Opinion
Civil 1:21-CV-87
08-31-2021
KENYATTA WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD ENGLEMEYER, et al., Defendants.
Rambo Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
Kenyatta Wright is a convicted felon and parole violator whose current civil rights lawsuit arises out of parole revocation proceedings brought against him. The present case stems from plaintiff Kenyatta Wright's parole sentence, which was extended by a period of over a year and a half due to a conviction for a parole violation based on his failure to pay fees pursuant to Rule 7 of the Dauphin County Probation/Parole/IPP Rules. Following this violation and the hearing in which he was re-sentenced, Mr. Wright was also arrested for possession with intent to distribute in violation of his parole.
It is against this backdrop that Mr. Wright brought suit against Rick Anglemeyer (incorrectly identified as Englemeyer), his probation officer; Dauphin County Prison Warden Greg Briggs; and the Dauphin County Prison Records Department, alleging that they have wrongfully incarcerated him past his original “max date” (maximum probation end date) of May 6, 2019.
Mr. Wright failed to file a proposed amended complaint by April 1, 2021, as ordered by this Court. His original complaint, (Doc.1), therefore remains the operative pleading in this case. Based upon this complaint, and uncontested court records, it appears that on March 13, 2019, plaintiff Kenyatta Wright was paroled from state prison with a max date of May 6, 2019 (Doc. 1, at 2). Mr. Wright then failed to pay biweekly fines pursuant to Rule 7 of the Dauphin County Probation/Parole/IPP Rules. (Id., at 3). On March 26, 2019, Probation/Parole Officer Richard Anglemeyer reported Mr. Wright for violating Rule 7 of his parole; the subsequent revocation hearing was held July 18, 2019. (Id. at 2-3). At the hearing, Judge Curcillo found Mr. Wright guilty of the parole violation and re-sentenced him to serve the remainder of his back-time-19 months and 3 days. (Doc. 15-3) This resulted in a new max date of February 21, 2021 and it appears that Wright was at some time released on supervised probation pending the completion of this extended term. (Doc. 1, at 3).
While serving this extended sentence, on March 12, 2020, Officer Anglemeyer notified Harrisburg City Police that Mr. Wright was in possession of cocaine and marijuana and Mr. Wright was arrested and placed in Dauphin County Prison. (Doc. 16, at 11). He was charged with possession with intent to distribute and a parole violation. (Id.) While incarcerated, Mr. Wright contacted the prison's records department to inquire about his max date; the records department initially and erroneously replied that the max date was May 6, 2019. (Doc. 1, at 4) Mr. Wright then contacted Warden Greg Briggs, to whom the records department reported that Mr. Wright was not past his current max date. (Id.) Mr. Wright also submitted several request slips to Warden Briggs and the records department inquiring again about his max date. (Id.) Mr. Wright subsequently brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officer Anglemeyer, Warden Briggs, and the Dauphin County Prison Records Department, claiming that the defendants wrongfully incarcerated him past his max date. (Doc. 1).
All three named defendants have now filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 15). The motion argues that Wright failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing his claim; that the Dauphin County Prison Records Department is not a “person” against whom a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim can be brought; that Probation Officer Anglemeyer (and by extension, the Dauphin County Probation Department) retain absolute immunity from suit; that Heck v. Humphrey bars Mr. Wright's complaint; that Mr. Wright failed to posit a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; and that Warden Briggs and Officer Anglemeyer retain qualified immunity against the Wright's claims. For the following reasons, we agree and will recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. Denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. This Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted.
Mr. Wright presents a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the three listed defendants, claiming that they wrongfully incarcerated him past his max date. However, after reviewing Mr. Wright's complaint, we find that he has not pleaded a proper § 1983 claim, and, had he done so, his claim remains barred on several independent grounds. We therefore recommend that this court grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.
As previously noted, Mr. Wright has brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows
Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws… [to be held] liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even assuming the veracity of its statements in accordance with the Iqbal standard, Mr. Wright's complaint does not allege all of the required elements for a § 1983 claim. Furthermore, Mr. Wright's claims are barred by his failure to meet the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)'s exhaustion requirement; the Supreme Court's requirement of proof of an overturned conviction, established under Heck v. Humphrey; and each named defendant is entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from liability in Mr. Wright's suit.
Each of these issues will be discussed below in greater depth.
a. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
At the outset, when bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an inmate must first exhaust all administrative remedies available at the facility in which he is held. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). This requirement applies to all inmates seeking redress through a § 1983 claim, regardless of the allegations and types of relief sought. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognizes “compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules, ” known as proper exhaustion, as necessary. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). Although some circuits recognize a “futility exception” in which inmate-plaintiffs may prove the use of administrative remedies to have been ineffective due to circumstances beyond their control, the Third Circuit has consistently held that “exhaustion of all administrative remedies [is] mandatory-whether or not they provide the inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he desires in his federal action.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, Third Circuit inmate-plaintiffs must exhaust all available remedies within all given deadlines.
The complete Dauphin County Prison grievance appeal process has been recognized by this court as follows:
(1) The submission of a grievance for review and determination by the Warden; (2) an appeal of any decision to the Chairman of the Dauphin County Prison Board of Inspectors; (3) an appeal of the Chairman's decision to the full Dauphin County Prison Board of Inspectors; and (4) an appeal from the Prison Board's decision to the Dauphin County Solicitor.Sawyers v. Brown, No. 3:12-CV-016942014, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13174, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2014). Under the rules recognized within the Third Circuit, each of these steps must be followed prior to submission of a § 1983 claim to a federal court.
Mr. Wright, however, does not allege that he has followed any of the above steps. Quite the contrary, despite acknowledging the availability of a grievance system at Dauphin County Prison, his complaint admits that the only “remedy” he has pursued thus far is to “[write] a request slip to records about [his] max date.” (Doc. 1, at 2). The submission of request slips is not a remedy recognized by the Dauphin County Prison grievance system.
Although Mr. Wright attempts to argue in his opposition brief that “there is no grievance policy here in the jail [Dauphin County Prison], ” such a claim directly contradicts his admission in his complaint that a grievance system exists in Dauphin County Prison. (Doc. 18, ¶ 47). Furthermore, Mr. Wright claims that “prisoners half [sic] to file grievances on inmate request slips” and “no inmate handbook is available… [which] more than fits the criteria of a grievance procedure not existing [sic] here in the jail.” (Doc. 18, ¶ 49). However, Mr. Wright failed to make these claims in his initial complaint. It is well settled that because a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint by examining the face of that complaint, a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint through the filing of a brief, or through arguments set forth in a brief opposing a dispositive motion. Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)); cf. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not consider after-the fact allegations in determining the sufficient of [a] complaint under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6)”). Therefore, we are unable to consider these additional arguments set forth in Mr. Wright's brief as they relate to the grievance process at Dauphin County Prison.
Mr. Wright also provides no evidence that he either attempted to request more information about the grievance system or file a grievance using the request slip method he alleges. Given the established existence of a grievance system under Sawyers and Mr. Wright's own complaint demonstrating that he did not complete the grievance process, we find that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing these claims, and the claims therefore fail.
b. Failure to Name § 1983 “Persons”
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims must be brought against a “person”-a term whose boundaries the Supreme Court has clearly delineated. Although a government official is a “person” in the most general sense of the word, the Supreme Court has “implied that a judgment against a public servant in his official capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided… the public entity received notice and an opportunity to respond.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471- 72 (1985). Thus, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity, ” including a state police officer, “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Third Circuit has consistently followed these definitions, ruling accordingly that “where a suit is brought against a public official in his [or her] official capacity, the suit is treated as if [it] were brought against the governmental entity of which he [or she] is an official.” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 369 (3d Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the Third Circuit has applied this rationale to county prisons, holding that the county orison is not a “person” within the meaning of §1983 since such facilities are operated by, and are a subdivision of, the county. Beaver v. Union County Pa., 619 Fed.Appx. 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2015).
Thus, § 1983 limits liability to persons who violate constitutional rights, a limitation that courts have construed as not reaching county jails as institutions. In short, “the ‘County Jail' is not a proper defendant in this § 1983 case[ ], because it is not a ‘person.' ” Crooks v. Passaic County Sheriff's Dep't/Jail, CIV. 07-0092 (FSH), 2007 WL 923330 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that New Jersey Department of Corrections and state prison facilities not “persons” under § 1983); Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F.Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976); Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not a ‘person' under § 1983); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F.Supp. 890, 893-94 (E.D. Va. 1992) (local jail not a ‘person' under § 1983)); see also Thomas v. Wilbert, CIV.A. 09-4796 GEB, 2011 WL 91001 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2011) (“County Correctional Institution is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 case and must be dismissed from this action”).Dempsey v. Tyson, No. 1:21-CV-852, 2021 WL 2229085, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dempsey v. York Cty. Cts., No. 1:21-CV-00852, 2021 WL 2222717 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2021).
Mr. Wright names the Dauphin County Prison Records Department as a defendant in this case. However, Mr. Wright's claims against the Dauphin County Prison Records Department do not represent a claim against a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the plaintiff's claims against the Dauphin County Prison Records Department fail as a matter of law.
c. Probation Officer Anglemeyer is Immune from Suit
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies.
As established by the previous section, official-capacity suits against state officials are treated as suits first against the official's state office, then against the state itself. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; see also McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 369. States retain absolute immunity in that “the Eleventh Amendment renders unconsenting States immune from suits brought in federal courts by private parties.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d. Cir. 2008). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Commonwealth remains “unconsenting” as a result of directly invoking its immunity. See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b); see also Slavish v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 3:17-CV-1468, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100758, at *27-28 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2018). Thus, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in federal court and against a Commonwealth official is untenable. Such Eleventh Amendment immunity has also historically extended to Pennsylvania's probation and parole departments as a result of the Commonwealth's unified judicial system. Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198 (quoting Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 426 F.2d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Mr. Wright's complaint names Probation Officer Richard Anglemeyer as a defendant. Although it is unclear as to whether Mr. Wright names Probation Officer Anglemeyer in a personal or official capacity, we find that Mr. Wright's allegations that Probation Officer Anglemeyer advised him of his initial violation and subsequently “changed [his] max date” align most clearly with his official duties as a parole officer. Id.; see also Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1977). In the first instance, we find that the official-capacity suit against Probation Officer Anglemeyer is to be understood as a suit against the Dauphin County Probation Department, of which Probation Officer Anglemeyer is an official, in accordance with Will. We then understand the suit against the Dauphin County Probation Department as a suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as dictated by Haybarger. Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under the same ruling, we find Probation Officer Anglemeyer and the Dauphin County Probation Department to be entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity. Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 197.
In the alternative, individual probation officers “are entitled to absolute immunity when they are engaged in adjudicatory duties.” Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Miles v. Zech, No. 3:18-1061, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109240, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2018). Such adjudicatory duties effectively extend to “affecting the length of sentences, ” as well as advisory actions. Thompson, 556 F.2d at 237-38. Thompson, for example, involves a suit against a parole board member who met with the plaintiff, an inmate at the Philadelphia Detention Center, to discuss a recent parole detainer. Id. at 233. The court determined the parole board member's advisory actions were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, ” and were therefore adjudicatory in nature. Id. at 237. Probation officers' adjudicatory immunity thus serves as a second layer of immunity, separate from the state immunity to which they are entitled.
As such, we find Probation Officer Anglemeyer entitled to additional immunity through his status as a probation officer engaged in adjudicatory duties at the times each of Mr. Wright's alleged harms occurred. Although Mr. Wright first claims Probation Officer Anglemeyer “violated [him]” (advised him of his initial parole violation), we find such advisement is comparable in nature to the actions taken by the parole board member in Thompson and is therefore adjudicatory in nature. (Doc. 1, at 2-3). Mr. Wright further claims that Probation Officer Anglemeyer “changed [his] max date.” Id. However, in considering the “undisputedly authentic” records attached by Mr. Wright himself in responding to the present motion to dismiss, it is clear that Mr. Wright was given the opportunity to contest his violation during a revocation hearing. (Doc. 15-3, at 6); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196. Furthermore, the records show that the revocation hearing's presiding judge, rather than Probation Officer Anglemeyer himself, sentenced Mr. Wright to the backtime owed on that docket after finding him guilty of the violation. (Doc. 18-2, at 43). Because the plaintiff's claims against Probation Officer Anglemeyer each raise either implausible allegations contradicted by authentic records he himself provided or the adjudicatory duties of a probation officer, we find Probation Officer Anglemeyer entitled to immunity from liability.
Because both the Dauphin County Probation Department and Probation Officer Anglemeyer are entitled to immunity from suit, the plaintiff's claims against each defendant are barred.
d. Improper Challenge under Heck v. Humphrey
When it comes to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that challenge the circumstances of an inmate's sentence, the Supreme Court has ruled that
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). By requiring evidence of a previous challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional sentence, courts separate the matters of guilt and cause into their respective criminal and civil trials, rather than combining the two into a single hybrid trial that encompasses both. Id. at 484.
The plaintiff demands as relief release from confinement, as well as compensation for the period of his incarceration beginning May 6, 2019. (Doc. 1, at 3). Any ruling on a possible release from confinement would necessarily invalidate Mr. Wright's sentence, as the court would be required to rule as well on the matter of Mr. Wright's guilt in order to determine whether such relief can be granted. Similarly, any ruling on the matter of compensation would also invalidate Mr. Wright's sentence by requiring a determination of whether Mr. Wright is entitled to release.
Although rulings on both of the plaintiff's demands for relief would require an invalidation of his previous sentence, his complaint presents no evidence of a prior ruling in favor of such invalidation. This court cannot rule on the matter of Mr. Wright's guilt in a § 1983 civil trial when it has not been previously overturned. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Thus, we find the plaintiff's claims to be barred by the Heck doctrine promulgated by the Supreme Court.
e. Failure to State Prima Facie Claim
As previously noted, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim provides relief only to a plaintiff who has been “[subjected]… to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Thus, to present a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege such a deprivation.
Even taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Wright, his complaint is unclear as to what constitutional violation he attempts to allege. At best, Mr. Wright claims the defendants are “literally giving [him] the runaround and straight up lieing [sic] to [him]”; however, this statement neither presents nor implies any sort of constitutional violation. (Doc. 1, at 4). Although Mr. Wright attempts to allege various constitutional violations in his opposition brief, he did not assert a cognizable violation of his rights in his complaint and because, as we have discussed, a plaintiff may not amend his complaint through a brief in response to a dispositive motion, we cannot consider the additional allegations. See Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. See also Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman, 836 F.2d at 181; Frederico, 507 F.3d at 202. Moreover, as discussed below, this complaint rests upon an erroneous legal premise-the notion that Pennsylvania's parole statute which permits the extension of maximum sentence dates for parole violators somehow violates the United States Constitution. We therefore find that the plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he has not even alleged a deprivation of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, ” as required.
f. Wright's Claims Fail on Their Merits and The Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
As stated by the Supreme Court, in order to prevent officials who perform their duties reasonably from becoming distracted by litigation, “an official sued under §1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Thus, the current evaluation of an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity involves a two-prong approach: (1) finding a violation of constitutional rights and (2) determining whether the attending officer would have reasonably considered the violated law or right to be “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). To find a constitutional violation with respect to the first prong, the “inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged” when “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.” Id. at 200-01. To find that a right has been clearly established with respect to the second prong, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the ruling in Pearson makes it unnecessary to consider both prongs of this benchmark standard for qualified immunity, we find that Warden Greg Briggs and Probation Officer Richard Anglemeyer are entitled to qualified immunity based upon both prongs of this test. As stated in the previous section, even when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, his allegations of the defendants “literally giving [him] the runaround and straight up lieing [sic] to [him]” do not establish any clear constitutional violation. (Doc. 1, at 4). Mr. Wright therefore does not satisfy the first prong, which requires at least the possibility of a constitutional violation.
Moreover, Wright's complaint is based upon a fundamentally flawed legal premise. Wright insists that the defendants violated his rights when they extended his sentence beyond its original expiration date based upon the revocation of his parole. Thus Wright's complaint rests upon the notion that the provisions of state law which call for the forfeiture of time spent on parole by criminal recidivists like the Wright who violate their parole supervision and permit the extension of a parole violator's maximum sentence date violate the United States Constitution.
On this score, Wright errs.
Indeed, for the past twenty-five years federal courts have expressly considered th[is] provision of state law . . ., which permits the recalculation and extension of parole release dates for recidivists who violate the terms of their release, and have held that “[n]o [federal]
constitutional question is involved in the Parole Board's failure to give relator credit for time on parole and its adjustment of the expiration date of his new maximum.” See United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.1966) (expressing “complete accord” and affirming opinion of district court in United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F.Supp. 773, 774 (E.D.Pa.1966)).Rivera v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 1:12-CV-1169, 2013 WL 5947728, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2013). Since Wright is simply incorrect when he alleges that the extension of his release date based upon his parole violations offends the Constitution, this complaint fails as a matter of law.
Furthermore, given this settled case law which rebuffs Wright's legal claims the defendants are plainly entitled to qualified immunity from damages since the actions of these defendants simply did not violate any “clearly established” right of the plaintiff. Thus, the defendants are cloaked in qualified immunity from damages and this complaint should be dismissed.
Simply put, Wright's complaint fails on numerous independent grounds which cannot be remedied through any form of artful pleading. Accordingly, for these reasons that we recommend the claims against Defendants Greg Briggs, Richard Anglemeyer, and the Dauphin County Prison Records Department be dismissed.
Having found that Wright's complaint is flawed in these ways which compel dismissal of this lawsuit, it follows that Wright is not entitled to a judgment in his favor. Therefore, Wright's pro se motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 24), which is unaccompanied by any brief, fails as a matter of law. Therefore, it is further recommended that this motion be denied.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) be GRANTED, and that the claims against Defendants Greg Briggs, Richard Anglemeyer, and the Dauphin County Prison Records Department be dismissed. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED. (Doc. 24).
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge withinstructions.