Opinion
23A-CR-1278
06-21-2024
Alexis Elizabeth Willocks, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Scott H. Duerring South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kelly A. Loy Assistant Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Amanda Martin-Nelson Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth C. Hurley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D08-2112-MR-18
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Scott H. Duerring South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kelly A. Loy Assistant Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Amanda Martin-Nelson Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Riley and Brown concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] Alexis Elizabeth Willocks ("Willocks") was convicted after a jury trial of murder, a felony, and was sentenced to fifty years with five years suspended to probation for an aggregate sentence of forty-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction ("the DOC"). Willocks appeals her conviction and raises the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support her murder conviction;
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury on accomplice liability; and
III. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On November 8, 2021, Anika Henderson ("Henderson") drove her boyfriend, Christian Howell ("Howell"), to a child support hearing for the child he shared with his former girlfriend, Willocks. After the hearing, Willocks drove her grey Honda Civic up next to Henderson's car in the parking lot, and the two argued. As Howell approached the cars, Willocks drove away. Howell got into the passenger seat of Henderson's vehicle, and as they were driving around, Henderson was "angrily" texting Willocks about meeting at a nearby park to fight. Tr. Vol. II p. 39.
[¶4] Henderson drove to Randolph Park in South Bend and parked parallel to the curb on the right side of the road. Henderson sent her location to Willocks, and Willocks responded, "Bitch I'm coming." Ex. Vol. IV pp. 162-63, 184-86. Within minutes, Willocks pulled up behind Henderson's car in her grey Honda Civic, and approximately thirteen to fourteen shots were fired into Henderson's vehicle. Willocks's car then drove away in the direction of her boyfriend's house. The driver was wearing a light-colored shirt, which was consistent with the tie-dye hoodie Willocks had been wearing earlier at the court hearing.
When the shots began, Howell ducked his head and did not see who fired the gun. However, after the shots ended, he looked up and saw Willocks's grey Honda Civic driving away and turning the corner.
[¶5] Howell called 911 at 12:15 p.m. and told the dispatch operator that he did not know who fired the shots or who was in the grey Honda Civic. Police officers and emergency medical personnel arrived on the scene within minutes of the shooting. Howell told the police to look for Willocks and that her car had driven away in the direction of 36th Street. He also told them the location of the home where she could be found. Henderson, who was seventeen years old, was later pronounced dead due to a gunshot wound to the head.
[¶6] During the investigation into Henderson's murder, the police interviewed Howell at the police station. Howell informed the interviewing officer that Nicholas Fairchild ("Fairchild")-Willocks's boyfriend-was their main suspect. Howell also showed the officer a screenshot of Fairchild's Facebook page and told the officer where Fairchild's house was located. The police began searching for Willocks the day of the shooting. They spoke with her friends and family and attempted to find her through electronic means. About two months after the shooting, Willocks's car was found parked behind a livestock trailer at her aunt's house, in a rural area in a nearby town. There were no tracks in the snow or ice to indicate that the car had been recently driven. The search for Willocks was eventually turned over to the U.S. Marshals Task Force, which located Willocks and took her into custody approximately eleven months after the shooting.
[¶7] The State charged Willocks with murder and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. A jury trial was held on March 29, 2023. At trial, in her opening statement, Willocks claimed that Fairchild was the shooter. Willocks claimed that there was "animosity" between Fairchild and Howell, and that they both were "young men that carry guns and like to resolve disputes by pulling triggers." Tr. Vol. II p. 12. Although in her opening statement, Willocks acknowledged that she and Henderson had "beef," Willocks claimed that, on the day of the murder, she had merely agreed to a "girl fight to settle the beef" and ultimately drove to the agreed location with Fairchild to make sure it was a fair fight. Id. at 13-14. Willocks asserted that, when she and Fairchild approached Henderson's car, it was Fairchild-her passenger-who opened fire at the car, and she had been unaware of his intention to do so. Willocks claimed the physical evidence of the bullet trajectories would support this theory and would reveal that it was impossible for the driver to have fired the shots. Willocks also pointed to anticipated evidence that Howell used the pronoun "they" when he told the officer where the car headed after the shooting and that Howell had shown the police a picture that Fairchild had posted on social media depicting a gun in Fairchild's lap that Howell suggested could be the murder weapon. Id. at 16.
[¶8] During its case in chief, the State presented evidence that placed Willocks at the scene of the crime. This evidence included a picture of Willocks's car at a nearby intersection at 12:12 p.m., minutes before the shooting. In the image, the driver appears to be wearing a light-colored shirt, and no one is visible in the passenger seat. Willocks's cell phone location data confirmed that she was in the vicinity of Randolph Park at the time of the murder. The State also presented testimony from a crime scene investigation technician who analyzed the locations where bullets hit Henderson's vehicle, the trajectories of the bullets, and the shell casings found at the scene. On cross-examination, the technician testified that, based on the trajectories of some of the bullets, the shots would have been fired from behind Henderson's car and then fired back from the shooter's car into Henderson's vehicle as it drove by.
[¶9] After both parties concluded their presentation of evidence, the prosecutor submitted instructions on accomplice liability based on Willocks's assertion in her opening statement that suggested that Fairchild was the shooter. Willocks objected to the instruction and argued that the State could not ask for an instruction on an alternate theory and that the evidence did not support giving the accomplice liability instruction. The trial court overruled the objection, but instead of reading the instruction proffered by the State, the trial court read the pattern jury instruction on accomplice liability.
[¶10] During closing arguments, Willocks again argued that she was not the shooter because, based on the trajectories of the shots and the location of the bullet casings, the shots must have been fired by a passenger. In response, during the State's rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued that, even if that were true, Willocks could still be found guilty as an accomplice. The prosecutor argued that in order to find that Willocks was guilty as an accomplice, she would have needed to be aware that Fairchild intended to shoot Henderson or Howell, specifically stating, "[Willocks] knows when she brings [Fairchild] that he's got a gun and he's that dangerous." Tr. Vol. II p. 237. Willocks objected, contending that that there was no evidence presented that Willocks knew her passenger had a gun. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that the prosecutor's argument was appropriate based on the context of "everything that's been said" and the evidence presented. Id. at 237-38. Willocks did not request an admonishment to the jury or a mistrial. The State continued with its argument, and later claimed that "[i]nnocent people don't abandon their life for a year and hide." Id. at 239. Willocks objected and argued that there was no evidence to support the statement that Willocks hid. The trial court overruled the objection finding it a reasonable characterization of the evidence presented. Willocks did not request a jury admonishment or mistrial.
[¶11] The jury returned guilty verdicts for murder and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. At sentencing, the trial court only entered judgment of conviction on murder and sentenced Willocks to fifty years executed in the DOC with five years suspended to probation. Willocks now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficient Evidence
[¶12] Willocks argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support her conviction for murder. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility." Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. "We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence." Id. Further, "[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
[¶13] In order to convict Willocks of murder as charged, the State was required to prove that she knowingly or intentionally killed Henderson. Ind. Code § 35-421-1(1). Willocks argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that she knowingly or intentionally killed Henderson because the evidence did not identify her as the person who shot Henderson. She contends that the evidence merely revealed that her vehicle was observed at the scene, her cell phone data placed her in the vicinity of the shooting when it occurred, and messages attributed to her and Henderson indicated that, shortly before the shooting, they were planning to meet at Randolph Park to fight.
[¶14] Looking to the evidence most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented established that, earlier on the day of the murder, Willocks and Henderson, who was dating Willocks's former boyfriend, Howell, engaged in a verbal argument in the parking lot after a child support hearing. After Willocks left the parking lot, she and Henderson began messaging each other and agreed to meet at Randolph Park to fight. When Henderson messaged Willocks her location, Willocks responded, "Bitch I'm coming." Ex. Vol. IV pp. 184-86. This message was sent approximately ten minutes before 911 was called. After Henderson and Howell arrived at Randolph Park, they parked along the curb with Henderson sitting in the driver's seat and Howell in the passenger seat. Henderson continued to message Willocks after they arrived. After they had been parked for approximately fifteen minutes, Howell heard "13 or 14 shots" ring out, and he ducked his head. Tr. Vol. II p. 40. When Howell looked back up, he saw Willocks's grey Honda Civic driving away and observed it turn a corner. After Willocks's car drove away, Howell called 911. An officer arrived shortly after the 911 call, and when he asked Howell who the shooter was, Howell told him to look for Willocks.
[¶15] Although Willocks argues that the evidence was insufficient because no one observed her to be the shooter, "a murder conviction can be based purely on circumstantial evidence." Ellis v. State, 725 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ind. 2002) (citing Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)). The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Willocks was driving her grey Honda Civic immediately after the court hearing, and the same car was observed leaving the scene of the shooting. Willocks's car was also captured by a camera set up to catch license plate numbers at an intersection near the shooting. The image from the camera showed a driver wearing a shirt consistent with what Willocks had been wearing earlier and that there was no passenger visible in the car at that time. The State also presented evidence that Willocks's cell phone data confirmed that she was in the vicinity of Randolph Park at the time of the murder. Additionally, when the grey Honda Civic drove away from the scene of the shooting, it traveled in the direction of Willocks's boyfriend's house. Based on this evidence, the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Willocks shot and killed Henderson after arranging to meet her at Randolph Park for a fight. Willocks's arguments are merely a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Willocks's conviction.
II. Jury Instruction
[¶16] Willocks next argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to give a jury instruction on accomplice liability because the evidence did not support giving the instruction. The instruction of the jury lies within the trial court's sound discretion, and we review the trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions only for an abuse of that discretion. Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 251 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied. We determine whether the instruction states the law correctly, whether it is supported by record evidence, and whether its substance is covered by other instructions. Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016). For the trial court to abuse its discretion, an instruction that is given to the jury must be erroneous, and the instructions viewed as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 849 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied.
When a defendant seeks reversal based on instructional error, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that his substantial rights have been adversely affected. Harrison, 32 N.E.2d at 251.
[¶17] "[W]here the circumstances of the case raise a reasonable inference that the defendant acted as an accomplice, it is appropriate to instruct the jury on accomplice liability even where the defendant was charged as a principal." Brooks v. State, 895 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Here, during her opening statement, Willocks stated that her boyfriend, Fairchild, was the actual shooter. Her defense theory was that although Willocks was the driver, the shooter was Fairchild who was riding as a passenger in her car. Willocks claimed there was "animosity" between Fairchild and Howell that was "more serious and a little more threatening" than the animosity between Willocks and Henderson, and that both Howell and Fairchild carried "guns and like[d] to resolve disputes by pulling triggers." Tr. Vol. II p. 12. She continued to present a narrative that she brought Fairchild and merely intended to physically fight with Henderson herself, but that Fairchild surprised her by firing shots intended for Howell.
[¶18] Over Willocks's objection, the trial court gave the following final jury instruction, which was the pattern jury instruction:
"Aiding, inducing or causing" an offense is defined by law as follows:
A person who, knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.
Before you may convict the Defendant of aiding, inducing, or causing the offenses of Murder and/or Criminal Recklessness, you must find there is evidence of the Defendant's affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference of a common design or purpose may be reasonably drawn. The Defendant's conduct must have been voluntary and in concert with the other person.
The Defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime, or mere acquiescence in the commission of the crime, is insufficient to convict for aiding, inducing, or causing the crimes charged.
A person may be convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing an offense even if the other person has not been prosecuted for the offense, has not been convicted of the offense, or has been acquitted of the offense.Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 100.
[¶19] The evidence presented at trial revealed that Willocks's grey Honda Civic was observed driving away from the scene of the shooting and at a nearby intersection minutes before the shooting with the driver of her car wearing clothing consistent with what Willocks was wearing earlier in the day, and her cell phone location data confirmed she was in the vicinity of Randolph Park at the time of the murder. Although no one was visible in the passenger seat of Willocks's car, the ballistics evidence presented at trial was consistent with the shooter being either a passenger in Willocks's car or the driver. Further, there was evidence presented that Howell told the police at the police station that Fairchild was their main suspect, showed the officer a screenshot of the purported murder weapon from Fairchild's Facebook page, and told him where Fairchild's house was located. Based on the way Willocks framed the issues in her opening statement, and the evidence presented at trial, the circumstances of the case raised a reasonable inference that the defendant acted as an accomplice, and it was "appropriate to instruct the jury on accomplice liability even where the defendant was charged as a principal." Brooks, 895 N.E.2d at 133. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a pattern jury instruction on accomplice liability.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[¶20] Willocks next argues that the State made statements in its closing argument that constituted prosecutorial misconduct, placing her in grave peril and denying her the right to a fair trial. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine "(1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) 'whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected' otherwise." Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 468 (Ind. 2012)). Whether a prosecutor's comments constitute misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. "'The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.'" Id. (quoting Cooper v, State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006)). "To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must-at the time the alleged misconduct occurs-request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial." Id. (citations omitted).
[¶21] Here, Willocks asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in two statements made during its rebuttal closing statement. First, she points to the following statement, "[Willocks] knows when she brings him that he's got a gun and he's that dangerous," referring to Fairchild. Tr. Vol. II p. 237. Willocks objected at trial, contending that that there was no evidence presented that Willocks knew her passenger had a gun. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that the prosecutor's argument was appropriate based on the context of "everything that's been said" and the evidence presented. Id. at 23738. Second, Willocks takes issue with the statement that, "[i]nnocent people don't abandon their life for a year and hide." Id. at 239. Willocks objected at trial and argued that there was no evidence to support the statement that Willocks hid. The trial court overruled the objection finding it a reasonable characterization of the evidence presented. Although Willocks timely objected to these statements, Willocks did not request an admonishment to the jury or a mistrial after the trial court overruled the objections. Therefore, Willocks has waived her claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1117 (Ind. 2004) (finding contention of prosecutorial misconduct waived where defendant objected to State's comments but did not request an admonishment nor move for mistrial).
[¶22] Waiver notwithstanding, Willocks has not demonstrated that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor's statement that "[Willocks] knows when she brings [Fairchild] that he's got a gun and he's that dangerous" was a fair and reasonable comment on the evidence in response to Willocks's narrative that Fairchild and Howell were "two young men that carry guns and like to resolve disputes by pulling triggers," as well as claims in her closing argument that the evidence of the pattern of shots and casings indicated that there must have been a passenger who committed the shooting. Tr. Vol. II pp. 12, 237. As to the prosecutor's comment that "[i]nnocent people don't abandon their life for a year and hide," this was also a reasonable comment based on the evidence presented. The police began looking for Willocks immediately after the crime occurred, and even when the U.S. Marshals Task Force assisted in the search for Willocks, she could not be located for eleven months after the shooting. A few months after the shooting, Willocks's car was located, hidden in her aunt's backyard behind a livestock trailer and in a different town. The prosecutor's comment, which indicated that the jury could infer guilt based on Willocks's flight, concealment of her vehicle, and evading law enforcement for months, was well within the permissible range of fair commentary on the evidence. Further, "[p]rosecutors are entitled to respond to allegations and inferences raised by the defense even if the prosecutor's response would otherwise be objectionable." Dumas, 803 N.E.2d at 1118 (citing Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Ind. 2001). We, therefore, conclude that the prosecutor's comments were not misconduct, and Willocks has not shown that prosecutorial misconduct occurred.
Conclusion
[¶23] We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Willocks's conviction for murder, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave the jury an instruction on accomplice liability. Further, Willocks has waived her assertions of prosecutorial misconduct, but waiver notwithstanding, she has not proven that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct.
[¶24] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.