Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG05241380
RUVOLO, P. J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth appeal arising out of the above-captioned matter. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of respondents. (Zarate v. Manuel (Oct. 10, 2008, A117808) [nonpub. opn.] (No. A117808).) In the second (Zarate v. Manuel (May 28, 2009, A120686) [nonpub. opn.] (No. A120686)) and third (Zarate v. Manuel (March 30, 2010, A125662) [nonpub. opn.] (No. A125662)) appeals, we affirmed attorney fee awards made to respondents in connection with their prosecution of the proceedings in the trial court and on appeal, respectively.
In our opinion in No. A117808, we concluded that the trial court’s signed statement of decision constituted the judgment in this case. (Slip opn., pp. 6-7.)
This appeals relates to events occurring after we issued the remittitur in No. A117808. Upon return to the trial court, respondents filed a motion seeking an order cancelling six deeds of trust filed by appellants against two parcels of real property which were the subject of the litigation. The motion related to that portion of the final judgment which concluded that the deeds of trust were “improper, invalid and unenforceable.” The post-appeal motion was brought because respondents wanted to record the order cancelling the deeds of trust to give notice to any interested third parties. The trial court granted the motion.
Appellants claim several errors by the trial court in connection with the motion, the principal ones being that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant it, because its purpose was to “amend the judgment, ” and that the order constituted an invalid order to enforce the judgment. We agree with respondents that the arguments made by appellants in this current appeal “border on the frivolous, ” and we affirm the trial court.
II.
Procedural and Factual Backgrounds
Our statement of facts relating to the dispute underlying this litigation is taken from our opinion in No. A117808:
“Appellants Rodelio and Herminigilda Manuel formerly owned and operated a number of skilled nursing facilities, including two that are involved in this litigation: Wisteria Care Center (Wisteria) and Milpitas Care Center (Milpitas). In 1999, after the California Department of Health Care Services rescinded appellants’ certification, they sold Wisteria and Milpitas to respondents Floro and Patricia Zarate. Respondents paid a portion of the purchase price for the two facilities by means of promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on the real property on which the facilities are located.
“In early 2000, respondents deeded a 40 percent interest in Wisteria to Joseph and Juliana Taburaza. Respondents defaulted on the payments due to appellants under the promissory notes, and appellants recorded notices of default on both properties. During the same time period, appellants had an appeal pending challenging a judgment against them that had been obtained by their creditor, Orthopaedic, Neurological & Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (ONR).
“On July 9, 2002, appellants, respondents, and ONR engaged in a mediation that resulted in a written settlement agreement. In essence, the settlement agreement was structured so that respondents would pay for and receive Milpitas, and appellants would assume the debt on Wisteria and regain ownership of it. All existing claims among the parties were released, except for the obligations undertaken in the settlement agreement.
“More specifically, with respect to Milpitas, the settlement agreement provided that: (1) respondents would pay appellants’ debt to ONR, in the amount of $125,000 plus interest; (2) respondents would pay appellants $200,000 plus 10 percent interest by August 1, 2007; (3) appellants would immediately rescind all of the notices of default that they had recorded; and (4) when the amounts owed by respondents under the settlement agreement had been paid in full, appellants would cancel the promissory notes that were secured by deeds of trust on Milpitas.
“With respect to Wisteria, the settlement agreement provided that respondents would return ownership of that facility and property to appellants or their nominee if and when certain conditions were satisfied, including: (1) appellants paid off or assumed the debts to Zion’s Bank and Comerica Bank that were secured by Wisteria, so that respondents would no longer be personally liable on those debts, and the deed of trust on respondents’ home securing the Comerica Bank loan would be released; and (2) appellants or their nominee received a license from the California Department of Health Services permitting them to operate Wisteria as a skilled nursing facility. On their part, respondents agreed to hold appellants or their nominee harmless with respect to any claim by the Taburazas related to Wisteria.
“Respondents made the payments to ONR and to appellants that were called for under the settlement agreement. However, other terms of the settlement agreement were not fulfilled. Appellants failed to rescind the pending notices of default. Instead, they continued to pursue foreclosure proceedings. They substituted their daughter as the trustee on the deeds of trust, and filed new notices of default. In addition, although they took steps to assume the financing on Wisteria and to obtain the necessary license to operate it, they never succeeded in fulfilling either of these conditions of the settlement agreement. Appellants contended that respondents interfered with their efforts to do so, and that respondents’ actions constituted a repudiation of the settlement agreement.
“On November 9, 2005, respondents filed an action in the Alameda County Superior Court for breach of contract and to quiet title in both the Milpitas and Wisteria properties. Appellants filed a cross-complaint on February 16, 2006.
“In 2006, while the litigation was pending, a dispute developed between the parties regarding the amount of interest owed by appellants under the settlement agreement. On April 14, 2006, respondents tendered what they contended was the remaining balance due to appellants under the settlement agreement by depositing that amount into the client trust account of a law firm, to be paid to appellants upon the surrender of the promissory notes and reconveyance of the deeds of trust on Milpitas. Appellants did not satisfy these conditions, and as of the date of trial, the funds remained in the law firm’s trust account.
“The action was tried to the court without a jury beginning on October 16, 2006, and was submitted on October 27, 2006 On January 23, 2007, the trial court issued a notice of intended decision. On February 2, 2007, appellants filed a request for statement of decision. On February 13, 2007, respondents filed proposals regarding the statement of decision, and appellants filed an actual proposed statement of decision. On the same day, the trial court ordered both parties to file proposed statements of decision. Respondents complied with this order on February 28, 2007.
“On March 13, 2007, the trial court signed and filed a statement of decision. The same document was also entered on the court’s electronic docket, on the same date, as the judgment in the action. The statement of decision found that respondents had fulfilled the conditions of the settlement agreement, and that the sum deposited with the law firm constituted the full amount that they then owed appellants, and that the conditions placed on the tender regarding surrender of the promissory notes and deeds of trust on Milpitas did not invalidate the tender, because respondents were legally entitled to impose those conditions. The statement of decision also rejected appellants’ contention that the transfer to the Taburazas constituted a breach of the settlement agreement.
“As to appellants, the statement of decision found that they had not complied with the conditions required under the settlement agreement for them to be entitled to regain ownership of Wisteria, and rejected their claims that respondents had interfered with their efforts to do so. It further found that appellants had breached the settlement agreement by failing to rescind the notices of default, reinstituting foreclosure proceedings, and refusing to reconvey the deeds of trust on Milpitas. Accordingly, it held that neither appellants nor anyone claiming under them had any further claim to either Wisteria or Milpitas, and ordered title to both properties quieted in respondents.
“On March 28, 2007, appellants filed a motion for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a separate motion for relief from forfeiture. After a hearing on May 4, 2007, the trial court denied both motions.”
In No. A117808, we affirmed the trial court, concluding that there were no errors in its findings or in its award of “clear title” to respondents. Our remittitur issued on January 22, 2009, after appellants’ petition for review to the Supreme Court was denied. As noted ante, we later heard two appeals relating to awards of attorney fees to respondents, which we affirmed separately on May 28, 2009 (No. A120686), and on March 30, 2010 (No. A125662).
Shortly after our remittitur in No. A117808 issued, respondents filed an ex parte application for an order cancelling the offending deeds of trust, in accordance with the judgment previously entered. The motion was filed on the ground that the judgment stated that no claims by appellants, or anyone claiming under them, could any longer exist against either Milpitas or Wisteria, and that appellants’ deeds of trust were cancelled. Respondents requested an order “which will unambiguously reflect the Court’s determination that the deeds of trust recorded by [appellants] are no longer in effect and enforceable.” In this way, notice could be provided “to any interested party that the deeds of trust recorded by [appellants] are of no effect and unenforceable.” Thereafter, the trial court issued a notice setting the matter for hearing on May 29, 2009.
Appellants filed an opposition. The trial court granted the motion on June 19, 2009, and issued an order cancelling the deeds of trust (the June 19 Order) that same day. This appeal followed.
III.
Analysis
Appellants challenge the June 19 Order by asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it because the order modified or amended the previous judgment, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. They also contend that, to the extent it was an order to enforce the judgment, the sole statutory authority relating to proceedings after entry of a non-money judgment are sections 712.010 through 712.070, and these general provisions do not provide for the relief granted. They also claim that the trial court erred in failing to rule on their request to take judicial notice, and to join “all parties with an interest in the mediation agreement.”
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Appellants’ sole argument that the motion improperly sought an order to amend the judgment is that either the motion was unnecessary because it sought the same relief granted in the judgment, or it sought improperly to amend the judgment, if the relief had not been granted. We disagree. The judgment, which was affirmed by this court on appeal, quieted title to Milpitas and Wisteria in respondents’ favor, and cancelled appellants’ recorded deeds of trust on those properties. Respondents simply sought the order to effectuate the judgment, by giving notice to “any interested party” that the deeds recorded on the chains of title for Milpitas and Wisteria had been cancelled by judicial action. This did not act to amend or to modify the judgment in any way.
Appellants alternatively assert that even if the June 19 Order was not an amendment to the judgment, there was no jurisdictional authority allowing the trial court to issue that order because it went beyond the statutory authorization for postjudgment orders affecting nonmoney judgments. (§§ 712.010 through 712.070.) Again, we disagree.
A quiet title action “ ‘is brought, as authorized by the statute, “for the purpose of determining” any adverse claim that may be asserted therein by a defendant to the land in controversy; and this does not mean that the court is simply to ascertain, as against a plaintiff shown to have a legal interest, whether or not such defendant has some interest, but also that the court shall declare and define the interest held by the defendant, if any, so that the plaintiff may have a decree finally adjudicating the extent of his own interest in the property in controversy. The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to....’ [Citation.]” (Lechuza Villas West v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 218, 242, quoting Peterson v. Gibbs (1905) 147 Cal. 1, 5.)
Where possession of the property is not in issue, a claim for quiet title is equitable, and is to be decided by the court sitting as a court in equity. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 134, pp. 212-213.) Because an action to quiet title is equitable, there are no fixed rules limiting a court’s equitable power in resolving the attendant controversy. (Roman v. Ries (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 65, 70.) The object of equity is to do right and to do justice. (Toscano v. Greene Music (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 685, 693.) In keeping with these principles, “ ‘[e]quity does not wait on precedent which exactly squares with the facts in controversy, but will adjust itself to those situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its intervention.’ [Citations.]” (Roman v. Ries, supra, at p. 70.) Equity preserves the elements of flexibility and expansiveness, such that new remedies may be constructed, or old ones modified, in order to meet the requirements of each case. (Ibid.; see also Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1786-1787.)
Other statutory provisions are also consistent with these broad principles of judicial discretion. The introductory language to section 681.010, entitled “Judgments; provisions for enforcement, ” states “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute....” Similarly, the Comment to that section further explains the clause: “The introductory clause recognizes that this title does not provide the exclusive means for enforcing all judgments entered in this state.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 16B West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2009 ed.) foll. § 681.010, p. 140.)
Furthermore, section 187 provides as follows: “When jurisdiction is, by the constitution or this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.”
Courts have explained that section 187 grants broad power to courts to take steps to effectuate their judgments. (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510 [court has equitable power to amend judgment by adding judgment debtors]; Severdia v. Alaimo (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 881 [court of equity properly issued order to show cause when party failed to turn over settlement check]; Thomson v. L.C. Roney & Co. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 420 [court had power to conduct hearing to determine true name of defendant against whom judgment was entered].)
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted well within its jurisdictional and statutory powers in granting respondents’ motion.
Lastly, we reject appellants’ contention that they are entitled to a reversal because the trial court failed to rule on their request to take judicial notice. The documents tendered related to a document recorded in November 2008, memorializing an unrecorded “Contract for Sale and Purchase of Property” purportedly transferring any interest appellants have in Wisteria to Wisteria Health Services, LLC (Wisteria Health Services).
We agree with respondents that, even if the court erred in not explicitly granting appellants’ request to take judicial notice, there was no prejudice to appellants. First, they cite no authority that they had any standing whatsoever to raise the issue of Wisteria Health Services’ interest postjudgment. Moreover, even if Wisteria Health Services could have any interest in the property, the judgment as to appellants remains unaffected by any such interest. Appellants have failed to cite any legal authority that would require the joinder of Wisteria Health Services in the litigation in connection with a motion filed after the judgment was entered.
Appellants contend that Wisteria Health Services has an unextinguished interest in Wisteria, under section 764.045, because no lis pendens was filed by respondents when the underlying action (No. A117808) was filed. We need not and do not decide whether Wisteria Health Services, as appellants’ assignee, has any such interest in Wisteria, and if so, whether the interest is precluded by the judgment, which invalidates and renders unenforceable any rights and interest in Wisteria asserted not only by appellants but also by “anyone claiming under them.” We note, however, that the documents as to which appellants sought judicial notice were not recorded until after the trial court in No. A117808 had already entered judgment in respondents’ favor.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The June 19 Order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs and attorney fees incurred on this appeal. This matter is remanded to the trial court for a determination as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded for this appeal.
We concur: REARDON, J.SEPULVEDA, J.