Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG05-241380
Ruvolo, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s award of attorney fees to respondents in the amount of $69,753.97. Appellants argue that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees since no judgment had been entered; (2) the trial court improperly found respondents to be the prevailing parties; and (3) the trial court improperly denied appellants’ “right” to present oral testimony in connection with the fee motion. We reject these arguments, and affirm the attorney fee award.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action was filed to enforce a written settlement agreement regarding a dispute over respondents’ purchase of two skilled nursing facilities from appellants. Respondents had purchased the facilities, in part, with promissory notes made payable to appellants and secured by the real property on which the facilities are located. A dispute arose when respondents defaulted on the notes and appellants recorded notices of default. Thereafter, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement providing that subject to certain conditions, appellants would regain ownership of one facility, and assume the debt on it. As to the second facility, in exchange for full ownership, respondents agreed to pay appellants, and their creditor, $325,000 plus interest.
However, the conditions upon which the settlement was based were not met, including that appellants’ license to operate a skilled nursing facility would be reinstated, and that the notices of default would be rescinded. Respondents then filed this action to enforce the settlement, and to quiet title on both properties.
During the litigation, respondents tendered to appellants what they contended was their full monetary obligation under the settlement agreement, deposited that amount into their attorney’s trust account, and amended their complaint to so state.
After a court trial, a statement of decision was filed which included the trial court’s findings that respondents generally had complied with the settlement agreement, and that the sum alleged in their complaint and deposited in their attorney’s trust account indeed represented the full amount they owed to appellants. The trial court also found that appellants had not complied with the settlement agreement, and therefore, were not entitled to regain ownership of one of the facilities. The titles to both properties were quieted in respondents.
Appellants previously appealed the trial court’s denial of motions for a new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for relief from forfeiture. This court affirmed the trial court’s orders in all respects and awarded respondents costs on appeal. (Zarate v. Manuel (Oct. 10, 2008, A117808) [nonpub. opn.] (Zarate I).) Appellants also filed a motion to remand the appeal for entry of final judgment, which we denied since the court’s signed statement of decision was sufficient to act as a final judgment. (Ibid.)
While the first appeal was pending in this court, respondents filed a motion with the trial court to declare them the prevailing parties and to award attorney fees in the amount $107,702.50. Appellants requested an evidentiary hearing on the attorney fee motion, specifically to subpoena respondents’ lead trial counsel and his firm’s custodian of records. The trial court denied appellants’ request, and adopted respondents’ proposed order awarding respondents attorney fees in the amount of $69,753.97.
In support of the merits of this appeal, appellants filed with this court only an opening brief and an appendix containing the trial court’s statement of decision following the court trial, the parties’ written submissions on the motion for attorney fees, two trial court minute orders regarding the motion, and the trial court’s written order stating the motion is granted and in what amount. In their Judicial Council form “Notice Designating Record on Appeal,” appellants indicated that they would not submit any record of oral proceedings.
III. DISCUSSION
In requesting our review of the trial court’s ruling on respondents’ motion for attorney fees, appellants argue that the motion was premature since no judgment had been entered following the trial court’s statement of decision. Appellants also argue the award of attorney fees was improper since respondents failed to move the trial court to determine which parties prevailed. Finally, appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to hear oral testimony regarding the motion.
Appellants’ argument that the motion and award was premature since no judgment had been entered has already been resolved. We held in our prior opinion in this case that the trial court’s statement of decision acted as the final judgment for purposes of establishing appellants’ standing to bring an appeal following the court trial because “ ‘the substance or effect of the judgment and not its designation is determinative of its finality.’ ” (Zarate I at p. 7, quoting Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, 896.) For the same reason, we now conclude that the statement of decision also acts as a final judgment for purposes of determining which parties prevailed and whether, and in what amount, attorney fees should be awarded. Therefore, respondents’ motion for attorney fees was not premature, and was properly considered by the trial court.
Appellants’ second argument that respondents “failed to make any motion to determine the prevailing party” is factually incorrect. The introductory paragraph in respondents’ moving papers in support of their motion for award of attorney fees made it clear that the issue was to be decided as part of the motion: “This motion addresses two... issues.... These issues are (1) whether [respondents] are the prevailing parties and thereby entitled to an award of reasonable attorney[] fees and, if so, (2) the amount of the reasonable attorney[] fees which should be awarded....” The court’s written order on the motion specifically included the finding that “the [respondents] are the prevailing parties....” Appellants are incorrect in contending that respondents failed to raise, or the trial court did not consider and decide, the issue of whether respondents were the prevailing parties.
Also, if appellants’ argument on this point is construed to be that the trial court abused its discretion in finding respondents to be the prevailing parties, they have provided an inadequate record to support such a claim. In this regard, appellants have failed to present as part of the appellate record the transcripts of two oral arguments held in connection with the attorney fees motion. The record contains only the court’s minute orders, and a proposed order adopted by the court, which states in conclusory language that respondents prevailed.
The court’s order on the motion indicates explicitly that its ruling is based, in part, on the arguments of counsel at the oral hearings. Had the transcript of the argument been included in the related appeal, we arguably could have taken judicial notice of it on our own motion. (See Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 37, fn. 2.) However, the record in that appeal was submitted prior to the time the motion for attorney fees was heard.
It is appellants’ burden to provide this court with an adequate record. An appellate court presumes that trial court rulings are proper, and cannot overturn a ruling without the appellant’s demonstration of the trial court’s error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) Further, appellants were bound under the rules of this court to provide a full record. Under the California Rules of Court, a reporter’s transcript or equivalent must be submitted if appellants “raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court.” (Rule 8.120(b).) Having an inadequate record upon which to examine a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding respondents to be the prevailing parties, we reject any such argument on that basis.
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
We also reject appellants’ argument that the trial court improperly denied appellants’ request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney fees. Appellants base their argument on former rule 323 (now rule 3.1306(a)), which restricts the presentation of oral testimony at law and motion hearings “unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown.”
While appellants cite to rule 323, that rule no longer exists, having been renumbered and amended as rule 3.1306 effective January 1, 2007, prior to the briefing and adjudication of the subject motion for attorney fees.
A trial court’s determination of “good cause” is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Laraway v. Sutro & Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 266, 273.) Yet, the only record before us as to this issue is a minute order which merely notes that the request for oral testimony was denied “as set forth on the record.” Again, appellate courts will presume that a trial court’s ruling is proper, and it is an appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record upon which an appellate decision can be based. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1140-1141.) Therefore, we reject appellants’ contention that the denial of the opportunity to present oral evidence in connection with the hearing on the motion for attorney fees was an abuse of discretion.
Appellants’ argument that they are entitled to present oral testimony to the trial court as a matter of due process has no merit, but in any event has been waived. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived.... [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Appellants make no argument and cite no authorities supporting the proposition that the denial of a party’s request to present oral testimony at a motion hearing is a denial of due process rights. In addition, our Supreme Court has noted that “[t]here is simply no authority for the proposition that a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion, in a motion proceeding, by resolving evidentiary conflicts without hearing live testimony.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 414.) While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that in some instances an abuse of discretion might be found, appellants fail to make any argument as to why the trial court abused its discretion in this particular case.
IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s ruling granting respondents attorney fees is affirmed in all respects.
We concur: Reardon, J., Sepulveda, J.