Yates v. State

Full title: ROWDY LEE YATES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jun 6, 2011

No. 05-09-01214-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 6, 2011)

Opinion

No. 05-09-01214-CR

Opinion Filed June 6, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-15107-PV.

Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice RICHTER.

A jury convicted appellant of injury to a child fourteen years of age or younger, found the enhancement paragraph true, and sentenced appellant to eighteen years' imprisonment. The trial court subsequently entered an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used during the commission of the offense. In four issues on appeal, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction and the deadly weapon finding. Concluding appellant's arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Standard of Review

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has overruled Clewis v. State, holding that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court is to apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). This standard requires the reviewing court to determine whether, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 899 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319). We defer to the jury's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Id. Therefore, although appellant raises both legal and factual sufficiency issues, we will conduct a single review of appellant's sufficiency complaints under the Jackson standard.

Discussion

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction

A person unlawfully causes injury to a child when they intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (West Supp. 2010). Serious bodily injury refers to "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (West 2003). A person acts "intentionally" when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2003). A person acts "knowingly" when he is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (West 2003). Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of the conduct. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, the mental state criminalized in the injury to a child statute contemplates the prohibited result, i.e. serious bodily injury. See Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The evidence adduced at trial established that appellant and Katrina Marshall are the parents of MY, the victim. MY was born prematurely and was required to remain on an apnea cardio unit to track his breathing and heart rate, and required multiple medications throughout the day. Appellant took care of MY during the day while Marshall worked. On the day in question, Marshall fed MY before she left for work, and the baby did not display any abnormal behavior. Marshall instructed appellant to give the baby a bath in preparation for a nurse who was scheduled to visit that day. The couple frequently bathed the child in the kitchen sink. Later that day, Marshall was making a delivery for her employer when a co-worker informed her that she needed to return because something was wrong with MY. When Marshall returned, appellant was there with MY, who was screaming and crying loudly. Appellant told Marshall he did not know what was wrong with MY. Marshall and appellant took MY to their house, and Marshall noticed that MY looked extremely pale. MY's temperature was 94.5 degrees. Marshall called the doctor, and was instructed to take MY to the hospital immediately. Marshall and appellant were stopped for speeding on the way to the hospital, and the officer called for an ambulance. When the paramedics arrived, they began administering oxygen to MY because he appeared unresponsive. Upon arrival at the hospital, MY was tested and found to have suffered a subdural hemorrhage and a skull fracture. Although Marshall repeatedly asked appellant what had happened, appellant insisted he did not know. Child Protective Services began an investigation, and interviewed both Marshall and appellant. Detective Billy Walts and Sergeant Gilbert of the Balch Springs police department were present for the interview. Appellant appeared to be nervous during the interview and stated that he did not know how MY sustained his injuries. Detective Walts interviewed appellant again later. Although appellant continued to assert that he did not know how the baby had been injured, he told Detective Walts the baby had bumped his head on his plastic car seat that morning. Again, Detective Walts observed that appellant appeared nervous during the interview. Several days later, Marshall confronted appellant again about what had transpired. After Marshall told appellant that "sometime accidents happen," appellant told her that he was attempting to call her at work, and while balancing the phone with his ear to his shoulder, picked MY up out of the sink with one hand and reached for a towel with his other hand. According to appellant, MY slipped from his hand and hit his head on the edge of the sink. Marshall contacted the authorities, and appellant wrote and signed a written statement detailing the story he told Marshall. Detective Walts testified that he interviewed appellant several times in connection with MY's injuries, and noted that on three occasions, appellant stated he "shook" MY in the cradle position after he fell in the sink. Detective Waits thought appellant's use of the word "shake" in this context was odd. Dr. Susan Scott of Children's Medical Center testified about MY's injuries. Dr. Scott stated that a significant amount of force was required to cause a subdural hemorrhage, and significant blunt force trauma would be required to fracture a skull. Dr. Scott opined that MY's injuries were consistent with being shaken and/or being struck by some object, and that striking a child against a sink could cause such injuries. Dr. Scott stated that there was no record of MY having suffered any type of head injury due to his premature birth, and his injuries were consistent with those of a child who has been abused rather than one who has suffered accidental trauma. Dr. Scott further testified that MY's injuries could not have been the result of rocking in a cradle position, bumping his head on a car seat, or falling a short distance to the kitchen sink because these events would not supply the force necessary to render the injuries in question. Testifying on his own behalf, appellant stated that he was tired on the day in question because he had not slept the day before. According to appellant, when the baby fell in the kitchen sink, the fall was no more than a foot in distance. Appellant stated that he did not immediately tell the authorities what had happened because he was scared and in shock, and was afraid he would get in trouble for being around children in violation of his parole conditions. Appellant did not recall having told the detective that he had shaken the baby, and denied that he ever intentionally hurt the baby. Appellant said the baby's injuries were the result of a "total accident." Appellant asserts a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he "intentionally or knowingly" caused the injuries alleged in the indictment because the State failed to offer any eyewitness testimony to contradict his testimony and because the medical testimony failed to account for MY's fragile health. We are not persuaded by this argument. Despite the fact that appellant's trial testimony was consistent with the statement he ultimately gave police, appellant repeatedly lied and changed his story before giving the police a statement. The fact finder may infer intent from the accused's acts and words as well as the surrounding circumstances. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Intent may also be inferred from the extent of injuries to the victim, the method used to produce the injuries, and the relative size and strength of the parties. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Although there was no eyewitness testimony to counter appellant's version of events, the jury was entitled to evaluate appellant's credibility and determine the weight to be afforded to all of the testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Based on Dr. Scott's testimony, the nature of the baby's injuries, and appellant's conduct following the offense, we conclude a rational jury could reasonably find that appellant's actions were knowing or intentional. Appellant's first two issues are overruled.

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Deadly Weapon Finding

In his third and fourth issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that he used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Specifically, appellant maintains the State failed to establish that appellant's hands, the sink, or some unknown object was used as a deadly weapon. We disagree. A deadly weapon is "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(B) (West 2003). "An object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Here, the indictment alleged the use of a deadly weapon in the alternative, stating that the injury occurred:

. . . by shaking the complainant with defendant's hands . . . by striking the complainant against a sink . . . and by striking the complainant with and against an unknown object. . . .

To be legally sufficient to sustain a deadly weapon finding, the evidence must demonstrate that: (1) the object meets the statutory definition; (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the offense; and (3) other people were put in actual danger. See Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A person's hands may be considered a deadly weapon depending upon the evidence presented. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In determining whether the evidence establishes the hands were used as a deadly weapon, the injuries inflicted on the victim are relevant factors to be considered. Id. In the present case, appellant testified that he gave MY a bath in the kitchen sink using his hands on the day MY suffered a subdural hemorrhage and skull fracture. Dr. Scott testified that a significant amount of force, such as a child being shaken, was required to cause a subdural hemorrhage, and significant blunt force trauma was required to cause a skull fracture. Dr. Scott further testified that these injuries could not have been caused by the child bumping his head on his car seat, being dropped a short distance in the sink, or being rocked in the cradle position. Detective Walt testified that based on his experience, a person's hands could become a deadly weapon if used to shake a baby. This evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant used objects capable of causing bodily injury that put MY in actual danger. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the deadly weapon finding. Appellant also argues that because a dependant's parole eligibility date is harshly affected with the entry of a deadly weapon finding, "it is obvious" the Legislature intended the deadly weapon statute be narrowly as opposed to broadly applied. Although appellant attempts to disguise this argument in the section of his brief challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the argument is one of statutory construction, not sufficiency. An objection at trial is not necessary before making a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning a deadly weapon finding. See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). But challenges other than to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a deadly weapon finding are subject to the rules concerning preservation of error. See e.g., Macias v. State, No. 08-02-00533-CR, 2004 WL 1485758 at * 3 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding due process argument concerning deadly weapon finding not preserved for appellate review). Because appellant did not raise the statutory construction issue in the court below, the issue has not been preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Appellant's third and fourth issues are overruled. Having resolved all of appellant's issues against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment.