Opinion
2:22-cv-00070
10-15-2024
DWAYNE EDMUND WILSON #258602, Plaintiff, v. STEVE HOLMA, et al., Defendants.
Hon. Jane M. Beckering U.S. District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAARTEN VERMAAT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R&R) addresses Defendant Holma's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 43.)
State prisoner Dwayne Wilson filed an unverified complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1.) The alleged events occurred at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF). (Id.) Wilson's remaining claim arose on March 1, 2022, when Defendant Corrections Officer (CO) Holma allegedly injured him by failing to fully open Wilson's cell door at shower time. (Id., PageID.5.) CO Holma was allegedly opening cell doors using the control panel located in the “Bubble” (control center). (Id.) Wilson says that when he attempted to push the cell door open, CO Holma closed the door, thereby causing his wrist and arm injury. (Id.) Then, Wilson says that CO Holma denied him medical care. (Id.) Wilson asserts that he was crying in pain due to his swollen arm, but no one would help him. (Id.)
Wilson alleged in his complaint:
(Image Omitted) (Id.)
Wilson says he kept asking for help for days. (Id.) Finally, Wilson says that it took five days for staff to send him to the hospital for an x-ray. (Id., PageID.5-6.) The doctor allegedly told him he would have to return to the hospital because his “swelling wouldn't go down.” (Id., Page.6.)
CO Holma moves for summary judgment and has attached a 43-second video of the incident as an exhibit.The video shows the cell door opening at least partially, and then Wilson is seen easily pushing the door with his open left hand and walking out of his cell and down the hallway without any indication that he was injured by the door. The video shows that Wilson was carrying a towel and another object in his right hand. Although the video shows no visible injury to Wilson's left wrist, or that he was in any type of pain or distress, Wilson says that CO Holma failed to provide him with immediate medical care for his injuries. Wilson was examined by a nurse after he made a formal request for healthcare. At that time, there was no visible injury, but Wilson asserted he was in pain. Wilson was provided with a cold compress, ACE bandage, and Ibuprofen.
Wilson complains that he was not given access to the video, but he admits that he viewed the 43-second video two times. (ECF No. 53, PageID.466.)
It is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has met his burden of showing that he did not violate Wilson's Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant CO Holma's motion for summary judgment because there exists no genuine issue of any material fact.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).
III. Eighth Amendment
1. Excessive force
Wilson alleges that he injured his left wrist when he pushed open his cell door after CO Holma failed to fully open the door using the control panel. The Eighth Amendment limits the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society's “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 346. Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-300 (1991). “The subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). “The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.'” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298).
Under the subjective component, the core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992). The Court “must judge the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015). In determining whether the use of force is malicious or sadistic, the Court should evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,” and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
Under the objective component, the pain inflicted must be “sufficiently serious.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). The Court's inquiry regarding the seriousness of the injury is “contextual” and is “responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9. While the extent of an inmate's injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison or jail official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). When prison or jail officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated, “[w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
First, Wilson has not presented any evidence that CO Holma acted maliciously or sadistically or with deliberate indifference to Wilson's health and safety at the time he opened Wilson's cell door. Second, the video of the incident contradicts Wilson's version of what happened and shows that Wilson was able to easily slide the door and walk out of his cell with minimal effort.(ECF No. 47.) The video shows that Wilson was not injured when he walked into the hallway from his cell.
Defendant failed to authenticate the video, but the lock history shows that Wilson was confined in AMF cell 229 on March 1, 2020, and the video shows an inmate exiting cell 229 on March 1, 2020. (ECF No. 44-3, PageID.406.)
The video was not filed under seal. If a party believes that the video should be sealed, a motion to seal the video may be filed.
The door opened at approximately 3:55:50 pm on March 1, 2020. The following time-stamped screen shots depict the incident and show that Wilson was able to leave his cell in less than three seconds without incident:
(Image Omitted)
(Image Omitted)
(Image Omitted)
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In the opinion of the undersigned, there exists no genuine issue of material fact remaining in the case, and CO Holma is entitled to summary judgment on Wilson's excessive force claim. Wilson has presented no evidence that CO Holma acted maliciously or sadistically or with deliberate indifference when he opened Wilson's cell door. Further, the video shows that Wilson was able to leave his cell without incident and shows him casually walking down the hallway. Nothing in the video depicts Wilson in pain. Wilson never touched his left wrist or even looked at his left wrist after he walked out his prison cell. The videotape contradicts Wilson's alleged version of the facts. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a court should adopt the facts “in the light depicted by videotape” capturing the alleged excessive force. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380. Here, as shown in the screen shots from the videos, there exists no genuine dispute of fact which could support Wilson's claim of excessive force.
2. Denial of medical care
Even though the video evidence contradicts Wilson's claim that he was injured by CO Holma, Wilson says that he was denied medical care for his injury. CO Holma argues that Wilson did not plead that CO Holma was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need in the complaint and Wilson should not be allowed to raise that claim in response to the motion for summary judgment. Arguably, as set forth above, Wilson raised this issue in his complaint by asserting that CO Holma refused to call the nurse after CO Holma hit the button to close the cell door on Wilson. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
An Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008). Where a prisoner challenges their treatment as inadequate, a prisoner must show more than a serious medical need. Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). To establish the objective component in a situation where a prisoner asserts that the care received was inadequate, a prisoner must prove grossly inadequate care which generally requires the introduction of medical evidence typically in the form of expert testimony. Id.
The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant's subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . .: A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).
The subjective component was summarized in Rhinehart. There, the court of appeals stated the following:
[T]he plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with a mental state “equivalent to criminal recklessness.” This showing requires proof that each defendant “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk” by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove subjective recklessness: A jury is entitled to “conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” And if a risk is well-documented and circumstances suggest that the official has been exposed to information so that he must have known of the risk, the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find that the official had knowledge.
But the plaintiff also must present enough evidence from which a jury could conclude that each defendant “so recklessly ignored the risk that he was deliberately indifferent to it.”Id. 738-39 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
As set forth above, there is no indication from the video that Wilson injured himself when he walked out his cell door. If Wilson spoke to CO Holma when Holma was working in the Bubble, there exists no evidence that CO Holma was aware that Wilson had an injury that required immediate medical attention. Nevertheless, Wilson did receive medical care after he made a formal request for medical care because he said he hurt his wrist when he pulled open the steel door. (ECF No. 444, PageID.408.) Registered Nurse Finegan examined Wilson on March 5, 2020. (ECF No. 45-5, PageID.410.) RN Finegan noted an older fractured left wrist with a slight deformity, but that the wrist was otherwise normal with no stiffness or swelling. (Id.) Wilson described pain on palpation, and was prescribed Ibuprofen, a cold compress followed by warm water soak, and an ACE bandage. (Id., PageID.411.) RN Finegan wrote:
(Image Omitted) (Id.)
Then, on March 11, 2020, Wilson was examined by Nurse Practitioner (NP) Lewis, who again noted that Wilson was “tender on moderate palpation from wrist to elbow.” (ECF No. 44-6, PageID.413.) NP Lewis requested an x-ray and explained her reasoning for the request:
Reason for Request:
US left fore arm, D Dimer 650, 49 year old AA male sustained an injury to his left forearm, wrist/hand on 3/2/2020 while pulling a cell door. States he felt a sharp pop, then later that day had numbness, tingling in his hand, has shooting pain radiating from wrist to elbow on both medial and lateral aspects. Had an Ace wrap for wrist, has not been elevating it. Now forearm is extremely swollen and painful all along radius and ulna from wrist to elbow. No upper arm pain or swelling. Left hand painful on anterior palpation but has full ROM of fingers, no swelling in fingers. ROM of fingers causes medial wrist pain. Cap refill spontaneous, sensation decreased in fingers.(Id., PageID.414.)
NP Lewis followed up with Wilson on March 23, 2020. (ECF No. 44-8.) The x-ray noted a hematoma. (Id., PageID.418.) Examination revealed an “Improved Nontramatic hematoma of soft tissue.” (Id., PageID.419.) In the opinion of the undersigned, Wilson has failed to show that CO Holma acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. First, the record fails to show that Wilson sustained an injury when he slightly pushed open the cell door. Second, when Wilson was initially examined by medical staff on March 3, 2020, he exhibited no swelling in his left wrist, but did complain of some pain. According to Wilson's medical record, the first visual indication of swelling appeared on March 11, 2020, and Wilson explained that his wrist began to swell during the evening on the date of the alleged cell door incident. At Wilson's deposition he stated as soon as he opened the cell door, he “heard something pop and I had a lot of pain in my wrist and my arm and - all of a sudden it just started swelling.” (ECF No. 44-2, PgeID389.) Wilson says after his shower “I'm telling the man, you know, can I get some healthcare. So he just waived me off.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Wilson has failed to establish that CO Holma denied him healthcare for an emergency or serious medical need. Wilson did receive healthcare after he made a formal written request. Wilson has failed to establish that the alleged delay in being examined by a nurse caused him harm.
IV. Qualified and Sovereign Immunity
CO Holma also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Wilson cannot prove that Holma could “reasonably understand that stopping Wilson's cell door from opening fully was unlawful.” (ECF No. 44, PageID.383.) However, this argument requires a factual analysis and is not simply a matter of Wilson failing to assert a violation of clearly established Eighth Amendment law. “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.'” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Analyzing claims of qualified immunity involves a two-pronged test. Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). First, the court must “determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). Second, the court asks if the right at issue was “‘clearly established' when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). A court may address these prongs in either order. Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if the court finds that there is no constitutional violation, or that the right at issue was not clearly established. See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016). CO Holma argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because there are no genuine issues of material fact, and he did not violate Wilson's Eighth Amendment rights. As stated above, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no genuine issue of material fact exists to support Wilson's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Holma.
CO Holma argues that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his official capacity as to Wilson's claim for monetary damages. Wilson sued CO Holma as a “correctional officer” so arguably Wilson named CO Holma in his official capacity. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
A lawsuit against a state official for monetary damages is treated as a lawsuit against the State. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Section 1983 did not expressly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court, Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). As such, it is the undersigned's opinion that Wilson's claims against CO Holma in his official capacity for monetary damages are properly dismissed in accordance with the Eleventh Amendment.
V. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant CO Holma's motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).