Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-05263-VMC
2023-09-14
W.K., E.H., M.M., R.P., M.B., D.P., A.F., C.A., R.K., and K.P., Plaintiffs v. RED ROOF INNS, INC.; FMW RRI NC, LLC; Red Roof Franchising, LLC; RRI West Management, LLC; Varahi Hotel, LLC; Westmont Hospitality Group, Inc.; and RRI III, LLC, Defendants.
Amanda Kay Seals, John Earl Floyd, Manoj Sam Varghese, Michael Rosen Baumrind, Tiana Scogin Mykkeltvedt, Amanda Bradley, Juliana Mesa, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jonathan Tonge, Patrick J. McDonough, Andersen, Tate & Carr, P.C., Duluth, GA, for Plaintiffs. C. Ashley Saferight, Pro Hac Vice, Chelsea R. Mikula, Pro Hac Vice, Sandra Wunderlich, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, Cleveland, OH, Christian T. Novay, Pro Hac Vice, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, Admir Allushi, Charles Kyle Reed, Emma Jeanette Fennelly, Lillian Kate Henry, Tameika Lavenia Briscoe, Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Marcella Coladangelo Ducca, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Red Roof Inns, Inc., FMW RRI NC, LLC, Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management, LLC, RRI III, LLC.
Amanda Kay Seals, John Earl Floyd, Manoj Sam Varghese, Michael Rosen Baumrind, Tiana Scogin Mykkeltvedt, Amanda Bradley, Juliana Mesa, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jonathan Tonge, Patrick J. McDonough, Andersen, Tate & Carr, P.C., Duluth, GA, for Plaintiffs. C. Ashley Saferight, Pro Hac Vice, Chelsea R. Mikula, Pro Hac Vice, Sandra Wunderlich, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, Cleveland, OH, Christian T. Novay, Pro Hac Vice, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, Admir Allushi, Charles Kyle Reed, Emma Jeanette Fennelly, Lillian Kate Henry, Tameika Lavenia Briscoe, Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Marcella Coladangelo Ducca, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Red Roof Inns, Inc., FMW RRI NC, LLC, Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management, LLC, RRI III, LLC.
ORDER
Victoria Marie Calvert, United States District Judge
This case involves allegations by Plaintiffs, who contend they were victims of sex trafficking, that Defendants, hotel chain owners, franchisors, and franchisees, violated state and federal laws by failing to prevent, and perhaps even benefitting from, sex trafficking taking place at their hotels. Specifically, this case involves two locations: the Red Roof Inn located at 2200 Corporate Plaza, Smyrna, Georgia, 30080 (the "Smyrna Red Roof") and the Red Roof Plus+ located at 1960 North Druid Hills Road NE, Atlanta, Georgia, 30329 ("Buckhead Red Roof"). All seven Plaintiffs, proceeding anonymously, were allegedly victims of sex trafficking at the Smyrna Red Roof. W.K. and R.P. are also allegedly victims of sex trafficking at the Buckhead Red Roof.
The Parties have variously referred to this second location as the Atlanta Red Roof, Buckhead Red Roof, and North Druid Hills Red Roof without defining the term they are using. This caused the Court some confusion because North Druid Hills does not cross into Fulton County, and Buckhead is typically considered to end at the Fulton County line. But the parties appear to have arrived at "Buckhead" by consensus and the Court will use this term to avoid further confusion.
Since mid-December 2012, the Smyrna Red Roof has been operated by a franchisee, former Defendant Varahi Hotel, LLC ("Varahi"). Red Roof Inns, Inc., FMW RRI NC, LLC ("FMW"), Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management, LLC, and RRI III, LLC ("RRI III") (collectively, "Red Roof Defendants") are various entities relating to the corporate ownership and franchising of Red Roof Inn hotels. As the parties dispute whether Westmont Hospitality Group, Inc. ("Westmont") has any connection to the Smyrna Red Roof or the Buckhead Red Roof, the Court will discuss this below. The following motions are pending before the Court:
In this Order, "Defendants" means all Defendants unless context makes it clear that Westmont is excluded.
Motions filed by Varahi prior to the Court's Order (Doc. 418) dropping it as a party are DENIED AS MOOT as to Varahi. (Docs. 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 298, and 299).
| Doc. | Filer | Motion |
| 259 | Varahi | Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims under the TVPRA |
| 260 | Varahi | Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Plaintiff D.P. |
| 261 | Varahi | Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Plaintiff E.H. |
| 262 | Varahi | Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Plaintiff M.B. |
| 263 | Varahi | Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Plaintiff R.P. |
| 264 | Varahi | Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Plaintiff W.K. |
| 267 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [K.P.] |
| 268 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [T.H.] |
| 269 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [W.K.] |
| 270 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [C.A.] |
| 271 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [D.P] |
| 272 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [R.P.] |
| 273 | Westmont | Motion for Summary Judgment |
| 274 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [A.F.] |
| 275 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [M.B.] |
| 277 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment AGAINST PLAINTIFF R.K |
| 282 | RRI | Motion for Summary Judgment Against E.H. |
| 283 | Red Roof Defendants | Motion for Summary Judgment [M.M.] |
| 298 | Varahi | Motion to Exclude Melanie Bliss, Ph.D. |
| 299 | Varahi | Motion to Sever |
| 362 | Red Roof Defendants and Westmont | Motion for Joinder Brief to Adopt Defendant Varahi Hotel, LLC's Motion to Exclude Melanie J. Bliss, Ph.D. |
Background
The Court omits background information about Plaintiffs E.H., M.B., and D.P., as each of them only held claims against Defendant Varahi.
A. W.K.
W.K. contends that she was about 14 years old the first time she was sold for sex when she met "Loso" at Hospitality Inn on Delk Road next to a gas station. (Doc. 334 ¶ 20). W.K. bought cocaine from him. (Id.). W.K. ran away from home and began working for Loso. (Id.). W.K. met her next pimp, Red, at the Motel 6 on Delk. (Id. ¶ 21). Red and others held W.K at gunpoint at the Super 8 on Jimmy Carter for days. (Id.). She ran from him when he went back to the Motel 6. (Id.).
In light of the voluminous record in this case, rather than citing to each respective statement of material fact and responses to each by identifying the movant and respondent, the Court will cite only the responses by docket number to identify facts not in dispute, unless the Court indicates otherwise.
For the purpose of this Order, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is immaterial whether a minor can voluntarily consent to commercial sex, and Plaintiffs' objections on these grounds are sustained.
W.K. met her next pimp, Aldonte Armstead, at the Super 8 on Franklin Road. (Id. ¶ 22). Armstead asked her to join his team to make money for him. At the time, W.K. understood this to be prostitution. (Id.). She had a sexual relationship with Armstead. (Id.). W.K. was allegedly sex trafficked by Armstead at several hotels starting in the summer of 2013: Hospitality Inn, Super 8, Motel 6, Marietta Hotel, Masters Inn, Buckhead Red Roof and the Smyrna Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 23). Each time W.K. was at a hotel, they would be there for 2-3 days at a time, constantly moving hotels to avoid law enforcement. (Id. ¶ 24[1]).
W.K. was with Armstead approximately 1 month before he became violent. (Id. ¶ 24[2]). After that, W.K. felt like she was not able to leave. (Id.). The first time she felt their relationship was "involuntary" was at the Marietta Hotel. (Id.). Armstead would get upset about W.K. not meeting her quota of $1,200-$1,500 a night (at $200/hour) or her doing too many drugs. (Id.). W.K. would see an average of 10-15 men a day. (Id. ¶ 25). She never thought to call the police, but as she points out in her brief, she testified that she was afraid of Armstead. (Id.).
W.K. alleges she was trafficked at the Smyrna Red Roof four or five times between the summer of 2014 and December of 2014. (Id. ¶ 26). W.K. never checked in at the front desk or went to the lobby, she always stayed in the car. (Id. ¶ 27). W.K. does not know if a staff member ever saw her go into a room, because the rooms they stayed in were never visible from the front desk and would always be in the back of the hotel and on an upper floor. (Id.). On December 6, 2014, there was an incident where Armstead choked W.K. in the stairwell of the Smyrna Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 28). W.K. testified Armstead grabbed her by her hair into the bathroom and forced her head under water. (Id.). When he finally let go, W.K. took off and caught a ride to her grandmother's house. She ended up at the RaceTrac on Delk Road where she called 911. (Id.).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the fact that some Plaintiffs later engaged in prostitution after their alleged trafficking is not determinative of any of the pending motions.
W.K. alleges that she was also trafficked at the Buckhead Red Roof one time, for about two or three days, during her time with Armstead in 2014. (Id. ¶ 32). She would stay in the car while Armstead bought the room, and never spoke with any employees or called the police while at Buckhead Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 33).
B. M.M.
M.M. first met her alleged trafficker, Mario in the streets somewhere around Windy Hill in 2010. (Doc. 332 ¶ 5). M.M.'s trafficking began when Mario burned M.M. on her chest with a lit cigarette and told her that she belonged to him. (Id. ¶ 6). In response to this, M.M. told Mario "[y]ou're a real ATL pimp. I don't think I'm ready for this." (Id.). Mario and M.M. eventually went to the Smyrna Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 7). M.M. stated that Forrest Castille, a Smyrna Red Roof employee, served as a lookout for Mario and would call to inform him when police were present, and looked after M.M. and other sex trafficking victims on the property. (Id. ¶ 8). Mario paid Mr. Castille for these services and would provide him with drugs. (Id.).
C. R.P.
Plaintiff R.P. claims she was trafficked from 2012 through 2018. (Doc. 333 ¶ 19). R.P. met her first trafficker, LaBryan Wilkerson ("AK") through Facebook (Id.). R.P. began working for AK at 18 years old. (Id.). R.P. thought what she was doing was part of the normal lifestyle in which she was living. (Id. ¶ 20). R.P. didn't think that she was being trafficked and didn't understand what was going on, but she knew it was wrong and illegal. (Id.). R.P. was aware of the concept of prostitution, but didn't realize that she was a trafficking victim until she "got out of the game" and went to rehab. (Id.).
The Court notes Plaintiffs' materiality objection but considers these facts for background purposes. The Court sustains Plaintiffs' objections regarding Doc. 333 ¶¶ 21 and 22 for the reasons the Court gave in note 7, supra.
R.P. claims she was allegedly trafficked at the Smyrna Red Roof beginning in March of 2012 through sometime before April 2016. (Id. ¶ 23). AK took R.P. to the Smyrna Red Roof three to four times. (Id.). Each stay was two to three days at a time and once for a whole month. (Id.). R.P. also worked at the Smyrna Red Roof with a person named Curtis George ("CG") a couple of times. (Id.).
R.P. testified that she worked at the Buckhead Red Roof from 2012 through 2018. (Id. ¶ 25). AK took her there a number of times over the years, possibly more than 30, (Id.). Each stay was for 2-3 days, maybe a week at a time. (Id.). CG took her to Buckhead 10-15 times. (Id. ¶ 26). Each stay was for 2-3 days at a time, or maybe a week. (Id.).
D. A.F.
A.F. alleges that in 2010 and 2011, she was trafficked by a man named Lorenzo Leftenant ("Leftenant"). (Doc. 325 ¶ 1). Throughout the entire period she was allegedly trafficked, A.F. believed she and Leftenant were in a relationship. (Id. ¶ 2). A.F. met Leftenant when she was around 15 years old, and the two began dating shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶ 3). A.F. and Leftenant broke up a couple months later after a physical altercation occurred wherein Leftenant pushed A.F. and tried to take her purse. (Id.). A.F. admitted that at that point she knew they did not have a good relationship. (Id.).
The Court notes Plaintiffs' materiality objection but considers these facts for background purposes.
Despite their previous physical altercation, A.F. again began seeing Leftenant at some point during her senior year of high school when he informed her of opportunities to make money which escalated into sexual activity for pay. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). A.F. was allegedly trafficked at 10 to 15 hotels during 2010 and 2011. (Id. ¶ 6).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is not material to any of the pending motions she was trafficked at other hotels or in other states or that she engaged in voluntary prostitution outside of her trafficking. See note 7, supra.
A.F. alleges that in 2010 and 2011 she was sex trafficked at the Smyrna Red Roof by Leftenant. (Id. ¶ 10). A.F. claims she was trafficked out of this hotel about five times for durations between a few days to a week. (Id. ¶ 11). A.F. testified she would interact with the front desk staff and housekeepers at the Smyrna Red Roof and that she would ask for extra towels or sheets. (Id. ¶ 12). She did not tell hotel employees that she was being held against her will, but Plaintiffs argue that there were several facts that should have led the employees to know that trafficking was taking place, including the presence of a pimp that was older than her, how she was dressed, the fact that she requested to use the internet, and the number of men coming in. (Id. ¶ 13) (citing deposition transcripts).
E. C.A.
Plaintiff C.A. testified that she met her first trafficker, Michael Beene ("Fresh"), in 2009 in her mother's suburban neighborhood. (Doc. 326 ¶ 5). C.A. was 21 years old at the time she met Fresh, but claims she was brainwashed by him over the next six months before she started engaging in commercial sex. (Id. ¶ 6). C.A. met her second trafficker, Earnest Floyd Wright ("Bagz"), within those same six months. (Id. ¶ 7). Fresh and Bagz spent six months persuading C.A. to perform sexual acts in exchange for money by selling the lifestyle as glamorous and lucrative. (Id. ¶ 8). The parties dispute the extent that C.A. could choose to work with Fresh or Bagz and whether such choice was influenced by force, manipulation, or coercion. (Id. ¶ 9-10).
The Court notes Plaintiffs' materiality objection but considers these facts for background purposes.
During the period of her alleged trafficking under Fresh and Bagz, C.A. claims she stayed at the Buckhead Red Roof roughly 5-10 times each year starting in 2009 and ending in 2014. (Id. ¶ 11). C.A.'s traffickers were not always with her when she was present at the Buckhead Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 13). C.A. testified that she had conversations with Buckhead Red Roof employees during this time, but could not remember their names. (Id. ¶ 14). She never told any of the employees that she was being forced to have sex while staying there, but Plaintiffs argue that that there were factors that should have made employees aware such as Bagz's renting multiple rooms with scantily-clad women wearing high heels, and referring to the women as "ho" or "bitch" within earshot of the workers, as well as requests for extra towels. (Id. ¶ 15) (citing deposition transcripts).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is not material to any of the pending motions that C.A. was trafficked at other hotels or in other states or that she engaged in voluntary prostitution outside of her trafficking. See note 7, supra. Whether C.A., or for that matter any of the other Plaintiffs, thought they were engaging in voluntary prostitution before coming to understand that they were being trafficked at the very least poses a fact dispute that the Court cannot resolve on summary judgment.
F. R.K. and T.H.
Plaintiff R.K. testified that she met her first trafficker, Lee Daniels ("Base Cleff"), while living and working in Dallas, Texas. (Doc. 331 ¶ 13). He made her have sex for money at hotels in Texas. (Id.). A month later she was rescued by her brother's friend. (Id.).
R.K. was also allegedly trafficked by Jayvon Gant aka Bless. (Id. ¶ 14). He flew her and her friend T.H. to Atlanta. (Id.). She and T.H. stayed at an Extended Stay hotel on Powers Ferry Road. She understood that she was going to have sex for money. (Id.). R.K. was 18 years old when she moved to Georgia in the spring or summer of 2010. (Id.). R.K. worked for Bless for less than 2 months in 2010. R.K. had sex with Bless, though the parties dispute whether it was voluntary. (Id.). R.K. was treated at Atlanta Medical Center on September 16, 2010 for pelvic pain. (Id. ¶ 15). She did not inform medical personnel that she was being abused or held against her will. (Id.).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this statement of fact (among others) fails to comply with LR 56.1(B)(1)'s requirement that "[e]ach material fact must be numbered separately," but declines to order Defendants to revise the statement at this time.
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that this fact is not material, but in any event, it only creates a fact dispute about whether R.K. was trafficked that could not be resolved on summary judgment.
Similarly, R.K. met her third trafficker, Earnest Floyd Wright, III ("Bagz"), a month later. (Id. ¶ 16). In October 2010, Bagz became her pimp. (Id.). She worked in several states before returning to Georgia. (Id.). R.K. had sex with Bagz the first week. (Id.). While in Georgia, Bagz rotated her from Buckhead Red Roof and three other hotels. (Id.). She stayed at Buckhead Red Roof in the ballpark of 25 times and for 3-5 days each time, beginning in late November 2010 through March 2013. (Id.).
The Court notes Plaintiffs' materiality objection but considers these facts for background purposes. The names of the other hotels at which she was trafficked is not material.
R.K. testified that Bagz was not always present when she worked for him. (Id. ¶ 17). She and someone named Ashley went on a trip out of town and Ashley had a plan to escape, but R.K. returned to Georgia; Plaintiffs point to testimony from R.K indicating she was still very scared of Bagz. (Id.) (citing deposition transcripts). R.K. did know at the time that it was illegal to perform acts of sexual intercourse in exchange for items or value like money. (Id. ¶ 18). But she was more afraid of Bagz than the police. (Id.). Similarly to several of the other Plaintiffs, Defendants argue that R.K. did not tell any of their employees that she was being trafficked or held against her will, and Plaintiffs argue that the "signs were obvious." (Id. ¶ 19) ("For example, RK and TH requested an excessive amount of towels . . . , always paid in cash on a daily basis . . . , dressed provocatively, with heels and showing lots of skin . . . .") (citations omitted).
The Court agrees that it is not material that R.K. learned about trafficking in 2014, after her alleged trafficking, or that she is suing Extended Stay America but not other hotels she stayed at.
G. K.P.
Plaintiff K.P. testified that she met her alleged trafficker, Tradelle "Tricky" Lacy, through a mutual friend at some point in 2010 while she was living in at the Canyon Ridge apartments in Sandy Springs, Georgia. (Doc. 329 ¶ 1). K.P. was approximately 23 years old at the time. (Id. ¶ 2). K.P.'s alleged trafficking at the hands of Tricky began approximately six months later. (Id. ¶ 3). K.P. further alleges that Tricky brainwashed her during this timeframe. (Id. ¶ 4). At some point in 2011 or 2012, K.P. moved to Germany to live with her father but returned to the United States in 2012. (Id. ¶ 5). When she returned to the United States, K.P. reconnected with Tricky and her alleged trafficking resumed. (Id. ¶ 6).
The Court notes Plaintiffs' materiality objection but considers these facts for background purposes.
K.P. claims that her trafficking took place at several hotels across multiple states in addition to the Buckhead Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 7). In this regard, K.P. testified that she was trafficked at the Buckhead Red Roof approximately 30 times over a six-year span. However, she cannot recall when she was first trafficked at the Buckhead Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 8).
In response to this statement of fact, Plaintiffs attempt to clarify that K.P. was trafficked at the Buckhead Red Roof between 2011 and 2014.
K.P. testified that Tricky was not always with her when she would meet clients at the Buckhead Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 9). K.P. testified that although she would interact with Buckhead Red Roof employees at times, she never told any employee that she was being sex trafficked, though Plaintiffs argue that "trafficking and prostitution at this hotel was out in the open." (Id. ¶ 10) (citing deposition transcripts). K.P.'s alleged trafficking concluded in 2016 when she slowly stopped seeing buyers and distanced herself physically from Tricky. (Id. ¶ 11).
The Court agrees that it is not material that K.P. moved in with her mother and son or that Tricky was not prosecuted. Whether or not Tricky "prevented" her from moving or discontinuing her commercial sex activities at best poses a factual dispute regarding trafficking which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
II. The Defendants
From 2010 to 2018, the Red Roof Defendants had two types of properties: corporate properties owned and operated by corporate affiliates and franchise properties owned by third-party franchisees. (Doc. 393 ¶ 1). From 2010 to 2018, the Buckhead Red Roof was a corporate property. (Id. ¶ 2). Defendant RRI III owned the land of the Buckhead Red Roof during the entire 2010-2018 time period. (Id. ¶ 5). The Smyrna Red Roof was also a corporate property until December 14, 2012. (Id. ¶ 3). Until December 14, 2012, Defendant FMW owned the land of the Smyrna Red Roof. (Id. ¶ 4). During the time each of these properties were corporate properties, Defendant RRI West operated the hotel and employed some regional staff. (Id. ¶ 6). During the time each of these properties were corporate properties, Defendant Red Roof Inns, Inc. employed the staff at the properties. (Id. ¶ 7). Beginning on December 14, 2012, Varahi became the franchisee of the Smyrna Red Roof. (Doc. 391 ¶ 8). Varahi was dropped as a party by Court Order on August 29, 2023. (Doc. 418).
III. Summary of Allegations Against Defendants
Over the course of nearly 700 paragraphs, Plaintiffs allege that "an open-air prostitution market" existed at the Smyrna Red Roof and the Buckhead Red Roof (Doc. 354 at 6), and that Defendants were aware of prostitution and/or trafficking at their properties for various reasons. The Court does not need to recount each of these details to adjudicate the pending motions.
Even in a novel, multi-plaintiff case such as this, nearly 700 paragraphs is excessive. Statements of material facts are supposed to be "concise," and the Court expects parties to use their editorial judgment to focus the Court's attention on the specific, material facts which are necessary to the resolution of the motion, rather than cataloguing every piece of evidence that could possibly be probative. In the event this case goes to trial, the Court similarly expects that the parties will respect jurors' time and use their judgment to limit their exhibits and testimony to those that are actually necessary to prove their case. See Fed. R. Evid. 403, 611(a).
Some examples of conduct that Plaintiffs point to include the following:
Forrest Castille worked the front desk of the Smyrna Red Roof Inn from 2008 to 2016. (Doc. 391 ¶ 54; Doc. 392-1 ¶ 54). He testified to seeing "8 to 10, maybe 15 to 20" girls or women at the Smyrna Red Roof at a time, and to seeing teenage girls, minors under 18 years old, being sold for sex at this hotel. He also testified that the activity "never stopped," with at times "over 50, 60 men a day." (Doc. 391 ¶¶ 54-57; Doc. 392-1 ¶¶ 54-57).
The Red Roof Defendants' objection that Mr. Castille and other front desk workers were "rogue" employees is a closing argument for trial, not an objection to a statement of material fact.
Vanessa Cole worked at the Smyrna Red Roof between July 2011 and December 2012. (Doc. 391 ¶ 58; Doc 392-1 ¶ 58). She described "adult men going in and out of rooms . . . in short order." (Doc. 391 ¶ 59; Doc 392-1 ¶ 59).
Michael Thomas was an employee at the Buckhead Red Roof in 2012. (Doc. 392-1 ¶ 26). He described women "hanging on the balcony in a negligee," (Id. ¶ 27) and testified the young girls he believed to be engaging in commercial sex "would come in with cash in their hands a lot of times." (Id. ¶ 47). He further testified that as early as 2012, when he was working there, Regional Vice President Jay Moyer told him to book suspected prostitutes in the back of the Buckhead Red Roof, where they would be less visible to other guests. (Id. ¶ 213).
Ms. Cole floated as a general manager at the Buckhead Red Roof "between 2011 and 2012." (Id. ¶ 86). During that time, she said prostitution was "pretty consistent there." (Id. ¶ 87). She also testified that she reported the prostitution "up the chain to . . . Jay Moyer and others." (Id. ¶ 88).
Monica Nash Hamilton worked as a security guard at the Buckhead Red Roof on weekend nights from 2013 through 2016. (Id. ¶ 89). She said that she saw what she believed were pimps and prostitutes virtually "every weekend [she] worked there." (Id. ¶ 90). As to commercial sex occurring at the Buckhead hotel, she testified "[i]t was just that obvious. There was no way you could not know." (Id. ¶ 92).
R.P. described having sex with three Buckhead Red Roof front desk workers, who paid her traffickers. (Id. ¶ 221). Plaintiffs also make a number of allegations regarding extra requests for linens and unusual contents of trash containers such as lubricants and condoms. (See e.g., id. ¶¶ 105-110).
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it is "a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The moving party's burden is discharged merely by " 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support [an essential element of] the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In determining whether the moving party has met this burden, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 1996). Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the non-movant then has the burden of showing that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in the favor of the non-movant. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). In addition, the court must "avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations." Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000). When the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute for trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted).
Discussion
I. Motion to Exclude Melanie Bliss, Ph.D.
Defendants filed a Motion to Exclude Melanie Bliss, Ph.D. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides as follows:
Red Roof Defendants' and Westmont's Motion to Join (Doc. 362) is GRANTED.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court recognized that Rule 702 provides "a gatekeeping role for the judge," but also emphasized that "[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one." The Supreme Court explained that "the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand," but also that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 596-97, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)).
As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, "[i]n discussing this rule [702], the Advisory Committee Notes state that, after Daubert, 'the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.' " Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 995 F.3d 839, 850 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee's Note to 2000 Amendments). The Eleventh Circuit has "distilled the expert admissibility inquiry into the following three factors:"
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address;Id. at 850-51 (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). That court has "also noted that, while 'there is inevitably some overlap among the basic requirements—qualification, reliability, and helpfulness—they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.' " Id. (citing United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
(2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and
(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
The Court's Local Rules provide that "[a]ny party objecting to an expert's testimony based upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) shall file a motion no later than the date that the proposed pretrial order is submitted." LR 26.2(C). While parties occasionally file Daubert motions alongside summary judgment motions, such motions typically implicate a summary judgment issue such as causation. It does not appear that Defendants' motion with respect to Dr. Bliss is relevant to an issue on summary judgment, and accordingly, the Court finds it to be premature to address the issue at this time. When the parties prepare their pretrial order, they should discuss whether an agreement as to any potential limitations on Dr. Bliss's testimony may resolve Defendants' objections, and if such an agreement cannot be reached, Defendants may renew their motion by incorporation without the need for further briefing by either party. The Court will then take up the issue at the pretrial conference.
That said, the Court notes Judge Ray denied a similar Motion to Exclude. See Order Denying Motion to Exclude Melanie J. Bliss, Ph.D., Does 1-4 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-04278-WMR (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2023), ECF No. 305.
II. Westmont Motion for Summary Judgment
Westmont has no employees, board of directors, officers or directors, partners, or affiliates and does not hold direct interest in any Red Roof hotels, and contends that it "did not, and does not, have any relationship" to the Red Roof Defendants "or the two subject properties." (Doc. 318 ¶¶ 15, 16, Doc. 273-1 at 6). Plaintiffs assert there are factual issues as to Westmont's involvement in this case.
Plaintiffs first argue that Westmont failed to identify itself as improperly joined in the parties' Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan (Doc. 353-1 at 2). While this omission may have been a basis for an extension of discovery or perhaps even an award of attorney's fees, Plaintiffs admit that "an acknowledgement that a party is properly joined is not admission of liability." (Id.). Next, Plaintiffs contend that
Further, from at least May 2012 through 2018 and beyond, "Westmont Hospitality Group, Inc." filed a "Texas Franchise Tax Public Information Report." That report listed the same "5847 San Felipe" address in Houston, Texas that appears on countless other documents associated with both Westmont and Red Roof entities(Doc. 353-1 at 3). And, they assert that
The Red Roof Defendants, likewise, produced two general liability insurance policies in the name of "Westmont Hospitality Group, Inc." Those policies each identify Red Roof Defendants as other named insureds and identify the Smyrna Red Roof and the Buckhead Red Roof, the two Inns at the center of this case.(Id. at 3). Finally, they contend that "persons affiliated with [unspecified] WHG entities—namely, Mohamed Thowfeek and Dorraine Lallani—were also directors and officers of several of the Red Roof Defendants from 2010 through 2018." (Id. at 5).
These loose threads do not create a genuine fact dispute in light of Westmont's sworn testimony that it had nothing to do with the incidents in question and did not own, operate, control, or manage the subject hotels. Accordingly, Westmont's motion for summary judgment is granted.
III. TVPRA Claims
A. Threshold Issues
Defendants made several threshold arguments against Plaintiffs' TVPRA claims which the Court resolves first. First, the Court agrees with those courts who have found that a criminal investigation or conviction of the trafficker or the civil defendant is not necessary to establish a violation under the TVPRA. Lundstrom v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 21-cv-00619-PAB-SKC, 2021 WL 5579117, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2021); S.Y. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No: 2:20-cv-622-JES-MRM, 2021 WL 1610101, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2021).
Similarly, there is no statutory or rule-based requirement that a TVPRA plaintiff join or attempt to join the trafficker in a civil action. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), plainly allows for "a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits . . . from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter)," and in common use, the word " 'or' is 'almost always disjunctive.' " Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141, 200 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018); cf. also Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 495 n.41, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (noting "or" in a statute can imply a choice). In light of this clear statutory language, there is no basis for a finding under Rule 19 that in the traffickers' "absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties," or that the traffickers "claim[ ] an interest relating to the subject of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Furthermore, the Court agrees with other courts that have held other hotels and properties where plaintiffs may have been trafficked are not necessary parties. See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2019).
B. Whether the Defendants Knowingly Benefitted
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to show a knowing benefit to them under the TVPRA, but "[s]everal district courts . . . have found that the rental of a room constitutes a financial benefit from a relationship with the trafficker sufficient to meet this element of the § 1595(a) standard." J.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (citing A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 1:20-CV-05231-JPB, 2022 WL 1644921, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2022); G.W. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 1:20-CV-05232-JPB, 2022 WL 1644923, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2022); M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp.3d 959, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2019); S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp.3d 1251, 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2020)).
As Judge Ray recently ruled in Does 1-4 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-04278-WMR, 688 F.Supp.3d 1247 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2023),
As to whether the Red Roof Defendants knowingly benefitted from participation in a venture that violated the TVPRA, the Court notes that "[k]nowledge requires '[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance.' " Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 725. But it is well established that a federal claim's "knowledge element" "can be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance." United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000). "[I]f a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge." Id. And to prove either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance, Plaintiff may rely on both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence based on the "totality" of circumstances. United States v. Perez, 698 F.2d 1168, 1171 (11th Cir. 1983).688 F.Supp.3d at 1254. The Court agrees with Judge Ray that the circumstances such as those presented in Part III of the Background section, supra, present evidence sufficient to create a jury question on Defendants' knowledge.
C. Whether the Defendants Participated in a Venture
Defendants argue that their conduct in operating the properties does not meet the definition of "participation in a venture." The Eleventh Circuit has defined "participation in a venture" in Section 1595 to mean that the alleged beneficiary "took part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit." Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021). In that case, the court approvingly cited the First Circuit's decision in Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 556-58 (1st Cir. 2017) for the proposition that a venture could be established by evidence that a trafficking victim's "abuser 'had prior commercial dealings with the [operators], which the parties wished to reinstate for profit.' " Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 725. (citing Ricchio, 853 F.3d. at 555). Again, the Court agrees with Judge Ray that here,
the evidence shows that the Red Roof Defendants had an ongoing relationship with known pimps and prostitutes at their Smyrna Red Roof hotel before they sold it to the franchisee, Varahi. The evidence shows that, prior to this sale, the Red Roof Defendants and their employees were aware that they were profiting from renting rooms to those pimps and prostitutes. Although Varahi purchased the Smyrna hotel in 2012, there is evidence that the Red Roof Defendants continued to participate in this venture, although to a lesser degree.Does 1-4, 688 F.Supp.3d at 1255 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2023). Moreover, the Red Roof Defendants continued to manage and operate the Buckhead Red Roof after selling the Smyrna Red Roof. The Court thus finds that there is a jury question on this aspect of the TVPRA claims as well. In light of the foregoing discussion in this Part III.C. as well as Part III.B., it naturally follows that there is also a jury issue on whether Defendants had knowledge that a violation of the TVPRA occurred. Therefore, Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the TVPRA claims are denied.
IV. RICO Claims
To establish a Georgia RICO civil claim, Plaintiffs must show that (1) the Red Roof Defendants acquired or maintained an interest in or control of money; (2) through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (3) the racketeering activity harmed Plaintiffs. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-14-4(a), 16-14-3(4)(A). "Racketeering activity" means to "commit, to attempt to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit" certain enumerated crimes known as predicate acts. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A). Plaintiffs point to keeping a place of prostitution, prostitution, pimping, and sex trafficking as predicate acts. See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A)(vi)-(vii). A pattern of racketeering activity requires two related predicate acts. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4)(A); Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 540, 615 S.E.2d 512 (2005).
Turning first to keeping a place of prostitution, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs, as participants in the predicate act, cannot bring a RICO claim, citing out-of-state case law. In response, Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that they are not guilty of any predicate act because they would have an affirmative defense under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-6, which provides that
(b) A person shall not be guilty of a sexual crime if the conduct upon which the alleged criminal liability is based was committed by an accused who was:
Plaintiffs, who were over 18 at the time of the alleged acts of trafficking, have submitted ample evidence to create a jury issue on whether they were voluntarily engaging in commercial sex or were under coercion or deception while being trafficked, and therefore summary judgment would not be appropriate on this issue solely based on Plaintiffs' alleged participation in the predicate act.(1) Less than 18 years of age at the time of the conduct such person was being trafficked for sexual servitude in violation of subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-46; or
(2) Acting under coercion or deception while the accused was being trafficked for sexual servitude in violation of subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-46.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with Judge Ray that "the record would permit a jury to find that the . . . Defendants committed or aided in the commission of the predicate act of 'keeping a place of prostitution' at the Buckhead and Smyrna Red Roof hotels" based on "Plaintiffs [testimony that they were] . . . repeatedly sold for sex, and hotel employees [admissions of] . . . not just observing but, in some cases, knowingly renting rooms to the prostitutes or their pimps." Does 1-4, 688 F.Supp.3d at 1255. Similarly, based on "evidence . . . that . . . Defendants not only knew of and allowed the prostitution at the hotels, including the prostitution of young or underage girls, but also that they actively assisted in the commission of those crimes by directing suspected prostitutes or their pimps to rooms in the back of the hotels where they would not be observed and, through their employees, alerting them of any police presence," "[t]he record would also permit a jury to find that the Red Roof Defendants were parties to the commission of the predicate acts of sex trafficking, prostitution, and pimping." Id., 688 F.Supp.3d at 1255. Whether Defendants' employees went "rogue" in such instances is an argument for the jury. Finally, the Court agrees with Judge Ray that "a jury could find that the predicate acts target the women who were sold for sex and that Plaintiffs' injuries were causally connected because Plaintiffs were [ ] among the class of people targeted by Defendants' predicate acts." Id., 688 F.Supp.3d at 1256-57. Therefore, Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the RICO claims are denied.
V. Negligence Claims
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are liable to them in negligence under a theory of premises liability. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 provides:
Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs were not "invitees" because they did not enter the properties for a "lawful purpose," but instead did so to engage in the crime of prostitution. The Court disagrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue for the same reason that the Court rejected the argument that Plaintiffs' allegedly participated in a RICO predicate act. Whether Plaintiffs were invitees or licensees is a jury question. Cf. McGarity v. Hart Elec. Membership Corp., 307 Ga.App. 739, 706 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2011) ("Evidence of [plaintiff's] status as an invitee was not nullified by evidence that he had a dual purpose for being on the property . . . ."). Moreover, whether Defendants' employees were acting outside of the scope of their employment is a jury question.
Similarly, such evidence creates a fact issue on whether Plaintiffs exercised ordinary care in spite of their allegedly superior knowledge of the traffickers' propensities and intent. (See Doc. 354 at 97-98).
The Parties have consented to the dismissal of negligence claims based on the theory that the Red Roof Defendants are vicariously liable for the acts of Varahi based upon the franchise relationship. (Doc. 420).
Defendants also contend that that the acts of the traffickers were not reasonably foreseeable to them. As the Georgia Supreme Court recently held:
In short, as a matter of law, the legal duty to keep the premises safe is imposed by statute and has been construed to encompass a duty to protect against foreseeable third-party criminal acts. But whether the third-party criminal acts were foreseeable under the facts of a particular case - thus triggering the duty to protect against them - is a question for the factfinder (unless no rational juror could find the criminal act reasonably foreseeable).Ga. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 890 S.E.2d 209, 222 (2023). Moreover, the court explained that in this context, "reasonable foreseeability" is determined by asking "whether the totality of the circumstances relevant to the premises gave the proprietor sufficient 'reason to anticipate the criminal act' giving rise to the plaintiff's injuries on the premises," which is "not susceptible to a mechanical formulation and instead must be made on a case-by-case basis." Id. As Judge Ray cogently explained in Does 1-4,
[p]rior incidents of prostitution are sufficiently similar to the crimes that caused Plaintiff's injuries—namely, keeping a place of prostitution, prostitution, pimping, and sexual servitude—to make the latter crimes foreseeable. There is evidence to show that, before and during the relevant time periods, consumer feedback and police activity alerted the . . . Defendants that prostitution and pimping was occurring at the Buckhead and Smyrna Red Roof hotels. Furthermore, there is evidence showing that hotel employees at both locations were aware of the prostitution occurring on the premises, they acknowledged that prostitution and sex trafficking share common indicators, and they reported the criminal activity to management. Because there is both evidence of prior, substantially similar criminal acts and evidence that the inherent danger of the sex trade was otherwise known to the . . . Defendants, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the danger of third-party criminal conduct here was reasonably foreseeable.Does 1-4, 688 F.Supp.3d at 1253. A jury must decide Plaintiffs' negligence claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Westmont's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 273) is GRANTED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to drop Westmont as a party. Red Roof Defendants and Westmont's Motion for Joinder (Doc. 362) is GRANTED. All other pending motions (Docs. 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 277, 282, 283, 298, and 299) are DENIED. The remaining parties are directed to submit a consolidated pretrial order by no later than October 13, 2023. If the parties intend to conduct further settlement talks or mediation, they may contact the Court's courtroom deputy prior to that date to obtain a postponement of this deadline.
SO ORDERED this 14th day of September, 2023.