Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-06-001 JEB.
Submitted: June 1, 1999.
Decided: March 8, 2000.
(On Appeal from the Industrial Accident Board in Hrg. No. 822610) Motion to Reverse Decision of Industrial Accident Board — DENIED
Nancy E. Chrissinger, Esquire Three Mill Road, Suite 301 Wilmington, DE 19806 Attorney for Employer Below — Appellant
Debra Aldrich, Esquire Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel Bhaya 1202 Kirkwood Highway Wilmington, DE 19805 Attorney for Employee Below — Appellee.
ORDER
Appellant Wilmington Finishing Company appeals a decision of the Industrial Accident Board denying Appellant's petition to terminate Appellee Judy Leary's survivor benefits. Because the statutory language of the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act, 19 Del. C. § 2330(b), extinguishes a widow's survivor benefits only upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse, neither of which have occurred here, the Board's decision is AFFIRMED.
I. FACTS
On October 2, 1986, Joseph F. Leary, Sr. ("Joseph") died in a compensable industrial accident while working for Wilmington Finishing Company ("WFC"). At the time of the accident, Joseph was married to and resided with Judy Leary ("Judy"). As a right of survivorship, Judy continues to live in her deceased husband's home. Since the accident, benefits have been paid to Judy as a surviving spouse from WFC's worker's compensation carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance, in accordance with 19 Del. C. § 2330.
Since March of 1987, Albert Leary ("Albert"), Joseph's brother, has been living with Judy. Albert and Judy are not legally married. Judy describes her relationship with Albert as that of a "companion" and acknowledges that the two are "more than friendly".
Albert does not pay rent to Judy. Albert pays the household utility expenses from a joint checking account owned with Judy. Judy is listed as a beneficiary on Albert's life insurance policy. Neither Albert nor Judy have a will. Judy is not covered by Albert's health insurance, nor does she have health insurance coverage of her own.
Judy disclosed that her previous attorney advised her that she would continue to be entitled to worker's compensation benefits as long as she did not remarry. Judy testified that she and Albert have never held themselves out as husband and wife.
On August 21, 1998, WFC filed a Petition for Review, asserting that Judy's eligibility for survivor's benefits had ceased. On April 22, 1999, the Industrial Accident Board ("Board") held a hearing in the matter. On April 29, 1999, the Board denied WFC's petition to cease Judy's worker's compensation benefits. WFC appeals the ruling of the Board.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the decision of the Board, the function of a reviewing court is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. The Court's review of alleged errors of law by the Board is plenary.
29 Del. C. § 10142(d); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (1965).
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994) (quoting Olney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981)).
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
Brooks v. Johnson, Del. Supr., 506 A.2d 1001, 1002 (1989) (citing Nardo v. Nardo, Del. Supr., 209 A.2d 905 (1965)).
III. DISCUSSION
At the hearing, the only evidence presented before the Board was testimony from Judy regarding her familial situation and relationship with Albert. Neither party is arguing that the Board's decision was not predicated upon substantial evidence. The Board based its decision on the fact that Judy was not excluded from receiving benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act by virtue of her cohabitation with Albert. This appeal is limited to whether the Board erred as a matter of law when it declined to terminate Judy Leary's benefits under 19 Del. C. § 2330(b). For the reasons which follow, the Court concludes that there was no legal error.Under the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act (the "Act"), 19 Del. C. § 2330(b), a surviving spouse is entitled to compensation which "shall continue after such period of 400 weeks until the surviving spouse dies or remarries." 19 Del. C. § 2330(g) provides that "[s]hould the surviving spouse remarry, the right of the . . . surviving spouse to compensation under this section shall cease."
Appellant WFC argues that Judy is no longer entitled to receive benefits under 19 Del. C. § 2330(b) because:
(1) Her continued receipt of benefits violates the public policy behind Worker's Compensation;
(2) The term "remarries" as it is used in the statute should be interpreted to include people in "meretricious" relationships; and
(3) Some other laws terminate alimony or benefit payments upon the cohabitation of the party receiving the payments.
WFC's arguments will be addressed in turn.
A. JUDY LEARY'S RECEIPT OF BENEFITS VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY
WFC first argues that because Act seeks to avoid more than one recovery for a single loss to the employee by reducing or offsetting compensation benefits by the receipt of other unemployment insurance benefits, this Court should "avoid a windfall" to Judy by discontinuing her survivor benefits since she is "receiving the benefit of Albert Leary's income". WFC contends that Guy J. Johnson Transportation. Co. v. Dunkle supports such an offset in this case.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 11.
Guy J. Johnson Transportation. Co. v. Dunkle, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 551 (1988).
The holding in Johnson is inapposite to the present controversy. As the Delaware Supreme Court in State v. Calhoun remarked:
[Johnson] involved an injured employee's attempt to recover medical expense pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2322(a) after those expenses had been paid by the employer's medical insurance carrier. Johnson represents a clear instance of double recovery in which an employee sought to recover for medical expenses which he had not, in fact, sustained. Johnson stands for the proposition that an employee cannot secure double recovery for a single loss where both sources of recovery emanate from the employer.Johnson cannot be read to encompass a situation where, as here, the asserted windfall" flows not from the employer or another insurance carrier, but results from the shared income of another person living in the same household. This is not a case of a surviving spouse receiving duplicative benefits from an employer in violation of public policy.
State v. Calhoun, Del. Supr., 634 A.2d 335, 338 (1993).
In addition, as the appellee correctly notes, Judy's receipt of benefits furthers the important public policy in Delaware of providing a surviving spouse with prompt compensation to the exclusion of the remedy of civil litigation against an employer. Such policy considerations were certainly weighed by the General Assembly in its adoption of the Worker's Compensation law. B. "REMARRIES" INCLUDES "MERETRICIOUS" RELATIONSHIPS
Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc., Del. Supr., 165 A.2d 447, 451 (1960) ("[T]he policy of the [Workers' Compensation] law is to take the whole subject Out of the field of negligence. The overall benefit to the employee is clear. For that benefit he gives up the right to sue at law.".); Moss Rehab v. White, Del. Supr., 692 A.2d 902, 909 n. 12 (1997) ("This Court has acknowledged that the two primary purposes of the Workers' Compensation law are to provide prompt payment of benefits without regard to fault and to relieve the employers and employees of the burden of civil litigation [citation omitted].").
Moss Rehab, 692 A.2d at 909.
Appellant uses the term "meretricious" numerous times, without further clarification, to describe the relationship of Judy Leary and Albert Leary. In light of the word's varying usages and often negative connotations, a brief discussion is in order. Black's Law defines meretricious" as:
1. Involving prostitution; of the unlawful sexual nature a meretricious encounter. 2. (Of a romantic relationship) involving either two people of the same sex or lack of capacity on the part of one party a meretricious marriage. 3. Superficially attractive but fake nonetheless; alluring by false show meretricious advertising claims. Black's Law Dictionary 1002 (7th ed. 1999).
Delaware Courts generally use the term "meretricious" to describe a relationship between a married person and an unmarried person. See Churchman v. Churchman, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 674, 1982 WL 117010, Brown, C. (June 14, 1982); Tilghman v. Gelette, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 5017, 1977 WL 5158, Brown, V.C. (June 6, 1977); Williamson v. Williamson, Del. Super., 104 A.2d 463 (1954); DuPont v. DuPont, Del.Supr., 90 A.2d 468 [ 90 A.2d 467] (1952).
On the other hand, Washington Courts define a "meretricious relationship" as a stable, marital-like relationship where the parties cohabit with the knowledge that they are not married. See Chesterfield v. Nash, Wash. Ct. App., 978 P.2d 551, 553 n. 1 (1999) (citation omitted) (noting that "[a]lthough the term, 'meretricious' is 'offensive, demeaning, and sexist[,]' courts will continue to use it until a legally precise expression emerges to replace it. [citation omitted]").
Perhaps the most appropriate and legally precise term to describe the relationship of Judy Leary and Albert Leary is that they are each a CUPOS. Black's Law defines CUPOS as an abbreviation for "[c]ohabiting unmarried person of the opposite sex." Black's Law Dictionary 386 (7th ed. 1999); see In re Eggers, Wash. Ct. App., 638 P.2d 1267, 1270 n. 2 (1982).
WFC next implores the Court to interpret the term "remarries" in 19 Del. C. § 2330(b) to include the "the arrangement Judy Leary currently has with Albert Leary: co-habitants in a meretricious relationship" in order to avoid an absurd result. The Court declines to give the term "remarries" such an paradoxical interpretation.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 11.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court must give a statute its plain meaning and avoid judicial interpretation if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations. Ambiguity may in limited instances arise from a finding that a literal interpretation of words of a statute would lead to "such unreasonable or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not have been intended by the legislature." However, the consequences must be found to be unreasonable or absurd either in the context of other provisions of the same legislation or from a clear inconsistency with the legislation's statutory purpose. Therefore, judicial construction in cases of perceived absurd or unjust results flowing from a literal interpretation of language "is a rule that is cautiously applied."
Bestemps v. Gibbs, Del. Super., C.A. No. 98A-04-003, 1998 WL 960759, at *2, Barron, J. (Oct. 22, 1998) (citing Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del. Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985)); McCormick v. Board of Education for the State of Delaware, Del. Super., C.A. No. 97A-10-003, 1998 WL 960733, at *1, Babiarz, J. (Aug. 27, 1998) (citation omitted).
Snyder v. Andrews, Del. Supr., 708 A.2d 237, 241 (1998) (citing Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246).
Scarborough Village v. City of Rehobeth, Del. Super., C.A. No. 93C-07-032, 1995 WL 411789, at *4, Graves, J. (June 20, 1995) (citing Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246).
Copeland v. Beh, Del. Supr., 1991 WL 73951, at *5 Horsey, J. (April 23, 1991) (withdrawn on other grounds).
Magill v. North American Refractories Co., Del. Supr., 128 A.2d 233, 236 (1956).
WFC does not attempt to argue that the language of the statute is ambiguous because the term "remarries" is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Instead, WFC argues that such a non-literal interpretation, admittedly "contrary to [the Act's] clear language", is necessary "to render the statute's more practical meaning: that survivorship benefits cease once the survivor has changed her position to effectively replace her missing spouse."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 14.
However, WFC has not convincingly explained how the receipt of survivor's benefits by Judy, a single person involved in a relationship with another, is an absurd result that simply could not have been premeditated by the Legislature or that is so utterly and clearly inconsistent with the purposes of 19 Del. C. § 2330. Quite the contrary, the plain language of the statute dictates that Judy is exactly the type of beneficiary envisioned by the Legislature: a surviving spouse who remains both (1) alive and (2) unmarried. Judy's right to benefits is based solely on her relationship to Joseph Leary at the time of his death and not on her financial needs. The mere fact that in individual cases a recipient who shares income with a co-habitant may have less of a practical need for benefits than a recipient who relies entirely upon her own income does not justify severing Judy's entitlement to benefits in contravention of the express language of 19 Del. C. § 2330.
WFC simply cannot show any ambiguity in the statute resulting in absurd consequences from a straightforward reading of 19 Del. C. § 2330 as it pertains to Judy Leary. In the absence of ambiguity, the statutory language must be regarded as conclusive of the General Assembly's intent, and the Court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words. The Court may not graft an exception onto the plain and positive terms of the statute.
State v. Cooper, Del. Supr., 575 A.2d 1074, 1076 (1990) (citations omitted).
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, Del. Supr., 11 A.2d 331, 337 (1940).
The literal meaning of "remarries" does not include the notions of CUPOS or "cohabitants in a meretricious relationship" as envisioned by WFC. Delaware defines marriage as "the civil status of one man and one woman legally united for life, with the rights and duties, which . . . from time to time may thereafter be, assigned by the law to matrimony." Further, Delaware does not recognize common-law marriage, which, despite WFC's insistence to the contrary, is essentially the type of relationship WFC urges the Court to recognize in order to disqualify Judy from her benefits. A common-law marriage is one which takes legal effect when a couple live together as husband and wife, intend to be married, and hold themselves out to others as husband and wife without a marriage license or ceremony.
Cohen v. Cohen, Del. Super., 84 A. 122, 123 (1912); see also Berdikas v. Berdikas, Del. Super., 178 A.2d 468, 469 (1962) ("In this state it has long been established that there can be no valid marriage unless there is compliance with the Statute; in short, this must be a ceremonial wedding.").
Wilmington Trust v. Hendrixson, Del. Super., 114 A. 215, 222 (1921); Owens v. Bentley, Del. Super., 14 A.2d 391, 392 (1940); Harleysville v. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carroll, Del. Super., 123 A.2d 128, 131 n. 3 (1956).
Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed. 1999).
By arguing that the term "remarries" should be read to encompass the relationship of two unmarried persons or CUPOS, WFC is requesting that the Court, in the absence of linguistic ambiguity, substitute its judgement for the clear intent and precise words of the Legislature. The Court refuses to do so.
This result follows even though the courts may disagree with the policy established by the statute, for it is the function of the Legislature and not the Judiciary to declare the public policy of the State. As Justice Brewer aptly stated over one-hundred years ago:
See Ames v. Wilmington Housing Authority, Del. Supr., 233 A.2d 453, 456 (1967); Federal United Corp., 11 A.2d at 337.
The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator. It is true there are cases in which the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling, but the cases are few and exceptional, and only arise when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent. No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute.
U.S. v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103 (1897).
C. OTHER LAWS TERMINATE BENEFITS UPON COHABITATION
WFC lastly argues that because certain other laws terminate payments upon the cohabitation of the party receiving the payments, the Court should extend this rationale to cut Worker's Compensation benefits to a CUPOS such as Judy Leary. Specifically, WFC points to two statutes: 13 Del. C. § 1512(g), a section of domestic relations law that terminates alimony payments upon the death, remarriage, or cohabitation of the party receiving alimony, and Section 307(7) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, which gives the compensation board discretion to terminates benefits if a widow is found to be "in [a] meretricious relationship and not married, or the widow [is] living a life of prostitution."
13 Del. C. § 1512(g) provides:
Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, the obligation to pay future alimony is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage or cohabitation of the party receiving alimony. As used in this section, 'cohabitation' means regularly residing with an adult of the same or opposite sex, if the parties hold themselves out as a couple, and regardless of whether the relationship confers a financial benefit on the party receiving alimony. Proof of a sexual relationship is admissible but not required to prove cohabitation . . .
The inclusion of such an argument is curious, as it completely undercuts WFC's position. The fact that other statutes include "cohabitation" and "meretricious relationships" as reasons which truncate alimony or benefits does not in any way support a departure from the plain language of 19 Del. C. § 2330(b); rather, the specific inclusion of these terms in the statutory scheme only proves that Legislatures know how to express their clear intent to provide exceptions to rules using plain language.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant WFC's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Industrial Accident Board is DENIED.