dissimilarities between stun gun injuries and mosquito bites, the distance between stun gun prongs, and that the marks on the child victim's body were the type that would be caused by a stun gun, are not matters which are within the common knowledge and experience of an average person, and therefore the district court erred in admitting the detective's testimony pursuant to Rule 11-701 NMRA. Moreover, the error was not harmless because there was a reasonable probability that the detective's testimony impacted the jury's verdict by authoritatively declaring that the cause of the child's injuries was a stun gun and that the number of assaults was at least twenty-four. State v. Vargas, 2016-NMCA-038. Personal observation is key factor in allowing lay opinion evidence. Estrada v. Cuaron, 1979-NMCA-079, 93 N.M. 283, 599 P.2d 1080, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215; Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 1982-NMCA-026, 97 N.M. 486, 641 P.2d 517. Ruling on admissibility of lay opinion is within discretion of trial court. State v. Luna, 1979-NMCA-048, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340. The admissibility of lay opinion testimony is within the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will not overturn the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of any discretion. Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 1982-NMCA-026, 97 N.M. 486, 641 P.2d 517. Whether a witness is shown to be qualified as an expert is a matter addressed to the judicial discretion of the trial court. Roberts v. Sparks, 1982-NMCA-171, 99 N.M. 152, 655 P.2d 539. No abuse of discretion to refuse to receive layman testimony. - There is no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to receive the opinion testimony of laymen when, based upon the evidence, the court could properly rule that the lay witnesses did not have a sufficient basis on which to form an opinion, or that their opinion would not have been helpful to a clear understanding of the issue. State v. Luna, 1980-NMSC-009, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183. Nonexpert opinion evidence competent if necessary to reproduce witness's knowledge. - Prior to enactment of rules of evidence, where descriptive language was inadequate to convey the precise facts to the jury, or the bearing of the facts on the issue, the description of the witness would, of necessity, be allowed to be supplemented by his opinion, since all nonexpert opinion and impression evidence was competent if it was necessary or appropriate to reproduce the witness's knowledge of the pertinent facts. Pavlos v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 1971-NMCA-096, 82 N.M. 759, 487 P.2d 187. II. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS. Authentication of substance as cocaine by lay testimony. - Where defendant was charged with trafficking and the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine; the state failed to present a laboratory analysis authenticating the substance found in defendant's vehicle as crack cocaine; when arrested, defendant raised the inference that the substance was an illegal narcotic by telling the arresting police officers that defendant was the user and that the substance was for defendant's personal use; three officers testified that the substance field tested for the presence of cocaine; one officer testified that the result of the test was positive; and two officers testified that based on their experience and training, the substance had the appearance of crack cocaine, the officers' opinions, combined with the actions and statements of defendant, provided sufficient evidence to support the admissibility of the crack cocaine into evidence. State v. Godoy, 2012-NMCA-084, 284 P.3d 410, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-007. Contents of computer hard drive. - A lay witness may testify about what he observed on a computer hard drive and "Zip" disks that came into evidence. Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon, 2008-NMCA-122, 144 N.M. 804, 192 P.3d 799. Lay opinion identification testimony. - Lay opinion identification testimony is helpful to a determination of whether the individual depicted in a surveillance recording is the defendant where there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury, and relevant factors include the witness's general level of familiarity with the defendant's appearance, the witness's familiarity with the defendant's appearance at the time the surveillance photograph was taken or whether the defendant was dressed in a manner similar to the individual depicted, whether the defendant disguised his or her appearance at the time of the offense, whether the defendant had altered his or her appearance prior to trial, and the degree of clarity of the surveillance recording and the quality and completeness of the subject's depiction in the recording. State v. Sweat, 2017-NMCA-069, cert. denied. Where defendant was charged with four counts of burglary of a vehicle, and the state introduced surveillance video taken in the parking lot where defendant was alleged to have broken into several vehicle, the officer's testimony opining that defendant was the person pictured on the surveillance video was admissible, because the officer's testimony that he and defendant had had "countless interactions," including an incident in which they were involved in a traffic accident, and with respect to alterations in defendant's appearance that defendant was much thinner at the time of the incidents, indicated that there was some basis for concluding that the officer was more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than was the jury. State v. Sweat, 2017-NMCA-069, cert. denied. Grooming evidence. - Where grooming evidence was offered to show the defendant's sexual intent, not to show that the defendant had groomed the child for sexual activity, the evidence was within the realm of lay testimony. State v. Sena, 2008-NMSC-053, 144 N.M. 821, 191 P.3d 1198. Blood alcohol concentration. - If an expert can determine a defendant's likely blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving from a blood alcohol concentration, of whatever measurement, taken a significant time after driving, and if the trial court finds that the expert's methodology satisfies the requirements of this rule, then nothing requires exclusion of that expert's testimony. State v. Jensen, 2005-NMCA-113, 138 N.M. 254, 118 P.3d 762, cert. quashed, 2005-NMCERT-011. Helicopters. - Persons affected by the noise of helicopters are not giving expert opinions in testimony regarding the relationship between distance and noise and annoyance, but are simply stating their admissible observations regarding the noise. KOB-TV, LLC v. City of Albuquerque, 2005-NMCA-049, 137 N.M. 388, 111 P.3d 708. Opinion based on observations of witness not expert testimony. - Where a person has an opportunity to observe the movement of a vehicle, he may give an opinion as to its speed at the time and when the opinion is based on the observations of the witness, it is not expert testimony. Dahl v. Turner, 1969-NMCA-075, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d 860. Expressing opinion as to speed is not giving expert testimony, but is permitted as a means of getting the picture before the jury, and is based upon a rule of expediency, where it is difficult or impossible to otherwise describe the occurrence in words. State v. Deming, 1959-NMSC-074, 66 N.M. 175, 344 P.2d 481; Bunton v. Hull, 1947-NMSC-005, 51 N.M. 5, 177 P.2d 168. Lay-opinion evidence used to corroborate expert testimony. - The testimony of neighbors in the vicinity concerning the effects of the blasts on property near the plaintiff's merely served to corroborate the expert testimony showing a causal connection between the blasts and plaintiff's damage and is therefore admissible. Jaramillo v. Anaconda Co., 1962-NMSC-166, 71 N.M. 161, 376 P.2d 954. Lay witness cannot opinionate on complexities of trial practice. - A lay witness does not have the experience, knowledge and wisdom to opinionate on the complexities of trial practice, including the verdict that a jury will render. Sanders v. Smith, 1972-NMCA-016, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 698, 496 P.2d 1094. Where witness was fully qualified by his experience so as to warrant the acceptance of his qualifications by recognized specialists in the field, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in allowing this witness's testimony to be presented to the jury. State v. Rose, 1968-NMSC-091, 79 N.M. 277, 442 P.2d 589, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028, 89 S. Ct. 626, 21 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1969). Where a nurse practitioner had specialized in diagnosing child sexual abuse from 1982 to 1988; had extensively read journals and other materials dealing with the subject; had attended a criminal justice program on sex abuse; and had been qualified to testify 23 times previously as an expert in child sexual abuse, she was a child sexual abuse expert based on her experience, training, and education, and it was proper to admit her testimony on the voluntariness of the victim's statement implicating the perpetrator. State v. Benny E., 1990-NMCA-052, 110 N.M. 237, 794 P.2d 380. That technician-witness was not specialist goes to weight, not admissibility. - Although witness was neither a chemist nor a medical expert, he had been trained to operate the test machine in question and had performed several hundred similar tests with it, and that he was not a specialist does not go to the admissibility of the evidence elicited from him nor to its sufficiency to support a finding based thereon, but rather to the weight to be accorded it. State v. Myers, 1975-NMCA-055, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280. Store manager may testify on whether burglary alarm activated. - In a prosecution for burglary the acting manager of the burglarized store was held qualified to give testimony that the store's burglar alarm system, with which he was familiar, was activated by something crossing a beam of light since his testimony concerned his own perceptions and was helpful in determining whether there had been an entry into the building. State v. Tixier, 1976-NMCA-054, 89 N.M. 297, 551 P.2d 987. Effect of chlorine established by worker's testimony. - In a worker's compensation case, the worker's testimony regarding his reaction to chlorine used to clean equipment, stating that the chlorine caused him to become dizzy, that this dizziness continued, causing his fall a few minutes later in the locker room, was sufficient to explain the cause of his fall and the judge reasonably determined from this evidence that the worker's fall arose from a risk related to his employment. Although the effect of chlorine upon an individual is a matter that may properly be presented by expert testimony, the judge did not err in permitting the worker to testify concerning his own personal reaction following his use of chlorine during his work. Garcia v. Borden, Inc., 1993-NMCA-047, 115 N.M. 486, 853 P.2d 737. There was sufficient foundation to justify admission of testimony by 18-year-old witness with driver's training, who had driven a car for about a year and a half, had observed traffic on the street in question daily, had fine eyesight, had estimated the speed of vehicles in the past and was 100 to 200 feet from the intersection on a clear night, concerning the speed of defendant's car. State v. Richerson, 1975-NMCA-027, 87 N.M. 437, 535 P.2d 644, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 450, 535 P.2d 657. Opinion of 17-year-old as to driver's sobriety admissible. - The testimony of a 17-year-old teenager as to a driver's level of sobriety was admissible where the opinion he expressed was based on his perceptions and experience with intoxicated persons, and was helpful to determine the issue of liability. Sanchez v. Wiley, 1997-NMCA-105, 124 N.M. 47, 946 P.2d 650. Testimony of lay witness as to driving times. - In a prosecution for murder, a lay witness could testify as to the driving times between the scene of the murder and locations the defendant admitted to being on the evening of the murder, based on firsthand knowledge he gained from personally driving the routes. State v. Woodward, 1995-NMSC-074, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231. Jury may assess weight of minor's unchallenged testimony identifying controlled substance. - Where a drug user, who is a minor, testifies as to the identification of a controlled substance and is not challenged on cross-examination, the court does not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to assess the weight of the minor's testimony. State v. Cortez, 1982-NMCA-175, 99 N.M. 727, 663 P.2d 703, rev'd on other grounds, 1983-NMSC-014, 100 N.M. 158, 667 P.2d 963, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 964, 104 S. Ct. 402, 78 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1983). No error in permitting wife, in divorce and alimony action, to testify as to her present medical condition. Russell v. Russell, 1984-NMSC-010, 101 N.M. 648, 687 P.2d 83. Owner of chattel may testify as to its value. - It is a general rule that an owner of chattel property is competent to testify as to the value of his property. This rule is applicable in both civil and criminal trials. State v. Zarafonetis, 1970-NMCA-064, 81 N.M. 674, 472 P.2d 388, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 669, 472 P.2d 383. Owner of real property may testify as to property's value. - An owner of real property is presumed to have special knowledge as to its value by reason of ownership and is therefore competent to testify to value. City of Albuquerque v. Ackerman, 1971-NMSC-032, 82 N.M. 360, 482 P.2d 63. Opinion testimony of police officers as to defendant's depraved mind and lack of regard for human life was rationally based on the witnesses' perceptions and was helpful to the jury's determination. State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024, 121 N.M. 445, 913 P.2d 252. Motel manager's testimony on value of used televisions was competent. - Motel manager's testimony that he was familiar with the value of the television sets that are sold to motels and testified that a used set like the one involved was worth between $150 and $200 was competent and meets the substantial evidence test. State v. Williams, 1972-NMCA-011, 83 N.M. 477, 493 P.2d 962. Opinion testimony of lay witnesses is admissible on question of insanity. State v. Gutierrez, 1975-NMCA-121, 88 N.M. 448, 541 P.2d 628; State v. Luna, 1980-NMSC-009, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183. Opinion testimony of layman may be received on question of insanity, and it is the duty of the trial court to pass upon the qualifications and opportunity of the lay witness to form such an opinion. State v. Lujan, 1975-NMSC-017, 87 N.M. 400, 534 P.2d 1112, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S. Ct. 469, 46 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1975). Expert should have been allowed to comment on validity of lay opinion. - Though the trial judge should probably have allowed defendant's expert to testify regarding the validity of lay opinion of defendant's mental condition, defendant was denied no substantial right, nor was he substantially harmed such that he was denied a fair trial, furthermore, the record clearly showed that the expert witness had an opportunity after the disallowed question to state the difficulty a lay person would have in forming a valid opinion as to defendant's mental condition. State v. Lujan, 1975-NMSC-017, 87 N.M. 400, 534 P.2d 1112, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S. Ct. 469, 46 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1975). Witness' speculative testimony as to starting of fight. - The trial court properly instructed the jury to disregard witness's opinion as to who started a fight where the trial court could properly conclude that witness's testimony was speculative, that the witness was not stating the totality of his actual observations but rather his own version of "but for" causation, and that this evidence was neither rationally based upon his perceptions nor helpful to the jury. Baum v. Orosco, 1987-NMCA-102, 106 N.M. 265, 742 P.2d 1. Opinion may be based upon voice and movements of person. - The opinion of the witness need not be based upon a recognition of face and features; it may be based upon the voice, size, gait and movements of the person whose identity is in question. State v. Quintana, 1961-NMSC-108, 69 N.M. 51, 364 P.2d 120; State v. Fore, 1933-NMSC-019, 37 N.M. 143, 19 P.2d 749. Apparent mental state of defendant. - In a prosecution for retaliation against a witness, it was not error to admit an officer's testimony that defendant appeared to be serious when he made the threatening statement. State v. Warsop, 1998-NMCA-033, 124 N.M. 683, 954 P.2d 748, cert. denied, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087. No indication victim knowledgeably could answer questions concerning defendant's rationality. - Where questions directed to the victim, all of which go beyond the victim's explanation, during direct examination, as to why defendant "seemed rational," ask her to state whether specific acts taken during the commission of the crimes of which defendant has been convicted were rational, absent something indicating knowledge by the victim of what would be rational conduct of a person committing the crimes involved, there is nothing indicating the victim has a knowledgeable basis for answering these questions. State v. Day, 1980-NMSC-032, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S. Ct. 163, 66 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1980). Questioning detective concerning witnesses' veracity improper. - In the cross-examination of a detective, defendant could not ask him whether he had written in his notes that witnesses he interviewed appeared to be exaggerating. State v. La Madrid, 1997-NMCA-057, 123 N.M. 463, 943 P.2d 110. Admission of juvenile probation officer's rebuttal testimony regarding opinion of defendant's reputation for truthfulness is impermissibly prejudicial. State v. Guess, 1982-NMCA-114, 98 N.M. 438, 649 P.2d 506. Computer diagram generated by investigating officer. Where an investigating officer made measurements at a crime scene and entered the measurements into a computer that used the measurements to draw a diagram of the scene showing the path of the defendant's car, the point of impact with the victim's body, the point at which the body came to rest, and the location of other physical evidence at the scene, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony and the diagram. State v. Wildgrube, 2003-NMCA-108, 134 N.M. 262, 75 P.3d 862, cert. denied, 134 N.M. 179, 74 P.3d 1071. Improperly elicited testimony. - Where defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor; defendant was stopped for speeding; defendant promptly and properly stopped the car, was cooperative and behaved appropriately in encounters with police officers, displayed no signs of impairment getting out of the car or walking, performed field sobriety tests with only minor errors, emitted the odor of an alcoholic beverage, had slurred speech and blood shot and watery eyes, and admitted to having one beer; defendant's breath test scores were .06 and .05; the prosecutor repeatedly asked questions, over the objections of defendant, intended to elicit the officer's unqualified and inadmissible opinions regarding the amount of alcohol defendant must have consumed to produce breath scores of .06 and .05; on one occasion the officer answered that the breath scores were not consistent with defendant's admission of having one beer; and there was no evidence to establish whether defendant's breath scores were indicative of impairment, defendant was entitled to a new trial because the inadmissible evidence was intentionally elicited by the prosecution and there was a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was induced by the officer's improperly induced testimony. State v. Armijo, 2014-NMCA-013, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-012. Shoe print comparison within the purview of lay witness testimony. - Similarities between shoe prints, including tread features and size, can be considered, in some instances, distinctive enough to be readily apparent to an average observer; the lay witness's opinion regarding the similarities between the prints or shoes at issue must derive from personal observation or examination of the similarities of the tracks believed to be the suspect's and a shoe or print known to be the defendant's. State v. Winters, 2015-NMCA-050, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-004. Foundation must be laid before a lay witness may testify to the purported similarities between shoe prints. - A foundation must be laid before a lay witness may testify to the purported similarities between prints; in such a case, a lay witness may be permitted to express his or her opinion as to the similarity of footprints if it can be shown that his or her conclusions are based on measurements or peculiarities in the prints that are readily recognizable and within the capabilities of a lay witness to observe. State v. Winters, 2015-NMCA-050, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-004. Where defendant was convicted with larceny and criminal damage to property, and arresting officer testified that shoe prints found at the scene of the larceny and a shoe print found at defendant's residence were "substantially the same," the foundation laid for the officer's opinion regarding the similarities between the shoe prints was insufficient; the officer did not testify to the observations he made regarding the similarities in the prints or any other peculiarities, and the officer also failed to specify which of the three shoe prints he believed matched shoe prints later observed outside defendant's residence, and the officer's testimony failed to establish a foundation linking the shoe prints he observed outside defendant's residence with defendant; the officer's testimony failed to provide a sufficient foundation for his opinion, because the evidence did not establish that his opinion was rationally based on his perceptions or helpful to clearly understanding his testimony; accordingly, the officer's testimony was impermissible lay witness opinion testimony. State v. Winters, 2015-NMCA-050, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-004. Testimony regarding the behavior of sexually abused children. - Testimony about the behavior of sexually abused children must be admitted as expert testimony and not as lay witness testimony, because it is neither the kind of personal observation that a lay person is capable of making nor common knowledge within the general public. State v. Duran, 2015-NMCA-015. Where S.A.F.E. House interviewer testified that the majority of children she has interviewed delayed in disclosing sexual abuse, the testimony was based on specialized knowledge and not the type of testimony generally known by an ordinary citizen or the general public; trial court erred in admitting interviewer's testimony as lay witness testimony. State v. Duran, 2015-NMCA-015. Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 53, 54, 68 to 73, 90, 165 to 167, 344, 353, 356. Admissibility in condemnation proceedings of opinion evidence as to probable profits derivable from land condemned if devoted to particular agricultural purposes, 16 A.L.R.2d 1113. Admissibility of opinion evidence as to whether vehicle involved in collision was standing still or moving, 33 A.L.R.2d 1250. Admissibility of opinion of nonexpert owner as to value of chattel, 37 A.L.R.2d 967. Admissibility of opinion evidence as to the cause of an accident or occurrence, 38 A.L.R.2d 13. Requisite foundation or predicate to permit nonexpert witness to give opinion, in a civil action, as to sanity, mental competency, or mental condition, 40 A.L.R.2d 15. Admissibility of opinion or estimate by nonexpert witness in personal injury action of future hospital expenses, future hospitalization, or the like, 45 A.L.R.2d 1148. Admissibility of opinion evidence of lay witnesses as to diseases and physical condition of animals, 49 A.L.R.2d 932. Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of opinion evidence that death was or was not self-inflicted, 56 A.L.R.2d 1447. Admissibility of opinion evidence as to point of impact or collision in motor vehicle accident case, 66 A.L.R.2d 1048. Admissibility of opinion evidence as to cause of death, disease, or injury, 66 A.L.R.2d 1082. Expert and opinion evidence as to cause or origin of fire, 88 A.L.R.2d 230. Admissibility and probative effect of testimony that motor vehicle was going "fast" or the like, 92 A.L.R.2d 1391. Expert or opinion evidence as to speed based on appearance or condition of motor vehicle after accident, 93 A.L.R.2d 287. Comment note: Ability to see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by lay witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258. Competency of nonexpert's testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405. Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d 575. Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability in health and accident insurance and workers' compensation cases, 89 A.L.R.3d 783. Admissibility of expert or opinion testimony on battered wife or battered woman syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4th 1153. Admissibility of expert or opinion testimony concerning identification of skeletal remains, 18 A.L.R.4th 1294. Competency of nonexpert witness to testify, in criminal case, based upon personal observation, as to whether person was under the influence of drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905. Admissibility of lay witness interpretation of surveillance photograph or videotape, 74 A.L.R.5th 643. Construction and application of Rule 701 of Federal Rules of Evidence, providing for opinion testimony by lay witnesses under certain circumstances, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 919. Reliability of scientific technique and its acceptance within scientific community as affecting admissibility, at federal trial, of expert testimony as to result of test or study based on such technique - modern cases, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 299. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1050 to 1058; 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 509 et seq., 528 et seq., 614 et seq.; 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 1214 et seq., 1271 et seq., 1298.