Opinion
6:23-cv-4812-HMH-JDA
10-11-2023
Anthony Woods, Plaintiff, v. SC Department of Social Services, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
Anthony Woods (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action alleging violations of his rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff is proceeding with this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Upon review, and for the reasons stated below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff sues a single Defendant in this action, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (“DSS”). [Id. at 2.] According to Plaintiff, DSS violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that, on November 12, 2022, he “received a false court summons in the mail at [his] place of abode.” [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff contends DSS used that false summons in an attempt to compel him to court for a child support matter. [Id.] Plaintiff sent a notice to DSS requesting “proof of debt verification,” but DSS never sent him the requested information. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that this process has caused mental stress to him and his family. [Id.] Plaintiff contends DSS has no right to enforce any order against him and the actions of DSS constitutes extortion and conspiracy against his rights. [Id.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he is “mentally stressed,” he lost a job, he lost a car, he is unable to support his family, his wife and children have endured stress, and it has damaged his relationship with his teenage son. [Id. at 5.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests money damages in the amount of $500,000. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
The precise nature of Plaintiff's legal claims are not entirely clear from the allegations in the Complaint. At its core, however, the Complaint appears to challenge a DSS action in the state family court requiring Plaintiff to pay child support, and he contends that those DSS proceedings have violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The undersigned further concludes that Plaintiff appears to be challenging state court proceedings and a family court order involving his obligation to pay child support.
Here, Plaintiff's entire Complaint is frivolous and substantively without merit. See Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[t]he word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and ‘not susceptible to categorical definition.'”); Worley v. Keller, 475 Fed.Appx. 484, 485 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that a suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact). Accordingly, for the reasons below, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Sovereign Citizen Theory
As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to be a “sovereign citizen,” and his Complaint and the attachment to the Complaint bear all of the hallmarks of the “sovereign citizen” theory. Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint a document titled “Affidavit of Fact” in which he makes the following pertinent assertions purportedly in support of the claims in the Complaint. [Doc. 1-2.] Plaintiff provides the following notice in his Affidavit:
Notice to all, I am that I am, the consumer in fact, natural person, creditor, lender, executor, administrator, holder in due course of any and all derivatives thereof for the surname given Anthony-Vashawn: Woods and have been appointed and
accept being the executor both public and private for all matter proceeding, and I hereby claim that I will d/b/a as ANTHONY WOODS and autograph as the agent, attorney in fact, so be it[.][Id. at 2.] Plaintiff also makes the following assertions. DSS “is a fictitious entity.” [Id.] Plaintiff is a consumer under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and an original creditor under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). [Id.] DSS is a debt collector under the FDCPA. [Id.] DSS has garnished Plaintiff's wages, “tak[ing] away [his] freedom to choose how he wants to spend his hard earned wages.” [Id. at 3.] DSS has used state law “to enforce and abridge [Plaintiff's] privileges and immunities as a natural person.” [Id.] Plaintiff “is a natural person and a living soul which means [DSS] cannot interface with [him] due to the fact that he has natural god given rights.” [Id. at 4.]
These assertions, along with others presented by Plaintiff, are couched in terms of the “sovereign citizen” argument, which “has been rejected repeatedly by the courts.” Smith v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 5464723, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2013). Adherents to the “sovereign citizen” theory “believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, No. 3:12-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2013) (collecting cases describing the “sovereign citizen” movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013).
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the “sovereign citizen” theory as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a ‘sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining claim by defendant that he was “outside” the jurisdiction of the United States to be “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous” and rejecting it “without expending any more of this Court's resources on their discussion”); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing the “sovereign citizen” theory as having “no conceivable validity in American law”); United States v. Chatman, No. 4:17-cv-01556-RBH, 2017 WL 3704832, at *1 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3676587 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2017); Glover v. South Carolina, No. 5:16-cv-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom., No. 17-6846, 2017 WL 5197454 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017). In light of these cases and the allegations presented, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for relief and is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis alone. See Gaskins v. South Carolina, No. 2:15-cv-2589-DCN, 2015 WL 6464440, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2015) (dismissing complaint by sovereign citizen, finding the complaint was “so ‘patently insubstantial' that it may properly be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)”).
The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint rests on the fact that DSS has pursued an action in the state family court to compel Plaintiff to pay child support; however, Plaintiff believes DSS lacks the authority to compel him to pay child support for reasons premised on the sovereign citizen theory. As noted, this contention is frivolous and the Complaint is subject to dismissal to the extent it is based on the “sovereign citizen” theory.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint seeks to challenge a child support order, or any other order or rulings, of the South Carolina family court, such claims are subject to summary dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as this Court is without jurisdiction to consider such claims. Weathers v. Pou, No. 2:09-cv-270-JFA-RSC, 2009 WL 1139984, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2009). The proceedings conducted and rulings made in the South Carolina family court cannot be reviewed or set aside by the District Court in this case. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This prohibition on a federal district court's review of a state court order is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005); Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani, 434 F.3d at 713.
This prohibition extends not only to issues decided by a state court but also to those issues “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court where, “in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state] court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alternations in original). This includes “constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court, as when success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Plyler, 129 F.3d. at 731 (quotation marks omitted).
Federal district courts routinely apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar claims raised in federal court challenging child support orders in state family court matters. See, e.g., Bardes v. South Carolina, No. 2:10-cv-559-PMD-RSC, 2010 WL 1498332, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1498190 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2010) (“This federal court does not have jurisdiction to review the various decisions issued by state courts in South Carolina and in North Carolina regarding the plaintiff's child support.”); Saylor-Marchant v. ACS, No. 2:15-cv-3749-DCN-MGB, 2015 WL 7871230, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2015), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2015 WL 7854233 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2015); Briggman v. Va., Dep't of Soc. Servs. Div. of Child Support Enf't, 526 F.Supp.2d 590, 601 (W.D. Va. 2007) (finding Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal court jurisdiction where the plaintiff appeared to assert his “claim as a state court loser complaining of injuries caused by the decisions of two state court judges with regard to his child support obligations and seeks a review by this court of those decisions”).
Here, although Plaintiff does not ask this Court to review or overturn the family court's orders or rulings in his child support case, he complains that DSS “used a false summons in an attempt to get [him] in court for child support” and enforce an order “that they have no right to enforce.” [Doc. 1 at 4.] And Plaintiff contends that DSS has violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 3.] Thus, the success of Plaintiff's claims in this action appears to be inextricably intertwined with the child support order from the state court, and, thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, “[u]nder the domestic relations exception, this Court lacks jurisdiction over child support issues, and must dismiss the case.” Moore v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15-cv-515, 2016 WL 775783, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
Abstention under Younger
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief related to any currently pending state family court proceedings, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state court proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with any DSS proceedings against Plaintiff in the state family court.
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has not expressly asked this Court to interfere with any pending state court proceedings. However, the crux of Plaintiff's claim is that DSS “used a false summons in an attempt to get [him] in court for child support.” [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff contends DSS “ha[s] no right to enforce any order against” him. [Id.] In his Affidavit, Plaintiff makes numerous references to attempts by DSS to garnish his wages and take him to court. [Doc. 1-2.] Thus, although Plaintiff does not ask this Court to interfere with any state court judgements or proceedings, a ruling in Plaintiff's favor would implicate any currently pending state court proceedings against him.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state court proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state family court proceedings, a ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case that would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings or would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings would be improper. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in any ongoing state family court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims to the extent they can be construed so seek relief from a currently pending action in the state court. See Dawkins v. Staley, No. 1:22-cv-299, 2023 WL 1069745, at *5 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 27, 2023) (applying Younger abstention doctrine where the plaintiff was “subject to an ongoing child support order”); Briggman, 526 F.Supp.2d at 604 (explaining the plaintiff's federal law claims were barred by the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent he was involved in state court proceedings for non-payment of child support).
Failure to Name a Proper Defendant
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant in this action. The sole Defendant named in this action-DSS-is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well settled that DSS, as a state agency, is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Garcia v. Lott, No. 3:21-cv-2780-JMC-PJG, 2022 WL 3239539, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (explaining DSS is not a “person” amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 3230086 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2022); Stroman v. York Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0:18-cv-1632-JMC-PJG, 2019 WL 498387, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (same). Accordingly, DSS is entitled to dismissal from this action and the Complaint as a whole would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction.
Further, DSS is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Dowling v. State of S.C., No. 0:06-1309-PMD-BM, 2006 WL 1751742, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2006). As such, absent the state's waiver or consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit directly against a state such as South Carolina or its agencies. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). It is well established that DSS, as an arm of the state, is immune from a suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See Coffin v. South Carolina Dept. of Soc. Servs., 562 F.Supp. 579, 583 (D.S.C. 1983) (holding that DSS is a state agency and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Jeter v. Harris, No. 0:07-cv-00857-GRA-BM, 2007 WL 1795788, at *2 (D.S.C. June 19, 2007).
In sum, the allegations in the Complaint are nonsensical and baseless. To the extent Plaintiff's allegations are not construed as patently frivolous, they are merely legal terminology and not actionable because the claims have no factual support. Plaintiff appears to challenge the ability of DSS to collect child support by attempting to raise a federal constitutional issue and asserting arguments couched in the sovereign citizen theory. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to present allegations to state a plausible claim for relief. As such, the Complaint should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).