Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5032-11T3
03-18-2014
CHARLES WHITTED, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Charles Whitted, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Megan E. Shafranski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and O'Connor.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Charles Whitted, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Megan E. Shafranski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Charles Whitted, an inmate at South Woods State Prison, appeals from a decision of the Department of Corrections finding him guilty of *.004, fighting with another person, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). As a result of the adjudication on this charge, defendant received fifteen days of detention, 180 days of administrative segregation, and a loss of 180 days commutation time.
On appeal, defendant raises the following point:
THE DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER AND THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR WAS NOT BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL OR CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO CONSIDER, DOCUMENT, AND PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION TO DENY APPELLANT'S SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM AND HIS RIGHT TO DEFEND AND PROTECT HIMSELF WITH USE OF REASONABLE FORCE TO PREVENT FROM BEING HARMED A VIOLATION OF STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SELF-DEFENSE PROMULGATED IN THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE CODEWe reverse.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found as follows. Defendant denied he had engaged in any fighting. Defendant reported that, after being in the yard, he returned to his cell and discovered his "bunky," James Moore, was smoking in the cell. Defendant asked Moore to put out his cigarette. Moore reacted by charging at defendant. As a result of the commotion, an officer responded to the cell and saw defendant and Moore "wrestling and banging into lockers and the door." The hearing officer observed, "[the] medical [staff] notes that both [inmates] had superficial abrasions." The hearing officer also noted:
Evidence and [defendant's] statement taken into consideration. To deter [Moore] from
fighting [defendant] claims self-defense. Both have abrasion[s] consistent with being involved in physical altercation.
The hearing officer concluded defendant was guilty of fighting with another person, and imposed the aforementioned disciplinary sanctions. Defendant filed an administrative appeal; an associate administrator of the Department of Corrections affirmed the hearing officer's decision, finding:
I did not find any violation of standards and the decision of the hearing officer is upheld.This appeal ensued.
The final decision of an administrative body should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998). However, "a finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Further, while "the determination of an administrative agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation requires more than a perfunctory review," Blackwell v. Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002), and we are obligated "to engage in a careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings." Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
If an inmate claims self-defense, he must present evidence that addresses each of the following conditions:
1. The inmate was not the initial aggressor;Our review of the record satisfies us that defendant met the above conditions.
2. The inmate did not provoke the attacker;
3. The use of force was not by mutual agreement;
4. The use of force was used to defend against personal harm, not to defend property or honor;
5. The inmate had no reasonable opportunity or alternative to avoid the use of force, such as, by retreat or alerting correctional facility staff; and
6. Whether the force used by the inmate to respond to the attacker was reasonably necessary for self-defense and did not exceed the amount of force used against the inmate.
[N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f).]
It is undisputed Moore was the initial aggressor. Defendant asked Moore to put out his cigarette and Moore responded by physically attacking defendant. There is no evidence defendant provoked the attack; Moore overreacted to defendant's very reasonable request that Moore put out his cigarette. There is no indication the use of force was by mutual agreement. The evidence suggests defendant had no alternative but to use force to keep from being injured. Both men were confined to a cell, limiting defendant's ability to retreat, and the commotion itself alerted the correctional facility staff to appear on the scene. Finally, there is no evidence the force defendant used exceeded that which was necessary. First, the medical evidence was that both defendant and Moore had superficial abrasions only. Second, while the corrections officer noted that both men were "wrestling and banging into the lockers and door," the defendant's actions were not inconsistent with one who is under attack and attempting to keep his aggressor at bay.
The hearing officer's apparent reason for rejecting defendant's claim of self-defense was "both have abrasion[s] consistent with being involved in [a] physical altercation." The presence of abrasions however is hardly conclusive evidence defendant was not acting in self-defense. If one is fending off an attacker or trying to contain an attacker from inflicting blows, there is a likelihood either the victim, the aggressor or both will sustain some kind of physical injury. We are not persuaded the medical evidence supports a finding defendant was engaging in a physical altercation.
The decision of the hearing officer, affirmed by the Department of Corrections, was unreasonable, as it arbitrarily discounted defendant's claim of self-defense, and was not based upon substantial evidence defendant committed the prohibited act with which he was charged.
Reversed
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION