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Wilson v. Woodford

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 23, 2006
Case No. 1:05-CV-00700-OWW-SMS-P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2006)

Opinion

Case No. 1:05-CV-00700-OWW-SMS-P.

February 23, 2006


ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED (Doc. 1)


I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Jack Allen Wilson ("Plaintiff") is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on June 1, 2005.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time he brought this action.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff's Claims

This action concerns conditions of confinement at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison-Corcoran, where Plaintiff was incarcerated during the relevant time period. Plaintiff names Jeanne Woodford and Derral Adams as defendants.

Plaintiff is seeking both money damages and equitable relief. When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those conditions.Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, this action shall be treated as one for damages only.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' policies have resulted in the denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges that he is denied black ink pens, which are necessary for him to access the courts, and that he is denied indigent postage for sending his appeal to the Director's Level of review, which precludes him from exhausting. Plaintiff also alleges that he was retaliated against for using the prison grievance system.

1. Access to the Courts Claim

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. An inmate claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 351.

The allegation that Plaintiff was not provided with black ink pens does not give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 for denial of access to the courts.

With respect to the mandatory exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), interference with an inmate's attempt to exhaust via the appeals process would give rise to a cognizable access to the courts claim only if and when the inmate suffered an actual injury by having his claim or action dismissed for failure to exhaust. Until such an injury actually occurs, it is pure speculation that an inability to exhaust will result in the loss of his claim or action. See e.g., Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (exhaustion occurred when appeals coordinator exercised discretion to screen out appeal as untimely and no further process remained available to the inmate);Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegation that he was denied access to the courts because he was denied postage to mail his appeal does not give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 for denial of access to the courts.

2. Retaliation Claim

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person `subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory ofrespondeat superior. When a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy `itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is `the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that he was retaliated against for using the grievance process is insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983.

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with one opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Plaintiff may not add any new claims in his amended complaint, and is limited to curing the deficiencies in his access to the courts and retaliation claims. If Plaintiff attempts to expand the scope of this action in his amended complaint, the amended complaint will be stricken from the record.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;
2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint; and
4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Wilson v. Woodford

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 23, 2006
Case No. 1:05-CV-00700-OWW-SMS-P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2006)
Case details for

Wilson v. Woodford

Case Details

Full title:JACK ALLEN WILSON, Plaintiff, v. JEANNE WOODFORD, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: Feb 23, 2006

Citations

Case No. 1:05-CV-00700-OWW-SMS-P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2006)