Opinion
Case No. 2:20-cv-01718-MAT
2022-01-12
Wakeem WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA DEBT RECOVERY, LLC, Defendant.
Jason D. Anderson, Thomas Tyler Santiago, Anderson Santiago PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff. Mark T. Case, Lynnwood, WA, Daniel Culicover, Elizabeth K. Morrison, Petra Nasreen Ambrose, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.
Jason D. Anderson, Thomas Tyler Santiago, Anderson Santiago PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.
Mark T. Case, Lynnwood, WA, Daniel Culicover, Elizabeth K. Morrison, Petra Nasreen Ambrose, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY
MARY ALICE THEILER, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24). Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Defendant's liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Washington Collection Agency Act (WCAA), and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), but does not move for the Court to rule on damages at this time. Defendant Columbia Debt Recovery, LLC (CDR) opposes (Dkt. 28). CDR separately moves to stay the matter pending the outcome of Columbia Debt Recovery, LLC v. Wakeem Williams , No. 127503, currently pending in Thurston County District Court (Thurston County Matter) relating to the underlying debt (Dkt. 26). Plaintiff opposes (Dkt. 33).
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24) and DENIES CDR's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 26).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff entered into a one-year lease with Black Lake Apartments (Black Lake) in Olympia, WA, with a term from November 11, 2017 through November 10, 2018. Dkt. 24, at 4; Dkt. 28, at 3. Plaintiff paid a $1,787.00 security deposit and a monthly rent of $1,487.00. Dkt. 24, at 4; Dkt. 28, at 3; Dkt. 31-1 (Lease Agreement), at 1. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not occupy the premises after December 1, 2018. Dkt. 28, at 4; Dkt. 31-3 (Black Lake Statement); Dkt. 34, at 3. Plaintiff did not receive any money back from his deposit upon moving out. Dkt. 24, at 4; Dkt. 28, at 4.
Plaintiff nevertheless asserts that he vacated the property before the expiration of the Lease Agreement. Dkt. 24, at 1, 4.
In 2019, Plaintiff learned that CDR was reporting on his credit that he owed a debt of over $3,000.00 related to Black Lake. Dkt. 24-1 (Williams Decl.), at ¶ 7. Plaintiff contacted CDR requesting validation of the debt. Id. at ¶ 9; Dkt. 28, at 6. On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter from CDR identifying a total debt of $3,902.01, an original balance of $3,000.49, and $618.52 interest due. Williams Decl. at ¶¶ 10–11, Ex. A; Dkt. 30-6 (August 19, 2020 Letter). In support of this debt, CDR included the Black Lake Statement and the first page of the Lease Agreement. Williams Decl. Ex. A; Dkt. 28, at 6. The Black Lake Statement identified a total balance of $3,035.65 due. Dkt. 31-3. On December 12, 2019, CDR filed a debt collection action against Plaintiff in Thurston County District Court, seeking to recover a sum of $3,000.49 plus interest and reasonable or statutory attorney's fees. Dkt. 24-2, Ex. B.
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff received the August 19, 2020 letter. Dkt. 24, at 5; Opp. at 5. However, in addition to the August 19, 2020 letter, Defendant asserts that it sent multiple letters to Plaintiff, including an initial dunning letter dated March 12, 2019, a "paid in full" letter dated July 8, 2019, and a dunning letter December 11, 2019. Dkt. 3,0 at ¶¶ 5, 8, 11–12.
Plaintiff initiated this action in King County Superior Court, and CDR removed the matter to this Court. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff brings claims against CDR asserting violations of the FDCPA, the WCAA, and the WCPA. Plaintiff now moves for partial summary judgment on CDR's liability under §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(8), 1692f, and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA (Counts 1 and 2) and RCW 19.16.250(21) (Count 3). Dkt. 28, at 9–16.
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's claims asserted under RCW 19.16.250(15). Dkt. 18.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In ruling on summary judgment, "[t]he court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Crane v. Conoco, Inc. , 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994). The court views the evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy , 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the nonmoving party must make a "sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof" to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers from improper or abusive debt collection efforts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute which "makes debt collectors liable for violations that are not knowing or intentional." Reichert v. Nat'l Credit Sys., Inc. , 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) ; see also McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC , 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011). "A single violation of any provision of the Act is sufficient to establish civil liability under the FDCPA." Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand , 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997). The FDCPA is a remedial statute construed liberally in favor of the consumer. Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc. , 755 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc. , 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e wish to reinforce that the broad remedial purpose of the FDCPA is concerned primarily with the likely effect of various collection practices on the minds of unsophisticated debtors."). Section 1692e prohibits the use of "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Section 1692e(2) prohibits "[t]he false representation of ... (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any ... compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt." Id. § 1692e(2). Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from "[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed." Id. § 1692e(8). Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using "unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt," including "[t]he collection of any amount ... unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitting by law." Id. § 1692f, (1).
There is no dispute that Defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) ; Dkt. 24, at 8–9; Dkt. 28, at 1. Further, there is no dispute that CDR reported on Plaintiff's debts to credit reporting. Dkt. 24, at 4–5; Dkt. 28, at 5. The Court finds that CDR's reporting of Plaintiff's debts was connected to its attempts to collect on that debt for purposes of satisfying § 1692e.
Plaintiff argues that CDR's August 19, 2020 letter improperly demanded amounts not owed. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the letter demanded that he pay $3,000.49 in principal and $618.52 in interest (totaling $3,619.01) yet stated that Plaintiff owed a total balance of $3,902.01 thereby demanding an additional $283. The parties do not dispute that the August 19, 2020 letter did not include a line item for the additional amount of $283. Dkt. 24, at 6; Dkt. 28, at 6. However, CDR asserts in briefing that the amount of debt owing reflected on the August 19, 2020 letter included an additional $283 for attorney's fees and court costs that CDR incurred when it filed a debt collection action against Plaintiff in Thurston County on December 12, 2019. Dkt. 28, at 6. CDR argues that it did not violate the FDCPA because it was legally authorized to collect legal fees and costs by the express terms of the Lease Agreement. Id. at 10–11. CDR relies on the paragraph 25(D) of the Lease Agreement, which provides the following:
In the event either party engages, retains or hires an attorney to enforce any provision of this Lease, or any obligation under law, including but not limited to the collection of rent and/or other charges due hereunder, both Landlord and Resident agree that, to the fullest extent permissible by law, court costs, prejudgment interest at the judgment rate from the date of default, and reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party , even if no case is filed with the courts.
Dkt. 31-1, at ¶ 25 (emphasis added); Dkt. 28, at 10–11.
CDR has not shown that it was entitled to receive $283 for attorney's fees and costs related to the Thurston County Matter at the time that it demanded the sum from Plaintiff. The Lease Agreement expressly authorizes an award of attorney's fees and costs "to the prevailing party" in enforcing the Lease. The Lease Agreement defines a "prevailing party" in the event that the Landlord voluntarily halts the action prior to judgment or where no case is filed. See Dkt. 31-1 at ¶ 25. The Lease Agreement does not otherwise define "prevailing party" where an action has been filed; therefore, "prevailing party" is construed according to its ordinary meaning. See Caliber One Indem. Co. v. Wade Cook Fin. Corp. , 491 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Washington law cautions against a court ‘creat[ing] ambiguity where none exists,’ and if a term is undefined, ‘[it] must be given [its] plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.’ " (citation omitted) (alterations in original)); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.330 (defining "prevailing party" in actions on contract or lease as "the party in whose favor final judgment is rendered"). There is no dispute that, at the time that CDR demanded the $283 sum for fees and expenses related to the Thurston County Matter, final judgment had not yet been rendered in the matter. Dkt. 24, at 6; Dkt. 28, at 2. CDR presents no evidence that it was a "prevailing party" in the Thurston County Matter at the time that it demanded the sum such that it was entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs related to the action under the terms of the Lease. See McCollough , 637 F.3d at 950 (affirming ruling that a demand for attorney's fees in a state court collection complaint without a basis in the parties’ agreement violated the FDCPA); see also Shula v. Lawent , 359 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that where the court did not make an award of costs against the debtor, the debtor did not become indebted to anyone for costs). Because CDR has not established that it was entitled to collect $283 in attorney's fees and costs related to the Thurston County Matter at the time that it demanded the sum from Plaintiff, CDR's attempts to collect this amount violated the FDCPA.
Plaintiff argues that the Lease's definition of "prevailing party" is unenforceable on its face. Dkt. 34, at 3. Because the Court's ruling is not dependent on the enforceability of the Lease Agreement's definition of "prevailing party," the Court does not reach the merits of this argument.
CDR further argues that its failure to include a line item for the properly recoverable court costs and fees was not "material" and, therefore, did not violate §§ 1698e or 1698f of the FDCPA. A debt collector's false or misleading representation must be "material" in order for it to be actionable under § 1692e or § 1692f. Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. , 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010). A representation is "materially false" if it could "cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort." Tourgeman , 755 F.3d at 1121. A false or technically incorrect statement may be immaterial so long as the total owed was accurately stated. See Donohue , 592 F.3d at 1034 ; see also Clark , 460 F.3d at 1171 ("In judging the actions of a debt collector, we invariably ask whether the information it provided was or its actions were confusing or misleading."). Here, CDR's August 19, 2020 letter overstated the balance due by seeking to collect $283 for fees and costs related to the Thurston County Matter—amounts to which it was not entitled. See Afewerki v. Anaya Law. Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 777 (9th Cir. 2017) (overstatement of principal is a material violation of the FDCPA). Further, the August 19, 2020 letter did not accurately reflect the original balance of the debt claimed by Black Lake as reflected in the Black Lake Statement attached to the letter—the Black Lake Statement reported an original balance of $3,035.65 while the August 19, 2020 letter reported an original balance of $3,000.49. The August 19, 2020 letter further calculated the total due based on the misstated original balance and not the original balance claimed by Black Lake. Dkt. 28, at 6. CDR's false and misleading statements in the August 19, 2020 letter were material because the letter did not clearly or accurately state the total amount due and, therefore, the least sophisticated debtor would have been unable to identify the accurate sum owed and would not have had the option to avoid a lawsuit simply by paying "the accurately stated sum to settle [the] debt." Donohue , 592 F.3d at 1034. CDR's material misrepresentation of the balance owed by Plaintiff and its attempts to collect on this debt violated §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(8), 1692f, and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA. Because the Court find that CDR is liable under the FDCPA, the Court need not consider other sources of liability under the FDCPA. See Taylor , 103 F.3d at 1238.
Turning to the WCAA and the WCPA, RCW 19.16.250(21) prohibits the collection, or attempted collection, of any amounts not authorized by law. RCW 19.16.250(21) (prohibiting the "[c]ollect[ion] or attempt to collect in addition to the principal amount of a claim any sum other than allowable interest, collection costs or handling fees expressly authorized by statute, and, in the case of suit, attorney's fees and taxable court costs"). Because actions prohibited under the WCAA are declared unfair acts or practices under the WCPA, a violation of the WCAA constitutes a per se violation of the WCPA. RCW 19.16.440 ; Weinstein v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP , 798 Fed. Appx. 88, 91 (9th Cir. 2019). As described above, CDR attempted to collect from Plaintiff amounts not authorized by law. See McCollough , 637 F.3d at 950. Therefore, all actions taken in furtherance of collecting the unauthorized amounts are violations of RCW 19.16.250(21).
B. Defendant's Request to Defer Ruling
CDR requests the Court to defer its ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pending the outcome of the Thurston County Matter. Dkt. 28, at 21. The Court denies CDR's request to defer its ruling. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to liability only. Liability under the FDCPA is a matter of law. See Tourgeman , 755 F.3d at 1118. Because, as described herein, the Court finds that CDR is liable under the FDCPA, the WCAA, and the WCPA as a matter of law for attempting to collect amounts related to the Thurston County Matter, amounts to which it was not entitled, a finding in the Thurston County Matter regarding the validity of the underlying debt would not impact this Court's ruling.
C. Defendant's Request for Additional Time Under Rule 56(d)
CDR requests that the Court defer its ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment under Rule 56(d) so that CDR may conduct additional discovery to oppose Plaintiff's claims. Dkt. 28, at 23. The Court may grant a continuance of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(d) if the party opposing the motion makes "(a) a timely application which (b) specifically identifies (c) relevant information, (d) where there is some basis for believing that the information sought actually exists." VISA Internat'l Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am. , 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts have denied an application a Rule 56(d) request "for lack of sufficient showing to support further discovery .... where it was clear that the evidence sought was almost certainly nonexistent or was the object of pure speculation." Id.
CDR specifically requests time to depose Plaintiff regarding "the nature of his purported confusion, interpretation of the earlier letters, how the letters affected any course of action in responding to the letter, including whether he ever intended to pay this debt." Dkt. 28, at 23. Because Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to CDR's liability only, discovery into Plaintiff's subjective confusion, interpretation of the dunning letters, or decisions regarding Plaintiff's response to the letters would be futile. See Tourgeman , 755 F.3d at 1118 (the FDCPA's "statutory text itself is aimed squarely at the debt collector's conduct, rather than at its effect on the consumer"). Inquiry under the FDCPA "is objective and is undertaken as a matter of law." Id. Accordingly, CDR has not met its burden to show that further discovery regarding Plaintiff's subjective testimony would raise a triable issue of fact as to CDR's liability to prevent summary judgment. See Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc. , 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The burden is on the party seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists, and that it would prevent summary judgment.").
CDR does not present a bona fide error defense in its briefing. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Nevertheless, CDR also requests additional time under Rule 56(d) to develop its bona fide error defense "with respect to the varying letter formats, some of which contain separate line items for attorney fees and court costs, and some of which do not." Dkt. 28, at 24. This information, however, is within the sole possession of CDR and, therefore, could not be sought or obtained by CDR through discovery. Because CDR has not shown that additional discovery regarding CDR's letter formats would raise a triable issue of fact as to CDR's unpresented bona fide error defense to prevent summary judgment, the Court denies CDR's application for additional time under Rule 56(d). See Chance , 242 F.3d at 1161 n.6.
D. Motions to Strike
The parties separately move to strike specific evidence in the briefs. Dkt. 28, at 8–9; Dkt. 34, at 11–12; Dkt. 38. The Court "can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA , 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). In so ruling, the Court does not focus on the admissibility of the evidence form but "on the admissibility of its contents." Fraser v. Goodale , 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) ; see also Block v. City of Los Angeles , 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56."); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co. , 953 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he nonmoving party need not produce evidence ‘in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.’ " (citation omitted)).
1. CDR's Motions
CDR moves to strike Exhibit B to the Declaration of Wakeem Williams (Dkt. 24-1, Ex. B) for lack of authentication. Dkt. 28, at 9. "Authentication is a ‘condition precedent to admissibility,’ and this condition is satisfied by ‘evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims.’ " Orr , 285 F.3d at 773 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) ). "In a summary judgment motion, documents authenticated through personal knowledge must be ‘attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.’ " Id. at 773–74 (citation omitted); see also id. at 773 n.1 (" ‘A document can be authenticated [under Rule 901(b)(1) ] by a witness who wrote it, signed it, used it, or saw others do so.’ "). Here, Plaintiff provided a declaration stating that the screenshots are "[t]rue and correct copies of excerpts from my credit reports demonstrating CDR's false reporting." Id. Williams Decl. ¶ 17. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 901. The Court denies CDR's motion to strike Exhibit B of the Declaration of Wakeem Williams. CDR also moves to strike "[s]elf-serving testimony regarding confusion of the letters at issue." Dkt. 28, at 9. Because liability under the FDCPA is an objective inquiry, see Tourgeman , 755 F.3d at 1118, the Court did not rely on Plaintiff's testimony in determining CDR's liability. Therefore, the Court denies CDR's motion to strike as moot for purposes of this Motion.
2. Plaintiff's Motions
Plaintiff moves to strike Exhibit A of the Declaration of Petra N. Ambrose (Dkt. 29-1) as improper character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). Dkt. 34, at 11. Exhibit A is a copy of a compilation of public records obtained from the General District Court website of Stafford County, VA, of which CDR asks the Court to take judicial notice. Dkt. 28, at 6 n.3. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) prohibits the use of "[e]vidence of a person's character or trait ... to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait." CDR offers the records to show that Plaintiff previously lost a suit for unlawful detainer and was previously sued by an apartment complex for non-payment, which CDR asserts is contrary to Plaintiff's assertions that he was never evicted. Dkt. 28, at 6. Because the Court's ruling on the Motion pertains to CDR's liability under the FDCPA, the WCAA, and the WCPA, and Plaintiff's residential history has no bearing on CDR's present liability, the Court did not rely on this evidence in ruling on the Motion. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to strike and CDR's request for judicial notice as moot for purposes of this Motion.
Plaintiff also moves to strike the Declaration of Mark Case (Dkt. 37) based on untimeliness and for containing inadmissible evidence. Dkt. 38. CDR filed the Declaration of Mark Case on January 10, 2022, in support of its opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkt. 37, ¶ 2. CDR filed its opposition brief on October 4, 2021. Dkt. 28. CDR failed to set forth in a praecipe why the Declaration of Mark Case and its attachments were not included with the original filing in accordance with LCR 7(m). Because the documents were not properly filed according to the local rules, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to strike the Declaration of Mark Case. The Court does not address the admissibility of the evidence contained therein.
E. Defendant's Motion to Stay
CDR separately moves to the stay the case pending the outcome of the Thurston County Matter. Dkt. 26. In considering a motion to stay, the Court must balance the competing interests that a grant or a refusal will affect. See CMAX, Inc. v. Hall , 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis v. North Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254–255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) ). The Court considers the possible damage that might result from a grant, the hardship or inequity a party might suffer by advancing the case, and the orderly course of justice measured by the simplification or complication of the issues, proof, and questions of law that could result from a stay. See id. The party seeking a stay bears the burden of showing his entitlement to a stay. See Latta v. Otter , 771 F.3d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) ).
Here, "neither the balance of hardships between the parties, nor the prospect of narrowing the factual and legal issues in the other proceeding, justifies a stay." See Lockyer v. Mirant Corp. , 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against ongoing and future harm by CDR's violations of the FDCPA, the WCAA, and the WCPA. The Supreme Court "cautions ‘if there is even a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to some one else,’ the party seeking the stay ‘must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity.’ " Lockyer , 398 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Landis , 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. 163 (alteration in original)). CDR has not shown that it would experience hardship or inequity in denying a stay of this matter pending the Thurston County Matter. Indeed, CDR removed this matter to this Court despite having filed its collection lawsuit in Thurston County nearly a year prior to removal. Dkt. 1.
Further, the outcome of the Thurston County Matter is unlikely to impact the resolution of Plaintiff's claims in this case. The Court has found CDR liable under the FDCPA, the WCAA, and the WCPA, and only the amount of damages remains an issue for trial. In assessing the amount of liability under the FDCPA, the court considers "the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). Because the Court has found CDR liable under the FDCPA, WCAA, and WCPA for improperly attempting to collect fees and costs related to the Thurston County Matter, the actual validity of the underlying debt does not impact the assessment of damages in this case. See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp. , 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The [FDCPA] is designed to protect consumers who have been victimized by unscrupulous debt collectors, regardless of whether a valid debt actually exists."). Further, Plaintiff bears the burden to prove his damages. Tourgeman , 755 F.3d at 1109. Therefore, the outcome of the Thurston County Matter is unlikely to conflict with the resolution of Plaintiff's claims in this Court.
The FDCPA provides for both statutory damages and actual damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages under the WCAA and the WCPA, RCW 19.16.440 and 19.86.090, and the WCPA authorizes treble damages.
For these reasons, the Court denies CDR's Motion to Stay.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the relevant briefing and remainder of the record, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 24). Defendant CDR is liable under §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(8), 1692f, and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA (Counts 1 and 2) and RCW 19.16.250(21) (Count 3) as stated above. The amount of damages remains an issue for trial.
The Court DENIES CDR's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 26). The Court further DENIES CDR's (1) request to defer its ruling on this Motion pending the outcome of the underlying Thurston County Matter, (2) request for Rule 56(d) relief, (3) motion to strike Exhibit B to Dkt. 24-1 (Declaration of Wakeem Williams), (4) motion to strike portions of Plaintiff's testimony as moot, and (5) request for judicial notice as moot. The Court further DENIES as moot Plaintiff's motion to strike Exhibit A of Dkt. 29 (Declaration of Petra N. Ambrose) and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to strike Dkt. 37 (Declaration of Mark Case).