Opinion
Civil No. 3:02-CV-1662-H
February 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on May 29, 2002. Each Defendant in this suit raised the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in their Answers. In an Order dated December 13, 2002, the Court requested briefing on the question of whether any of Plaintiff's claims are barred by statute of limitations. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Brief on the Question of Statute of Limitations, filed January 14, 2003, Defendant Daniel Maples' Response, filed January 22, 2003, Defendant Quentis Roper's Response, filed January 24, 2003, and the City of Dallas' Response, filed January 31, 2003. On February 10, 2003, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File his First Amended Complaint.
Where, as here, the Defendants have raised the statute of limitations defense, the district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds. Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609, n. 11 (2nd Cir. 1980).
I. Background
Plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit arise out of an arrest that occurred on February 26, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that Officers Quentis Ray Roper ("Roper") and Daniel Earl Maples, ("Maples") illegally entered and conducted a warrantless search" of an apartment that Plaintiff was visiting. Pl.'s Complaint at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that Roper and Maples demanded $5,000 from Plaintiff, and indicated that if the money was not paid evidence would be planted on Plaintiff. Id. When Plaintiff failed to produce the cash, Defendant Roper entered the apartment and came out with a handgun and cocaine. These items were later attributed to Plaintiff. Pl.'s Complaint at 4. Plaintiffs Complaint brought claims against officers Maples and Roper for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional search, arrest, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also brought state law claims for negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment or wrongful detention, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff has since withdrawn his claims of malicious prosecution. See Pl.'s Brief at 2. Therefore, all remaining claims are related to the events surrounding Plaintiff's initial search, arrest and detention.
II. Analysis
A. § 1983 Claims
There is no disagreement among the parties about the statute of limitations to be applied to the § 1983 claims in this case. Under § 1983, courts must apply the forum state's general personal injury limitations period. Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2001). In Texas, that statute of limitations is two years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.003(a). The conflict in this case arises over when the Plaintiff's cause of action accrued. The general rule for accrual of § 1983 actions is that the claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 139 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1998). However, there is an exception to this rule created by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphries, 512 U.S. 477, 486-7, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a "§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence is invalidated." Id. at 490. The Court also stated that where the civil suit "will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed." Id. at 487. Lower courts have interpreted Heck in many differing ways. The Fifth Circuit has applied Heck to require a determination of whether the § 1983 claim would undermine the validity of the previous conviction. Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995) ( per curiam). If the civil claim will undermine the validity of the previous conviction, ie. equal a collateral attack on the verdict, then the claim does not accrue until the "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck at 487. If the civil claim does not undermine the validity of the conviction, the claim will accrue when the Plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.
The Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the exact issue in this case, where the Plaintiff has been released from prison and the principal question is accrual. It has however, addressed similar issues involving plaintiffs still serving time on their convictions. The analysis of the latter should apply to the former in cases like these. See, e.g., Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1021 (1999).
This Court is faced, then, with the question of whether Plaintiff's claims in this case undermine the validity of his previous conviction. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Maples and Roper extorted him with threats that they would plant evidence on him if he did not pay. Pl.'s Complaint at 3. When it became clear that Plaintiff did not have the requested cash, Roper entered the apartment where Plaintiff was staying and came out with a gun and some cocaine that was later attributed to Plaintiff in his criminal trial. Pl.'s Complaint at 4. If the Court were to find that Maples and Roper did in fact plant the gun and cocaine on Plaintiff, that would necessarily implicate the invalidity of his subsequent convictions and sentences. Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims accrued to him at the time of the dismissal of the charges pending against him-June 8, 2000. As the Complaint in this case was filed on May 29, 2002, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff also brings claims under Texas state law. Specifically, Plaintiff brings claims for negligence, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
1. Negligence
Plaintiff brings a claim against the City of Dallas only for negligence based upon Defendants Maples and Roper's actions during the arrest. A cause of action for negligence under Texas state law is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.003(a). Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes an injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of the injury. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). An exception to this rule is the "discovery rule." Under the discovery rule, an action does not accrue until the plaintiff "knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and resulting injury." S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996). Plaintiff also alleges in his Amended Complaint that Defendant engaged in "fraudulent concealment" that bars Defendants from relying upon a statute of limitations defense. Pl.'s Complaint at 22. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "actively suppressed the truth" from Plaintiff, in that, they arrested him without probable cause and later created probable cause." Id. However, Plaintiff's Complaint also makes it clear that Defendants Maples and Roper demanded cash from Plaintiff and expressly told him that if he did not provide the requested money, evidence would be "planted" on him and he would be charged with serious felony offenses. Pl.'s Complaint at 3. The Court does not see how it is possible that Defendants both expressly extorted money from the Plaintiff and then falsely arrested him after carrying through on their threat, and yet fraudulently concealed the fact that he had been wrongfully arrested. The two propositions are mutually exclusive. Even if the fraudulent concealment defense applied to this claim, such a defense only gives the Plaintiff an attempt to rely upon the discovery rule-Plaintiff's statute of limitations still begins to run at the time that he "knew or should have known" of the facts giving rise to his injury. Jackson v. West Telemarketing Corp. Outbound, 245 F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 2001). The discovery rule provides no succor for Plaintiff here. Even if the discovery rule applies, Plaintiff would certainly have been aware of the facts underlying his claims no later than the conclusion of his trial. The theory underlying Plaintiff's claim is that if Defendants had properly performed their job duties (ie. not planted evidence on Plaintiff to "create" probable cause for arrest), Plaintiff would not have been arrested or prosecuted. Therefore, Plaintiff "knew or should have known" there was a problem when Roper came out of the apartment with a gun and baggie of cocaine that did not in fact belong to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ). Certainly, at the conclusion of Defendants' testimony at Plaintiff's trial, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this lawsuit. Therefore Plaintiff's state-law claim for negligence is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
2. False Arrest
Plaintiffs claim for false arrest is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ). As with Plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, Plaintiff's claim for false arrest accrued at the time of the arrest. Upon arrest, Plaintiff was aware that he had been arrested without probable cause (ie. that the evidence had been planted on him). Id. Plaintiff's state-law claim for false arrest is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. False Imprisonment
Plaintiffs claim for false imprisonment is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. However, false imprisonment is a "continuing tort" for which a cause of action accrues when detention ends. Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). Therefore, Plaintiff's cause of action for false imprisonment did not accrue until his release from prison. Plaintiffs claim for false imprisonment under Texas state law is not barred by the statute of limitations.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiffs state-law claims for negligence and false arrest are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims under § 1983, as well as for false imprisonment under Texas law remain before the Court.
SO ORDERED.