In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the offending party or his or her attorney, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a reasonable attorney fee, and when the misconduct is wilful, a monetary penalty. When appropriate, the court may, by contempt proceedings, compel obedience by any party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under these rules. Notwithstanding the entry of a judgment or an order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, any order imposing monetary sanctions, including such orders as may be entered on motions which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal.
Where a sanction is imposed under this paragraph (c), the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219
Administrative Order
In re Discovery Rules
The order entered March 28, 2002, amending various rules and effective July 1, 2002, shall apply to all cases filed after such effective date as well as all cases pending on such effective date, provided that any discovery order entered in any such case prior to July 1, 2002, shall remain in effect unless and until amended by the trial court.
Committee Comment
(Revised May 29, 2014)
The Committee believes that the rule is sufficient to cover sanction issues as they relate to electronic discovery. The rulings in Shimanovsky v. GMC, 181 Ill. 2d 112 (1998) and Adams v. Bath and Body Works, 358 Ill.App.3d 387 (1st Dist. 2005) contain detailed discussion of sanctions for discovery violations for the loss or destruction of relevant evidence and for the separate and distinct claim for the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.
Order entered November 27, 2002, effective immediately.
Committee Comment
(March 28, 2002)
This rule is amended to conform to the changes in terminology made in Supreme Court Rule 213.
Committee Comments
(Revised June 1, 1995)
Paragraphs (a) and (b)
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule were derived from former Rules 19-12(1) and (2). In 1974, Rule 214 was amended to provide for a request procedure in the production of documents and tangible things and inspection of real estate, eliminating the requirement that the party seeking such discovery obtain an order of court. Paragraph (a) of Rule 219 was amended at the same time to extend its coverage to cases in which a party refuses to comply with a request under amended Rule 214.
Paragraph (c)
Paragraph (c) is derived from former Rule 19-12(3). The paragraph has been changed to permit the court to render a default judgment against either party. This is consistent with Federal Rule 37(b)(iii), and makes effective the remedy against a balky plaintiff. The remedy was previously limited to dismissal (although it is to be noted that in former Rule 19-12(3) nonsuit and dismissal were both mentioned), and the plaintiff could presumably bring his action again, while in case of the defendant the answer could be stricken and the case decided on the complaint alone. The sanctions imposed must relate to the issue to which the misconduct relates and may not extend to other issues in the case.
Subparagraph (c) was amended in 1985 to make it clear that the sanctions provided for therein applied to violations of new Rules 220 and 222, as well as any discovery rules that may be enacted in the future. Subparagraph (c) was further amended in 1985 to recognize the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce any monetary sanctions imposed thereunder for any abuse of discovery in any case in which an order prescribing such sanctions was entered before any judgment or order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary (see North Park Bus Service, Inc. v. Pastor (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 406), or to order such monetary sanctions, and enforce them, in any case in which a motion for sanctions was pending before the trial court prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary. This change in no way compromises a plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss his action under section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1009). It simply makes it clear that a party may not avoid the consequences of an abuse of the discovery process by filing a notice of voluntary dismissal.
Paragraph (c) has been expanded to provide: (1) for the imposition of prejudgment interest in those situations where a party who has failed to comply with discovery has delayed the entering of a money judgment; (2) the imposition of a monetary penalty against a party or that party's attorney for a wilful violation of the discovery rules; and (3) for other appropriate sanctions against a party or that party's attorney including the payment of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct together with a reasonable attorney fee.
Paragraph (c) is expanded first by adding subparagraph (vii), which specifically allows the trial court to include in a judgment, interest for any period of pretrial delay attributable to discovery abuses by the party against whom the money judgment is entered.
Paragraph (c) has also been expanded to provide for the imposition of a monetary penalty against a party or that party's attorney as a result of a wilful violation of the discovery rules. See Safeway Insurance Co. v. Graham, 188 Ill. App. 3d 608 (1st Dist. 1989). The decision as to whom such a penalty may be payable is left to the discretion of the trial court based on the discovery violation involved and the consequences of that violation. This language is intended to put to rest any doubt that a trial court has the authority to impose a monetary penalty against a party or that party's attorney. See Transamerica Insurance Group v. Lee, 164 Ill. App. 3d 945 (1st Dist. 1988) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
The last full paragraph of paragraph (c) has also been amended to give greater discretion to the trial court to fashion an appropriate sanction against a party who has violated the discovery rules or orders. The amended language parallels that used in Rule 137. This paragraph has also been amended to require a judge who imposes a sanction under paragraph (c) to specify the reasons and basis for the sanction imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order. This language is the same as that now contained in Rule 137.
Paragraph (d)
Paragraph (d) is new. It extends the sanctions provided for in the new rule to general abuse of the discovery rules.
Paragraph (e)
Paragraph (e) addresses the use of voluntary dismissals to avoid compliance with discovery rules or deadlines, or to avoid the consequences of discovery failures, or orders barring witnesses or evidence. This paragraph does not change existing law regarding the right of a party to seek or obtain a voluntary dismissal. However, this paragraph does clearly dictate that when a case is refiled, the court shall consider the prior litigation in determining what discovery will be permitted, and what witnesses and evidence may be barred. The consequences of noncompliance with discovery deadlines, rules or orders cannot be eliminated by taking a voluntary dismissal. Paragraph (e) further authorizes the court to require the party taking the dismissal to pay the out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred by the adverse party or parties. This rule reverses the holdings in In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, 259 Ill. App. 3d 231, 631 N.E.2d 1302 (1st Dist. 1994), and Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 209 Ill. App. 3d 128, 568 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist. 1991). Paragraph (e) does not provide for the payment of attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed.