Colo. Mun. Ct. R. P. 248

As amended through Rule Change 2024(18), effective October 2, 2024

Rule 248 - Dismissal

(a) By the Prosecution. No case pending in any court shall be dismissed or a nolle prosequi therein entered by the prosecution, unless upon a motion in open court and with the court's consent and approval. Such a motion shall be supported by a statement concisely stating the reasons for the action. Such a dismissal may not be entered during the trial without the defendant's consent.

(b) By the Court. If there is unnecessary delay in the trial of a defendant, the court may dismiss the case. If the trial of a defendant is delayed more than 91 days (13 weeks) after the arraignment of the defendant, or unless the delay is occasioned by the action or request of the defendant, the court shall dismiss the case and the defendant shall not thereafter be tried for the same offense; except that if on the day of a trial set within the last 7 days of the above time limit a necessity for a continuance arises which the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion determines would warrant an additional delay, then one continuance, not exceeding 28 days, may be allowed, after which the dismissal shall be entered as above provided if trial is not held within the additional time allowed.

Entire chapter amended June 30, 1988, effective 1/1/1989; (b) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective 1/1/2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b).

ANNOTATION Mandatory limit to initiate prosecution. "Unnecessary delay" in section (b) does not merely codify the defendant's basic constitutional right to a speedy trial, since the reference to 90 days, rather than being a guideline for the court's discretion, is a mandatory limit. Bachicha v. Municipal Court, 41 Colo. App. 198, 581 P.2d 746 (1978). Delay caused by defendant. The defendant may not whipsaw the court between its obligation to protect his right of confrontation and his right to a speedy trial. When, as a result of defendant's actions, the court cannot determine whether he has waived his right to be present at trial, it is clear that defendant has delayed proceedings within the meaning of this rule. Crandall v. Municipal Court ex rel. City of Sterling, 650 P.2d 1324 (Colo. App. 1982). Where defendant requested a pretrial conference for the purpose of achieving a disposition of his case without going to trial, and agreed to the terms of the disposition, defendant could not complain of the delay occasioned by his unsuccessful efforts to meet the conditions for disposition. Alley v. Kal, 44 Colo. App. 561, 616 P.2d 191 (1980). Right to speedy trial under this rule violated where defendant is not brought to trial in county court within 90 days of filing of appeal requesting a trial de novo. Rainwater v. County Court, 43 Colo. App. 477, 604 P.2d 1195 (1979). The computation of the speedy trial period begins from the entry of the last not-guilty plea. People of City of Aurora v. Allen, 885 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994). If the charges brought against the defendant are dismissed without prejudice, they become a nullity. Dismissal of all the charges is a final judgment on the case. If and when the defendant is arraigned under a subsequent information, the speedy trial period begins anew, even if the charges are identical. People of City of Aurora v. Allen, 885 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994). Speedy trial is tolled while an appeal is pending. People of City of Aurora v. Allen, 885 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994). When a trial court continues a case due to docket congestion, but makes a reasonable effort to reschedule within the speedy trial period, and defense counsel's scheduling conflict does not permit a new date within the speedy trial deadline, the resulting delay is attributable to defendant. The period of delay is excludable from time calculations for purposes of the applicable speedy trial provision. Hills v. Westminster Mun. Court, 245 P.3d 947 (Colo. 2011).