Opinion
A-13584
10-06-2021
DERRICK WREN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Derrick Wren, in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant. Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-19-07000 CI, Erin B. Marston, Judge.
Derrick Wren, in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant.
Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Derrick Wren appeals the dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. In Wren's application, he challenged the Department of Corrections' calculation of his discretionary parole eligibility date. In particular, Wren argued that the Department of Corrections misinterpreted the phrase "active term of imprisonment" as it applies to a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole under AS 33.16.090.
Wren was convicted of second-degree murder and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to 70 years with 10 years suspended on the murder charge and 5 years to serve, consecutive, on the tampering charge, for a composite sentence of 75 years with 10 years suspended. Wren v. State, 2013 WL 5972364, at *1 (Alaska App. Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished).
The superior court agreed with the Department's interpretation of the pertinent statutes and dismissed Wren's application on the grounds that it failed to state a prima facie claim for relief. The court held that "active term of imprisonment" includes a defendant's total term of imprisonment without any deduction for statutory good time credit.
On appeal, Wren renews his argument that "active term of imprisonment" includes a deduction for statutory good time credit and that Alaska's truth-in-sentencing statute, AS 12.55.015(g), requires the Department to subtract a defendant's statutory good time credit from the total term of imprisonment before calculating a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole.
Wren's eligibility for discretionary parole is governed by the pre-2019 version of AS 33.16.090(b). With respect to Wren's second-degree murder conviction, this statute provides, in relevant part, that a prisoner "may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served . . . one-third of the active term of imprisonment imposed." It also provides that, as used in this section, "active term of imprisonment" has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127 - i.e., "active term of imprisonment" means the "total term of imprisonment imposed for a crime, minus suspended imprisonment."
Former AS 33.16.090(b)(1) (2018).
AS 12.55.127(e)(1).
Our recent opinion in Seaman v. State is dispositive of Wren's appeal.Seaman made the same three arguments as Wren does in the present case. First, Wren argues that this Court's decision in Perotti v. State - an unpublished decision in which this Court held that good time credit is generally not included in the calculation of discretionary parole eligibility - was wrongly decided. Second, Wren contends that the superior court should have relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State v. Leathers to interpret the phrase "active term of imprisonment." And third, Wren argues that the legislature rendered the phrase "active term of imprisonment" ambiguous when it passed former AS 33.16.090(b)(8) as part of Senate Bill 91.
Seaman v. State, __P.3d__, Op. No. 2708, 2021 WL 4343851 (Alaska App. Sept. 24, 2021).
Perotti v. State, 2008 WL 2469147 (Alaska App. June 18, 2008) (unpublished).
State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 2011).
Our opinion in Seaman addressed and rejected each of these arguments and concluded that the Department is not required to deduct a defendant's statutory good time credit when calculating a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole unless the statute expressly requires such a deduction. We reach the same conclusion here.
We note that when the superior court dismissed Wren's application, the court found that Wren had conflated the phrases "supervised release" and "suspended sentence." But Wren clearly did not conflate the two phrases - he understands that the two phrases are different and has plainly argued, both to the superior court and on appeal, that the Department should not include a prisoner's "supervised release" on mandatory parole when calculating discretionary parole eligibility. However, the superior court's misunderstanding of Wren's argument is harmless. The superior court correctly ruled that the "active term of imprisonment" is "[t]he whole unsuspended sentence[.]" See AS 12.55.127(e)(1).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.