Opinion
24A-CR-987
10-23-2024
William Frank Wray III, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. _
Appeal from the Jefferson Superior Court The Honorable Carl H. Taul, Senior Judge Trial Court Cause No. 39D01-2306-F6-755
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
R. Patrick Magrath
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP
Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] William Frank Wray III ("Wray") pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator and Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences, ultimately imposing an aggregate sentence of five years. Wray argues-and the State concedes-that the five-year sentence was improper because it fell outside the range authorized by our consecutive sentencing statute. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing.
I.C. § 9-30-5-3(2).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On June 14, 2023, Officer Cameron Blankenship ("Officer Blankenship") was dispatched to a public park in Madison, Indiana, regarding a report of a possibly intoxicated person at the park. The caller informed the dispatch operator that he saw a person, later identified to be Wray, bring a child, later identified as Wray's seven-year-old son, to the park and drink several beers in his car. Upon arrival, Officer Blankenship located Wray in the driver's seat of a white Kia. When questioned, Wray denied consuming alcohol. Wray's son walked up to see what was going on, at which point Wray told him, "we have to go." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. Officer Blankenship observed a beer can on the floorboard in between Wray's legs and sent Wray's son back to play at the park. Officer Blankenship conducted a records check of Wray's license, which revealed that his license was revoked due to his status as a habitual traffic violator. Officer Blankenship removed Wray's keys from the ignition and conducted standard field sobriety tests. Wray failed the tests and blew a 0.175 blood alcohol content on a portable breath test. See id. at 44. A subsequent search of his vehicle produced three more empty beer cans and three partially empty bottles of vodka. Wray eventually admitted to consuming alcohol and driving his minor child to the park. Wray submitted to a blood draw which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.099. See id. at 52.
[¶3] On June 20, 2023, the State charged Wray with: Count I, operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator as a Level 6 felony; and Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a minor passenger as a Level 6 felony. Wray entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to both charges, with sentencing left to the trial court's discretion. The trial court sentenced Wray to two and one-half years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total of five years, with ten days executed in the Jefferson County Jail, three years on home detention, and the remaining two years suspended to probation with treatment at LifeSpring. Wray now appeals
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] A trial court has the discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment. S.B. v. State, 175 N.E.3d 1199, 1202-03 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). However, that discretion "does not extend beyond the statutory limits." Edwards v. State, 147 N.E.3d 1019, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d) (permitting a trial court to impose "any sentence . . . authorized by statute" if the sentence passes constitutional muster). "Therefore, in reviewing a sentence, we will consider whether it was statutorily authorized." Edwards, 147 N.E.3d at 1021.
[¶5] Wray contends that his Level 6 convictions resulted "from the same date, . . . time[,] and . . . conduct," and thus, "the maximum sentence allowed by law was four (4) years rather tha[n] the five (5) year sentence pronounced by the trial court." Appellant's Br. p. 10. We agree. Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) ("consecutive sentencing statute") limits the aggregate length of consecutive sentences imposed for felony offenses arising out of a single episode of non-violent criminal conduct. A single episode of criminal conduct means "offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance." I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). Where, as here, "the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 6 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed four . . . years." I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(1).
[¶6] Here, Wray's Level 6 felony convictions arose out of him operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a suspended license. Thus, the trial court lacked authority to impose an aggregate sentence in excess of four years. Because the trial court sentenced Wray to an aggregate sentence of five years, we reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with the statutory guidelines.
[¶7] Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.