Opinion
No. 192, 2001
Decided: January 31, 2002
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County Cr. A. Nos. IK00-03-0651 through 0653.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
RODNEY D. WINCHESTER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 192, 2001 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Decided: January 31, 2002
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County Cr. A. Nos. IK00-03-0651 through 0653.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
Myron T. Steele, Justice:
ORDER
This 31st day of January 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Appellant Rodney Winchester appeared before a jury in Superior Court on charges of Attempted Murder in the First Degree and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. On the Attempted Murder charge, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the two charges of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. In March 2001, the State moved to declare Winchester an habitual offender under Del. C. Ann. tit. 11 § 4214(a). Based upon a presentence report that identified Appellant by name, birth date, and Social Security number as the individual who committed the requisite crimes listed in the State's motion, the Superior Court declared Appellant an habitual offender and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment at Level 5, followed by one year of work release at Level 4, eighteen months at Level 3 probation, and three years at Level 2 probation. This is Winchester's direct appeal from his conviction and sentencing.
(2) Winchester argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he admitted two allegedly forged checks that the State delivered to Winchester on the day before trial. Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 requires the State, upon request of the defendant, to "permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers [and] documents . . . which are within the possession, custody or control of the state, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense. . . ." The record clearly shows that the State provided Winchester's counsel with the opportunity to inspect the documents that it had in its possession at Winchester's counsel's convenience. We have held that the State's obligation to make material documents available for inspection and copying does not create an affirmative duty to transmit copies to a defendant. The State provided unsolicited copies of the actual documents shortly before trial. Because the defense failed to avail itself of the State's timely invitation to review and photocopy relevant evidence, including the checks in question, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to exclude the checks from evidence on the sole theory that the State did not physically deliver the checks to defense counsel more than one day before trial.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(1)(C).
Robinson v. State, 676 A.2d 906 (Table), 1996 WL 145828 (1996) (Walsh, J., order).
(3) Winchester incorrectly asserts that the State has a legal duty to provide witnesses and fingerprint evidence to verify the identity of a defendant for the purpose of declaring him an habitual criminal. We require only that the State produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Winchester is the same individual listed in the State's motion. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he decided that the evidence contained in the presentence report was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Winchester had been convicted of the requisite offenses to merit habitual offender status.
State v. Alls, 540 A.2d 113 (Table), 1988 WL 26590 (1988) (Horsey, J., order).
State v. Cobb, 592 A.2d 983, 984 (Del.Super.Ct. 1990).
(4) Winchester finally contends that the language of the sentencing statutes mandates that the trial judge impose a period of transitional custodial supervision at either Level IV, III, or II and therefore the court erred by sentencing Winchester to diminishing supervision at all three levels. Appellant's argument is wholly without merit and is controlled by our holding in Nave v. State.
Del. C. Ann. tit. 11 § 4204(1)(2001).
783 A.2d 120, 122-23 (Del. 2001).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.