Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-1182-P
June 5, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court for consideration is Defendant Minyard Food Stores' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 2, 2001; Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 14, 2001; and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 20, 2001. After reviewing the arguments and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Wendell T. Worsham is a black person residing in Mesquite, Texas. Mr. Worsham worked for the supermarket chain Minyard Food Stores as a night stocker from September 1995 to August 1999. Worsham sues under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for racial harassment, and for failure of Defendant to send Plaintiff his W-2 form. All Plaintiff's other claims were dismissed by Order of this Court on December 19, 2000. Plaintiff claims he was subject to a hostile environment of harassment based upon his race. Plaintiff also reports a series of unfriendly incidents between another co-worker and himself, which included threats to Plaintiff's physical well-being by the co-worker; Plaintiff claims that Minyard management was unresponsive to his requests for remedial action such as transferring Plaintiff to another store. The tension between Plaintiff and his co-worker allegedly culminated in a pushing incident after which Plaintiff summoned the Dallas Police to the Minyard store where he worked on June 25, 1999. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's grocery manager improperly led the police to allow the hostile co-worker to file assault charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was fired from his job on August 13, 1999.
See Complaint at 1.
Id.
See Complaint at 4.
See Complaint at 2-3.
See Complaint at 3.
Id.
Id.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving party bears the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such an absence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party defending against the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless he provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment. Id. at 248-50; Abbot v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court need only rely on the portions of submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs. Id.
B. Racial Harassment
Defendant claims that by failing to respond to Defendant's discovery request for admissions, Plaintiff has admitted pivotal matters that demand summary judgment be granted for Defendant. There is no dispute that Defendant mailed, by certified mail and regular mail, Defendant's First Request for Admissions to Plaintiff, along with Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, on December 29, 2000. The certified mail receipt does not indicate that the discovery requests were received and signed for. However, Plaintiff clearly was aware of the request for admissions, for he filed a motion with this court to dismiss or strike Defendant's discovery requests, including the request for admissions, on January 10, 2001. Magistrate Judge Sanderson denied Plaintiff's motion on February 1, 2001. To date, the Court has no evidence to contradict Defendant's assertion that Worsham has not responded to Defendant's request for admissions or any of the other discovery requests by Defendant. According to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requests for admissions are deemed admitted if the requests have gone unanswered and unobjected to for more than thirty days after service of the requests. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a) ("The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, . . . the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the party's attorney."). The Court considers whether Worsham's January 10 Motion for Dismissal or Strike of Defendant's Motion to Produce Documents and Request for Discovery Materials etc. was a proper objection to the discovery requests.
See Def's App. at 4-5.
The magistrate judge evidently did not consider Plaintiff's Motion to be an Objection to the discovery requests. When the magistrate judge denied Plaintiff's motion, the judge did not specifically order Plaintiff to answer the request as specified by Rule 36(a) for when an objection is made ("Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served."). Defendant clearly did not believe the Motion to be an Objection, as it so argued in its terse Response to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant did not move the Court to determine the sufficiency of Plaintiff's objections as specified under Rule 36. Supposing Plaintiff's Motion were an Objection, Defendant's failure to move the court would be immaterial since Plaintiff's motion brought the matter before the court. Yet ironically, Defendant's Response to the Motion argued, "The propriety of the discovery requests or of Plaintiff's responses thereto is not presently before the Court" (emphasis added). The magistrate judge's brief February 1 order states only that "Plaintiff has not sought or obtained an order of the court compelling Defendant to provide discovery in this case. Plaintiff's motion fails to present any meritorious grounds for the relief sought in his motion."
This Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss or Strike was not an objection to Defendant's discovery requests. Even if it was an objection, the magistrate judge's denial of Plaintiff's Motion was sufficient to place Plaintiff on notice of his obligation to respond to the discovery requests, even if the magistrate judge did not specifically order Plaintiff to answer the requests, Presumably because the denial of an objection is accompanied by a court order to answer, there is no time limit set for a party to answer after its objection fails. The Court must thus conclude that the original 30-day period for response would again apply. Less than 30 days passed between the magistrate judge's ruling and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, more than 30 days passed between the magistrate judge's ruling and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff made no mention in his Response of any answers he made to discovery. Consequently, the matters within the request for admissions are admitted. Plaintiff will not be permitted to flout the Federal Rules and ignore legitimate discovery requests simply because he is pro se. His briefs are sophisticated enough to demonstrate he is capable of complying with the Rules. Local Rule 83.14 provides, "Pro se parties must read and follow the local civil rules of this court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." This Court also cautioned Plaintiff in its Order of January 23, 2001 that he must follow the local and federal rules when he files a motion for summary judgment.
Admissions may be considered when determining a summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (emphasis added)). Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's summary judgment motion does not object to Defendant's use of these admissions as a basis for its motion. Plaintiff's denial of the facts underlying the admissions that Defendant relies upon in its summary judgment motion does not affect whether the issues have been previously admitted by Rule. Accordingly, the Court will rely on Plaintiff's admissions in determining Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff has admitted the following facts:
(a) During his employment with Minyard, Plaintiff never complained that he was the victim of, or being subjected to, any form of racial harassment.
(b) During his employment with Minyard, Plaintiff was never the victim of, or subjected to, any form of racial harassment.
These admission preclude Plaintiff's racial harassment claim, making a grant of summary judgment appropriate.
C. Failure to Provide W-2 Form
Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to send him his 1999 W-2 form. Plaintiff does not refute Defendant's contention that the only remedy relating to one's W-2 form is the Internal Revenue Service's assessment of a $50 penalty against the employer under 26 U.S.C. § 6722(a); there is no private cause of action to recover damages or the W-2 form itself. Even if there were a private remedy, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's sworn testimony that Minyard mailed Mr. Worsham's W-2 form to his last known address in January 1999. Nor does Plaintiff address the statement of Defendant's counsel contained in his July 19, 2000 letter to Plaintiff which contended that Plaintiff had changed his address without informing the appropriate Minyard department or the post office, causing the W-2 to be returned to Minyard. Plaintiff also admits in Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Answer (page 3) that Minyard did at some point send him his W-2 form, as supported by Defendant's Return Receipt indicating Plaintiff picked up his W-2 form on July 20, 2000. For these reasons, summary judgment must be granted as to the W-2 claim.
See Complaint at 5.
See Def's App. at 12 (Aff. of Mary Marvin).
See Def's App. at 5 1.
See Def's App. at 5 1-54.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims.
So ORDERED.