Opinion
No. 296 C.D. 2013
11-13-2013
Clinton Rhea Yonce v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County which sustained the appeal of Clinton Rhea Yonce from the 60-day disqualification of his Commercial Driver's License (CDL). After review, we reverse.
On September 10, 2012, Yonce received a citation for speeding while operating a commercial motor vehicle in Massachusetts, for which he was subsequently convicted. After the Bureau received a report of Yonce's conviction, he was sent a notice of disqualification dated October 18, 2012, informing him that his 60-day disqualification under Section 1611(g) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1611(g), would take effect November 22, 2012. Yonce appealed the disqualification to the trial court.
Before the trial court, the Bureau offered into evidence without objection a packet of documents containing a certification page, a copy of the notice of disqualification, a copy of the "out of state conviction list," a "traffic safety inquiry," a "CDL holder date span inquiry list," a certification statement, and Yonce's certified driving history. The "traffic safety inquiry" document indicated that Yonce was convicted on September 20, 2012, of "ACD: S92 Speeding Lim/Act req," and that the violation occurred in a "CMV," a commercial motor vehicle. According to his certified driving history, this was the second serious traffic offense within a three-year period. A similar S92 Speeding conviction in Maine occurred on April 17, 2012.
Collectively, Commonwealth Exhibit 1.
ACD stands for the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) Conviction/Withdrawal Code Dictionary, which was "developed to assist states in exchanging conviction and withdrawal information between licensing authorities." Hyer v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 957 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The Code Dictionary is used by many states, including Pennsylvania, "to determine the comparability of out-of-state offenses with in-state offenses, and its primary function is to enable the Commercial Drivers' License Information System (CDLIS) to exchange convictions and withdrawals. It is an interpretive tool for states involved in the Driver License Compact of 1961, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1581, to 'translate' the nature of a conviction reported by a sister state." Id. According to the Bureau, the code, "S92" refers to a violation for "Speeding-Speed limit and actual speed (detail required)." See Appellant's Brief at 13, fn.3. This code violation is similar to a violation in Pennsylvania under Section 3362, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3362 Maximum speed limits.
Yonce testified that he was speeding on the date in question, but asked for leniency from the court, stating that his CDL was his only form of income and that, "I just really can't lose my license." Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 12-13; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 21a-22a. Despite noting that the Vehicle Code does not allow for discretion in shortening disqualifications, and that according to his certified driver's record Yonce had a number of traffic violations, which included the out-of-state traffic violation in Maine, the trial court sustained Yonce's appeal and rescinded the Bureau's suspension. This appeal followed.
The Bureau's sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by waiving Yonce's statutorily mandated 60-day disqualification when it sustained his appeal. The Bureau avers that under Section 1611(h) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1611(h), it is required to treat out-of-state traffic violations by a CDL holder as having occurred in Pennsylvania. When the Bureau received the report from Massachusetts regarding Yonce's speeding conviction, which was his second serious traffic offense, it was required to impose a 60-day disqualification of Yonce's commercial operating privilege under Section 1611(g). This section, the Bureau contends, is mandatory and does not allow either it or the trial court any discretion. The Bureau submits that other than ruling on a challenge to the validity of the out-of-state convictions or whether or not the Bureau had acted in accordance with the law, the trial court was not free to modify the disqualification based on its determination that Yonce somehow deserved "a break." N.T. at 15, R.R. at 24a. To do so, the Bureau argues, "infringes upon the discretion vested in the Secretary [of Transportation] and amounts to a manifest abuse of discretion . . . ." Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. McCartney, 279 A.2d 77, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971). As Yonce neither challenged the out-of-state convictions nor asserted that the Bureau did not comply with the law, the Bureau asserts that his appeal should have been dismissed. We agree.
As the party with the burden of proof, the Bureau can establish a prima facie case for disqualification by presenting a receipt of a report of an out- of-state conviction to the trial court. Glidden v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 962 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The Bureau must then show that the conviction is substantially similar to the proscribed offense in Pennsylvania and further, that the out-of-state conviction requires a disqualification under Pennsylvania law. Taddei v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 982 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Aten v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 649 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Once the Bureau has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the licensee to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was not convicted of the offense and that the record is erroneous. Taddei; Glidden.
Section 1611, titled "Disqualification," states in pertinent part:
(g) Disqualification for serious traffic offenses. - The department shall disqualify any person from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 60 days if convicted of two serious traffic violations . . . arising from separate and distinct incidents occurring within a three-year period. A violation will only be considered a serious traffic violation for purposes of this subsection where:
(1) the person was a commercial driver's license holder at the time of the violation, and conviction of the violation results in a revocation, cancellation or suspension of the person's operating privileges for noncommercial motor vehicles; or
(2) the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the violation.
(h) Conviction in Federal court or another state.—For purposes of the provisions of this section, a copy of a report of conviction or a copy of a report of administrative adjudication from a Federal court or another state for an offense similar to those offenses which would result in disqualification in this section shall
be treated by the department as if the conviction had occurred in this Commonwealth . . . .75 Pa. C.S. § 1611(g) and (h).
Here, the Bureau presented the certified out-of-state conviction showing that Yonce, while driving a commercial vehicle in Massachusetts, was convicted of driving 67 mph in a 50 mph zone. Under the AAMVA Code Dictionary, the conviction was identified as an S92 violation, which translates into an offense under Section 3362 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3362. Yonce did not challenge the Massachusetts conviction, admitting that, "I know I did wrong, you know." N.T. at 12; R.R. at 21a. Nor did Yonce argue that the Bureau improperly imposed the 60-day disqualification of his CDL, but instead offered the explanation that he was starting his own business and was unfamiliar with all of the requirements of the Vehicle Code and that he had had a "rough" year. Id. at 13; R.R.at 22a. While noting the Bureau's prima facie evidence, the trial court stated, "[f]or today, as I said, I'm going to cut you a break. I'm going to sustain your appeal. I'm going to rescind this suspension." Id. at 18; R.R. at 27a. The trial court further stated to Yonce, however, if he committed a third offense, "it will be considered a third serious violation and it will result in a 120-day suspension, and you will have almost no basis to appeal because now you have been educated by me - -[.]" Id. at 15; R.R. at 24a.
The evidence submitted by the Bureau established that Yonce was convicted of driving in excess of the speed limit while operating a commercial vehicle in Massachusetts and that such a violation is akin to a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3362, relating to maximum speed limits. The Bureau further established that this violation requires it to disqualify Yonce's CDL for a period of 60-days under 75 Pa.C.S. §1611(g). Having established a prima facie case for disqualification, and with no testimony or evidence to rebut the Bureau's evidence other than his plea for leniency, the trial court was bound to uphold the law and dismiss Yonce's appeal.
See Banks v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (three-month suspension was mandatory and trial court had no discretion to consider the hardship and other equitable factors involved); Aten v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 649 A.2d 732, 736 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (licensee having been convicted of the motor vehicle offense charged, the courts may not examine circumstances of the underlying conviction). --------
Accordingly, we reverse.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of November, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED and the license disqualification issued by the Department of Transportation is hereby reinstated.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge