Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1925
05-12-2021
Jordan Donta WILSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorneys for Appellant: Valerie Boots, Indianapolis, Indiana, Kurt A. Young, Nashville, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellant: Valerie Boots, Indianapolis, Indiana, Kurt A. Young, Nashville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Following a jury trial, Jordan Donta Wilson was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety years imprisonment. In this belated appeal, Wilson challenges his convictions, presenting two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial?
2. Are his convictions for murder and attempted murder supported by sufficient evidence?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On January 22, 2019, C.C. purchased a car and early that evening picked up her "on and off" boyfriend, Christopher Griffin, at Griffin's mother's house. Transcript Vol. 2 at 128. Griffin was accompanied by Wilson, whom C.C. recognized from Facebook photographs as Griffin's friend who went by the name "Yellow." Id. at 129. Griffin sat in the front passenger seat and Wilson sat in the rear passenger seat. After stopping at a gas station, they all went back to C.C.’s home.
[4] While C.C. and Griffin were in C.C.’s bedroom, Wilson stayed in the living room. Griffin had given Wilson the password to C.C.’s Wi-Fi, and C.C. let Wilson use a phone charger. Griffin told C.C. that Wilson needed a place to stay, and C.C. told him that Wilson could sleep on the couch that night. At some point, C.C. left to pick up her nine-year-old daughter and ten-year-old niece. C.C. was gone for a short time and when she returned, she helped the girls get ready for bed. Around this time, Griffin asked to use C.C.’s car. Griffin and Wilson left together and were gone for about an hour. Griffin and Wilson left a second time when C.C. asked Griffin to buy her donut sticks from a nearby gas station. While Griffin and Wilson were at the gas station, they video chatted with C.C. to confirm that Griffin was purchasing what she wanted.
[5] Minutes later, when Griffin and Wilson returned to the house, C.C. was sitting on her bed. Griffin walked into the bedroom, smiled, and threw a bag of chips toward her. C.C. then heard a gunshot and covered her ears. When she looked up, she saw Wilson pointing a gun at her. The next thing she knew, she was "laying face down on [her] bed with blood ... like pouring into [her] mouth." Id. at 142. C.C. did not move because she was afraid Wilson would shoot her again. After she heard the front door shut, C.C. called 911 and managed to get to the front door to lock it. Griffin was lying on the floor in her bedroom, and C.C. told the 911 operator that he had been shot and she thought he was dead.
[6] When police arrived, they found C.C. covered in blood with an obvious injury near her neck. C.C. told the officers that the shooter was a young, light-skinned black male with tattoos on his face and hands and who went by the nickname Yellow. During a protective sweep of the house, the officers located Griffin, who appeared to be deceased from a gunshot wound to the back of the head, lying on the bedroom floor. C.C.’s daughter and niece were found hiding under blankets in another bedroom in the house.
[7] As officers responded to C.C.’s house, Richard Faulkner, Sr., an officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department went to look for the suspect. He parked in the area of the nearby gas station and waited. After a few minutes, Officer Faulkner observed Wilson—who fit the description of the suspect provided by C.C.—casually leaning against a light pole across the street from the gas station and eating donut sticks. When another police car drove by, the officer observed Wilson straighten up and lean closer to the light pole. Wilson then walked across the street to the gas station. Officers moved in and arrested Wilson. Wilson had donut sticks on him and according to one officer, Wilson appeared sweaty and out of breath like he had recently been running. During a pat-down search, officers found a bag of seven unfired bullets in Wilson's pocket.
[8] An autopsy revealed that Griffin suffered a fatal gunshot wound behind his right ear. The bullet severely fractured his skull and lodged in his brain. C.C. suffered a single gunshot wound that injured her neck, cheek, and wrist. She remained in the hospital for approximately four days.
[9] On January 24, 2019, the State charged Wilson with murder, attempted murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. A jury trial was held March 2-4, 2020. At trial, C.C. testified that she saw Wilson pointing the gun at her at the time of the shooting. Several witnesses, including C.C. and Griffin's mother and brother, identified Wilson as Griffin's companion on the day of the shooting. The State also presented evidence that Wilson's phone connected to C.C.’s Wi-Fi on the evening in question and of footprints in her car that were consistent with the shoes Wilson was wearing. The bullets found in Wilson's pocket were of the same caliber, albeit multiple brands, as the two spent casings found at the scene of the shooting.
[10] During the trial, Detective Chris Edwards testified that he created a photo array for C.C. to make her initial identification. In response to the deputy prosecutor's question as to how he selected the photographs for the photo array, Detective Edwards stated that he used "a computer system with – basically like mugshots of everybody whose [sic] been arrested in Marion County." Transcript Vol. 3 at 96. Defense counsel immediately objected. Following a short sidebar conversation, the trial court struck Detective Edwards's response and admonished the jury not to consider it:
I show the last comment made by Detective Edwards, the last statement made by him about mugshots and in Marion County, Indianapolis is stricken from the record. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are not to consider that. That is stricken from the record.
Id. at 97. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel requested a mistrial, claiming that Detective Edwards's testimony was an "evidentiary harpoon" that placed him in "a position of grave peril." Id. at 98, 97. He also disagreed with the State's argument that Detective Edwards's use of the term "mugshot" was inadvertent and that the situation could be rehabilitated. Id. at 100. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. Detective Edwards then testified that he has access to several databases as sources for photographs to make a photo array, including the bureau of motor vehicles. Upon being shown the photo array, C.C. identified Wilson as the person who shot her. Reports on the contents of C.C.’s and Griffin's cell phones showed that the video chat from the gas station occurred approximately ten minutes before the 911 call was made from C.C.’s phone at approximately 9:32 p.m. C.C. testified that the shooting occurred immediately after Griffin and Wilson had returned.
Griffin's mother and brother also identified Wilson from a photo array as the individual accompanying Griffin that evening.
[11] At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Wilson guilty as charged. After the guilty verdict, the trial court granted the State's request that the firearms charge be dismissed. On June 22, 2020, the trial court sentenced Wilson to consecutive terms of sixty years for murder and thirty years for attempted murder. On October 9, 2020, Wilson was granted permission to pursue a belated appeal. Additional facts will be provided, as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
1. Mistrial
[12] The grant or denial of a motion for mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Brittain v. State , 68 N.E.3d 611, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. We afford the trial court great deference on appeal because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the relevant circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury. Id. at 620. The grant of a mistrial is an extreme remedy that should be used only when no other curative measure will rectify the situation. Kemper v. State , 35 N.E.3d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a mistrial, the defendant must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was both in error and had a probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision. Pierce v. State , 761 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ind. 2002). More specifically, the appellant must establish that the questioned conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Gregory v. State , 540 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. 1989).
[13] Wilson argues that a mistrial was warranted because Detective Edwards's testimony that he created the photo array using "mugshots of everybody whose [sic] been arrested in Marion County" informed the jury that Wilson had previously been arrested, thereby inviting the jury to draw the forbidden inference. Transcript Vol. 3 at 96. He claims that such testimony was intentionally injected into the trial in that there was no legitimate purpose to ask about the source of the photographs in the array and the testimony was provided by an experienced police officer.
[14] In Coleman v. State , 490 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. 1986), our Supreme Court was presented with similar circumstances. In that case, a veteran police officer testified that in creating a photographic array, he "pulled the mugshots—I'm sorry, the police photographs out and gave each [victim] a group of photographs." Id. at 327. The Supreme Court noted that "the use of the term mug shot in testimony may be prejudicial to the defendant. However, the mere mention of the term mug shot is not reversible error per se. Reversal is not required if the reference is unintentional or evidence of guilt is strong." Id. at 328. With regard to the specific instance, the Court determined that the testimony, although made by an experienced police officer, was inadvertent. The Court also determined that use of the term mugshot "did not refer to any particular mug shot of the defendant, but referred to the general category of photos used in a photographic array." Id. Finally, the Court found that there was substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial.
[15] The same result follows here. First, Detective Edwards did not explicitly state that Wilson's photograph was obtained from the mugshot database. Second, even though Detective Edwards referred to mugshots and arrests, his testimony created the same risk of prejudice that was addressed in Coleman . Third, that Detective Edwards did not correct his misstatement is not indicative of his intent or lack thereof as defense counsel immediately objected before Detective Edwards could reflect upon his testimony and perhaps attempt to correct his misstatement. In any event, the trial court was in the best position to determine whether the evidence was intentionally or inadvertently injected into the trial. See Greenlee v. State , 655 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ind. 1995) (whether challenged testimony was intentionally injected into the trial is but one factor that is relevant in deciding whether reference to prior acts warrants a mistrial).
[16] Finally, as in Coleman , here, there is substantial evidence of Wilson's guilt. C.C. identified Wilson as the person she saw pointing a gun at her just before she was shot. The next thing she knew, she was lying face down on her bed with blood pouring into her mouth. Other witnesses identified Wilson as Griffin's companion that evening. Wilson's cell phone connected to C.C.’s Wi-Fi the evening of the shooting and shoe prints in C.C.’s car were consistent with shoes worn by Wilson. Not ten minutes before Griffin and C.C. were shot, C.C. was video chatting with Griffin and Wilson while they were at a gas station a few blocks from C.C.’s house picking up snacks. In the video, Wilson was holding the donut sticks requested by C.C. and when he was arrested shortly after the shooting, he was eating donut sticks.
[17] Moreover, we find that any peril was immediately addressed when the court strongly admonished the jury. See Lehman v. State , 777 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("[r]eversible error is seldom found when the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings, because a timely and accurate admonition to the jury is presumed to sufficiently protect a defendant's rights and remove any error created by the objectionable statement"). We disagree with Wilson that the court's admonition, in which the trial court repeated the testimony being stricken, amounted to a "drumbeat repetition" of the improper testimony. Appellant's Brief at 21. The trial court simply identified the precise testimony that the jury was to disregard.
Additionally, we note that the jurors received a specific instruction at the outset of trial not to consider stricken evidence:
During the trial the court may rule that certain questions may not be answered and/or that certain exhibits may not be allowed into evidence. You must not concern yourselves with the reasons for the rulings. The court's rulings are strictly controlled by law. Occasionally, the court may strike evidence from the record after you have already seen or heard it. You must not consider such evidence in making your decision.
Transcript Vol. 2 at 103-04. Jurors are presumed to follow a trial court's instructions. Ward v. State , 138 N.E.2d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
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[18] Wilson has not shown that the passing reference to mugshots and arrests placed him in great peril. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.
2. Sufficiency
[19] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Drane v. State , 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence, and we will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence will be found sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Id. at 147. "The uncorroborated testimony of one witness, even if it is the victim, is sufficient to sustain a conviction." Whitener v. State , 982 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[20] Wilson argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because the jury's verdicts are based on his mere presence at the scene. Wilson claims that there is no evidence that he fired the gun that killed Griffin and seriously wounded C.C. and given the fact that there is "no discernable reason for the shooting, the jury easily could have found that another person was present but not seen by C.C. and that person may have been the shooter." Appellant's Brief at 25. We will not indulge Wilson's blatant request to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses. C.C. testified that she heard a gunshot and looked up and saw Wilson pointing a gun at her. The next thing she knew, she was lying face down on her bed with blood pouring into her mouth. When police responded to her 911 call, she immediately identified Wilson as the shooter and provided a physical description. A short time later, while still at the hospital, C.C. identified Wilson from a photographic array. C.C.’s testimony is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Wilson murdered Griffin and then shot C.C.
[21] Judgment affirmed.
Kirsch, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.