Opinion
No. CV 04 4003054
July 20, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (#101) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
This action arises out of a car accident that occurred on August 22, 1998, between the plaintiff, Carla Bernard, and the defendant Cheryl Buendia.
On October 20, 2004, the plaintiff, Carla Bernard, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants, Cheryl Buendia and State Farm Fire And Casualty Insurance Company (State Farm).
State Farm is the only defendant who filed this motion to strike.
Count one alleges negligence when Buendia swerved into the center lane causing Bernard to lose control of her car and drive into the jersey barrier on the highway.
Count two alleges a claim of recklessness when Buendia did not attempt evasive action prior to swerving into Bernard's lane.
Counts Three through Six are directed against the defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (State Farm), the insurer of the plaintiff, Bernard.
Count three alleges that State Farm did not award Bernard monies she was entitled to under the uninsured motorist provision of her insurance policy.
Count four alleges that State Farm was unjustly enriched when it received a premium from the insurance policy and did not compensate Bernard.
Count five alleges breach of contract by State Farm when it failed to compensate Bernard.
Count six alleges that State Farm breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to compensate Bernard.
On November 23, 2004, State Farm filed a motion to strike counts four and six of the complaint. On March 30, 2005, Bernard filed an objection to State Farm's motion to strike and a memorandum of law.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003). In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court examines the complaint "construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378 (1997). "[T]he court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp, 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173 (2004). "On a motion to strike, the trial court's inquiry is to ascertain whether the allegations in each count, if proven, would state a claim on which relief could be granted . . . A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are not supported by the facts alleged." In re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119, 122, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 911 (2000).
State Farm moves to strike count four on the grounds that it fails as a matter of law because the claim lies in quasi-contract. State Farm maintains that unjust enrichment is an equitable claim which cannot be properly alleged in the same count as the existence of an express contract.
State Farm also moves to strike count six on the grounds that it does not give rise to a legally sufficient claim of bad faith. They argue that the count is "devoid of any allegations of wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence, dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, furtive design or ill will on the part of State Farm."
Bernard counters that State Farm was unjustly enriched to her financial detriment when it received a premium for insurance coverage and did not compensate her when she was injured. She further argues that State Farm promised that upon receiving her premium, it would provide her uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. She maintains that by failing to compensate her they acted in bad faith.
AS TO COUNT IV: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
"[An unjust enrichment claim] is an action in quasi contract, i.e. an obligation, arising by law, on which the same remedy is given as would be given if the obligation arose out of contract . . . Although the right of recovery is based on equitable principles, it is nevertheless an action at law, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment . . . The only remedy is in an award of money damages." Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn.App. 436, 441 (2003). "Unjust enrichment applies whenever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract . . . Indeed, lack of a remedy under the contract is a precondition for recovery based upon unjust enrichment. [Unjust enrichment] is a doctrine based on the postulate that it is contrary to equity and fairness for a defendant to retain a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff." Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 401 (2001). "[P]arties who have entered into controlling express contracts are bound by such contracts to the exclusion of inconsistent implied contact obligations . . . Proof of a contract enforceable at law precludes the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment . . . at least in the absence of a breach of the contract by the defendant . . ." . . ." Polverari v. Peatt, 29 Conn.App. 191, 199, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 913 (1992).
"Unjust enrichment is a very broad and flexible equitable doctrine that has as its basis the principle that it is contrary to equity and good conscience for a defendant to retain a benefit that has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff . . . The doctrine's three basic requirements are that (1) the defendant was benefitted, (2) the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and (3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiff's detriment . . . All the facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the circumstances render it just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, to apply the doctrine." (Citations omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 409, 766 A.2d 416 (2001).
"Under our pleading practice, a plaintiff is permitted to advance alternative and even inconsistent theories of liability against one or more defendants in a single complaint." Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 245 (1985). "[W]hile a plaintiff may claim alternative relief based upon an alternative construction of the cause of action . . . pursuant to Practice Book § 10-26, alternative pleadings must be set forth in separate counts . . . Asserting both an express contract and claiming unjust enrichment [within the same count] is legally insufficient . . . Where a plaintiff incorporates allegations of an express contract in a count alleging unjust enrichment, the claim for unjust enrichment cannot lie." Whitby School, Inc. v. Grenaille, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 03 0195602 (December 29, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 285, 286).
"A party may, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-25, plead in the alternative . . . however, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-26, alternative pleadings must be set forth in separate counts." (Citations omitted.) Berman Sable v. National Loan Investors, LP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X06 CV 000167145 (January 16, 2002, McWeeny, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 272).
In Whitby School, Inc. v. Grenaille, supra, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 285, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment was granted because the plaintiff incorporated the allegations from its breach of contract claim into its claim for unjust enrichment. In the present case, Bernard has incorporated breach of contract allegations from count three into her unjust enrichment allegations in count four. By incorporating the allegations, Bernard has rendered the count legally insufficient. Accordingly, State Farm's motion to strike count four is hereby granted.
AS TO COUNT VI: IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
"The common law implies into every contract . . . a covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Jones v. H.N.S. Management Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 0471419 (September 17, 2004, Levin, J.). "[T]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been applied . . . in a variety of contractual relationships, including . . . insurance contracts . . . The concept of good faith and fair dealing is [e]ssentially . . . a rule of construction designed to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties as they presumably intended." Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 207 Conn. 179, 190 (1988). "[T]he examination of good faith and fair dealing in the settling of an insurance claim requires a case-by-case analysis." Id. "It is axiomatic that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship . . . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party's discretionary application or interpretation of a contract . . . [T]he existence of a contract between the parties is a necessary antecedent to any claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing." Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc., 252 Conn. 789, 793 (2000).
"[E]very contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 424, 432 (2004). "The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is breached, when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured." Lawrence v. Commodore Commons Condominium Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 98 063281 (September 8, 2000, Curran, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr 56, 57-58). "To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith . . . Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive . . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, 269 Conn. 433.
"This doctrine is a guide toward interpreting contracts, not a free-standing cause of action to be applied in the absence of a contract." Plotkin v. Barot, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV 97 0162347 (December 7, 2001, Hodgson, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 113, 121).
"The lynchpin of a bad faith claim is a state of mind characterized by an intent to mislead or deceive or defraud." Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV04 4000582 (January 26, 2005, Sheedy J.).
"[C]ourts have stressed that such a claim must be alleged in terms of wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence for, punitive damages may be awarded only for outrageous conduct, that is, for acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others . . . In order to make [such a claim] the plaintiff must allege that the defendant did more than simply deny the plaintiff's claim for benefits." Grant v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 95 321277 (January 16, 1996, Hauser, J.) ( 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 49, 51).
In the present case, Bernard has failed to allege facts that demonstrate that State Farm acted in bad faith. She has alleged only that she made a claim for uninsured motorist's coverage and that State Farm "unreasonably and in bad faith" failed to compensate her. She has not alleged any facts that demonstrate that State Farm did more than deny her claim. The statements made are conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant State Farm's motion to strike count six is hereby granted.
By the Court,
Joseph W. Doherty, Judge