Summary
granting of summary judgment on false imprisonment claim where, during meeting in which employee was accused of stealing from store, loss prevention officer threatened to call the police
Summary of this case from McKinley v. Petsmart, Inc.Opinion
Civ. No. 99-1032-AH-C.
September 5, 2000.
JUDGMENT
This matter having come before the Court on motion for summary judgment and in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered this day, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff shall have and recover nothing from Defendant and that Plaintiffs claims are due to be, and hereby are, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 11). After considering the motion, supporting briefs, evidence on file, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.
I. Facts
Plaintiff Annie Williams sued her former employer, Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., asserting three causes of action under Alabama state law: false imprisonment, defamation and the tort of outrage. Each of Plaintiffs claims arise from Wal-Mart's investigation and subsequent termination of Plaintiff following an incident in which Plaintiff was alleged to have underpaid for merchandise purchased in the early morning hours of September 16, 1999.
Plaintiff was employed as a 'zoner' at the Schillingers Road Wal-Mart, Store # 853, in Mobile, Alabama, beginning in March of 1999. As a zoner, Plaintiff was directed to ensure that items throughout the store were displayed in their proper locations and format.
Plaintiff was working the night shift on September 16. At approximately 1:45 A.M. that day, during a work break, Plaintiff took a variety of items to a cash register operated by another Wal-Mart employee, Tina Stallworth. Plaintiff proceeded to pay for the items after they had been rung up. The receipt from the transaction demonstrates that several items were voided off, or removed from the transaction, after they had been rung up.
One of the store's assistant managers, Marilyn Evans, was near the cash register operated by Ms. Stallworth at the time the transaction occurred. Ms. Evans asked to see the receipt. Ms. Evans became suspicious after noting that the voided items had been subsequently rung up at a price different from their original price. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Evans discussed the transaction individually with Plaintiff and Ms. Stallworth. Ms. Evans then decided to submit the incident to the Wal-Mart loss prevention department for determination.
Plaintiff returned to work beginning the following Saturday, and continued to work until Wednesday, September 23. Plaintiff claims she was approached by several co-employees during these shifts, and was told by them that they thought plaintiff had been fired for larceny. Plaintiff also alleges that these individuals told her that they had been told this information by assistant manager Evans. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff was unable to identify any of these individuals by their first or last name.
Plaintiff did refer to an employee named 'Amanda,' and claimed that 'Amanda' had told Plaintiff that she thought Plaintiff had been fired. Plaintiff did not assert, however, that 'Amanda' had heard the allegedly defamatory statement from any of the Wal-Mart individuals present in Plaintiffs termination meeting, or that 'Amanda' had been told the statement by any Wal-Mart supervisor.
On September 23, 1999, Plaintiff was called into the manager's office at the back of the store to speak with Jason Williams, Wal-Mart's district loss prevention officer. Also present at the meeting were Marilyn Evans and Peggy Black. Ms. Black was present as one of the Plaintiffs supervisors and assistant managers of store # 853.
During the meeting, which lasted less than one hour, Plaintiff discussed the incident with the above named individuals, denying any wrongdoing. Although the accounts of the parties differ as to precisely what was said, it is undisputed that Plaintiff never asked nor attempted to leave the meeting. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was never told by any Wal-Mart employee that she could not leave the meeting. At one point, an employee attempted to enter the room on unrelated business, but was immediately told to leave. In addition, there is some evidence that Wal-Mart's loss prevention officer threatened to call the local police, however, he did not do so.
At the end of the meeting, Plaintiff signed a written statement indicating that she had been involuntarily terminated, and was told she had 5 minutes to exit from Wal-Mart property. Plaintiff left at that time, and found employment that same day at a different retail store nearby.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted:
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); accord Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992).
The basic issue before the Court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the Court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). "If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment." Miranda v. B B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank Trust v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Once the movant satisfies their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, as the movant has done in this case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 6(e)). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must "demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." See Clark v. Coats Clark Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). "[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole." Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). "'The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Tipton, 965 F.2d at 999 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
III. False Imprisonment
Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to false imprisonment by Defendant. The facts indicate that during Plaintiffs shift on September 23, 1999, one of Plaintiffs supervisors called Plaintiff to come to the manager's back office in the Wal-Mart store. Plaintiff walked to the back of the store and entered the back office. Two female assistant managers, Ms. Black and Ms. Evans, and a male Wal-Mart loss prevention officer, Mr. Williams, were waiting for Plaintiff in the office.
Plaintiff, the two assistant managers and the loss prevention officer met in the office for less than one hour. During the meeting, Plaintiff and the Wal-Mart officials discussed the charge that Plaintiff had under-paid for Wal-Mart merchandise.
Plaintiff states that during the meeting, the loss prevention officer exhibited a badge and threatened to call the police. Plaintiff states that the loss prevention officer informed Plaintiff that she could be imprisoned for stealing Wal-Mart merchandise. At one point, another WalMart employee attempted to walk into the office. Plaintiff states that one of the female assistant managers obstructed the employee from entering the room.
Plaintiff states that she was upset during the meeting and wished to leave. Plaintiff states that she suffers from asthma and her condition was aggravated by the meeting. Plaintiff admits that she did not ask to leave, nor did she make an attempt to leave. Plaintiff alleges that the threat of arrest and impression that no one could enter the room caused her to reasonably believe that she was confined.
The Alabama Code defines false imprisonment as "the unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-170. The Alabama Supreme Court has explained:
"For there to be a false imprisonment, there must be some direct restraint of the person; however, it is not necessary that there be confinement in a jail or a prison. Any exercise of force, or the express or implied threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go, is an imprisonment."Big. B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So.2d 999, 1001 (Ala. 1993).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence upon which the Court could find that there is an issue of any use of force, actual or implied. Plaintiff admits that she did not attempt to leave or ask to leave. Plaintiff claims that she felt confined due to the loss prevention officer's threats to call the police, however:
"[I]t is well settled that liability for false imprisonment, like liability for malicious prosecution, cannot be predicated merely on a person's good faith act of giving information to a police officer tending to show that a crime has been committed or on a person's good faith act of identifying one suspected of a crime, for such involvement in another's detention or arrest is not regarded in the law as an instigation of or participation in the detention or arrest."Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 679 So.2d 651, 654 (Ala. 1996).
Finally, Plaintiff has alleged that the female assistant manager's act of obstructing another employee from entering the room constituted an implied threat of force in that she would not be able to leave the room. However, the deposition testimony was clear that an employee was merely restricted from entering the office. The Wal-Mart manger explained that due to the sensitive nature of the meeting, other employees were not permitted in the office. The Court cannot find that this action constituted the implied threat of use of force.
Therefore, due to the foregoing, the Court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted on Plaintiffs false imprisonment claim.
IV. Defamation
The elements of a cause of action for defamation in Alabama are:
"1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at least to negligence; and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm cased by the publication of the statement." Drill Parts and Service Co. v. Joy Mfg, 619 So.2d 1280, 1289 (Ala. 1993).
To establish actionable defamation, Plaintiff must show that Wal-Mart published a false and defamatory statement concerning Plaintiff to a third person. See Nipper v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 638 So.2d 778, 781 (Ala. 1994). Communications between employees in the course of a company's business do not constitute publication. See id.
Plaintiffs entire response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defamation states:
"In regard to the defamation claims, Ms. Williams has pointed out specifically that, in fact, store employees were informed that she was a 'thief' and had 'stolen' from Wal-Mart and that was the reason for her dismissal. Accordingly, the elements of defamation set forth in Drill, Parts Service Company vs. Joy Manufacturing, 619 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1993) have clearly been met."
The quotation above is the extent of Plaintiffs offer of disputed facts on the claim of defamation by oral publication, or slander. The Court cannot find that Plaintiffs conclusory statement that "store employees were informed" provides the necessary proof to show that WalMart employees allowed an unauthorized publication to a third party of a false statement about Ms. Williams. See Walker v. Darby, supra. While Plaintiff maintains in her deposition that Ms. Evans communicated a false statement to Wal-Mart employees, Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence to support her claim, such as the first or last names of any individual employees or third parties that might have heard Ms. Evans publish the allegedly false statement. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any admissible evidence establishing the publication of any allegedly false statements to a third party. Therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted on Plaintiffs defamation claim.
V. Tort of Outrage
Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for the tort of outrage. Local Rule 7.2 provides that failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment "will be considered an admission that no material factual dispute exists." Consequently, the Court finds that summary judgement is due to be granted on Plaintiffs tort of outrage claim.
VII. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant's MOTION for summary judgment is due to be and hereby is GRANTED.