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Yosemite Meat and Locker Service, Inc. v. Dolarian Business Group, Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 21, 2008
No. F052452 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County No. 292762, Roger M. Beauchesne, Judge.

Law Office Of Myron F. Smith and Myron F. Smith; Lanahan & Reilley, Richard L. Harriman, for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant Dolarian Business Group, Inc.

Ara G. Dolarian, in pro. per., for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant.

Schofield & Associates, Louis F. Schofield and Michael A. Maxey, Jr., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent.


OPINION

Wiseman, J.

Procedural and factual HISTORIES

This appeal arises out of a commercial contract dispute. In May 2000, Mid Prairie Products, Inc., and Mid Prairie Genetics, Inc., entered into a contract (Yosemite contract) with respondent Yosemite Meat & Locker Service, Inc. (Yosemite). Under the terms of the contract, Mid Prairie agreed to supply Yosemite with up to 450 high-quality roaster pigs per week for a period of five years. Yosemite entered into the agreement after determining that Mid Prairie had a superior genetic breeding stock and was capable of producing 100,000 baby pigs a year. Yosemite was looking for approximately 25,000 roaster pigs a year. Roaster pigs are sold whole, weigh between 70 to 100 pounds, and must be healthy with no signs of sickness or abnormalities. It was Yosemite’s intention that Mid Prairie would provide a steady source of healthy, good-quality roaster pigs to supply Yosemite’s market for whole pigs. Yosemite believed the pigs supplied under the Yosemite contract would be grown by Mid Prairie. In exchange, Yosemite paid Mid Prairie an interest-free “access fee” of $234,000 at the start of the contract for the purpose of further developing Mid Prairie’s herd and assuring a sufficient supply of roaster pigs. The access fee was to be repaid to Yosemite at a rate of $2 per pig delivered to Yosemite over the course of the five-year contract term. The parties agreed that the $2 repayment fee would be waived for the first 17,000 pigs.

Throughout the business relationship at issue here, these two corporations were considered one entity. Jon Willers was the president of both entities and was the principle human actor in connection with the Yosemite contract. We treat them here as one entity and will refer to them collectively as “Mid Prairie.”

In February 2001, Mid Prairie, struggling financially to meet its obligations under the Yosemite contract and other contracts to which it was bound, assigned the Yosemite contract to appellants Dolarian Business Group and Ara Dolarian (collectively Dolarian, unless otherwise noted). On January 30, 2001, Yosemite was notified that it was to send payments under the Yosemite contract to Dolarian, but was not notified of the assignment. Before and after the assignment, Mid Prairie provided information to Dolarian about the contract and Mid Prairie performance. After the assignment, Dolarian purchased pigs to add to Mid Prairie’s herd. It also purchased pigs to supply the Yosemite contract.

Prior to oral argument, Yosemite filed a motion to dismiss the appeal with respect to Dolarian Business Group because the corporation’s status was suspended for nonpayment of taxes. We deferred a ruling on the motion until the date of oral argument with directions to file proof that the corporation’s status was revived before oral argument or the motion would be granted. On July 15, 2008, Richard Harriman filed proof that the corporation’s status had been revived. As a result, the motion to dismiss was denied from the bench at oral argument.

When the appeal initially was filed, Dolarian Business Group was represented by attorneys Myron Smith and Richard Harriman. Ara Dolarian appeared in pro. per. Although the interests of Mr. Dolarian and the corporate appellant are essentially identical, a corporation is a separate legal entity and appears on appeal as a distinct represented party. Within the time allotted by the court, Mr. Smith requested oral argument on behalf of his client, Dolarian Business Group. Mr. Harriman did not request argument on any client’s behalf, although it would have been permissible for him to ask to share argument time with Mr. Smith on behalf of the corporation, Mr. Harriman’s client of record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.256(c)(2)(3) [governing conduct of argument and sharing of argument time].) Mr. Dolarian did not request oral argument on his own behalf, nor did anyone do so for him. The day before oral argument, we received notification from Mr. Harriman that, contrary to his earlier indication, he would be arguing, not on behalf of the corporation, but on behalf of Mr. Dolarian. At the time and date set for argument, Mr. Harriman was over 20 minutes late, and Mr. Smith, although unprepared to argue all issues, stated that he was representing both the corporate appellant and Mr. Dolarian as an individual. Mr. Harriman also argued on behalf of both appellants. Although we permitted counsel to appear on behalf of both appellants, in the future, counsel need to follow the proper procedure by filing a substitution of attorneys indicating a change in the client(s) they are representing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.36(b).)

Although Mid Prairie made a number of shipments to Yosemite during the contract term, it was unable to provide the quantity expected by Yosemite, and the quality of the pigs delivered was not acceptable to Yosemite. Mid Prairie provided only 16.9 percent of the promised pigs to Yosemite. Yosemite continued to tell Mid Prairie it wanted more pigs. Mid Prairie responded, telling Yosemite it had to be patient as it was still adding sows to its herd and growing the roasters. At the start of the contract, the quality of the pigs shipped was good, but quality began to decline. Many of the pigs were overweight and blemished. Some arrived dead; others were condemned upon arrival as unfit for human consumption. The number of nonconforming pigs and the nature of the defects were documented by Yosemite and provided to Mid Prairie. There is no challenge to Yosemite’s determination of quality or to its bookkeeping.

In February 2001, Yosemite notified Mid Prairie that it was unhappy with the quality and quantity of the pigs shipped under the contract. The problem did not resolve itself and, in May 2001, Yosemite received a shipment of such poor quality that it withheld payment for the load. When Willers informed Dolarian that Yosemite had withheld payment, Dolarian called to talk with Yosemite. A meeting followed at which Dolarian told Yosemite that Dolarian owned the pigs at Mid Prairie and that it had purchased pigs at auction to supply the Yosemite contract. Auction pigs are lower quality pigs, known in the business as “junk pig[s].” Junk pigs are unacceptable to Yosemite’s customers. Dolarian did not assure Yosemite that it or Mid Prairie could supply Yosemite with the pigs it needed. When it became apparent that neither Mid Prairie nor Dolarian could comply with the terms of the contract in the future, Yosemite rescinded the Yosemite contract by letter dated May 16, 2001, and demanded repayment of the access fee minus the withheld payment. Dolarian and Mid Prairie refused to return the balance of the access fee.

Shortly afterward, Mid Prairie filed bankruptcy. Yosemite sought and received permission from the bankruptcy court to proceed against Dolarian after Yosemite and Mid Prairie settled in the bankruptcy court. A second amended complaint alleged causes of action for breach of contract, rescission, inducement of breach of contract, and unfair business practices. The matter was tried before the court. The court found Mid Prairie had breached the Yosemite contract by failing to supply the quantity and quality of pigs required by the contract and that rescission was proper because neither Mid Prairie nor Dolarian could meet its contractual obligations. The court also implicitly found that Mid Prairie had assigned the Yosemite contract to Dolarian, and therefore, Dolarian was liable to Yosemite for the unpaid access fees. The court found against Yosemite on the remaining two causes of action. Restitution was ordered in the amount of $185,706.97, the $200,000 access fee minus the amount rightly withheld by Yosemite. Dolarian appeals.

Mid Prairie is not a party to the appeal. In addition, there were several other named defendants in the second amended complaint. For a number of reasons, none of these entities are party to the appeal, nor are they relevant to any of the issues raised on appeal. We will not discuss them here.

Discussion

I. Assignment

Dolarian contends that the document entitled “Assignment of Contract” is actually a security agreement for financing and not a true assignment of the supply agreement. Yet, the nature of the assignment agreement on its face is unambiguous. “When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties’ intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible. (Civ. Code, § 1639.)” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.) The contract is labeled an “Assignment of Contract” and identifies the parties as “Assignor” and “Assignee.” There is no reference to a security agreement or to a financing agreement. The term of the assignment is set to the entire duration of the Yosemite contract or “until the Assignor is able to purchase Assignee’s herd of Gilts and Roasters that are being serviced by the Assignor” as agreed in a separate agreement. There is no evidence presented that suggests this was not intended as an assignment of contractual rights.

Dolarian’s argument, however, is not that its agreement with Mid Prairie did not assign contractual rights, but instead that the assignment was limited to payments due under the Yosemite contract. Dolarian argues that the assignment was never intended to substitute Dolarian for Mid Prairie as the obligor under the Yosemite contract. Dolarian is claiming it never assumed the duties of the contract when it negotiated assignment of the benefits of the contract, but was simply trying to secure its financial investment in Mid Prairie. We agree there is no express assumption of contractual duties. The question is whether the duties were impliedly assumed under the law governing the assignments.

Dolarian does not cite any law in support of its position, other than to cases establishing the appropriate standard of review. It is the job of appellate counsel to convince us that the trial court erred in specific ways, which resulted in prejudice to the parties. In addition, argument must be supported by legal authority. An appellate court may consider contentions waived if not supported by sufficient argument or authority. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.) At oral argument, again without authority, counsel argued that finding Dolarian had assumed the duties of the contract as well as the benefits through the assignment would squelch overtures by lenders to struggling small businesses and set harmful public policy. We disagree. Venture capitalists, lenders, and investors need only adopt prudent business practices and spell out the terms of their agreements when lending money to struggling small businesses and obtain proper security interests to protect their investments. If Dolarian had spelled out the terms of its agreement with Mid Prairie, told Yosemite about its agreement with Mid Prairie and the limitation of its terms, and acted within those limits, this case would pose very different legal issues.

We briefly review the law of assignment.

“Every bilateral contract while still executory on both sides involves both rights and duties for each party. [¶] … [¶] (2) Either party to the contract, without the assent of the other, may assign effectively such rights as have accrued to it or are expected to accrue to it under the contract. [¶] … [¶] (3) Either party may make such an assignment of rights and also authorize the assignee to perform the duties under the contract which bind the assignor, if they are of a kind of performance that can be delegated. There is a transfer of rights, but a mere delegation of duties, and inquiry must be separately made as to whether the right can be effectively assigned, and whether performance of the duties may be delegated. The assignor remains bound to perform the duties, … whatever arrangement the assignor and assignee make with one another.… [¶] … [¶] (4) Not only may performance be delegated to the assignee, but a promise may also be exacted from the assignee that it will perform the delegated duties. The right of the other party to the contract to take advantage of this promise involves substantially the same question as any case where an obligation of a promisee to a third person is assumed by a promisor.” (29 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2003) § 74.30, pp. 433-439, fns. omitted.)

The general rule in California is that, where an assignee accepts the rights that will accrue under a contract, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, the assignee impliedly undertakes the performance of the contract duties. (Civ. Code, § 1589; see also Rest., Contracts, § 164(2), p. 445; Cutting Pack. Co. v. Packers’ Exch. (1890) 86 Cal. 574, 576; Drips v. Moore (1918) 179 Cal. 249, 252; Tarpey v. Curran (1924) 67 Cal.App. 575, 587-588; Enterprise Leasing Corp. v. Shugart Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 737, 745-746; Bank of America v. McLaughlin (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d Supp. 911, 913-914.) This is particularly true where, by action, the assignee holds himself or herself out as personally liable under the contract and recognizes the original contract as binding upon himself or herself. In this situation, the assignee is liable to the other party equally with the assignor. (See Jones v. Allert (1911) 161 Cal. 234, 238; see also Gregers v. Peterson Ice Cream Co., Inc. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 746, 751 [when assignee takes over or assumes responsibilities for ongoing business, it is implied that assignment is promise to undertake duties of contract assigned]; accord, Walker v. Phillips (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 26, 32-33.)

In this case, although the assignment does not expressly state that Dolarian has assumed the obligations of the contract, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that Dolarian impliedly did so. The January 30, 2001, letter to Yosemite instructed, without limitation, that all payment under the contract be sent directly to Dolarian. Dolarian accepted the full benefits of the contract, undertaking the responsibility of finding sufficient roaster pigs to supply the Yosemite contract. Ara Dolarian said he did this for “the fulfillment of our obligation under the [Yosemite] contract .…” (Italics added.) At trial, Ara Dolarian attempted to soften his deposition testimony by saying Willers actually made the arrangements for finding the needed supply of pigs, but Ara Dolarian admitted that it was Dolarian who bought the pigs sent to Yosemite. At the May 16, 2001, meeting with Yosemite, Dolarian asserted ownership of the Mid Prairie pigs. Dolarian also asserted the right to decide what pigs would be sent to fulfill the Yosemite contract.

When Yosemite withheld payment for the May 6, 2001, shipment, Yosemite informed Willers it was doing so. Willers immediately informed Dolarian and Dolarian, not Willers, set up the May 16, 2001, meeting. Until that time, Yosemite had spoken only with Mid Prairie about the problems with the pig supply. It knew nothing of the true nature of Dolarian’s involvement with Mid Prairie or of Dolarian’s interpretation of the contracts terms, i.e., that pigs could be purchased on the open market to supply the Yosemite contract and any number of pigs “up to 450” would suffice. We believe that after this meeting there could be little doubt that Dolarian was now closely involved in Mid Prairie operations and had assumed the obligations of the Yosemite contract as part of the assignment.

We are not persuaded that Yosemite’s continued dealing with Mid Prairie suggests a contrary intention. Yosemite’s understanding of the assignment is not the issue. The issue is whether, under the assignment, Dolarian assumed the obligations of the Yosemite contract along with the benefits. Further, the January 30, 2001, letter to Yosemite said nothing about an assignment; it merely informs Yosemite where to send future payments. There is no other evidence proving Yosemite had knowledge that its contract with Mid Prairie had been assigned to Dolarian. Therefore, nothing can be implied from Yosemite’s continued dealings with Mid Prairie.

In any event, as we have explained, because an assignment can be made without the consent of a contracting party unless specifically prohibited by the contract’s terms, the assignor remains obligated on the contract even after the assignment. (29 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 74.30 at pp. 433-439.) Yosemite was free to continue to deal with Mid Prairie because Mid Prairie remained an obligor under the contract, especially since there was no request that it communicate directly with Dolarian.

The trial court did not err in finding that Dolarian became liable to Yosemite under the Yosemite contract by virtue of the assignment.

II. Commercial Code

Dolarian contends that Yosemite failed to comply with various provisions of the Commercial Code, specifically sections 2603, 2605, 2606, and 2607, which govern the duties of a buyer faced with a nonconforming load of product sold pursuant to a commercial contract. Dolarian argues that the failure to comply with these provisions dictates a conclusion that Yosemite never rejected a complete load and never covered a nonconforming load. As a result, Dolarian claims that Yosemite accepted the defective pigs and has waived any claim of material breach. Yosemite responds, first, that the failure to cover is irrelevant to the appeal because the court granted rescission; no damages were awarded. In the alternative, Yosemite argues it did comply with the statutory mandate by processing the pigs according to industry standards. Dolarian’s reply brief does not address Yosemite’s contentions.

Commercial Code section 2603 requires that a seller who intends to reject certain goods as unacceptable under the terms of a commercial contract must follow the reasonable instructions from the seller or in the absence of such instruction act reasonably to sell the product if it is perishable or would decline in value speedily. Commercial Code section 2605 requires that the seller provide specifics to the buyer when rejecting a shipment of goods and precludes a seller from relying on the defects of the goods to establish breach unless notice is given and the seller could have cured the defect if it had been identified with particularity. Commercial Code sections 2606 and 2607 define “acceptance” and explain the effect of acceptance of commercial goods.

We read Dolarian’s argument as a contention that Yosemite was itself in breach of the contract by failing to cover and cannot claim rescission because it accepted the defective pigs. “A party who has failed to perform a dependent covenant cannot rescind for the other party’s breach or failure of consideration. [Citation.] The right to rescind a contract rests only with the party who is without default. One party cannot violate the contract himself, and then seek a rescission on the ground that the other party has followed his example. [Citations.]” (Nelson v. Spence (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 493, 499.) However, implicit in the trial court’s decision that Yosemite was entitled to rescind the contract is the conclusion that Yosemite was not in material breach and acted reasonably to cover the defective pigs. The trial court expressly found that the contract called for Mid Prairie to supply 450 roaster pigs a week.

First, we find no fault with the trial court’s interpretation of the quantity requirement of the contract. We review the interpretation of a contract de novo. If the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence, we look to see if the factual findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. (City of Chino v. Jackson (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 377, 382-383; Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake Farms, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 807, 817.) The contract requires that Mid Prairie provided “up to 450” roaster pigs per week of a specified quality and weight. At trial there was some discussion about what the “up to 450” meant and whether this was a specified quantity. However, the trial court noted, and we agree, that the financial provisions of the contract clearly refer to a quantity of 450 per week. The access fee loaned to Mid Prairie ($234,000) was to be paid back in the amount of $2 per pig over a five-year term. Doing simple math, this requires shipment of 450 pigs per week for 52 weeks.

There can be no doubt the parties intended that Mid Prairie supply a sufficient number of pigs to be able to repay within five years the negotiated access fee. (See Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1723, 1734 [cardinal rule of construction of contract that contract is to be construed as a whole].) In addition, Yosemite owner Johnnie Lau testified that Yosemite was trying to develop a steady source of pigs equaling approximately 25,000 per year. The court’s primary goal is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties, which is determined by the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, “including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. [Citations.]” (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) Yosemite was willing to pay a premium price for the pigs grown by Mid Prairie in order to ensure a steady supply of high-quality roaster pigs. It is uncontroverted that neither Mid Prairie nor Dolarian provided anywhere near the required number of pigs to Yosemite during the term of the contract. Dolarian does not claim on appeal that the trial court improperly interpreted the contract on this point.

In addition, Yosemite did not accept the pigs in the shipments received that did not comport with the contractual standards. The contract required that the roaster pigs meet the “weight standard and quality established by [Yosemite].” The contract also provided that an acceptable roaster pig must weigh not less than 70 nor more than 100 pounds, have no obvious signs of disease, and be healthy and fully mobile. In each of the shipments received from Mid Prairie, there were animals dead on arrival; animals condemned by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspector working at the plant; animals over 100 pounds and thus not suitable to be sold as roaster pigs; or animals so defective they could not be sold whole as roaster pigs. The general quality of the animal, whether dead, condemned, or defective, was documented at the time of arrival and processing decisions were made as a result. Animals that are pulled off the line by the inspector and condemned are sent directly to the tallow plant, as are animals dead on arrival. Sick animals cannot be returned to the producer. Animals that have abscesses or other obvious defects, or animals that are over 100 pounds, are cut and boxed as other pork products. If animals are severely defective, they are deboned and made into sausage. The defective pigs were not sold as roaster pigs under the contract because they did not meet contractual standards. Further processing lowers the value of the meat. For example, roaster pigs (requiring limited processing) sell for $1.50 per pound; highly processed sausage sells for $0.75 a pound.

Lau testified that it was the common practice in the trade to remit payment with documentation to the seller showing the number of animals arriving at the plant dead, the number of animals condemned, and the number of defects identified by the inspector. The payments made reflected the ultimate handling of the animal shipped. He testified that this type of documentation was the standard industry practice. If the seller questions the processing decisions, the documentation, or the number of animals condemned or dead on arrival, the common practice is to raise the issue immediately after getting the purchase documentation. Neither Mid Prairie nor Dolarian ever questioned the documentation provided. There is no argument made on appeal that the processing decisions made were unreasonable or in bad faith. Lau testified that Yosemite tried to salvage what it could from the Mid Prairie-shipped pigs, selling what it could and figuring the price to be paid from that point. There is nothing about this practice that is inconsistent with Mid Prairie’s ownership interest in the pigs. This is not a situation in which there is a disagreement over the quality of the pigs. There is no evidence that Dolarian could have cured any of these defects had Yosemite given Dolarian immediate notice of them. It is uncontested that Dolarian and Mid Prairie were never able to provide Yosemite with the quantity of pigs agreed to in the Yosemite contract.

The acts or conduct a defendant claims constitute a waiver are “the evidence to be considered in determining the ultimate fact of waiver or nonwaiver.… Whether or not a person has ratified a voidable contract, or elected to affirm it rather than to rescind it, depends primarily upon his intention, and this is shown by his declarations, his acts, or his conduct .…” (French v. Freeman (1923) 191 Cal. 579, 590.) There is nothing in Yosemite’s conduct that constitutes acceptance of the damaged and defective pigs or suggests that Yosemite meant to affirm the contract.

Given this record, we conclude the implied findings of the trial court that Yosemite was not in material breach of the contract and had not affirmed the contract are supported by the evidence.

III. Notice and opportunity to cure

Dolarian’s last contention is related to the second. It claims the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding that Yosemite acted in a commercially reasonable manner when it rescinded the contract without providing Dolarian with notice and an opportunity to cure the breach. It is undisputed that Yosemite did not provide Dolarian written documentation identifying the breach and setting forth a cure. It is also not disputed that Yosemite rescinded the Yosemite contract without providing Dolarian with an opportunity to cure the breach. However, we agree with the trial court that this was not required and Yosemite’s failure to do so does not preclude rescission.

Dolarian provides no authority for its proposition that Yosemite must provide the assignee notice of a breach or for its contention that Yosemite must give the assignee an opportunity to cure the breach before rescinding a contract after waiting nearly a year for the contract to be performed. As we have already stated, an appellate court may consider contentions waived if not supported by sufficient argument or authority. (Guthrey v. State of California, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) We conclude these arguments are waived.

Second, if we were to consider the merits of the argument, we would determine that Dolarian had notice of the breach through its review of Mid Prairie’s records, including the payment documentation provided by Yosemite, its involvement in Mid Prairie’s operations, and its knowledge that Mid Prairie had never provided the quantity of pigs required under the Yosemite contract. In any event, Dolarian certainly had notice by the May 16, 2001, meeting as it concedes that it called the meeting in order to work out the problems that caused Yosemite to hold the May contract payment.

Finally, even if Yosemite were under some unidentified legal principle required to give Dolarian, in addition to Mid Prairie, a reasonable opportunity to perform the contract, Dolarian cannot show that it was able to perform the contract. The contract calls for 450 roaster-quality pigs per week grown by Mid Prairie. Mid Prairie was unable to provide the necessary quantity of pigs prior to rescission and there is no showing that anything had changed. At oral argument and in its briefing, Dolarian ignores these key provisions of the contract terms. Purchasing the pigs on the open market, as was the practice before the May 16, 2001, meeting, was not an acceptable option under the contract. At the meeting, Dolarian, even though on notice that Mid Prairie was in breach of the terms of the agreement, could not give Mr. Lau reasonable assurance that the contract terms could be met.

IV. Motion to dismiss Ara Dolarian

Yosemite has filed a motion to dismiss Ara Dolarian from the appeal for failure to comply with postjudgment discovery orders. (See TMS, Inc. v. Aihara (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 377, 379 [appellate court has inherent power to dismiss appeal of any party who willfully has refused to comply with orders of trial court].) In order to dismiss the appeal, we would have to resolve the factual question of whether Dolarian’s noncompliance was willful. The record here is inadequate to enable us to make this determination. Consequently, the motion is denied.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The motion to dismiss Ara Dolarian filed on June 30, 2008, is denied. Costs are awarded to Yosemite.

WE CONCUR: Vartabedian Acting P.J., Hill, J.


Summaries of

Yosemite Meat and Locker Service, Inc. v. Dolarian Business Group, Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 21, 2008
No. F052452 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2008)
Case details for

Yosemite Meat and Locker Service, Inc. v. Dolarian Business Group, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:YOSEMITE MEAT AND LOCKER SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Jul 21, 2008

Citations

No. F052452 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2008)