Opinion
22-CV-4918 (LTS)
09-02-2022
ROBERT M. YOUNGS, Plaintiff, v. ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFFS ORGANIZATION; CARL DUBOIS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
Laura Taylor Swain Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights while he was in pretrial detention at the Orange County Jail. By order dated June 14, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which is quoted verbatim:
The Court quotes from the complaint, rather than summarizing Plaintiff's claims, because some of the allegations implicate several claims.
1. While in Orange County Correctional Facility I faced severe problems with the command staff. The facility staff refused to provide officers with access to updated minimum standards and refused to allow inmates ready access to the grievance process. Sergeant Colby, the grievance sergeant, even authored a statement that defended staff not follow[ ] the grievance policy. Due to these problems within the facility . . . officers, know the advantage they have, use this situation to their benefit to file false reports or buy inmate complaints.
2. While in custody I was retaliated against multiple times for requesting grievance forms and filing them, I was discriminated against by a sergeant, forced to sign into protective custody because said sergeant hired an inmate to be his enforcer (three contracts were taken out on me), consistently had my safety threatened by inmates who had to be removed from other units for fighting, spit on by an officer during a pandemic, and denied the minimum standards right of calling witnesses during a disciplinary hearing.
....
3. On 12-2-21, at 6:40 AM I requested a grievance from [O]fficer Riccardo Laudate at 6:10 AM. At 6:40 AM I requested a grievance from Officer Hankins while Officer Laudate was present. Officer Laudate proceeded to engage the disciplinary process. The report he wrote was almost entirely false but . . . the facility does not record and there exists no way to prove this. However, there is one part that is clearly false. During my hearing Sergeant Gessner admitted that the officer lied but still found me guilty.
4. I had reported to several sergeants and to Sheriff Dubois that the officer filed a false report however, no investigation was performed. When I attempted to FOIL request the facility video footage for the incident and Officer Hankins [illegible], I was denied. The Sheriff's office simply refused to investigate this crime.
5. On 10-30-2019 deputy officer Angel Mendoza tortured a twelve year old girl and attempt to coerce her into accusing me of abuse. In 2021 I reported this to the Sheriff along with an affidavit from the child, detailing her experience, and one from me, detailing the significant [illegible] reported by her mother. No investigation was started, the crime was buried by the Sheriff.
6. I have statements from Sergeant Dollapio . . . and Sergeant Mann . . . which request that I remain in cell confinement for requesting grievance forms....Sergeants Dollopio and Mann also requested I stay in cell confinement for a ticket that I was eventually found ‘not guilty' of.
7. I also have reports that were falsely made....However, a large amount of my search is on a flash drive that the DOCCS refused to let me access.(ECF 2, at 7-8.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Claims Brought Against the “Orange County Sheriff's Organization”
Plaintiff names the Orange Count Sheriff's Organization, which the court understands to be the Sheriff's Office for Orange County, New York. This entity, however, cannot be sued under Section 1983 because county agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F.Supp.2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,' as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”).
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against Orange County, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against Orange County, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the Orange County Sheriff's Organization with Orange County. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses Orange County may wish to assert.
B. Claims That May Not Proceed
1. Grievance Procedure Claim
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that he was denied access to a grievance as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Due Process Clause “protect[s] a substantive interest to which [an] individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Holcomb v. Lykens, 337 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted, alterations added). While some “state laws may in certain circumstances create a constitutionally protected entitlement to substantive liberty interests, state statutes do not create federally protected due process entitlements to specific state-mandated procedures.” Id. (citations omitted).
In the context of a prison grievance program, which is not required by the Constitution, a correctional official's mere failure to comply with state procedural requirements does not give rise to a due process claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Graham, 470 Fed.Appx. 11, 2011 WL 933993, *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (noting that, where prison officials failed to comply with state grievance procedure, a plaintiff cannot state a claim that he “was deprived of any substantive liberty interest”); Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 853 F.Supp.2d 400, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases); Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F.Supp.2d 353, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that prisoners do not have a “constitutional right to a prison grievance procedure or to have his grievances investigated”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Torres v. Mazzuca, 246 F.Supp.2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that “correction officers' failure to properly address [the prisoner's] grievances by conducting a thorough investigation to his satisfaction does not create a cause of action for denial of due process because [the prisoner] was not deprived of a protected liberty interest”).
As Plaintiff does not state facts suggesting that any alleged failure to comply with the grievance procedure or investigate his grievances deprived him of any constitutionally protected rights, Plaintiff fails to state a viable due process claim. The Court therefore dismisses this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2. Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”)
Section 1983 does not provide a claim for “violations arising solely out of state law.” Driscoll v. Townsend, 60 F.Supp.2d 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Holcomb, 337 F.3d at 224. As such, a suggested violation of FOIL, see N.Y. Pub. Off. L. §§ 84-90, does not support a Section 1983 claim. See, e.g., Rankel v. Town of Somers, 999 F.Supp.2d 527, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[M]any of Plaintiff's allegations - e.g., that the Town refused to fulfill FOIL requests . . . - involve state law, not federal constitutional violations.”). Where a plaintiff's state FOIL request is denied, he must challenge that denial in an Article 78 proceeding, not in a federal civil rights action. See Hudson v. Cnty. of Dutchess, 51 F.Supp.3d 357, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Thus, if a plaintiff has “not pursued any Article 78 process to address the alleged denial of his FOIL application . . . his Section 1983 claim . . . falters.” Id. at 371.
Here, Plaintiff's allegation that his FOIL request for video footage was denied does not give rise to a constitutional claim, and thus the facts alleged do not state a viable Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Claims That May Proceed
Plaintiff alleges that correction officers: (1) denied him due process during a disciplinary hearing; (2) filed a false misbehavior report in retaliation of his filing a grievance; (3) spit on him during the pandemic; and (4) failed to protect him from other prisoners. He does not, however, allege enough facts in support of any constitutional claim under Section 1983. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state facts in support of these claims and name defendants who he alleges violated his rights.
1. Disciplinary Due Process Claim
Plaintiff's allegations suggest that he was denied due process during a disciplinary hearing, which may have been held after correctional staff issued a misbehavior report. In its current form, the complaint does not, however, state a claim suggesting that staff denied him due process.
“In a [Section] 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The threshold question for a due process claim “‘is always whether the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution.'” Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trs. of the Conn. State Univ., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1988)).
For prison disciplinary proceedings, where a liberty or property interest is implicated, individuals are entitled to (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) a hearing affording the accused a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; (3) a fair and impartial hearing officer; and (4) a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken. Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004) (relying on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he requested a grievance from Officers Riccardo Laudate and Hankins, and “Officer Laudate proceeded to engage the disciplinary process.” (ECF 2, at 7.) He also alleges that during the disciplinary hearing, Sergeant Gessner “admitted that the officer lied but still found me guilty.” (Id.) These allegations do not suggest that any of these individuals denied Plaintiff due process during his hearing. First, the conclusory suggestion that Officer Laudate did not have cause “to engage the disciplinary process” is not supported with any facts. Second, even assuming that Sergeant Gessner did “admit[] that the officer lied,” the complaint does not suggest that Gessner's finding that Plaintiff was guilty violated Plaintiff's right to due process; it simply suggests that Gessner believed Plaintiff was guilty, notwithstanding his finding that an officer lied. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to state facts in support of his due process claim in an amended complaint.
2. Retaliatory False Misbehavior Report Claim
Individuals who are incarcerated do not possess a “general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). If an individual who is incarcerated is “granted a hearing, and [is] afforded the opportunity to rebut the charges against him, the defendant's filing of unfounded charges d[oes] not give rise to a per se constitutional violation actionable under section 1983.” Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986). Allegations of false disciplinary charges therefore generally do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim unless a plaintiff shows something more, such as that the misbehavior report was filed in retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of his constitutional rights. See Boddie,105 F.3d at 862; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that a misbehavior report was false, and separately, suggests that correctional staff issued a false report after he filed a grievance. Plaintiff does not, however, provide any other facts regarding this claim. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to state facts in support of this claim as well.
3. Excessive Force Claim
The Court construes Plaintiff's claim that a correction officer spit on him during the pandemic as asserting an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 533 (2d Cir. 2018). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that an officer engaged in an “exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (noting a pretrial detainee asserting an excessive force claim must show only that the force used against him was objectively unreasonable and is not required to prove the defendant's subjective intent, as has been required in cases involving convicted prisoners). The Court grants Plaintiff leave to state more facts regarding this claim because, without more, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff states a claim on which relief may be granted.
4. Conditions of Confinement Claim
The Court also construes Plaintiff's claim that an officer spit on him, as asserting a conditions of confinement claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged condition is sufficiently serious, and (2) a “subjective” element, which requires a showing that the defendant-official acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Id.
For the objective element, a pretrial detainee “must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.'” Id. at 30 (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), and quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). The deprivation of “basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions” could satisfy this element. Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the subjective element, a pretrial detainee must allege “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. The mere negligence of a correction official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
Here, Plaintiff's sole allegation that an officer spit on him during the pandemic does not provide enough facts to state a claim that the officer intentionally created a serious risk to Plaintiff's health. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend this claim to provide more facts surrounding this incident, including facts indicating where the other spit on him and what Plaintiff experienced during this alleged spitting.
5. Failure to Protect Claim
Plaintiff generally alleges that correction officers failed to protect him from other prisoners' assaults and suggests that officers encouraged such alleged assaults. The Court construes this claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 (1979); Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29, 33 n.9. Similar to a conditions of confinement claim, to state such a claim, Plaintiff must allege that the failure to protect him was sufficiently serious, and that correctional staff acted with at least deliberate indifference. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29, 33 n.9. Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to suggest that any correctional staff intentionally failed to protect him from other prisoners' assaults. The Court therefore grants him leave to amend this claim by alleging enough facts to suggest that a correction officer was aware of the threat of assaults, but ignored those threats. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that correctional staff encouraged assaults, he must allege facts in support of this allegation.
6. Municipal Liability
The Court, having substituted as a defendant Orange County for Orange County Sheriff's Organization, grants Plaintiff leave to state facts in support of any claim he seeks to bring against the County. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff must state facts suggesting that Orange County implemented a policy or adopted a custom or practice that caused the violation of his rights. For example, to state a claim against Orange County, the facts alleged must suggest that in furtherance of a policy, custom, or practice, correction officers violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As the complaint does not suggest such a policy, custom, or practice, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to state a claim against Orange County.
7. Personal Involvement
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in any alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not name any individual defendants, except Sheriff Carl Dubois, in the caption of the complaint. He does, however, refer to several individual officers in the body of his complaint. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to name the individual officers who he alleges violated his rights in his amended complaint.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts in support of his claim alleging (1) the denial of due process, (2) the issuance of a retaliatory false misbehavior report, (3) the use of excessive force, and (4) the failure to protect, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims as follows:
1. Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
2. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint, with a description, such as “John Doe #1, Orange County Jail.”
The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action, and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a. the names and titles of all relevant people;
b. a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c. a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d. the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-4918 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Orange County Sheriff's Organization because this entity cannot be sued under New York law. The Clerk of Court is directed to add Orange County as a Defendant under Fed.R.Civ.P. 21.
The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's FOIL claim and his grievance procedure claim for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.