Summary
In Whitby School, Inc. v. Grenaille, supra, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 285, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment was granted because the plaintiff incorporated the allegations from its breach of contract claim into its claim for unjust enrichment.
Summary of this case from Bernard v. BuendiaOpinion
No. CV 03-0195602
December 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On June 11, 2003, the plaintiff, Whitby School, Inc., filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Christopher Grenaille and Julie Grenaille. This action arises out of contracts entered into by the plaintiff and defendants to enroll the defendants' daughters at the Whitby School, a private school in Greenwich, for the 2001-02 and 2002-03 school years.
Count one alleges that the plaintiff performed its contractual obligations and the defendants breached the contracts by failing to pay all monetary obligations owed under the contracts. Count two incorporates the allegations set forth in count one and further alleges that the defendants have been unjustly enriched because they failed to pay the plaintiff for benefits conferred. Count three incorporates the allegations contained in count one and two and also alleges the plaintiff is entitled to recover in quantum meruit.
On August 4, 2003, the defendants filed motion #102 to strike counts two and three of the complaint. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial." Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn. App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993). In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court reviews the complaint "construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 498.
The defendants move to strike counts two and three on the ground that "these [c]ounts rest on the premise that there is no operable contract and/or that the [p]laintiff has no remedy available pursuant to such a contract." In support of the motion to strike, the defendants claim that counts two and three are legally insufficient because express contracts are in dispute. The defendants maintain that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are appropriate remedies only when there is no remedy available under an operable contract. The defendants contend that the breach of contract disputes, therefore, preclude the plaintiff from. asserting unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.
Conversely, the plaintiff maintains that it is permissible to allege alternative and/or inconsistent theories of recovery. The plaintiff asserts that it is permissible to allege unjust enrichment and quantum meruit in the alternative to breach of contract.
The defendants further maintain that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are remedies, not causes of action, and, therefore, while the plaintiff may plead alternative causes of action, it may not plead alternative theories of remedy. In response, the plaintiff asserts that it has properly pleaded alternative theories of liability.
"Both unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are doctrines allowing damages or restitution, that is, the restoration to a party of money, services or goods of which he or she was deprived that benefit[t]ed another . . . Quantum meruit is usually a remedy based on implied contract and usually relates to the benefit of work, labor or services received by the party who was unjustly enriched, whereas unjust enrichment relates to a benefit of money or property . . . and applies when no remedy is available based on the contract . . . The lack of a remedy under a contract is a precondition to recovery based on unjust enrichment or quantum meruit." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Clearheart Construction Co., 71 Conn. App. 506, 512-13, 802 A.2d 901 (2002); see also Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 02 0188007 (December 6, 2002, Lewis, J.). "[W]hile a plaintiff may claim alternative relief based upon an alternative construction of the cause of action . . . pursuant to Practice Book § 10-26, alternative pleadings must be set forth in separate counts." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, supra. "Asserting both an express contract and claiming unjust enrichment [within the same count] is legally insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Where a plaintiff incorporates allegations of an express contract in a count alleging unjust enrichment, the claim for unjust enrichment cannot lie." Leshine v. Goodrich, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0448323 (May 15, 2003, Licari, J).
In Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0188007, the defendant moved to strike counts three and four of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Count three alleged quantum meruit, but also incorporated breach of contract allegations. Count four alleged recovery under unjust enrichment and incorporated all of the allegations contained in count three. This court granted the motion to strike count three "[b]ecause the absence of an express contract is a condition to recovery under a theory of quantum meruit . . ." This court also concluded count four was legally insufficient because it alleged both express contract and unjust enrichment within the same count.
Similarly, the plaintiff in the present case incorporates breach of contract allegations from count one within its unjust enrichment allegation in count two. The plaintiff, by incorporating these allegations, renders this count legally insufficient. The plaintiff, in the alternative, may plead unjust enrichment, but may not assert breach of contract and unjust enrichment within a single count.
The plaintiff also incorporates all of the allegations asserted in counts one and two into its quantum meruit allegation in count three. Following this court's reasoning in Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0188007, the plaintiff improperly alleges express contract and quantum meruit together in a single count. Count three, therefore, is also legally insufficient.
Therefore, the defendants' motion to strike counts two and three of the complaint is granted because these counts simultaneously allege either breach of express contracts and unjust enrichment or breach of express contracts and quantum meruit within a single count.
So Ordered.