Opinion
Case No. CL-2010-5279
03-14-2011
William Kkchner, et al. v. Krista McAjjiolev, et al.
Joseph W. Stuart, Esq. Kimberly A, Murphy, Esq. Samantha S. Fredieu, Esq. Hale Carlson Baumgartner, PLC Fairfax, VA 22030 Karl W. Pilger, Esq. Jeffrey A. Hord, Esq. . Boring & Pilger, P.C.
DENNIS J. SMITH. CHIEF JUDGE
MARCUS Q. WILLIAMS
JANE VARUM ROUSH
LESLIE M. ALDEN
JONATHAN C.THACHER
K TERRENCE NEY
RAND/ i. BELLOWS
CHARLES J. MAXF1ELD
sruce a WHITE
HOBEHTJ. SMrm
DAVtD s. SCHELL
JAN L BRODIE
lorraine NORDLUND
BRETT A. KASSA5IAN
MICHAEL F. DEVINE
judges
BARNARD F. JENNINGS
THOMAS J. MIDDLETON
THOMAS A FORTKORT
RICHARD J. JAMBORSKY
JACK Br STEVENS
J. HOWE BROWN
F. BRUCE BACH
M. LANGHORNE KETTH
ARTHUR B.ViEREGG
KATHLEEN H. MACKAY
ROBERT W.WOOLDRIDGE, JR.
MICHAEL P. MeWEENY
GAYLORD L FINCH. JR.
STANLEY P. KLEIN
RETIRED JUDGES
March 14, 2011
Dear Counsel:
This matter came on to be heard on January 28, 2011 on the Demurrers of the Defendants to the Amended Complaint. At that time, the court took the matter under advisement. The court has now fully considered the pleadings, the briefs, and the argument of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the demurrers will be sustained in part and overruled in part.
Background
The plaintiffs in this case are William Kirchner, individually ("William") and as the personal representative of the estate of Kathryn Kirchner ("Kalhryn''), and Stephanie Kirchner Little ("Stephanie") (William, Kathryn, and Stephanie may be referred to collectively as the "plaintiffs" or the "Krrchners1'). The defendants in the case are Krista McAninley ("McAninley"), McArunley's two minor children Ian and Adam McAninley, Divya Katyal ("Katyal"), Katyal's husband Gurpreet Bains, and Katyal's minor child Kanuj Bains.
Kirstin Kirchner ("Kirstiri"), William's daughter, died on June 26, 2006. Kirstin was unmarried and had no children. Kirstin left a will, which has been admitted to probate. To date, however, no one has qualified as the executor or administrator of Kirstin's estate.
Stephanie was Kirstin's sister. Kathryn was William's mother and Kirstin's grandmother. Kathryn survived her granddaughter Kirstin but has since died.
Katyal was unrelated to Kirstin. Katyal is a CPA and was a co-worker of Kirstin's, McAmnley is an attorney. She was also Kirstin's attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney. was Knstin's first cousin.
The amended complaint alleges a series of transactions by Katyal and McAninley related to Kirstin's finances when she was alive and her estate after her death. The plaintiffs allege that these transactions constituted fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment.
For the purposes of these demurrers, the court assumes, as it must, that all of the well-pleaded facts of the amended complaint are true.1
Kirstin worked for RCN Corporation and one of its subsidiaries, Starpower Cormnuiiications. Katyal was Kirstin's supervisor at RCN until Katyal was terminated in July 2003. Later, Katyal and her son came to live with Kirstin. At the time, Katyal claimed to be estranged from her husband, although they presently live together and jointly own property.
In 1999, Kirstin established two individual retirement accounts (TRAs) held at the Edward Jones firm. After Kirstin was diagnosed with a virulent form of brain cancer in March 2005, she designated her father as the beneficiary of those accounts.
Beginning in August 2005, Katyal, who enjoyed a "confidential and fiduciary relationship" with Kirstin, "inveigled" Kristin to purchase several investment properties with Katyal. Pursuant to this plan, in August 2005, Kirstin purchased a house in Woodbridge, Virginia for approximately $524,000 which was titled in the names of Kirstin and Katyal as joint tenants with right of survivorship. This house was purchased using the proceeds of a first and second deed of trust on Kirstin's principal residence in Chantilly, Vuginia. Later that same month, Kirstin purchased a house in Gainesville. Virginia for approximately $500,000, also titled in the names of Kirstin and Katyal as joint tenants with right of survivorship. This house was also purchased with the proceeds of loans secured by liens on Kristin's principal residence. Katyal also persuaded Kirstin to purchase a condominium in Snowshoe, West Virginia in 2005. Katyal took title to the condominium in her own name after Kirstin's death.
McAninley knew of Katyal's undue influence but took no steps to protect .Kirstin. McAninley actively participated in defrauding Kirstin. In April 2006, McAmnley, by means of Kirstin's power of attorney, refinanced the first and second deeds of trust on the Woodbridge property and took the $30,000 cash obtained from the refinancing and gave it to Katyal.
Less than a month before Kirstin died, Katyal contacted Edward Jones and informed Edward Jones that Kirstin wanted to change the beneficiary of her ERAs. Katyal forged Kirstin's signature on the change of beneficiary forms and sent the forms to Edward Jones. The change of beneficiary form added McAninley's two sons, Ian and Adam, as primary beneficiaries (in addition to William, Kirstin's father and the original sole beneficiary). Katyal forged the change of beneficiary forms as a for McAiiinley's having given Katyal $30,000 from the refinancing of the Woodbridge property.
Katyal held one or more joint accounts with Kristin from March 2005 until Kirstin's death in June 2006. Katyal transferred "tens of thousands of dollars" belonging to Kirstin to herself or to her husband for their sole benefit.
McAninley falsely told Kristin's grandmother Kathryn that Kristin needed money for her treatment The grandmother sent $5000, which Katyal misappropriated. Katyal used the money misappropriated from Kristin to purchase property in Hamilton, Virginia and Lorton, Vrigrida.
In the last months of Kristin's life, when she was completely debihtated, Katyal fraudulently altered Kristin's 401(k) plan at RCN/Starpower Communications to benefit Katyal's minor son, Kanuj Bains.
After Kirstin's death, Katyal and McAninley attempted to obtain the proceeds of a life insurance policy insuring Kristin's life when William, Kristin's father, was the beneficiary,
Katyal falsely represented that she was the executor of Kristin's estate, and, as a result, received refunds of taxes Kristin paid in her lifetime.
McAninley falsely represented to the clerk of the court that Kirstin's estate was worth less than $15,000 in order for it to qualify as a small estate. Katyal proceeded to collect assets of Kristin's by means of false affidavits asserting that the estate was worth less than $15,000.
Katyal has failed to comply with Kristin's directive in her will that the loan secured by a Hen on her automobile be satisfied from the proceeds of her savings account and the automobile be given to Stephanie. Instead, Katyal falsely averred in an affidavit that she was entitled to the automobile and that Kristin's estate was worth less than $15,000. Through such misrepresentations, Katyal caused the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to reissue the tile to the automobile showing Katyal as the owner. Katyal is still in possession of Kristin's automobile.
The Causes of Action Alleged in the Complaint
The plaintiffs have alleged eleven causes of action in their amended complaint:
I. Fraud (against Katyal related to changing the beneficiaries of the Edward Jones IRAs to add McAninley's sons).
II. Conversion (against McAninley and her two sons related to the boys' receipt of two-thirds of the proceeds of Kirstin's IRAs held at Edward Jones).
III. check obtained from Kirstin's grandmother, Kathryn).
IV. Conversion (against Katyal related to her retention of Kirstin's automobile bequeathed to Stephanie).
V. Conspiracy to Commit Fraud (against Katyal and McAninley related to the Edward Jones IRA accounts and the mortgages obtained against properties owned by Kirstin).
VI. Aiding and Abetting Fraud (against McAninley for aiding Katyal in defrauding Kirstin in connection with the IRAs, the $5000 gift from Kirstin's grandmother, and the new or additional mortgages on Kirstin's properties).
VII. Conspiracy to Commit Conversion (against Katyal and McAninley related to the misappropriation of Kixstin's funds from March 2005 until Kirstin's death in June 2006, as well as the conversion of the IRAs, the mortgage proceeds, and the automobile).
VIII. Aiding and Abetting Conversion (against Katyal and McAninley for assisting each other in converting the $5000 check from Kirstin's grandmother, the IRAs, and the automobile).
IX. Declaratory Judgment (seeking a judicial declaration that change of the beneficiaries of the IRAs was fraudulent and that Kirstin's father, William, is the sole beneficiary of those accounts).
X. Unjust Enrichment (against McAninley's sons related to the proceeds of the ERAs that they received as a result of the fraudulent change in beneficiaries).
XI. Unjust Enrichment (against Katyal, her husband and her son, related to the funds or assets obtained from Kristin as a result of Katyal's fraud).
The Demurrers
The McAninley defendants (McAninley and her two sons) and the Katyal defendants (Katyal, her husband, and her son) have demurred to the amended complaint.
I. The McAninley Demurrer
The McAninley defendants demur to Counts I, HI, TV, V, VI, VII, VIII, DC, X, and XI of the amended complaint.
The McAninley defendants demur to Counts I, TV, and XT on the ground that those counts seek no relief against any of the McAninley defendants. That does not appear to be a cognizable ground for a demurrer. There is no need for the McAninley defendants to demur to any count that seeks no relief against them. Therefore the McAninley defendants' demurrer to Counts I, TV, and XI will be overruled.
McAninley demurs to Counts HI, V, VI, VII VIII, LX, and X, which do seek relief against her or her sons. The court will address the arguments related to each of these counts in turn:
1. Count III. McAninley demurs to Count HI, alleging fraud, on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to allege that McAninley intended to defraud Kathryn or Kirstin in relation to the $5,000 check. The plaintiffs respond that the allegation of McAninley's intent can be inferred from their allegations that she knowingly misrepresented a material fact to Kathryn.
The Court agrees that each of the elements of fraud must specifically be pleaded, including the element that the misrepresentation was made "intentionally and knowingly" with the "intent to mislead." State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Remley, 27 Va..209, 218 (2005); Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 85 (1999). In this case, there is no allegation that McAninley intended to mislead Kathryn.
The plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend Count HJ to plead as to McAninley all of the elements of actual fraud.
2. Count V. McAninley demurs to Count V on the ground that the plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to support a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud. The plaintiffs respond that they have pleaded sufficient facts to show a conspiracy to commit fraud between McAninley and Katyal.
A common law claim of civil conspiracy generally requires proof that the underlying tort was cormnitted. Almv v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 80 (2007). A conspiracy claim includes the same elements of proof as the underlying tort. Id. at 81. It follows, then, that because the underlying tort of fraud has not been properly pleaded as to McAninley, the pleading of the conspiracy to commit fraud is similarly infirm.
McAninley's demurrer to Count V will be sustained with leave to amend.
3. Count VI. McAninley demurs to Count VI on the ground that Virginia does not recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting a tort. The plaintiffs respond by citing several circuit court cases which have recognized the separate tort of aiding and abetting a tort.
The court notes that no appellate case in Virginia has recognized the separate tort of aiding and abetting a tort. In Halifax Corporation v. Wachovia Bank, 268 Va. 641 (2004), the Virginia Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the tort of aiding abetting a breach of fiduciary duty existed, but that the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficiently the elements of such a cause of action. There are several Vkginia Supreme Court cases that state that one who aids and abets a tort is jointly liable with the principal tortfeasor. Ratcliffe v. Walker. 117 Va. 569 (1915); Daingerfield v. Thompson, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 136 (1880); Patterson v. Horsley, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 263 (1877).
The court agrees with the McAninley defendants that, under the facts of this case as pleaded in the amended complaint, Virginia would not recognize a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraud. If McAninley aided and abetted Katyal in defrauding Kristin or Kathryn, she is liable as a principal for fraud.
McAninley's demurrer to Count VI will be sustained with leave to amend to allege McAninley's direct liability for fraud as a result of any assistance she provided to Katyal in defrauding Kirstin or Kathryn,
4. Count VII McAninley demurs to Count VI on the basis that the plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to support a claim of conspiracy to commit conversion. Specifically, no allegation of an unlawful act or an unlawful means to accomplish a lawful act. McAninley argues further that there are insufficient allegations of an agreement between McAninley and Katyal to commit an unlawful act.
In response, the plaintiffs cite numerous paragraphs of the amended complaint in which they have alleged specific facts to support their claim that McAninley is liable for conspiracy to commit conversion.
A common law conspiracy consists of two or more persons combined to accomplish, by some concerted action, some criminal or unlawful purpose or some lawful purpose by a criminal or unlawful means. Commercial Business Systems v. BellSouth, 249 Va. 39, 48 (1995).
The tort of conversion encompasses any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another's goods, depriving or her of their possession, and any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over property in denial of the owner's right, or inconsistent with it. PGL Inc. v. Rathe Productions, Inc., 265 Va. 334, 344 (2003).
The plaintiffs have alleged that McAninley and Katyal agreed that Katyal would forge the documents needed to add and Katyal acted in concert, over a period of time, to obtain "other benefits" for Katyal and her family by means of fraudulent and improper actions. ¶ 140. Concert of action was similarly alleged in ¶¶ 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, and 154.
The court concludes that Count VII has been adequately pleaded. It is not necessary to survive a demurrer for the plaintiffs to plead all the specifics of their allegations of conspiracy. That is what discovery is for. It is sufficient that the pleading notify the defendants of the nature of the conspiracy charged. The amended complaint in this case meets that standard. Accordingly, McAninley's demurrer to Count VII will be overruled.
5. Count VIII. McAninley demurs to Count VIII for the same reason she demurred to Count VI, that is, that Vfrginia does not recognize a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting a tort.
Although "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,"3 the court will make the same ruling on the demurrer to Count VIII as it did with . Count VI. Under the facts of this case as pleaded in the amended complaint, Virginia would not recognize a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting conversion. If McAninley aided and abetted Katyal in converting property rightfully belonging to Kirstin (or any of the plaintiffs), she is liable as a principal for conversion.
McAninley's demurrer to Count VIII will be sustained with leave to amend to allege McAninley's direct hability for conversion as a result of any assistance she provided to Katyal in converting Kirstin's property (or the property of any of the other plaintiffs).
6. Count IX. The McAninley defendants demur to Count LX on the ground that declaratory judgment is not appropriate in this case where it is not sought to guide the parties in their future conduct. The plaintiffs concede that Count IX is unnecessary if their other claims survive demurrer. The McAninley defendants' demurrer to Count LX will be sustained, without leave to amend.
7. Count X. Trie McAninley defendants demur to Count X on the ground that the elements of unjust enrichment have not been pleaded properly.
The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: (i) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (h) the defendant knew of the benefit and should reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff; and, (iii) the defendant accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its value. Schmidt v. Household Finance Corp., 276 Va. 108, 116 (2008).
The McAninley defendants maintain that there is no allegation of an implied agreement between the plaintiffs and the McAninley children by which the children agreed to compensate the plaintiffs for the amounts received as the beneficiaries of Kkstrn's IRAs.
The plaintiffs respond that their cause of action under Count X is one of general assumpsit:
Assumpsit will he whenever the defendant has received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and which the defendant is obliged by natural justice and equity to [rejpay.City of Norfolk v. County of Norfolk. 120 Va. 356, 364 (1917).
The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the facts alleged could support a cause of action of general assumpsit against the McAninley children. The McAninley defendants' demurrer to Count X will be sustained with leave to amend to allege a cause of action for general assumpsit.
II. The Katyal Demurrer
The Katyal defendants demur to Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, LX and XI. In addition, the Katyal defendants demur generally to the amended complaint on the grounds of misjoinder. Finally, they allege that William is has no standing to bring certain of the claims in the amended complaint. The court will address each of these arguments in turn:
1. Misjoinder. Katyal demurs generally to the complaint on the grounds of misjoinder. According to Katyal, the amended complaint "misjoins parties and multiple causes of action in violation of Virginia Code § 8.01-272."
The plamtiffs respond that modern pleadings practice, as evidenced by Code §§ 8.01-281 and 8.01-272, and Rule 1:4(k), permits a plaintiff to state as many claims as he or she has regardless or consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds.
In Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412 (1987), the Virginia Supreme Court noted that these provisions, when read together, constitute "a radical departure from the common law pleading rule,“
The court concludes that the amended complaint in this case is not infirm because of misjoinder of parties or claims. As with the complaint in Fox v. Deese, "a fair reading of the [amended complaint] shows that [the plaintiffs have] pleaded alternative theories of recovery against the same group of defendants and that the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence." Id. at 423. That "same transaction or occurrence" is the alleged misappropriation of Kirstin's property and estate during her final illness and immediately after her death.
Katyal's demurrer to the amended complaint on the grounds of misjoinder will be denied.
2. Count I. Katyal demurs to Count I, alleging fraud, on the ground that "Plaintiffs make this allegation [that Katyal forged the change of beneficiary forms] despite actual knowledge that [Katyal] has already stated under oath (in another litigation) that she did not sign [Kirstin's] name to said forms." The demurrer will be overruled on this ground. A demurrer assumes that all the well-pleaded facts in the complaint are true. Therefore, it is not a proper basis of a demurrer to aver that the facts in the complaint are not true.
Katyal demurs further on the ground that there is no allegation that she intended to mislead any plaintiff. The plaintiff responds that an intent to mislead is inherent in the charge of forgery: "By definition, a forgery is a false representation of a material fact, intentionally and knowingly made with the intent to mislead and defraud." Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Demurrers at p.
In Virginia, the elements of a charge of forgery are: (i) trie defendant, falsely made a writing, (ii) without the authority to do so, and (iii) to the prejudice of another's right. See Virginia Model Jury Instructions -Criminal No. G30-100 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender) (2010) (emphasis added).
The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the allegation that Katyal intended to defraud is subsumed within their allegation that Katyal "forged" the change of beneficiary forms. Therefore, Katyal's demurrer to Count I will be overruled.
3. Count HI. Katyal demurs to Count III, alleging fraud, on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts in support of their allegation that the representation to Kathryn that Kirstin was gravely ill and needed money for her medical care was materially false.
Contrary to Katyal's argument, 84 alleges that the representations to Kathryn that Kirstin needed money to pay for her cancer treatments "were untrue" and that "Kirstin had access to substantial funds by virtue of her income at that time."
Katyal's demurred to Count JH will be overruled.
4. Count IV. Katyal demurs to Count IV, alleging conversion, on the ground that the plaintiffs have not alleged that Katyal has deprived Stephanie of possession of Kirstin's automobile. "In fact, as the plaintiffs are already aware, [Katyal] made numerous written offers (both individually and through counsel) to deliver the automobile to Stephanie." Katyal's Memorandum in Support of Demurrer at p. 6.
It is not a proper basis of a demurrer to argue the truth of facts that are not contained within the four comers of the complaint. Resolving factual disputes is why we have trials in Virginia. A demurrer assumes all well-pleaded facts of the complaint are true. The complaint in this case adequately alleges that Katyal converted Kirstins's automobile to her own use contrary to Kirstin's bequest of the automobile to Stephanie.
Katyal's demurer to Count IV will be overruled.
5. Count V. Katyal demurs to Count V, alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud, on the basis that the underlying tort of fraud has not been adequately pleaded. Because the underlying tort of fraud has been adequately pleaded as to Katyal, her demurrer to Count V will be overruled.
6. Count VI. Katyal demurs to Count VI on the ground that Virginia does not recognize aiding and abetting a tort as separate tort.
For the reasons stated above, the court agrees with Katyal that, under the facts of this case as pleaded in the amended complaint, Virginia would not recognize a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraud. If Katyal aided and abetted McAninley in defrauding Kristin (or any of the other plaintiffs), she is liable as a principal for fraud.
Katyal's demurrer to Count VI will be sustained with leave to amend to allege Katyal Js direct liability for fraud as a result of any assistance she provided to McAninley in defrauding Kirstin (or any of the other plaintiffs), assuming that any such claims are not duplicative of Count III.
7. Count VII. Katyal demurs to Count VII, alleging a conspiracy to commit conversion, on the ground that the underlying tort of conversion has not been adequately pleaded. Because the underlying tort of conversion has been adequately pleaded as to Katyal, her demurrer to Count VTI will be overruled.
8. Count VIII. Katyal demurs to Count VIII on the ground that Virginia does not recognize aiding and abetting a tort as separate tort.
For the reasons stated above, the court agrees with Katyal that, under the facts of this case as pleaded in the amended complaint, Virginia would not recognize a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting conversion. If Katyal aided and abetted McAninley in converting any of Kirstin's property (or the property of any of the other plaintiffs), she is liable as a principal for conversion.
Katyal's demurrer to Count VIII will be sustained with leave to amend to allege Katyal's direct liability for conversion as a result of any assistance she provided to McAninley in converting Kirstin's property (or the property of any of the plaintiffs), assuming that any such claims are not duplicative of Counts II or IV.
9. Count LX. Katyal demurs to Count DC, seeking a declaratory judgment, on the ground that declaratory judgment is not appropriate in this case where it is not sought to guide the parties in their future conduct. The plaintiffs concede that Count DC is unnecessary if their other claims survive demurrer. Katyal's demurrer to Count DC will be sustained, without leave to amend.
10. Count XI. The Katyal defendants demur to Count XI on the ground that the elements of unjust enrichment have not been pleaded properly.
The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: (i) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (ii) the defendant knew of trie benefit and should reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff; and, (iii) the defendant accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its value. Schmidt v. Household Finance Corp., 276 Va. 108, 116 (2008).
The Katyal defendants maintain that there is no allegation of an implied agreement between the plaintiffs and the Katyal defendants by which the Katyal defendants agreed to compensate the plaintiffs for the amounts received as the result of Katyal' s fraud.
The plaintiffs respond that their cause of action under Count XI is one of general assumpsit. See City of Norfolk v. County of Norfolk, 120 Va. 356, 364 (1917), quoted above.
For the reasons stated above, the court agrees with the plariitiffs that the facts alleged could support a cause of action of general.assumpsit against the Katyal defendants. The Katyal defendants' demurrer to Count XI will be sustained with leave to amend to allege a cause of action for general assumpsit.
11. Katyal finally demurs to Counts HI, V, VI, VII, and VIII on the grounds that William has only qualified as the personal representative of Kattrryn's estate in a foreign state, not Vriginia.
The plaintiffs respond that any factual dispute related to William's standing to bring these causes of action on behalf of Kathiyn's estate is not reachable by demurrer, The court agrees with the plaintiffs. The general demurrer challenging Wilham's standing as the personal representative of Kathryn's estate is overruled, without prejudice to the issue being raised by the proper pleading.
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the demurrers will be sustained in part and overruled in part. The plaintiffs will be given twenty-one. days to amend their complaint. If the plaintiffs do not amend their complaint as to those counts to which a demurrer has been sustained, those counts will stand dismissed. The defendants will have twenty-one days to file their answers or otherwise respond to the second amended complaint.
Will Mr. Stuart please prepare an order reflecting the rulings contained in this letter, circulate it to defense counsel to endorse as to form, and present the order to the court for entry within thirty days? If there are any further demurrers, they should be noticed for one of my civil motions dockets.
Sincerely,
Jane Marum Roush _______________________________________________ 1 The following recitation of facts is drawn from the amended complaint. 2 All further paragraph references are to the numbered paragraphs of the Amended Complaint 3 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays: First Series, Self Reliance (1841).