Opinion
Case No. 2:05-CV-280.
January 4, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which plaintiff Norman V. Whiteside ("plaintiff"), an inmate of the State of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"), alleges retaliation, discrimination and denial of his right to access the courts. Complaint ¶ 1. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or for Preliminary Injunction — Urgent Motion Per S.D. Ohio Local Rule 7.1(b)(3) ("Plaintiff's Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction"), Doc. No. 56, and plaintiff's request for oral argument on this motion. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion and request for oral argument are both DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2006, plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 56, requesting that defendants be required to allow plaintiff meaningful access to his legal materials and enjoined from housing plaintiff in the segregation unit. Id. at 1. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendants deny him his constitutional right of access to the courts by denying him access to his legal materials that are necessary in litigating three lawsuits currently pending in the Ohio Court of Claims. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for TRO/PI — Urgent Motion Per S.D. Ohio Local Rule 7.1(b)(3) ("Plaintiff's Reply") at 1-3, 7. Plaintiff also contends that his legal materials have been unlawfully confiscated and that defendants are likely to destroy or misplace them, causing him irreparable injury. Id. at 7. In addition, plaintiff claims that he was falsely accused of forging a document that he submitted to this Court. Id. at 6-8. Inviting the Court to make handwriting comparisons, plaintiff maintains that the document is not forged, or that he was unaware of any forgery. Id. Plaintiff was convicted by a Rules Infraction Board ("RIB") panel of forging, possessing or presenting a forged or counterfeit document and of possessing the property of other inmates; plaintiff was ordered to segregation. See Affidavit of Melody Haskins ¶ 5 attached to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or for Preliminary Injunction — Urgent Motion Per S.D. Ohio Local Rule 7.1(b)(3) ("Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition"). Plaintiff argues that the RIB panel lacked sufficient evidence to convict him and that his placement in segregation is in reality retaliation for bringing lawsuits against prison officials. Plaintiff's Reply at 7-8.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
Plaintiff's motion is governed by F.R. Civ. P. 65. The decision whether or not to grant a request for interim injunctive relief falls within the sound discretion of the district court. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1982). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only after consideration of the following four factors:
Where, as here, the opposing party has notice of the request for interim injunctive relief, even a request for a temporary restraining order is governed by Rule 65. First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1978)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) and (b).
(1) whether the movant has a "strong" likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although these four considerations are factors to be balanced, Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp.2d 902, 918 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (J. Sargus), the first factor is often determinative:
. . . [C]ourts have often recognized that the first factor is traditionally of greater importance than the remaining three. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that when the proponent of the injunctive relief has no chance of success on the merits of the claim, the Court may dismiss the motion without considering the other three factors. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). Failure to do so is reversible error. See id.; Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).Stanley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. Corr., Case No. C2-02-178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21996, *8-9 (S.D. Ohio August 12, 2002) (J. Sargus) (denying motion for injunctive relief after evaluation only of chance of success on the merits factor).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's request for interim injunctive relief is based on his allegations that defendants have refused to allow him access to necessary legal materials and because of the feared loss and/or destruction of those materials. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants unlawfully placed him in segregation in retaliation for having engaged in litigation. Plaintiff's Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1. Turning to the first factor of the four-part test, the Court concludes that plaintiff has demonstrated little opportunity for success on the merits of these claims.
First, although prisoners enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), that right is not without limit, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explains that the constitutional right "is not a generalized right to litigate but a carefully-bounded right":
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). "Thus, a prisoner's right to access the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only." Id.
Plaintiff has identified three cases that he contends were impacted by defendants' actions: 1) a case in the Ohio Court of Claims based on allegations of negligence and defamation, Case No. 2006-02340; 2) a case in the Ohio Court of Claims based on allegations of defamation and property damage, Case No. 2006-01785; and 3) a case in the Ohio Court of Claims based on allegations of property damage, Case No. 2005-06813. See Exhibits B, C, D attached to Plaintiff's Reply. All three cases involve state tort claims against the ODRC, which do not, of course, trigger constitutional concerns. See Rodgers v. Hawley, 14 Fed. Appx. 403, 409 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Under Lewis and Thaddeus-X, any alleged prejudice regarding these two [tort] cases will not support a claim that [the plaintiff] was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts."). A prisoner simply "has no remedy under § 1983 to pursue tort claims against prison officials." Thomas v. Campbell, 12 Fed. Appx. 295, 297 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1454 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff attaches unauthenticated copies of documents from each of these cases; however, this Court has taken judicial notice of these three proceedings which are of record in the Ohio Court of Claims. See Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2006) ("we are authorized to `take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record'" citing Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980)).
Second, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not established that he has exhausted available administrative remedies with regard to either of the claims giving rise to his request for interim injunctive relief. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (" PLRA"), requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies available to the prisoner prior to filing an action in a federal court. The PLRA states in pertinent part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.Id. The plaintiff-prisoner bears the burden of proving that a grievance has been fully exhausted. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2002). Although exhaustion is not a jurisdictional predicate, it is nevertheless mandatory, Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999), even if proceeding through the administrative system would appear to the inmate to be "futile." Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1999). A prisoner must either attach "a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome." Knuckles-El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The reason for the requirement to show with specificity both the claims presented and the fact of exhaustion is so that the district court may intelligently decide if the issues raised can be decided on the merits."). Federal courts should not prematurely adjudicate the merits of a prisoner's claims until the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d, 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) ("a federal court should not prematurely `decide' the merits of any such action").
Plaintiff's claims of denial of access to the courts and retaliation are both grievable complaints but plaintiff has not established that he has exhausted these claims through available administrative procedures. These claims are therefore not properly before this Court. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) ("we hold that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."). See also Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Corr., Case No. 99-3521, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14083, *2, 4 (6th Cir. June 14, 2000) (affirming district court's dismissal for lack of exhaustion prisoner's claim of retaliatory placement in segregation); Evans v. Voorhies, Case No. 1:06-cv-629, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78166, *7-8 (S.D. Ohio October 26, 2006) (J. Dlott) (dismissing for, inter alia, failure to exhaust denial of access to courts claim where prisoner claimed "that his legal materials were confiscated for one month during his placement in the `hole' and that he lost a case by `default' in the Ohio Court of Appeals as a result"); Easley v. Collins, Case No. 1:06-cv-431, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65785, *14-15 (S.D. Ohio September 14, 2006) (J. Beckwith) (requiring exhaustion for denial of access to courts case where prisoner claimed prison officials "`stole' his legal materials which resulted in the dismissal of a criminal appeal"). The mere fact that other claims are presented in this action does not mean that plaintiff may effectively seek to expand his allegations to include unexhausted claims or that the Court may now properly become involved in the day-to-day interactions between plaintiff and prison administrators. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003) (purpose of the "exhaustion requirement is to provide states the first opportunity to resolve problems themselves"). Plaintiff will not be permitted to forgo required administrative procedures available to him and bring his grievances directly to this Court in the context of a motion for interim injunctive relief.
In short, plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim of denial of access to the courts or retaliation. He is therefore not entitled to the interim injunctive relief that he seeks.
With regard to plaintiff's request for oral argument pursuant the Local Rules of this Court, that request is DENIED. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.1(b)(2) (parties may apply to the Court for oral argument if "oral argument is deemed to be essential to the fair resolution of the case because of its public importance or the complexity of the factual or legal issues presented"). Oral argument would not be helpful in resolving the merits of plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief nor does the Court find it essential to the fair resolution of his motion. See id.; see also Whitescarver v. Sabin Robbins Paper Co., Case No. C-1-03-911, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51524, *7 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2006) (J. Dlott) ("Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) leaves the Court with discretion whether to grant a request for oral argument."). WHEREUPON Plaintiff's Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 56, is DENIED and plaintiff's request for oral argument is likewise DENIED.