Summary
denying motion for injunctive relief after evaluation of only chance of success on the merits factor
Summary of this case from Armstead v. BaldwinOpinion
Case No. C2-02-178
August 12, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Steven Stanley ("Stanley"), an Ohio prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has asserted a number of constitutional, statutory, and tort claims against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC") and a number of its officials and employees. Among them is a claim that the recent policy change imposing a $3.00 co-payment upon all prisoners seeking medical treatment is unconstitutional as applied to prisoners incarcerated before the change was enacted. Stanley filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction (file doc. #25) requesting the Court enjoin the imposition of the co-payment. The defendants have responded and Stanley has replied. The motion is now ripe for decision. For the following reasons, Stanley's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction will be denied.
I.
The facts necessary for decision of Stanley's motion are few. Stanley avers that he was convicted and sentenced in 1990. At that time, the ODRC provided free medical care to all prisoners. In 1997, however, the Ohio Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code § 5120.56, a financial responsibility statute that allows the ODRC to recover costs associated with the supervision and incarceration of criminal offenders. In particular, Ohio Rev. Code § 5120.56(D)(1) empowers the ODRC to impose a "user fee or copayment for services at a detention facility or housing facility, including, but not limited to, a fee or copayment for sick call visits." Id. (emphasis added). Pursuant to this grant of authority, the ODRC enacted Ohio Admin. Code 5120-5-13 effective March 16, 1998. This enactment provides that inmates either requesting or receiving healthcare services be assessed a $3.00 co-payment fee for the services provided, unless the services at issue fall within specifically exempted categories. See Ohio Admin. Code 5120-5-13(B). It also ensures that the inmates are aware of the charge, see id. at 5120-5-13(C), (E), and provides a mechanism for collection and for contesting the charge. See id. at 5120-5-13(C), (D). Finally, the regulation explicitly provides that every inmate will be provided "appropriate medical care based on . . . need," regardless of his or her ability to pay the $3.00 copayment at the time of treatment. See id. at 5120-5-13(A).
Stanley claims to suffer from a number of medical disorders and conditions, including hepatitis B and C, irritable bowel syndrome, ulcers, duodenitis, hiatal hernia, and severe esophageal reflux, all of which presumably require significant medical attention. He avers that the new regulation imposing the co-payment is an unconstitutional violation of the "retroactivity doctrine," which this Court will construe as a contention that the provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Furthermore, although not articulated in the complaint, he alleges in his instant motion that the provision violates the takings clause because "the payment fee is not only being unconstitutionally applied, but affect Plaintiffs' property interest, i.e., his personal account funds to support his personal maintenance." Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (file doc. #25) at 2 (errors in original). Although he insisted during two grievances that "he falls outside the purview of this policy and application. . . ." he contends that the defendants have refused to exempt him from the payments and continue to charge him for his medical care "at their whim." Id. at 2-3. He seeks a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent them from imposing the $3.00 co-payment upon him while his case proceeds to trial.
II.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 permits a party to a suit to seek injunctive relief if he believes he will suffer irreparable harm or injury while the suit is pending. In determining whether a grant of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is appropriate, the Court should consider: (1) the likelihood that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the action; (2) whether the party requesting the relief will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of relief; (3) the likelihood or extent that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the degree to which granting the injunction will advance the public interest. See. e.g., Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cty, 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001);Wonderland Shopping Center Venture Ltd. Partnership v. CDC Mortg. Capital, Inc., 274 F.3d 1085, 1097 (6th Cir. 2001); McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994). These four different considerations are not required elements of a conjunctive test but are rather factors to be balanced. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1099. In any case, "[t]he complaint or motion of the party seeking such relief must identify specific facts and reasons demonstrating the existence and extent of the immediate injury and why it is irreparable." City of Parma, Ohio v. Levi, 536 F.2d 133, 135 (6th Cir. 1976). "To show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the [party seeking the injunction] must show the likely existence of a constitutional violation causally related to the result sought to be enjoined." L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1985), quoting Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 1982).
III.
Turning to the first factor of the four-part test, the Court, upon review, finds that Stanley has virtually no opportunity for success on the merits of his underlying constitutional claim involving the imposition of the co-payment. First, the statute and corresponding regulatory provision at issue are simply not laws susceptible to ex post facto analysis. The Ex Post Facto Clause serves to prohibit federal or state legislatures from enacting any law that either increases the punishment for a crime or produces a sufficient risk of increased punishment beyond that imposed when the crime was committed. See U.S. CONST. Art I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law"); California Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 488, 504 (1995); Shabazz v. Gabry, 123 F.3d 909, 913 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the change undoubtedly occurred subsequent to Stanley's conviction, the imposition of a co-payment for medical services upon prisoners simply does not impose any additional punishment or risk of punishment. This argument is utterly without merit.
Second, Stanley's allegations fail to articulate any valid Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. While prisoners certainly have a property interest in their inmate accounts, see Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir. 1997), Stanley has not had his account "taken" by the state, the ODRC, or the named defendants without just compensation. Rather, he has exchanged this co-payment for medical services he has either desired or required, and it is likely that the value of the medical services received far exceeds the relatively small co-payment demanded. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 180 (3d Cir. 1997); Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding no due process claim arose when prisoners used personal funds to purchase postage "for value received"); Bailey v. Carter, 2001 WL 845446 at **4 (6th Cir. July 20, 2001) (holding Ohio's co-payment requirement raises no constitutional concerns). Furthermore, to the extent that Stanley attempts to contend that his illness(es) fall within some enumerated exception to the co-payment plan, he has provided the Court with no basis to make that determination, and, in any case, he has not contended that the post-deprivation procedure is inadequate. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, he fails to articulate any valid constitutional claim.
Although, as mentioned above, the four factors are to be balanced in determining whether a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should issue, courts have often recognized that the first factor is traditionally of greater importance than the remaining three.See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978)). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that when the proponent of the injunctive relief has no chance of success on the merits of the claim, the Court may dismiss the motion without considering the other three factors. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). Failure to do so is reversible error. See id.: Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, based on the determination that Stanley's underlying claims appear to lack merit, his request for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction will be denied.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Stanley's motion for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction (file doc. #25) is DENIED.