Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12082 No. 6609
03-21-2018
RONALD MILES WINTERS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage. Patricia L. Haines, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-12-1407CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Jack Smith, Judge. Appearances: Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage. Patricia L. Haines, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg, Judges. Judge ALLARD.
Ronald Miles Winters appeals his convictions for felony driving under the influence, driving while license revoked, and reckless endangerment. On appeal, Winters argues that the superior court erred when it failed to suppress incriminating statements that Winters contends were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. For the reasons explained here, we affirm the superior court's ruling.
AS 28.35.030(n); former AS 28.15.291(a)(1) (pre-2016); and AS 11.41.250, respectively.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
Background facts and prior proceedings
In January 2012, Anchorage Police Officer Brian Wilson responded to a single-vehicle rollover on the Glenn Highway. Officer Wilson found a blue minivan on its side. There were two people standing outside of the vehicle: Ronald Miles Winters and Mary Waterman. Several bystanders who had gathered at the scene told Officer Wilson that Winters and Waterman had been the occupants of the van.
Both Winters and Waterman showed signs of intoxication. Winters was staggering and his speech was slurred. Winters gave Officer Wilson his Alaska identification card, which had a red stripe on it indicating that he was not allowed to buy alcohol. Officer Wilson also learned that Winters was on felony probation with a "no alcohol" condition.
Initially, both Waterman and Winters stated that Waterman had been driving the van. While Officer Wilson was conducting field sobriety tests on Waterman, medics arrived on scene and attended to Winters. When questioned by the medics, Winters initially denied drinking, but he later admitted to drinking "a little bit."
Officer Wilson spoke briefly with Winters while Winters was inside the ambulance, strapped onto a gurney with a collar stabilizing his head. Winters told Officer Wilson that he was asleep when the accident happened. Officer Wilson informed Winters that he noticed a significant odor of alcohol coming from Winters, and Officer Wilson also informed Winters that the situation would be "dealt with accordingly" — referring to the fact that Winters was on probation with a no-alcohol condition. The ambulance then took Winters to the hospital. Winters did not seek suppression of the statements he made in the ambulance.
Shortly after Waterman was arrested for driving under the influence, Waterman admitted that Winters was actually the driver. Upon learning this, Officer Wilson went to the hospital to speak with Winters. Officer Wilson arrived at the hospital just as the medics were bringing Winters into a room in the emergency room area. Officer Wilson waited outside the room while the medical staff attended to Winters. After they left, Officer Wilson entered the room and told Winters that he believed Winters had been driving. Winters then began to talk at length about what happened, telling Officer Wilson he made a "bad choice" and admitting that he had been drinking and driving. Officer Wilson turned on his tape recorder and recorded the conversation.
Officer Wilson administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Winters, which Winters failed. About seventeen minutes into the conversation, Officer Wilson advised Winters of his Miranda rights. Wilson verbally waived his Miranda rights and indicated that he was willing to answer the officer's questions.
Following the waiver of his Miranda rights, Winters continued to talk to the officer, again admitting that he had been driving and that he had consumed two drinks within the three hours prior to the crash. At the conclusion of the interview, Officer Wilson left without arresting Winters.
The blood tests conducted at the hospital subsequently showed that Winters's blood alcohol level was only 0.022 percent — well below the legal limit of 0.08. The blood tests also revealed the presence of amphetamine, methamphetamine, opiates, and cocaine in Winters's system, although they did not reveal the levels of those drugs.
Winters was subsequently charged with felony driving under the influence, reckless endangerment, driving with a revoked license, and providing false information. (The jury acquitted Winters of the false information charge at trial.)
Prior to trial, Winters moved to suppress the statements he made to Officer Wilson at the hospital, arguing that these statements had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, Winters argued that he was unlawfully subjected to custodial interrogation from the beginning of the interview and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights when the officer advised him of them.
The superior court denied Winters's motion to suppress following an evidentiary hearing in which Officer Wilson testified. In its oral ruling, the court explained that it had reviewed the recording of the interaction and the court found that the interaction between Winters and Officer Wilson was cordial and that the officer did not press Winters to answer his questions or in any way suggest that Winters was required to do so. The court also found that Officer Wilson had a "calm demeanor" and that the majority of the interview consisted of Winters speaking. The court acknowledged the potential coerciveness of the hospital setting, including the fact that Winters was essentially immobilized during the interaction. But the court also noted that the officer was not responsible for the immobilization, and that Winters remained free to ask the officer to leave. The court also found that Winters was coherent and rational during the interview and that his responses to the Miranda advisement indicated that he understood what was being said to him, notwithstanding the drugs and alcohol that he had consumed. The court also noted that there was no evidence that Winters had suffered a concussion or any other head injury.
Based on these facts, the court concluded that Winters had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation in the early part of the interview and that Winters had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights in the middle of the interview.
Why we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress
On appeal, Winters renews his claim that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being advised of his Miranda rights, as well as his claim that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights once the advisement was given.
We find no merit to either claim. As the Alaska Supreme Court explained in Hunter v. State, in the absence of an actual arrest, there must be something "said or done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates (to the defendant) that they would not have heeded a request to depart or allow the suspect to do so." Here, as the superior court found, the interaction was cordial and the officer never pressed Winters to answer his questions or suggested in any way that Winters was required to do so. Moreover, as the superior court noted, although Winters was confined to his hospital bed, the officer was not responsible for this situation and Winters was still free to ask the officer to leave his hospital room. We agree with the superior court that Winters's confinement in the hospital bed does not, standing alone, constitute the type of "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest."
See Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979).
State v. Smith, 38 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Alaska 2002) (citations omitted); see also Underwood v. State, 2003 WL 22405432, at *3 (Alaska App. Oct. 22, 2003) (unpublished); Lewellyn v. State, 1999 WL 331390, at *5 (Alaska App. May 26, 1999) (unpublished).
We also agree with the superior court that the State met its burden of showing that Winters voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. We review the question of voluntariness de novo under the totality of the circumstances, accepting the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. We have reviewed the recorded interaction between Winters and Officer Wilson and we agree that the recording shows that Winters was responding in a rational and coherent way to the officer's questions and to the Miranda advisement. As the superior court also noted, there is no evidence that Winters suffered any type of head injury in the accident. Given all this, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Winters knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
See Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 & n.4 (Alaska 1981); McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 498-99 (Alaska 1980).
See Nashoalook v. State, 663 P.2d 975, 979 & n.2 (Alaska App. 1983). --------
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.