Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate. A. Rex Victor, Judge. Super.Ct.No. J217679
Margaret Hogenson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Jeffrey L. Bryson, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J.
Petitioner Yoselin C. (mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 8.452 (formerly rule 38.1(a)), challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to her child, Barbara J. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services under section 361.5, and in finding that the Department of Children’s Services (the department) had provided her with reasonable reunification services, pursuant to the court’s order at the detention hearing. We deny the writ petition.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2007, the department filed a petition on behalf of the child, who was less than one month old at the time. The petition alleged that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling). Specifically, the petition alleged that mother had long histories of violence and substance abuse, both of which interfered with her ability to parent. The petition further alleged that mother had a history of living a transient lifestyle, that the child’s half sister, A.M., was found to have been emotionally abused and neglected by mother, resulting in emotional problems and fear, that mother’s reunification services as to A.M. were terminated on June 14, 2007, and that mother had failed to reunify with A.M. The allegations under subdivision (d) (sexual abuse) only concerned the child’s alleged father, who is not a party to this petition.
In the detention report, the social worker stated that mother had been known to the department for the past five years. Her first daughter, A.M., was removed on March 24, 2006, after the department received two child abuse referrals. At the time of the abuse incidents, mother was in an inpatient drug treatment center. Residents of the center reported observing mother slapping A.M., smacking her in the head, and kicking her. A court ordered mother to participate in a family reunification plan, including drug treatment, anger management, and parenting classes. The social worker reported that mother made no progress in the 12 months of services offered to her. Reunification services were terminated on May 30, 2007. Mother’s parental rights as to A.M. were subsequently terminated on November 30, 2007.
The social worker later testified at the jurisdictional hearing that mother’s reunification services were terminated on June 14, 2007.
On October 18, 2007, the court detained the child. At that time, the court ordered the department to provide reunification services, pending development of a case plan.
Jurisdiction/Disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdictional/dispositional report on November 7, 2007, recommending that the child be declared a dependent of the court and that no reunification services be provided to mother. The social worker reported that mother herself was a dependent of the court from 2002 to 2005 and had been placed in 10 different group homes due to a history of verbal outbursts, property damage, drug use, poor impulse control, “intermitted explosive disorder,” and depression. Mother became involved in drugs at age 14. She gave birth to A.M. in April 2002, when she was 15 years old. During mother’s time as a dependent, she received numerous services at her group homes, including parenting classes, counseling, anger management classes, and drug treatment.
The social worker further reported that, in the past 12 months, she learned of disturbing incidents concerning mother. Mother’s grandfather described mother as having a violent temper, as evidenced by her stabbing him when she was 14 years old and leaving two long scars on his stomach. The grandfather almost died from that incident.
The social worker also reported that mother lived a transient lifestyle and had been primarily homeless for most of the past two years. Her poor decisions led her to live with several different men with violent criminal histories. She was unemployed and had never held a job.
On October 24, 2007, mother entered the Rialto Perinatal Center (the Perinatal Center) and had been participating for approximately 14 days at the time of the writing of the jurisdiction/disposition report. Mother historically had never been able to stay in any treatment program for more than one month. She denied any current drug use, but admitted to drinking alcohol.
The social worker concluded that mother had made no progress in the five years of services offered to her. Mother had only demonstrated “a profound lack of insight and a complete inability to benefit from treatment” that had been provided to her. The social worker concluded that the department had exhausted every resource. Nonetheless, mother continued to have the same issues which led to the removal of A.M., and she had not made any changes that would indicate an ability to parent the child.
On December 14, 2007, the social worker filed an addendum report. She informed the court that mother had been enrolled in drug treatment for one and one-half months and had been testing clean. However, mother still had not addressed any of her history of violence. Mother minimized her violent behavior and blamed her violence on the fact that she “‘was coming off drugs.’” Mother stated that she did not believe cussing at her daughter or threatening to kill her was wrong, or that letting her watch violent, scary movies was inappropriate. The social worker further reported that mother failed to acknowledge that she threw a five-pound metal rake through a living room window out of anger a few months prior. Mother was not enrolled in anger management or parenting classes. She was living in a homeless shelter and did not believe she had time to work. She continued her relationship with the child’s father, visiting him regularly in jail. She also requested that the foster mother bring the child to the jail for a visit.
Jurisdictional Hearing
A contested jurisdictional hearing was held on December 27, 2007. Mother testified at the hearing and admitted that she had a long history of violence, but said it was “in the past” and that she was “working on it.” She similarly admitted that she had a history of substance abuse “in the past,” but claimed that she had been clean for almost two years. She testified that she started using methamphetamine and marijuana when she was 13 years old. Mother further admitted that, since the dependency case with A.M., she had not taken any classes to address her problem with violence. She also admitted that sometime between July 2007 and November 2007, she had a violent fight with her father during which she threw the metal rake through a window at his home. She claimed that it was only self-defense. Mother stated that she did not believe she needed to take anger management courses at that time, but she only had to because the court required her to do so in order to get back the child.
She was 20 years old at the time of the hearing.
The social worker also testified at the hearing. She testified that mother did not complete any components of her case plan with regard to A.M. That case plan was designed to address mother’s problems with substance abuse and physical abuse. The social worker further testified regarding mother’s current progress at the Perinatal Center. The social worker was informed by the Perinatal Center that mother had missed eight appointments, and that she was in jeopardy of being terminated. The social worker also reported that mother admitted she used methamphetamine in February 2007, and that she currently still drank alcohol.
The court determined that mother had not demonstrated any change since her parental rights to A.M. had been terminated. The court found all of the allegations in the petition to be true and that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j).
The reporter’s transcript reflects that the court found the child came within section 300, subdivision (g), as well. However, the copy of the petition in the clerk’s transcript does not contain an allegation under subdivision (g).
Dispositional Hearing
A contested dispositional hearing was held on January 15, 2008. Mother testified and admitted that her daughter A.M. was removed from her care because of her problems with substance abuse, anger management, and acts of violence, and that her reunification services and parental rights were terminated. Although the court previously found true the allegations that she was physically and emotionally abusive, not just verbally abusive, mother denied those allegations. Mother admitted that she had been terminated from three different substance abuse programs. She said that she was currently attending a program at the Perinatal Center, and had taken one class in anger management, one class in domestic violence, and one class in parenting.
The court found, among other things, that the department had complied with the order made at the detention hearing to provide reunification services. The court ordered that no reunification services be provided to mother, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), and (b)(13). The court found there was clear and convincing evidence that the child’s half sibling, A.M., had been removed from mother’s custody, that mother’s reunification services as to A.M. were terminated, and that mother’s parental rights as to A.M. were terminated. The court also found that mother had a history of substance abuse, and that she had resisted prior treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the current petition. The court declared the child a dependent of the court and set a section 366.26 hearing for May 14, 2008.
ANALYSIS
I. The Court Properly Denied Mother Reunification Services
Mother argues that the court erred in denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), and (b)(13). We disagree.
At the outset, we note that the court did not deny mother services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(12). The court adopted the department’s recommended findings, and the department relied on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) and (e)(1) with respect to the child’s father only. The department and the court did not rely upon section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) (the whereabouts of the parent are unknown) for either parent. Although the reporter’s transcript does reflect that the court stated there was evidence that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) applied, the recording was apparently a mistake on the court reporter’s part. The court actually determined that section 361.5 (e)(1), not (b)(1), applied, as shown by its specific finding that services would be detrimental to the child since the child’s father was incarcerated. (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).)
A. Standard of Review
“‘In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600 (Francisco G.).)
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient
Subdivision (b) of section 361.5 “sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed altogether. These bypass provisions represent the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances. [Citation.]” (Francisco G., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.) Specifically, “[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (10) That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any . . . half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the . . . half sibling after the . . . half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 . . . and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the . . . half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian. [¶] (11) That the parental rights of a parent over any . . . half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, . . . and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the . . . half sibling . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (13) That the parent or guardian of the child has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment . . . on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible.” (§ 361.5, subds. 10, 11 & 13, italics added.)
1. Mother Has Not Made a Subsequent Reasonable Effort to Treat Her Problems
Mother does not dispute that her reunification services and parental rights as to A.M. were terminated. Rather, she argues that she has made a “subsequent reasonable effort” to treat her problems. The department claims that the time span relevant to examine whether mother had made reasonable efforts was the period subsequent to A.M.’s removal. However, section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) states that the juvenile court must find that the prior court “ordered termination of reunification services for any . . . half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the . . . half siblings . . . and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the . . . half siblings . . . .” (Italics added.) Subdivision (b)(11) uses the same language with regard to termination of parental rights. Thus, the relevant time period for the court to examine was the period subsequent to the termination of reunification services and parental rights, not subsequent to A.M.’s removal. Mother’s reunification services as to A.M. were terminated on May 30, 2007, and her parental rights were terminated on November 30, 2007. (The court detained the child in the current case on October 18, 2007.)
We again note that the social worker testified at the jurisdictional hearing that mother’s reunification services were terminated on June 14, 2007.
The problems that led to A.M.’s removal included mother’s lack of parenting skills, her inability to take care of and support A.M., anger management, acts of violence, and her history of drug and alcohol abuse. The social worker opined that mother had made no progress in the five years of services offered to her. Mother had only demonstrated “a profound lack of insight and a complete inability to benefit from treatment” that had been provided to her. The social worker concluded that the department had exhausted every resource. Nonetheless, mother continued to have the same issues which led to the removal of A.M., and she had not made any changes that would indicate an ability to parent the child. Although mother had enrolled at the Perinatal Center, and had attended a few classes there, the social worker reported that mother had missed at least eight appointments, and that she was in jeopardy of being terminated. At the dispositional hearing on January 15, 2008, mother admitted that she had only taken one class in anger management, one class in domestic violence, and one class in parenting. This evidence does not demonstrate that mother has made a reasonable effort to address her serious problems.
In addition, the evidence showed that mother did not have stable housing as of the dispositional hearing. Mother had been living at the Tay Center, an aftercare facility that assists youths with housing and employment, for about two months only. Prior to that, she was living at the Cameron Hills Aftercare Program. The social worker testified that mother had been living a transient lifestyle for several years—living with numerous relatives and her boyfriend, in various locations. Mother also had no income. She had just secured a part-time job at Cameron Hills, but had not yet started working. Mother had never held a job before.
In view of the evidence, the juvenile court could easily conclude that mother had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to A.M.’s removal and that it was not in the best interests of the child to provide mother with reunification services.
2. Mother Had a History of Extensive, Abusive, and Chronic Drug Use
Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding under section 361.5, subdivision (13). The court found true the allegation that mother had a long history of substance abuse. Mother does not dispute this finding, but simply asserts that “her ability to avoid drug use for one year indicates that [she] does not have an extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs.” Mother cites no authority for this bold proposition. Furthermore, mother admitted to the social worker that she used methamphetamine in February 2007, less than a year prior to the dispositional hearing, and that she still drank alcohol. Moreover, it is the nature of addiction that one must be “clean” for a long period of time to show real reform. (In re Clifton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424.)
Furthermore, the social worker testified mother had a seven-year history of drug problems that she had not made a reasonable effort to treat. The evidence showed mother had failed to complete three drug programs within the last three years. In fact, mother admitted she had been terminated from three different substance abuse programs.
Mother asserts that she had “demonstrated a tremendous level of commitment to her current program.” Even so, mother had only been in her current program for a few months and she had a history of failing to complete treatment programs.
The court only needed to find clear and convincing evidence of one of the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b) in order to deny mother reunification services. We conclude that there was more than enough evidence to support the court’s order denying services to mother.
II. The Department Provided Reasonable Reunification Services
Pursuant to the Court’s Order at the Detention Hearing
Mother argues that the department failed to provide her with reasonable reunification services, pursuant to the court’s order at the detention hearing. She further claims that the court erred in finding that reasonable services were provided, since the services did not address her potential psychological issues, and since the department failed to give her the “referrals necessary to satisfy all components of her case plan.”
Mother’s claim is nonsensical. At the detention hearing, the court made the following order: “Pending development of the case plan, the Department shall provide services to reunify the child with the family.” Section 319, subdivision (e) provides that, if a court orders a child detained, it shall “order services to be provided as soon as possible to reunify the child and his or her family if appropriate.” At the time the court ordered the services, there was no case plan, as clearly stated in the court’s order. Thus, mother’s claim that the department failed to give her the referrals needed to satisfy her case plan is senseless. Moreover, mother fails to explain how the department’s provision of services between the period of detention and disposition would have any effect on the court’s decision to deny her reunification services under section 361.5. Therefore, we reject mother’s claims. We nonetheless note that mother was offered a variety of services after the detention hearing, including counseling, case management, emergency shelter care, parent training, public assistance services, transportation, and referrals to substance abuse treatment programs.
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied.
We concur: RICHLI, J., KING, J.