Opinion
2020–04972 Index No. 506494/17
11-08-2023
In the Matter of Jermaine YOUNG, appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, respondent.
The Law Office of Fred Lichtmacher P.C., New York, NY (Joseph Certa of counsel), for appellant. Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Deborah A. Brenner and Eva L. Jerome of counsel), for respondent.
The Law Office of Fred Lichtmacher P.C., New York, NY (Joseph Certa of counsel), for appellant.
Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Deborah A. Brenner and Eva L. Jerome of counsel), for respondent.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., WILLIAM G. FORD, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York City Department of Correction dated December 6, 2016, which terminated the petitioner's probationary employment as a correction officer, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), dated May 15, 2020. The judgment denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal is deemed to be a notice of appeal by the petitioner (see CPLR 2001 ; Matter of Tagliaferri v. Weiler, 1 N.Y.3d 605, 775 N.Y.S.2d 753, 807 N.E.2d 864 ); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
In 2017, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York City Department of Correction dated December 6, 2016, which terminated the petitioner's probationary employment as a correction officer. The petitioner alleged, among other things, that the determination was arbitrary and capricious. In a judgment dated May 15, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.
"An employee's probationary appointment may be terminated ... for any reason or no reason at all, so long as the termination was not in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason" ( Matter of Trager v. Suffolk County, 185 A.D.3d 697, 698, 126 N.Y.S.3d 513 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gagedeen v. Ponte, 170 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 96 N.Y.S.3d 349 ). "In demonstrating that administrative actions were made in bad faith, ... the petitioner bears a heavy burden of proof, for which conclusory allegations and speculative assertions will not suffice" ( Matter of Trager v. Suffolk County, 185 A.D.3d at 698, 126 N.Y.S.3d 513 ; see Matter of Petkewicz v. Allers, 137 A.D.3d 1045, 1046, 27 N.Y.S.3d 263 ). Discretion to hire probationary employees is especially broad "in appointment of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied" ( Matter of Trager v. Suffolk County, 185 A.D.3d at 698, 126 N.Y.S.3d 513 ; see Tardif v. Town of Southold, 56 A.D.3d 755, 757, 868 N.Y.S.2d 143 ).
Here, the petitioner failed to allege in his petition that his discharge from his position was made in bad faith (see Matter of Meighan v. Ponte, 164 A.D.3d 504, 505, 77 N.Y.S.3d 871 ; Matter of Marshall v. Simon, 160 A.D.3d 648, 649, 74 N.Y.S.3d 580 ). Moreover, the record demonstrates that there was a rational basis for the determination terminating the petitioner's probationary employment and that the determination was not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Bruno v. Greenville Fire Dist., 171 A.D.3d 1169, 1170, 98 N.Y.S.3d 619 ; Matter of Petkewicz v. Allers, 137 A.D.3d at 1046, 27 N.Y.S.3d 263 ).
The respondent's remaining contention is without merit.
DUFFY, J.P., FORD, DOWLING and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.