Opinion
No. 13-56362
07-02-2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00024-PSG-PJW MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Qin Zhang appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in her action alleging federal and state law violations arising out of prior state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Zhang's federal claims sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims were a forbidden "de facto appeal" of a prior state court judgment or were "inextricably intertwined" with that judgment. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's claim because the relief sought "would require the district court to determine that the state court's decision was wrong and thus void"); Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (a court may dismiss sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without violating due process).
The district court properly dismissed Zhang's state law claims due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction over any federal claims. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court has no discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it dismisses federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Zhang's requests for judicial notice, set forth in her opening brief, are denied as unnecessary.
The Google defendants' request for sanctions, set forth in their April 11, 2014 answering brief, is denied.
Pursuant to the May 28, 2014 clerk order, the Clerk is directed to strike the reply brief filed on March 27, 2014.
AFFIRMED.