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Williams v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont
Nov 24, 2021
No. 09-19-00366-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2021)

Opinion

09-19-00366-CR

11-24-2021

DARRELL PAUL WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


Do Not Publish

Submitted on July 20, 2021

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 16-24060

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOLLIS HORTON JUSTICE

In a fight among a group of people gathered outside a local nightclub, Darrell Paul Williams shot and killed Rubin Williams. Williams fled the scene. Later, he refused to discuss the shooting with the detective in charge of the investigation that the police conducted of the shooting. Williams was charged with murder. At trial, he pleaded not guilty. In his trial by jury, the attorney Williams retained argued that Williams shot Rubin in self-defense. But the jury rejected the argument and found Williams guilty. In the sentencing hearing that followed, the jury determined Williams should serve a twenty-year sentence.

To avoid confusion, we shall refer to Rubin by using his first name since the defendant and the victim have the same last name. We also note that nothing in the record shows the two men were related.

Williams raises three issues in his appeal. We take the issues in the following order to simplify our discussion of them in the opinion. First, Williams argues the evidence doesn't support his conviction because the jury could not have reasonably determined he was not acting in self-defense when he shot Rubin. Second, Williams suggests the prosecutor elicited testimony in the trial that referenced Williams' "post-arrest silence." Williams argues the testimony resulted in egregious harm, even though he also acknowledges he did not object to the questions or the answers that resulted from them in his trial. Third, Williams complains that during final argument, the prosecutor committed reversible error by commenting on Williams' right to remain silent after he was arrested by the police.

We conclude Williams' issues lack merit and affirm.

Background

In 2016, Williams was indicted for intentionally or knowingly causing Rubin's death by shooting him with a firearm. When called to trial, Williams pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the trial court admitted a videorecording a bystander captured of the shooting. A total of six witnesses testified in the guilt phase of Williams' trial.

We discuss the evidence relevant to Williams' issues in the light favoring the jury's verdict. On December 25, 2015, Rubin's daughter, Renika and his stepdaughter Yasmin, went to a party at a nightclub. Later, Renika called Rubin from the nightclub on her cellphone. She told Rubin that Yasmin had been assaulted by a man named Michael Corbin. Renika asked Rubin to come to the nightclub, explaining she thought he could "diffuse the situation[.]"

Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

When Rubin arrived, a large crowd had gathered in the nightclub's parking lot since it was closing time for such clubs. After Rubin found Renika in the parking lot, Renika and Yasmin took him to Corbin. According to Renika, when they approached Corbin, Corbin appears as if he was preparing to swing. But according to Renika, Corbin changed his mind after he realized he knew Rubin. Renika stated that after they talked to Corbin, Corbin shook their "hands and . . . apologized."

A short time later, Yasmin began arguing with Taneka Mose. According to Yasmin, Mose "was with Michael Corbin" and among those who had gathered outside the club after it closed. Mose and Yasmin exchanged words. After that, they began to fight. Renika joined in. Renika testified she never saw Rubin throw any punches at anyone while she and Yasmin were fighting Mose and the others involved in that fight. Renika also testified she never saw Rubin reach for his waist after Williams swung at Rubin with his fist. According to Renika, when the fight between Williams and Rubin started, someone pulled her to the ground. Renika explained she heard two shots go off, and she thought the second shot she heard was the one that killed her father.

Yasmin's testimony about what she saw in the parking lot is similar to that the jury heard from Renika. Like Renika, Yasmin testified she never saw Rubin with a weapon that night. According to Yasmin, after she began fighting Taneka, Williams charged Rubin and swung at him. She also said she saw Williams jump back and shoot Rubin before Rubin could swing on Williams. Yasmin and Renika were the only witnesses who were present in the parking lot when the shooting occurred who were called to testify during Williams' trial.

Dr. John Wayne, a board-certified forensic pathologist, testified to Rubin's cause of death. Dr. Wayne explained he performed the autopsy on Rubin's body. According to Dr. Wayne, Rubin died from a gunshot wound to his abdomen, which caused severe bleeding when the bullet that struck Rubin passed through his aorta in the location where it lies next to the spine.

Williams did not testify or call any witnesses in the trial. In closing argument, the attorney who represented him in the trial argued the evidence showed that "Darrell Williams intentionally and knowingly fired the weapon that caused the death of [Rubin] Williams. There's not any doubt about that." Even so, the attorney continued, Williams was justified in shooting Rubin because Williams subjectively believed the force he used that night "was immediately necessary to protect himself against Rub[i]n's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force." Williams' attorney also conceded that Rubin did not have a gun, suggesting Williams was simply mistaken about whether Rubin had a weapon on him that night. The attorney suggested that Williams' belief that he needed to use deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances where the videorecording shows Rubin reaching toward "his waistband like this (indicating) multiple times at the same time that shots [were] going off." On top of that, the attorney argued you can hear the report from a gunshot just seconds before Williams shot Rubin. And Williams' attorney continued, the evidence the jury heard reflects that all witnesses interviewed by the police told the police they heard two or more gunshots in the parking lot that night.

To be sure, we have carefully reviewed the videorecording numerous times. We agree that one gunshot is audible in the recording, but it's the sound of Williams' gun when he fires and kills Rubin. The report from the other gunshot, if even audible in the recording, is ambiguous. While there is a muffled sound that might be a gunshot just seconds before Williams fires his gun, the sound is not one that the jurors were required to conclude was either a gunshot or if it came from a gun fired in the immediate vicinity of the altercations that involved Williams and Rubin. None of the testimony or exhibits clarifies whether any of the other gunshots that the witnesses the police officers were referring to in their testimony came from a location near where Williams shot Rubin.

When he testified, Detective Dischler acknowledged that police, when investigating the shooting, found two .45 caliber shells in the parking lot. But he also explained police never found any shells associated with a 9mm-caliber weapon, the caliber of the weapon Dr. Wayne determined killed Rubin. At trial, no one disputed that the bullet that killed Rubin came from a 9mm gun. That fact is also not disputed in the appeal.

When asked why police found the two .45 caliber shells in the parking lot that night, Detective Dischler explained he did not know, offering he could not say if they were associated with the gunfire that some of the witnesses reported to the police. Suggesting the shells might not even be associated with the altercation involved in the shooting, Detective Dischler said: "There's always shots fired at all the nightclubs."

After police discovered the recording, they determined Williams was the person involved in the altercation that involved Rubin. According to Detective Dischler, while police identified Williams in the recording, he then failed to immediately surrender to the police. After surrendering, Detective Dischler complained that Williams never offered to explain to him what happened that night. And, according to the detective, Williams never told him he shot Rubin because he feared serious injury or death. Williams never objected to any of the detective's testimony during his trial.

In closing, Williams' attorney suggested the State, in presenting its case, failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Williams committed murder. The evidence did not do so, according to the attorney, because the evidence shows Williams "reasonably believed the force used was immediately necessary to protect himself against [Rubin's] use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force."

The prosecutor disputed the argument presented by Williams' attorney in Williams' defense. According to the prosecutor, Williams instigated the altercation by throwing the first and only punch. The prosecutor continued by explaining that when Rubin was attacked, he took a defensive stance. Then, according to the prosecutor, the videorecording and the testimony shows Williams pulled "a gun on an unarmed man." The prosecutor ended his argument, stating "[i]n what world is it necessary to shoot somebody who's coming at you to hit you? There's nothing reasonable about what Darrell Williams did."

The jury found Williams guilty of murder, and by doing so implicitly rejected the argument presented by Williams' attorney suggesting Williams acted in selfdefense. In the sentencing hearing, which followed, the jury found Williams should serve a twenty-year sentence. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's guilt and punishment verdicts that is consistent with the jury's findings on the issues in the charge.

Murder is a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (c). Williams, however, pleaded true to an enhancement count in his indictment, which allowed the jury in determining his sentence to consider a punishment that ranged from a minimum of fifteen to a maximum of 99 years (or life) in prison. See id. § 12.42(c)(1).

Standard of Review

When reviewing claims asserting the evidence is insufficient to support a jury's verdict, we review the evidence admitted in the trial in the light that favors the jury's verdict and decide whether a rational factfinder, from that evidence, could have found the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In trials to juries, the jury is the ultimate authority in deciding which witnesses are credible and in deciding what weight to give any particular testimony or evidence. As a reviewing court, we give full deference to the jury's right to fairly resolve conflicts that may exist in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts proven at trial to ultimate facts the jury must decide before answering the questions in the charge. If the record shows that reasonable jurors could have made inferences other than those supporting the verdict, we must presume the jurors chose to resolve those conflicts in favor of the verdict the jury reached, and we are required to defer to the resolution if it is one that based on the evidence is rationale. In deciding whether the inferences the jury made were reasonable, we look to the combined and cumulative force of the evidence after we have viewed it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

While the standard requires deference by a reviewing court, juries "are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually supported inferences or presumptions." We must determine if the inferences the jury had to make to reach a verdict "are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. In our review, we view circumstantial evidence as being equally probative as direct evidence on deciding the defendant's guilt, which allows circumstantial evidence alone to be capable of supporting a verdict. In a trial, each witness's testimony need not point directly and independently to the defendant's guilt; instead, the question is whether the combined and cumulative force of the incriminating circumstances, as proven in the trial, supports the jury's verdict. Thus, even when the parties disagree "about the logical inferences that flow from undisputed facts, [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the [jury's] choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."

Id. at 17.

Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (cleaned up).

Issue One

Williams argues the evidence does not support the jury's verdict, suggesting that reasonable jurors, based on the evidence presented during trial, could not have reasonably rejected Williams' argument that he shot Rubin while acting in selfdefense. We disagree with that claim, as there is ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the circumstances show the shooting was not justified by the circumstances proven to the jury in the trial.

In this case, the issue of guilt arises in the context of a trial where the trial court gave the jury instructions on self-defense. Under Texas law, a person commits murder if he "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual." Even so, however, the Penal Code provides a justification defense, which when raised by the evidence allows trial courts to instruct juries that they may decide the defendant is not criminally responsible for committing the offense at issue in the trial.

Id. § 9.31. Importantly, none of the parties argued here, nor did they do so in the trial court, that the evidence in the trial did not properly support instructing the jury on self-defense. In legal terms, we mean no one argued or claimed at trial or here that self-defense was not the "law applicable to the case." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 36.14 (requiring the trial court to deliver a charge that distinctly sets forth "the law applicable to the case"). Under the circumstances, we assume without deciding the evidence raised an issue on self-defense that involved the use of deadly force because it makes no difference in the outcome of any of the issues Williams raised to support his appeal.

There is no dispute between the parties about whether a handgun, like the one Williams used to shoot Rubin, is a deadly weapon. So, the question is simply whether, from the evidence, the jury could rationally decide Williams did not subjectively (and reasonably) believe that Rubin was using or intended to use deadly force during the altercation that is depicted in the recording admitted before the jury in the trial. In the context of criminal trials, the term reasonable belief is defined by the Penal Code as a belief "that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the [defendant]."

Id. § 1.07(a)(42).

Given the trial court's instructions on self-defense, the jury had to decide whether Williams, in his altercation with Rubin, formed a reasonable belief that Rubin was using or about to use deadly force in the encounter. The evidence allowed the jury, acting rationally, to reject the argument Williams presented that his decision to shoot Williams was reasonable. For instance, the recording and the testimony shows that Williams was the aggressor at all relevant times in the altercation. Williams approached and swung on Rubin before Rubin was even apparently aware Williams was among those in the crowd. The recording of the altercation shows Rubin pulling Renika away from the woman she and Yasmin were fighting when Williams approached Rubin as he was pulling his daughter away from a fight in which Williams, at that point, was not yet involved. In the recording, Rubin's hands are visible. He is not seen holding a weapon; instead, the jury could rationally have inferred from what they saw in the recording and the testimony that Rubin was unarmed. For instance, Rubin appears in the recording in a long-sleeved shirt, which is tucked in at his belt. He has no weapons on him from what is seen in the recording. There are also no bulges that are visible in the recording as if Rubin had a weapon under his shirt. Rubin also is never seen with a weapon of any kind (including a gun) in his hands.

The recording shows Williams in a view that shows his left side. He has a liquor bottle in his left hand as he approached Rubin. He swings at Rubin, but it is unclear from the recording whether his fist hit Rubin. Rubin then took a defensive stance in response to being attacked. Williams then stepped back, placing his weight on his right foot as if he is going to throw a punch. Williams' right hand, however, 12 is obscured by his torso since the camera captured the recording on Williams' left side. Then, Williams' right hand appears above his body in the recording. While it is difficult to see, Williams has a gun in his right hand. He steps toward Williams with his right foot, placing the gun next to Rubin's stomach. Williams then fired the gun and shot Williams in the stomach. As Williams steps forward with the gun in his right hand, Rubin holds his hands, palms out, at about a shoulder level. His fists are both open, so it appears he is either trying to block a punch or is signaling he surrendered in the fight. In the recording, Rubin and Williams appear to be of approximately the same height and weight. None of the testimony shows the men knew each other before the shooting occurred. And no testimony in the trial shows that Rubin was either known in the community or known to Williams as someone who carried a deadly weapon on him, a weapon such as knife or a gun. And no testimony shows that before the shooting, Williams was aware or had ever heard that Rubin was a person capable of causing a death or serious injury based on his ability to use his fists.

Boiling it down, the evidence supports the jury's inference that Williams was not justified in using deadly force during his altercation with Rubin. The evidence allowed the jury to rationally reject Williams' argument claiming he feared serious injury or death during the altercation depicted in the recording. To be sure, the recording shows Rubin step toward Williams after Williams took the first swing.

Even so, the recording and the testimony does not show Rubin reaching beneath his shirt or pocket at any time in the alteration as if he was reaching for a knife or gun.

We conclude Williams' first issue lacks merit, so it is overruled.

Issue Two

In Williams' second issue, he argues the prosecutor violated his right to remain silent by asking Detective Dischler whether Williams, after he turned himself in to police, ever explained that he shot Rubin because he feared for his life. On appeal, Williams acknowledges he failed to object to the testimony that he complains about in his appeal. Even so, Williams suggests the error admitting the testimony is reversible because it was "so egregious[.]"

Under Texas law, the general rule of error preservation requires parties to preserve error to avoid forfeiting their right to complain about the alleged error later in an appeal. Almost every right-whether constitutional or statutory-is waivable if the party fails to object, move for relief, or request the court for relief during trial.Still, the general rule, which requires parties to preserve error before having the right to have it reviewed in a later appeal, is subject "to two relatively small" exceptions: they consist of "violations of 'rights which are waivable only' and denials of 'absolute systemic requirements.'" But neither of those exceptions applies to the claim Williams is trying to raise about the admission of evidence, the complaint he acknowledges first raising in his appeal.

See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1.

Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.2d 873, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

The first exception is a waivable-only right, which consist of "'rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived.'" The second exception applies to "systemic requirements," which the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained exist "only in a very limited class of cases: a total deprivation of the right to counsel, lack of an impartial trial judge, unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race, the right to self-representation at trial, the right to a public trial," or if the trial court erroneously instructs the jury by defining reasonable doubt. These two categories of exceptions do not apply the error Williams is complaining about for the first time here.

Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279)); Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 888.

Williams does not even try to argue that the error he relies on, which concerns an alleged error in admitting evidence, falls in the two exceptions to error preservation discussed in Mendez. Like most errors, complaints concerning a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence are subject the general rule of error preservation, which requires a party to complain about the alleged error in the trial court in one of the ways provided by the Rules of Appellate Procedure before the party has the right to be heard on the complaint later in an appeal.

Id.

See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278 ("In short, the rights of litigants in our system of adjudication are usually forfeited by a failure to exercise them.").

We conclude Williams did not preserve the complaint he raises in his appeal about the questions the prosecutor asked Detective Dischler in the trial. Williams did not object to the testimony at trial, so he cannot now complain about the fact the questions were asked in the presence of the jury in his appeal. The complaints about the questions were not preserved, so the issue is overruled.

Issue Three

In issue three, Williams complains that in closing argument, the prosecutor commented on Williams' right to remain silent when he criticized Williams for failing to give Detective Dischler his account about what happened in the shooting. According to Williams, "[t]he comment was so egregious as to deny [Williams] a fair trial[.]"

For the reasons explained in issue two, Williams forfeited any right he might have otherwise had to complain about the prosecutor's argument because he did not object to the argument when it occurred in the trial. Because the complaint was not preserved, we also overrule issue three.

See Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ("The right to a trial untainted by improper jury argument is forfeitable.").

Conclusion

Having overruled each of Williams' issues, the trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Williams v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont
Nov 24, 2021
No. 09-19-00366-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2021)
Case details for

Williams v. State

Case Details

Full title:DARRELL PAUL WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont

Date published: Nov 24, 2021

Citations

No. 09-19-00366-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2021)