Opinion
Civ. 1:21-CV-852
05-12-2021
DOUGLAS EDWIN DEMPSEY, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER TANNER TYSON, et al., Defendants.
Kane, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1). According to the well-pleaded facts in the complaint, the plaintiff, Douglas Dempsey, is currently awaiting trial on aggravated assault charges and other related offenses. Commonwealth v. Dempsey, CP-67-CR-0004953-2019. In his complaint, Dempsey makes claims in the nature of false arrest and malicious prosecution, alleging that his on-going prosecution is discriminatory and sexist, allegations that are apparently based upon Dempsey's belief that the authorities have taken the word of the alleged victim, a woman, over his account of these events. (Doc. 1). Based upon these averments, Dempsey attempts to sue the arresting officer, Officer Tanner Tyson; the district magisterial judge who set his original bail, Judge David Eshbach; the York County Courts; the Northern York Regional Police Department; and the York County Prison. (Id.)
Along with his complaint, Dempsey has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, finding that Dempsey's claims fail as a matter of law, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed without prejudice to Dempsey filing an amended complaint which states claims upon which relief may be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this complaint is fatally flawed in a number of respects as set forth below. Accordingly, it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed complaint without prejudice to the filing of a proper amended complaint.
B. Dempsey May Not Sue the York County Courts.
At the outset, Dempsey may not file a civil rights damages claim against the state court system, as he attempts to do in this lawsuit. These state courts are institutions of state government. See, e.g., Walters v. Washington County, No. 06-1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D. Pa. March 23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations Section, No. 09-266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2009). Since the courts are institutions of state government, this complaint further runs afoul of basic constitutional rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials. As a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States ....” U.S. Const. amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and, therefore, also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies, and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
The constitutional protections afforded to the states and the state court system under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's unitary court system. These court officers and agencies enjoy immunity from lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Walters, 2009 WL 7936639; Van Tassel, 2009 WL 3052411. Absent an express waiver of the immunity established by the Eleventh Amendment, all of these state court agencies, and their employees who are sued in their official capacities, are absolutely immune from lawsuits in federal court. These longstanding, constitutionally-grounded immunities directly apply here and prevent the plaintiff from maintaining this civil action for damages against the state court. This claim must, therefore, be dismissed.
C. Dempsey May Not Sue the Northern York Regional Police Department.
Likewise, we note that the Northern York Regional Police Department is not a proper institutional defendant in this action since police departments serve only as an administrative arm of a municipality, and it is a municipality through which any liability must flow to the police department. Indeed, it has been repeatedly held that a police department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and, therefore, is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dep't, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6012568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6002689 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Golya v. Golya, 2007 WL 2301085, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2007) (explaining that courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that a police department is merely a sub-unit of the local government and is not amenable to suit under § 1983)); Wivell v. Liberty Township Police Dept., 2007 WL 2155540, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2007) (explaining that police department not subject to suit in a § 1983 action); Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (city police department is a sub-unit of the city government that is merely a vehicle through which the city fulfills its policing functions, and is not a separate entity for purposes of suit); Tobin v. Badamo, 2000 WL 1880262 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2000) (municipal police department is not a proper party to a section 1983 action because it is merely a subunit of the city and not a separate corporate entity); McMahon v. Westtown-East Goshen Police Dept., 1999 WL 236565, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F.Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993) and Agresta v. City of Philadelphia, 694 F.Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1988)). In light of this consistent case law rejecting efforts to name local police departments as institutional defendants in § 1983 civil rights actions, it is recommended that Dempsey's claims against this institutional defendant also be dismissed. Sanders v. York Cty. Jud. Ctr., No. 1:16-CV-905, 2016 WL 3382136, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-905, 2016 WL 3220670 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2016).
D. The Plaintiff May Not Sue State Judges for Performing Judicial Acts.
In addition, Dempsey's complaint names a state judge, District Magisterial Judge Eshbach, as a defendant and purports to sue the judge for actions taken as a judge in his state criminal case. This Dempsey may not do.
To the extent that the complaint seeks to hold any judge personally liable for civil rights violations based upon judicial actions, it is well-settled that such officials are individually cloaked with immunity from liability. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir. 1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities apply here and prevent the plaintiff from maintaining this civil action against any judge named in this complaint since the judge is entitled to judicial immunity for any judicial acts, including presiding over a criminal case or sentencing a defendant. See, e.g., Arsad v. Means, 365 Fed.Appx. 327 (3d Cir. 2010); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). As we have explained when rejecting similar efforts to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge, this immunity is both broad and absolute:
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.'” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and citing Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868)). “The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors, ” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), and “[j]udicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.” Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694, 703 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Such immunity can be overcome only where a judge's acts are nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.Catanzaro v. Collins, CIV. A. 09-922, 2010 WL 1754765 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2010), aff'd, 447 Fed.Appx. 397 (3d Cir. 2011); Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 Fed.Appx. 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citations omitted)) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit. ‘A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the >clear absence of all jurisdiction'”).
Since Dempsey's complaint against this state judge runs afoul of judicial immunity, the state judge named in this complaint should be dismissed as a defendant.
E. Dempsey May Not Sue the County Prison.
Dempsey has also named the York County Prison as an institutional defendant in this case. To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to bring a lawsuit against the county prison as an institution, the plaintiff may not maintain a prisoner civil rights action against this particular defendant. Rather, inmate civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
Thus, § 1983 limits liability to persons who violate constitutional rights, a limitation that courts have construed as not reaching county jails as institutions. In short, “the ‘County Jail' is not a proper defendant in this § 1983 case[ ], because it is not a ‘person.'” Crooks v. Passaic County Sheriff's Dep't/Jail, CIV. 07-0092 (FSH), 2007 WL 923330 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that New Jersey Department of Corrections and state prison facilities not “persons” under § 1983); Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F.Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976); Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not a ‘person' under § 1983); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F.Supp. 890, 893-94 (E.D. Va. 1992) (local jail not a ‘person' under § 1983)); see also Thomas v. Wilbert, CIV.A. 09-4796 GEB, 2011 WL 91001 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2011) (“County Correctional Institution is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 case and must be dismissed from this action”).
This limitation on the reach of proper defendants in a § 1983 civil rights case compels dismissal of this claim, as stated in this pro se complaint, with respect to the county jail, which is not a proper defendant in a civil rights action brought under § 1983.
F. Dempsey May Not Bring a Civil Rights Action for Malicious Prosecution Unless and Until the State Case Has Been Resolved in His Favor.
Finally, this complaint fails because it rests on a yet another fatally flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff seeks to bring a civil rights action premised on claims of malicious prosecution without showing that his state criminal case has been resolved in a fashion that is favorable to him.
This he cannot do.
Quite the contrary, it is well-settled that an essential element of a civil rights malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim in a setting where he has not achieved a favorable outcome in the underlying state case, the plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d
249 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the common law of torts, “defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point for inquiry under § 1983 as well.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's § 1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure, and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked what common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate's claim and concluded that “malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy ... because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the elements of malicious prosecution, the court held that the inmate's claim could not proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal conviction. Id.Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-56 (3d Cir.2000).
Thus, “our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 Fed.Appx. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case.” Steele v. City of Erie, 113 Fed.Appx. 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, it is evident from the complaint that this state criminal prosecution did not terminate favorably for the plaintiff since he remains in custody on these pending charges. In the absence of such a favorable termination of the state criminal case, this federal civil rights malicious prosecution lawsuit cannot proceed. In short, this complaint is based upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, this complaint fails as a matter of law. See Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL 3953112, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).
G. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice.
While it is clear that Dempsey cannot maintain this complaint in its current form, we recognize that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, acting out of an abundance of caution, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint by dismissing this deficient complaint at this time without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to file an amended complaint containing any proper claims that he may have.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 21 days of any dismissal order.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.