N.M. R. Crim. P. Dist. Ct. 5-302
N.M. R. Crim. P. Dist. Ct. 5-302
Committee commentary. - This rule governs preliminary examinations held in the district court. Most preliminary examinations will be held by the magistrate or metropolitan court and will be governed by Rule 6-202 NMRA or Rule 7-202 NMRA. The magistrate and metropolitan court rules are substantially identical to this rule.
If a preliminary examination is commenced within the time limits of Subparagraph (A)(1) of this rule, but completion of the hearing requires extension into a second day that falls outside the time limits, the district court may grant an extension to complete the disposition of the preliminary examination under Subparagraph (A)(2) of this rule. The district court may extend the time limits for commencing and holding a preliminary examination if the defendant does not consent only on a showing of exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the state or the court. "'Exceptional circumstances,' . . . would include conditions that are unusual or extraordinary, such as death or illness of the judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney immediately preceding the commencement of the trial; or other circumstances that ordinary experience or prudence would not foresee, anticipate, or provide for." See Committee commentary to Rules 6-506 and 7-506 NMRA.
Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees that the state cannot prosecute a person for a "capital, felonious or infamous crime" without filing either a grand jury indictment or a criminal information. If the state is going to proceed by criminal information, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 . At the preliminary examination, "the state is required to establish, to the satisfaction of the examining judge, two components: (1) that a crime has been committed; and (2) probable cause exists to believe that the person charged committed it." State v. White, 2010-NMCA-043, ¶ 11, 148 N.M. 214, 232 P.3d 450.
If the court dismisses a criminal charge for failure to comply with the time limits in Paragraph A of this rule or for lack of probable cause under Paragraph D of this rule, the dismissal is without prejudice, and the state may later prosecute the defendant for the same offense by filing either an indictment or an information. See State v. Chavez, 1979-NMCA-075, ¶ 23, 93 N.M. 270, 599 P.2d 1067; see also State v. Peavler, 1975-NMSC-035, ¶ 8, 88 N.M. 125, 537 P.2d 1387 (explaining that, following dismissal of an indictment, "the State can choose whether to proceed by indictment or information"); State v. Isaac M., 2001-NMCA-088, ¶ 14, 131 N.M. 235, 34 P.3d 624 (concluding that the right to be free from double jeopardy does not preclude "multiple attempts to show probable cause" because "it is settled law that jeopardy does not attach pretrial"). Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(f) ("If the magistrate judge finds no probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or the defendant committed it, the magistrate judge must dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant. A discharge does not preclude the government from later prosecuting the defendant for the same offense.").
Discharging the defendant means relieving the defendant of all obligations to the court that originated from a criminal charge. Thus, to discharge a defendant the court must release the defendant from custody, relieve the defendant of all conditions of release, and exonerate any bond.
In State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047, ¶ 26, 314 P.3d 236, the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right of confrontation at the preliminary examination, overruling Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, to the extent Mascarenas held otherwise. Paragraph B of this rule was amended in 2014 to clarify that Lopez did not affect the other rights and procedures that apply to preliminary examinations. See Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047, ¶ 26. The list of procedures and rights in Paragraph B of this rule is not intended to be a comprehensive list of the defendant's rights at the preliminary examination.
First, Lopez did not alter the prosecution's duty to provide discovery, as available, to the defendant. See Mascarenas, 1969-NMSC-116, ¶ 14 (holding that if the state is going to call a witness to testify at the preliminary examination, then the defendant has a right to inspect any prior statements or reports made by that witness that are in the possession of the prosecution). However, the defendant's right to discovery prior to the preliminary examination is limited to what is available and in the prosecutor's immediate possession. For example, the defendant does not have a right to discover a laboratory report that has not been prepared and is not ready for use at the preliminary examination.
Additionally, the Rules of Evidence remain generally applicable to preliminary examinations, subject to specific exceptions for certain types of evidence not admissible at trial. See Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047, ¶ 4 (noting that the "Rules of Evidence generally govern proceedings in preliminary examinations" but explaining that Rule 6-608(A) NMRA, which was amended and recompiled as Rule 6-202.1 NMRA in 2022, "provides a specific exception to our hearsay rule for admissibility" of certain types of written laboratory reports).
The defendant also retains the right to call and obtain subpoenas for witnesses and to cross-examine the state's witnesses. Thus, although Rule Rules 5-302.1 , 6-202.1 , and 7-202.1 NMRA may permit the state to use a laboratory report at a preliminary examination without calling the laboratory analyst as a witness, the defendant retains the right "to call witnesses to testify as to the matters covered in the report." Rule 6-202.1(F) NMRA; accord Rule 7-202.1(F) NMRA. And the preliminary examination remains "a critical stage of a criminal proceeding" at which "counsel must be made available to the accused." State v. Sanchez, 1984-NMCA-068, ¶ 10, 101 N.M. 509, 684 P.2d 1174.
Paragraph E of this rule was added in 1980. The contents of this paragraph were formerly found in Rule 5-601(C) NMRA.
Subparagraph (B)(4) of this rule allows for witnesses to appear by audio-visual communication under compelling circumstances. For the purposes of this subparagraph, compelling circumstance may include a witness who resides out of state or is too ill or injured to appear in person. The judge in these proceedings will have the discretion to decide what rises to the level of compelling circumstances for witnesses requesting to appear by audio-visual communication.
[Amended by Supreme Court Order No. 14-8300-020, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2014; amended by Supreme Court Order No. 17-8300-016, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2017; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. 22-8300-022, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2022.]
ANNOTATIONS The 2017 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 17-8300-016, effective December 31, 2017, revised the time limits for scheduling and holding a preliminary examination, revised the rule regarding when a district court may extend the time limits for holding a preliminary examination if the defendant does not consent, and revised the committee commentary; in Paragraph A, Subparagraph A(1), in the introductory clause, after "shall be", added "scheduled and", after "in any event", deleted "not" and added "no", after "(10) days", deleted "after the first appearance", after "(60) days", deleted "after the first appearance", and after "not in custody", added "of whichever of the following events occurs latest", added Subparagraphs A(1)(a) through A(1)(f), and in Subparagraph A(2), after "upon a showing", added "on the record", after "that", deleted "extraordinary" and added "exceptional", and after "circumstances", added "beyond the control of the state or the court". The 2014 amendment, approved by Supreme Court Order No. 14-8300-020, effective December 31, 2014, provided for extensions of time for holding a preliminary hearing beyond the ten day time limit; provided for appointment of counsel and discovery; provided for the application of the Rules of Evidence; added Paragraph A; in Paragraph B, deleted the former title "Subpoena of witnesses" and added the current title and in the introductory sentence, after "must be conducted", added "the following procedures shall apply"; added Paragraphs B (1) and (2); in Paragraph B (3), after "required by the", deleted "district attorney" and added "prosecution"; in Paragraph B (4), added the title, after "the defendant's presence", deleted "and may be cross-examined" and added the remainder of the sentence; and added Paragraph B (5); in Paragraph C, in the title, after "Record of", deleted "hearing"; in Paragraph D (1), after "of the examination", deleted "it appears to", after "appears to the court", added "finds", after "defendant has committed", deleted "an" and added "a felony", after "the court shall", added "dismiss without prejudice all felony charges for which probable cause does not exist and", and after "discharge the defendant", deleted "as to those offenses"; and deleted former Paragraph D which is restated in Paragraph A (1). The 1999 amendment, effective on and after June 1, 1999, substituted "sixty (60)" for "twenty (20)" in Paragraph D. Compiler's notes. - Paragraph C is similar to Rule 5.1(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For constitutional rights to preliminary examination and to confrontation of witnesses, see N.M. Const., art. II, § 14 . For magistrate court rule relating to preliminary examination, see Rule 6-202 NMRA. For bindover order form, see Rule 9-207 NMRA. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Preliminary examination waived by plea. - Under former law, defendant's plea in district court constituted a waiver of his right to a preliminary examination. State v. Sexton, 1968-NMCA-003, 78 N.M. 694, 437 P.2d 155; see also State v. Paul, 1971-NMCA-040, 82 N.M. 619, 485 P.2d 375, cert. denied, 82 N.M. 601, 485 P.2d 357; State v. Darrah, 1966-NMSC-171, 76 N.M. 671, 417 P.2d 805; State v. Deltenre, 1966-NMSC-187, 77 N.M. 497, 424 P.2d 782, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976 , 87 S. Ct. 1171, 18 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1967); State v. Gibby, 1967-NMSC-219, 78 N.M. 414, 432 P.2d 258; State v. Tanner, 1967-NMSC-253, 78 N.M. 519, 433 P.2d 498; State v. Henry, 1967-NMSC-265, 78 N.M. 573, 434 P.2d 692; State v. Olguin, 1968-NMSC-012, 78 N.M. 661, 437 P.2d 122; State v. Sisk, 1968-NMSC-087, 79 N.M. 167, 441 P.2d 207; State v. Sanders, 1968-NMSC-169, 79 N.M. 587, 446 P.2d 639; State v. Leyba, 1969-NMCA-030, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 198, 453 P.2d 219; State v. Maimona, 1969-NMCA-081, 80 N.M. 562, 458 P.2d 814. Plea of nolo contendere waives right to preliminary examination. State v. Raburn, 1966-NMSC-174, 76 N.M. 681, 417 P.2d 813 (decided under former law). Exception to waiver by plea. - Where defendant waived right to preliminary hearing without benefit of counsel, and later self-employed counsel requested remand for hearing on grounds it was essential to preparation of case, the entry of a plea upon arraignment in the district court did not operate as a waiver of defendant's right to a preliminary examination. State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 1963-NMSC-057, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196; State v. Vega, 1967-NMSC-255, 78 N.M. 525, 433 P.2d 504. Determination of probable cause based on judicially-noticed testimony. - Where no witnesses testified at defendant's preliminary hearing; the State offered testimony that the victim and a detective had given at a previous hearing before the magistrate pertaining to a different charge; the magistrate took judicial notice of the testimony and based solely on the judicially-noticed testimony, issued a determination of probable cause; defendant proceeded to a jury trial without challenging the preliminary hearing; and defendant claimed that defendant was deprived of the right to a preliminary hearing, defendant had no remedy for the error in the preliminary hearing. State v. Perez, 2014-NMCA-023, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-001. Losing of jurisdiction. - Under former law, even though the district court acquires jurisdiction of a criminal case upon the filing of the information, that jurisdiction originally acquired "may be lost 'in the course of the proceeding' by failure of the court to remand for a preliminary examination when its absence is timely brought to the attention of the district court". Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, overruled by State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047; State v. Vasquez, 1969-NMCA-082, 80 N.M. 586, 458 P.2d 838. Right to examination where charge by information. - When the charge is by criminal information, defendant had a right to a preliminary examination. State v. Vasquez, 80 N.M. 586, 1969-NMCA-082, 458 P.2d 838 (decided under former law). Right to preliminary hearing not absolute. - There exists no absolute right to a preliminary hearing and N.M. Const., art. II, § 14 , leaves it in the discretion of the prosecutor to proceed by indictment and thus to obviate the requirement of preliminary examination. The constitutional alternatives protect an accused from being charged except upon probable cause. State v. Peavler, 1975-NMSC-035, 88 N.M. 125, 537 P.2d 1387. Does not exist where grand jury indictment. - When charged by criminal information, a defendant has a right to a preliminary examination. No such right exists if the defendant is indicted by a grand jury. State v. Burk, 1971-NMCA-018, 82 N.M. 466, 483 P.2d 940, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S. Ct. 309, 30 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1971) (decided under former law). Discovery not object of hearing. - Because there was a grand jury indictment, defendant's claim that he was deprived of the discovery he could have obtained at a preliminary hearing is no ground for error as discovery is not the object of a preliminary hearing. State v. Burk, 1971-NMCA-018, 82 N.M. 466, 483 P.2d 940, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S. Ct. 309, 30 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1971) (decided under former law). Effect of postarrest irregularities on hearing. - If the manner of arrest of an accused will not affect the jurisdiction of the court where the charge of which he is accused is pending, the irregularities which occur subsequent to the arrest but prior to preliminary hearing should likewise have no effect on the jurisdiction of the court. State v. Barreras, 1958-NMSC-085, 64 N.M. 300, 328 P.2d 74 (decided under former law). Preliminary hearing critical stage. - Where complaint and information are utilized in lieu of indictment, the preliminary hearing has been held to be a critical stage of the criminal process for purposes of applying the right-to-counsel provision of U.S. Const., amend. VI. State v. Burk, 1971-NMCA-018, 82 N.M. 466, 483 P.2d 940, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S. Ct. 309, 30 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1971) (decided under former law). The preliminary examination is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, because a defendant needs the advice and assistance of counsel at the time of his arraignment, at the entry of plea and his announcement as to whether he desires or waives a preliminary examination, and because he needs the assistance of counsel in cross-examining the state's witnesses at the preliminary examination. Pearce v. Cox, 354 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 976 , 86 S. Ct. 1869, 16 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1966) (decided under former law). Generally, as to right to counsel. - Under state law the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. It has been held that counsel must be made available at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, if represented by counsel when arraigned in district court, if no objection is made to a lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing stage, or even of the total absence of a preliminary, without a showing of prejudice, there is a waiver of the right to counsel at the earlier stages. Neller v. State, 1968-NMSC-130, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (decided under former law). Claim that defendant was entitled to counsel when he appeared before the magistrate states no basis for post-conviction relief where defendant was represented by counsel at preliminary hearing. State v. Apodaca, 1967-NMSC-218, 78 N.M. 412, 432 P.2d 256 (decided under former law). The determination of the question of indigency must often be made before the otherwise normal appearance of the accused before the district court. To hold a preliminary hearing without counsel present, unless the right to counsel has been competently, intelligently and voluntarily waived, vitiates the hearing. State ex rel. Peters v. McIntosh, 1969-NMSC-103, 80 N.M. 496, 458 P.2d 222 (decided under former law). Necessity for prejudice resulting from absence of counsel. - Failure to assign counsel prior to preliminary examination of an indigent defendant in a noncapital case is not ground for vacating a conviction or sentence based upon a plea of guilty, at least without a showing that prejudice resulted therefrom. Sanders v. Cox, 1964-NMSC-214, 74 N.M. 524, 395 P.2d 353, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 , 85 S. Ct. 680, 13 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1965) (decided under former law). Failure to assign counsel to represent defendant before the magistrate or at his arraignment did not abridge defendant's constitutional rights where no prejudice was shown. Gantar v. Cox, 1964-NMSC-215, 74 N.M. 526, 395 P.2d 354 (decided under former law). Where the failure to assign counsel prior to preliminary examination did not prejudice petitioner's position in any manner in the district court, such failure does not require vacating the plea of guilty. French v. Cox, 1964-NMSC-236, 74 N.M. 593, 396 P.2d 423 (decided under former law). Failure to appeal forecloses question of error in preliminary hearing. - Under former Rule 93 , R. Civ. P. (Dist. Cts.) (now former Rule 1-093), the question of error in a preliminary hearing is foreclosed by failure to take an appeal from original conviction. State v. Anderson, 1973-NMCA-078, 84 N.M. 786, 508 P.2d 1019 (decided prior to Rule 5-802 NMRA). Second hearing not afforded by amended information. - Having been afforded a preliminary hearing on the original information, the defendant was not entitled to another on the amended information. State v. Wesson, 1972-NMCA-013, 83 N.M. 480, 493 P.2d 965 (decided under former law). Preliminary hearing is no essential prerequisite to guilt-determining process which comports with fundamental fairness and due process and state may proceed by indictment rather than information. State v. Burk, 1971-NMCA-018, 82 N.M. 466, 483 P.2d 940, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955 , 92 S. Ct. 309, 30 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1971) (decided under former law). Probable cause the only issue. - The preliminary hearing is not a trial on the merits with a view of determining the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime "failure to appear"; at a preliminary hearing the only issue is whether there exists probable cause to believe defendant committed the offense. State v. Masters, 1982-NMCA-166,99 N.M. 58, 653 P.2d 889. Magistrate court jurisdiction over aggravated battery. - Magistrate courts have no trial jurisdiction over aggravated battery, which is a third-degree felony, but do have authority to conduct preliminary examinations upon charges therefor. State ex rel. Moreno v. Floyd, 1973-NMSC-117, 85 N.M. 699, 516 P.2d 670. Purpose of procedures prescribing preliminary hearing conduct. - Statutory procedures prescribing the conduct of a preliminary hearing are designed to protect the rights of the accused, and it is only upon a full examination that probable cause may be found to exist and a defendant be bound over to the district court for trial. State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 1963-NMSC-057, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196 (decided under former law). No provision for reopening of preliminary hearing. - There is no provision under the statutes allowing for the reopening of a preliminary hearing. State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 1963-NMSC-057, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196 (decided under former law). Law reviews. - For survey, "Children's Court Practice in Delinquency and Need of Supervision Cases Under the New Rules," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 331 (1976). For comment, "The Use of an Information Following the Return of a Grand Jury No Bill: State v. Joe Nestor Chavez," see 10 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (1979-80). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 575 to 588 . Right of indigent defendant under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to appearance of witnesses necessary to adequate defense, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 233. Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 892. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 357 et seq. II. SUBPOENA OF WITNESSES. Scope of right to confront witnesses. - When the constitution grants to an accused the right to be confronted by the witness against him, it grants that right at all of the criminal proceedings, including the preliminary examination. Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, overruled by State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047. Effect of denial of right to confront witnesses. - As the preliminary examination is a part of the criminal prosecution, denial of that right to be confronted with the witnesses against defendant amounts to the denial of a preliminary examination and the court was without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial based upon an information. Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, overruled by State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047. Production of prior statements or records. - When it is made to appear that when a witness called to testify by the state in a preliminary examination has made a prior written statement concerning the matter about which he is called to testify, the accused is entitled to an order directing the prosecution to produce for inspection all statements or reports of such witness in its possession touching the events about which the witness will testify. Any other result would be to deny the accused his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and would have the same effect as though he were denied a preliminary examination. Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, overruled by State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047. Defendant may call witnesses in his defense at a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate must, if necessary, issue subpoenas to compel their appearance. State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 1963-NMSC-057, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196 (decided under former law). Denial of defendant's right to call witnesses in his behalf, at a preliminary examination, was error which required the trial judge to sustain a plea in abatement for a full and complete preliminary examination. Mascarenas v. State, 1969-NMSC-116, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789, overruled by State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047. III. RECORD OF HEARING. Scope of rule defining "record". - Rule 55 (see now Rule 5-111 NMRA) is merely a definition of a "record" and pertains equally to proceedings in district court and to preliminary examinations pursuant to this rule in magistrate courts. State ex rel. Moreno v. Floyd, 1973-NMSC-117, 85 N.M. 699, 516 P.2d 670. Tape recording constitutes an adequate record of the preliminary hearings in a magistrate court regardless of the fact that defendant's attorneys prefer a stenographic copy of these proceedings. State ex rel. Moreno v. Floyd, 1973-NMSC-117, 85 N.M. 699, 516 P.2d 670. Two alternatives where witness' testimony at hearing lost. - Where the loss of the testimony of a witness at the preliminary hearing because of equipment failure is known prior to trial, there are two alternatives: (1) exclusion of all evidence which the lost evidence might have impeached; or (2) admission, with full disclosure of the loss and its relevance and import, and the choice between these alternatives must be made by the trial court, depending on its assessment of materiality and prejudice. State v. Pedroncelli, 1981-NMCA-142, 97 N.M. 190, 637 P.2d 1245. IV. FINDINGS OF COURT. District judge in preliminary hearing has authority to decide probable cause. State v. Chavez, 1979-NMCA-075, 93 N.M. 270, 599 P.2d 1067, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215. Effect of magistrate court findings on subsequent indictment. - Subsequent indictment is not barred when the magistrate conducts a preliminary hearing and decides that insufficient probable cause exists for binding the accused over for trial in district court. State v. Peavler, 1975-NMSC-035, 88 N.M. 125, 537 P.2d 1387. Effect where punishment not within magistrate court jurisdiction. - If it appears that an offense has been committed, the punishment of which is not within the jurisdiction of the magistrate as a trial judge, and there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty thereof, the magistrate, without the necessity of further complaint, or further preliminary examination, shall commit or bail the accused to appear at the next term of the district court. State v. Vasquez, 1969-NMCA-082, 80 N.M. 586, 458 P.2d 838 (decided under former law). V. TIME. Due process not denied by delay where no prejudice. - Where there is nothing in the record indicating that appellant was prejudiced in the delay in arraignment, then absent a showing of prejudice, the delay in holding a preliminary hearing is not a denial of due process. State v. Olguin, 1968-NMSC-012, 78 N.M. 661, 437 P.2d 122 (decided under former law). When defendant has been denied timely preliminary examination, the court is to proceed in its discretion in fashioning relief to an aggrieved defendant; however, neither dismissal of the charge nor reversal of a conviction is an appropriate remedy if there is no showing of prejudice. State v. Warner, 1974-NMCA-034, 86 N.M. 219, 521 P.2d 1168. VI. REMAND FOR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. Subdivision (e) (see now Paragraph E) of this rule is not limited only to cases which originate in district court. State v. Tollardo, 1982-NMCA-156, 99 N.M. 115, 654 P.2d 568. Jurisdiction of magistrate court expanded beyond usual time limit. - Nothing in either the district court rules or the magistrate court rules limits the jurisdiction of the magistrate court to the time limits specified in Rule 15 , N.M.R. Crim. P. (Magis. Ct.) (see now Rule 6-202 NMRA); rather, they specifically grant limited jurisdiction to the magistrate court, by Rule 3 , N.M.R. Crim. P. (Magis. Ct.) (see now Rule 6-104 NMRA) and Subdivision (e) (see now Paragraph E) of this rule, beyond the time limits prescribed in Magistrate Court Rule 15 (see now Rule 6-202 NMRA). State v. Tollardo, 1982-NMCA-156, 99 N.M. 115, 654 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1982).