Opinion
Civil No. 3:19-CV-633 Civil No. 3:19-CV-922
09-24-2019
MELISSA M. YOUELLS, Plaintiff v. JULIUS DZAKPASU AND WESTERN EXPRESS, INC., Defendants WILLIAM WAGNER, Plaintiff v. JULIUS DZAKPASU AND WESTERN EXPRESS, INC., Defendants
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Two separate cases come before the Court on a motion to consolidate. These two lawsuits arose out of a single traffic accident wherein the plaintiffs were injured after a tractor trailer, driven by Julius Dzakpasu while he was employed by Western Express, Inc., hit the vehicle that the plaintiffs occupied together. The defendants have moved to consolidate the separate actions brought against them by the plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42. For their part, the plaintiffs have opposed wholesale consolidation of these two cases, citing in particular differences in the claims and elements of proof and damages sought at trial. For the following reasons, we will recommend that the defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
While a motion to consolidate is not a dispositive motion which would require a Report and Recommendation in lieu of an order, we have elected to present this proposed disposition as a Report and Recommendation because we understand that this proposal could affect the scheduling, presentation and management of this case at trial, and matter uniquely within the province of the trial judge.
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
On March 15, 2017, at approximately 2:45 p.m., William Wagner and Melissa Youells were in a Trans Med Ambulance headed southbound on Interstate 81 near mile marker 162.5, Hanover Township, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Wagner Doc. 1-4, at 6). Youells was driving the ambulance while Wagner was sitting in the rear of the vehicle. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 9; Wagner Doc. 1-4, at 6). Snowy conditions on the road had caused an accident further ahead on I-81 S, making it necessary for Youells to stop the ambulance on the interstate. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 10).
On the day in question, Julius Dzakpasu, was operating a tractor trailer owned by his employer, Western Express, Inc.. (Youells Doc 2-1, at 9). As Dzakpasu approached where the plaintiffs sat on the highway, he was unable to bring his vehicle to a stop before colliding with the rear of the ambulance. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 10). Both plaintiffs are alleging various injuries as a result of this incident. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 17-18; Wagner Doc. 1-4, at 9).
In their complaints, the plaintiffs assert claims of negligence against the defendants as well as a claim for vicarious liability against Western Express. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 16-21; Wagner Doc. 1-4, at 7-10). Youells additionally brings a claim for punitive damages against both defendants. (Youells Doc. 2-1, at 22). The defendants now move for these cases to be consolidated.
Recognizing that these two lawsuits arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts, we have set case management schedules for these two cases which are identical in terms of discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. We have taken this action without any objection by the parties but the plaintiffs have opposed the defense motion for further consolidation of these two actions at trial, noting in part that the elements of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs may be significantly different in these two cases. While we regard this as a close case, after a review of the plaintiffs' claims in each of their individual cases, we conclude that these cases should be consolidated for discovery, dispositive motions, and at trial on the issue of liability. However, given the numerous injuries alleged by each plaintiff, the distinctions between these damages claims, and the possible complexity of calculating each plaintiff's damages, the district court may, in the exercise of its discretion, consider a bifurcated examination of the issue of damages.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
The threshold requirement for determining whether consolidation is permissible under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that the "actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact" in order to justify consolidation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); Farahmand v. Rumsfeld, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22473, *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2002). If the court finds that such a commonality exists, the court may "(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The moving party bears the burden of proof to show a common question of law or fact and that consolidation will reap more benefit than harm. McClenaghan v. Turi, Civil Action Nos. 09-5497, 11-3761, 2011 WL 4346316 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2011). The court has broad discretion to determine if consolidation is appropriate. Easterday v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1312684, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2015). In its determination, the court must balance the advantages of judicial economy against the potential harm in delays, additional expenses, jury confusion, or prejudice. Farahmand, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22473, at *4. However, federal courts have found that, "[e]ven where cases involve some common issues of law or fact, consolidation may be inappropriate where individual issues predominate." In re Consolidated Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998).
This discretion extends to any decision to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of a trial. It is well-settled that: "Ordinarily, the decision of whether or not to bifurcate a case is firmly within the discretion of the trial court. See In Re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975)." Kushner v. Hendon Const., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93, 98 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd sub nom. Hendon Constr. Inc. v. Naholnik, 609 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979), and aff'd sub nom. Kushner v. Hendon Constr. Inc., 609 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1979). In other words, "the rule in this circuit since 1972 has been that the decision to bifurcate Vel non is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis and must be subject to an informed discretion by the trial judge in each instance. Idzojtic v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 456 F.2d 1228, 1230 (3d Cir. 1971) ('The district court is given broad discretion in reaching its decision whether to separate the issues of liability and damages. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure s 2392.')" Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978).
B. The Defendants' Motion Should Be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.
In their motion to consolidate, the defendants assert that consolidation is proper for several reasons. First, the lawsuits arise from the same motor vehicle accident and involve the same parties named as defendants. Second, both lawsuits assert claims of negligence against Dzakpasu in that he was negligent in traveling too fast for the road conditions at the time, failing to keep a proper lookout for stopped traffic, and failing to operate his tractor trailer in a manner that would allow him to come to a stop before colliding with the ambulance containing the plaintiffs. (Doc. 14, at 3). In addition, both lawsuits assert claims of negligence against Western Express in that it failed to evaluate Dzakpasu's qualifications upon hiring and failed to train and supervise Dzakpasu after he was hired. (Doc. 14, at 4). As such, the defendants claim that each lawsuit will involve "almost identical considerations" in determining the liability of each defendant. (Doc. 14, at 5-6).
The defendants also argue that failure to consolidate the Youells and Wagner lawsuits will result in a significant waste of judicial resources in addition to the increased time and expense which will be inevitably incurred by the defendants. (Doc. 14, at 6). For example, the defendants identify several depositions of various witnesses that will need to be repeated as well as documentary evidence likely to overlap between the cases. (Doc. 14, at 6-7). They argue that this repetition can be easily avoided if their motion to consolidate is granted. The defendants also note that both cases are at similar, if not the same, stage of trial and discovery has not yet begun, so some consolidation has a certain intuitive appeal. In fact, we have entered parallel case management order in these two cases, orders which effectively set consolidated discovery and dispositive motion schedules in these cases.
Nevertheless, both plaintiffs adamantly object to wholesale consolidation for trial, arguing that there will be excessive and unwarranted jury confusion in distinguishing the host of different injuries and damages that each plaintiff alleges and the extensive, but distinct, medical testimony required for each plaintiff to recover. The plaintiffs also argue that, though many of the claims against the defendants in both cases are the same, Youells has additionally brought a claim against both defendants for punitive damages and Wagner has not pursued punitive damages claims. As a result, the plaintiffs state that the jury will struggle to keep the different standards of liability separate, thus negatively impacting the result for one or both plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue, these issues will cause undue prejudice, significantly outweigh the benefit of judicial economy in this instance, and deprive each plaintiff of their day in court.
While we regard this case a close case, we note that one court in this district was presented with a similar factual scenario in Gray v. Ratanchandani, 2016 WL 6433040 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2016) (Saporito, M.J.). In Gray, a motor vehicle accident occurred when the defendant allegedly drove through a stop sign, colliding with the vehicle in which Miller and Gray were passengers. Id. at *1-2. Gray brought suit against Ratanchandani alleging that the accident and his injuries were the result of the defendant's carelessness and negligence. Id. at *2. In that case, Ratanchandani filed a third-party complaint joining Miller as a defendant, alleging that Miller was jointly or severally liable because Miller was "driving too fast at the time of the accident and failed to comply with the assured clear distance ahead rule." Id. at *5. In a separate action, Miller also asserted a negligence claim against Ratanchandani. Id. at *2. Ratanchandani subsequently filed a motion to consolidate the two actions for much the same reasons as the defendants in the case at hand, arguing that consolidation would be proper and promote judicial economy because the cases both arose from the same accident, involved common questions of law and fact, and turned on the same theories of liability. Id. at *4.
Gray opposed consolidation of the two cases due to the differing injuries suffered by the two passengers, among other concerns. Id. at *4-*5. Magistrate Judge Saporito noted that "[f]ederal courts have long consistently recognized the fairness and desirability of consolidating cases for trial, particularly on the issue of liability." Id. at *7. Judge Saporito found that nothing in the filings suggested the plaintiffs were in opposition regarding who was to blame or the facts of the accident, thus consolidation for the liability phase of trial was proper. Id. at *6. However, the court ordered the damages phase of trial to remain separate, stating that the "medical testimony is likely to be different and could prejudice either or both of the plaintiffs if their damages claims were tried together." Id. at *7.
In the instant case, we find Judge Saporito's reasoning persuasive and recommend that the motion to consolidate be granted as to the liability phase of trial but that the district court consider bifurcating the damages phase of the trial and proceeding with separate damages presentations allowing for an individualized assessment of the distinct damages claims by the jury in the event that the jury returned a liability verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. There may be merit to this course since both cases contain similar legal and factual questions concerning liability arising out of a singular traffic accident but plaintiffs insist that the cases involve different damages claims and evidence. Thus, we are persuaded that the benefits of consolidating the cases for discovery purposes, consideration of dispositive motions and for the liability determinations is consistent with the purposes of Rule 42 and would far outweigh any potential for harm manifested in jury confusion or otherwise. Ferst v. Kauffman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185941 (E.D. Pa. December 22, 2014) (consolidation was proper despite separate attacks which occurred at different places and times and involved different victims who suffered from varying injuries); Baker v. Ricci, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91718 *25 (D.N.J. June 28, 2013) (separate habeas corpus petitions were consolidated despite different convictions); Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. v. DexCom, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73198 *10-*11 (D. Del. Sep. 30, 2007) (cases consolidated despite covering seven different patent infringements); Moss v. Associated Transport, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 335, 337 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (cases properly kept separate for liability and consolidated for damages because it eased the jury's burden and saved time from being unnecessarily wasted on damage determinations that ultimately would not make it through liability considerations); Miller v. Sammarco, 9 F.R.D. 215, 216 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (automobile accident cases consolidated in spite of differences in damages which the court found could be cured by jury instruction, and despite plaintiffs' opposition based on different questions of negligence presented).
Indeed, in our view this course may meet several of the considerations underlying Rule 42. It promotes judicial economy by consolidating discovery and motions practice. It also avoids the potential of inconsistent liability verdicts on an identical set of facts. Yet, it allows for individualized scrutiny of damages claims through separate bifurcated consideration of those claims. Despite these apparent benefits, in her brief opposing consolidation, Youells attempts to distinguish her case from Gray, arguing that her allegations of reckless indifference to support her claim for punitive damages warrants a separate trial both on the issue of liability and damages. However, the differing liability standards between proving negligence and punitive damages are not of such magnitude that a jury would be incapable of differentiating between them. See Vicky M. v. Northeastern Educational Intermed. Unit, 689 F.Supp.2d 721, 740 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that there is a heightened standard for punitive damages, but that "punitive damages may be awarded based on a cause of action sounding in negligence if the plaintiff is able to show that 'the defendant's conduct not only was negligent but that the conduct was also outrageous'") (internal citations omitted)). Thus, although we recognize Youells' concerns, we believe that any potential for confusion at the liability stage of the litigation can be addressed by a jury instruction articulating the respective differences between the two legal standards of liability.
However, we appreciate the plaintiffs' concerns that requiring a jury to distinguish between the extensive list of injuries and medical testimony for each plaintiff has the potential to create an irreconcilable level of confusion, thus rendering the damages phase of the trial prejudicial if consolidated. Indeed, each plaintiff has alleged numerous injuries that differ in severity and variety from the other plaintiff's injuries, including the treatments and long-lasting or short-term effects of each alleged injury. The calculation of each plaintiff's damages will turn on the medical testimony of each plaintiff's experts and will entail differing medical opinions. Therefore, in order to cure any potential prejudice to the plaintiffs and avoid the negative outcomes articulated in Rule 42(a), the district court may consider bifurcating the damages phases of these cases and the directing the jury to separately consider each damages claim. See In re Consolidated Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998) (consolidation of fourteen products liability actions denied because the individual issues overshadowed the common questions of law or fact presented). We believe that the recommendation in this case is consistent with Magistrate Judge Saporito's opinion in Gray in its full context and provides each plaintiff with proper access to individual justice.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendant's motion to consolidate be GRANTED in part and DEFERRED in part. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the plaintiffs' cases be consolidated for discovery, dispositive motions and the liability phase of trial, but that the district court in the exercise of its discretion may consider bifurcating the damages phase of trial.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 24th day of September 2019.
/S/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge